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A11  Rigtls reserved PREFACE, 
IN  bringing  out  the first  volume  of  a  History  of  Mediaval 
Pohtlcal Theory, it  may be well to indicate briefly the character 
of  the  work  which  we  hope  to carry  out.  In this volume 
we  deal  with  the elements  out  of  which  the more  developed 
theory  of  the  Middle  Ages  arose;  we  hope  to carry on  the 
work  to  the  political  theorists  of  the  sixteenth  and  early 
seventeenth  centuries-that  is,  to  the  time  when,  as  it  is 
thought, the specific characteristics  of  modern  political  theory 
began  to take shape. 
The  subject  with  which  we  are  endeavouring  to  deal  is 
strictly  a  history  of  theory,  not  of  institutions.  We believe, 
indeed,  that in the Middle  Ages,  as at other  times,  the  two 
things  are  closely  related  to  each  other,-that  theory  never 
moves  very  far  away  from  the  actual  conditions  of  public 
life;  but  yet  the  two  things  are  distinct,  if  not  separate. 
The  principles  which  lie behind  the development of  political 
institutions  are  sometimes  the  subject  of  careful  reflection, 
sometimes  are  hardly  apprehended;  but  in  either  case  they 
are  to be  distinguished  from  any  particular  concrete  forms 
in  which  they  may  be  embodied.  We  have,  indeed,  been 
compelled frequently to examine the institutions of  the Middle 
Ages, but  we  have done this only  in order  to  draw  out more 
clearly  the  character  of  the  theories  which  were  actually vi  PREFACE. 
current  among  those  who  reflected  on the nature of  political 
life. 
We are very  conscious of  the  fact  that in the  attempt  to 
deal  with  a  subject  which  extends  over  so  many  centuries 
it is probable  that we  have  made  many  mistakes,  and  have 
been  guilty  of  many  omissions.  We can  scarcely  hope  that 
we  have  succeeded  in  discovering  or  understanding  every 
important  reference  to  political  theory, and we  shall  bo  very 
grateful  to  any  one  who  may  enable  us  to  supplement  or 
correct  our judgment  upon  any  aspect  of  the subject. 
PREFACE  TO VOLUME  I, 
WHILE  1 am  alone  responsible  for the judgments  which  are 
expressed  in this volume, it would  have  been  impossible  for 
me  to  prepare  it  without  the  work  which  my  brother  has 
already  completed  on  the political  literature of  the eleventh, 
twelfth,  and  thirteenth  centuries.  I  must  express  my  in- 
debtedness first  of  all to  my  friend  the Rev. J. M.  Schulhof, 
M.A., of Clare  College, Cambridge, and Exeter College, Oxford, 
who  has read  through the whole  of  the proofs,  and to whose 
learning  and  careful  correction  I owe  the removal  of  many 
serious  mistakes.  But I must  also  express  my  most  sincere 
gratitude to Mr A. J. Greenidge, Lecturer in Ancient  History 
at Brasenose  and  Hertford  Colleges,  Oxford,  who  has  read 
the ploofs  of  Parts I.  and  11.  of  this  volume;  to  the  Rev. 
F.  E.  Brightman,  Fellow  of  Magdalen  College,  Oxford,  who 
has  read  most  of  Part 111.;  to Mr H. W.  C.  Davis, Fellow 
and  Tutor of  Balliol  College, Oxford, who  has read  Part IV.; 
and to the Rev. J. N.  Figgis,  formerly  Chaplain  and Lecturer 
of  St  Catharine's  College,  Cambridge,  who  has  read  a  large 
part  of  the  work.  These  gentlemen  are  not  responsible  in 
any degree  for the judgments  expressed  in this volume, but 
I  am  under  great  obligations  to them  for  many  important 
 correction^ and suggestions. 
A.  J.  CARLYLE. CONTBNTS  OF  THE  FIRST  VOLUME. 
PART  I 
INTRODUCTION. 
CHAPTER  I 
THE  POLITICAL THEORY  OF  CICERO 
Continuity of  anc~elit  and modern  politlcal  theory,  l-Clcero  and Seneca as 
replesenti~~g  the pohtical theory of  the later Republlc and early Emp~re,  3 
--C~cero's theory of  justice and natural laa, 4-his  dogmatlc assertion  of 
equal~ty  of  human nature, 6-ongin  of  the State, 13-definit~on  of  the 
State, and meanlng  of  political  I~berty,  14-sumnlary  of  the more  im 
portant aspects  of  Clcero's  pohtical  theoly,  17 
CHAPTER  I1 
THE  POLITICAL  THEORT  OF  SENECA. 
General simila~~ty  to that of  C~cero,  19-the  equality  of  human nature, and 
lts relation to slave~y,  20-contrast  between  the convent~oual  and  the 
pnmitlve conditions of  society, the state of  nature, 23-the  relatlon of  the 
wlse man to the State, 25-the  theory of  llherty and the best go\eiument, 
29-the  dlv~ile  soulce of  poht~cal  authorltj ,  30. 
PART  11. 
THB POLITICAL THEORY OF THE  KOh5AN  LAWYEXS. 
CHAPTER  I11 
TIIE  THEORY  OF  THE LAW OF KATURE 
The Digest  and  Inst~tutes  of  Justnilan  and  thew  mflaence  on  medieval 
politlcal  theory,  33-Galus'  theory  of  the  ?us genttn~m, 36-dist~nction 
between  the jus  naturale  and  the jua  yentzum in Ulpian and others,  39- 
relat~on  of thls distlnct~on  to the theory of  a state of  nature, 42 CONTENTS.  CONTEXTS. 
CHAPTER  IV. 
PART  111. 
BLAVERY  AND  PROPERTY. 
Theory of  the natural eqnality and liberty of  human nature, 45-the  limitation 
of  rlghts of  masters over  slaves, 48-the  origin of  property, 51-private 
property  a  natural  and  priulltive  institution,  62-doubtful  posltion  of 
Heluogeuiauus,  63. 
CHAPTER  V. 
TEE THEORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  LAW. 
aaius and Marcianus  hold  that clvil  law  1s  the application  of  the general 
principles of  justice to the circumstances of  a part~cular  community, 55- 
Ulplan's  definitions of  jzu  and jurzs prudentpa represent the same concep 
tion, 57-ambiguous  phiases of 1Jlp11n and Paulus, 58-the  theory of  the 
jurists the sanie as that of  Cicero and the Stoics, 61 
CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  SOURCE  OF  POLITICAL  AUTHORITY. 
l'he theory of  the jurists and the social contract, 63-Ulpian  S phrase deriv~ng 
the authority of  the Emperor from the Roman 21opulus represents the vlew 
of  the junsta  from  the second  century  to  the sixth, 64Julianus, 64- 
Gaius, 65-Pomponius,  66-A4arcianus  and Papluian, 68-Theodosius  and 
Valentinian,  69-Justinian,  69-divme  source  of  authority  of  govern- 
ment, 69. 
CHAPTER  VII. 
rhe Institutes enable us to judge of  the permanent  tendencies  of  the Roman 
jurisprudence,  '11-the  theory of  the pis naturale and the gua gentzum, 71 
-theory  of  the primitive  state,  75-slaveiy,  property,  civil law,  source 
of  polltical  authonty, 76-summary  of  the  most  impoltant  elements in 
the political  theory  of  the jurists,  77. 
THE  POLITICAL THEORY  OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT  AND 
THE  FATHERS. 
CHAPTER  VIII. 
THE POLITICAL  TIlEORY  OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT 
Need  of  care In estimating the influence of  Chr~st~anlty  on polltical theory, 81 
-theoly  of  the natural  law,  82-the  equality  of  human  nature,  83- 
theoly  of  slavery, 85-the  divlne  character and the end of  government, 
89 -relation  of  the  Christian  Church  to the Empire,  91 -anarchical 
elements in prlmitlve Christianity, 93-relation  of  the Christian theory of 
the State to the philosophical, 97-theory  of  prxvate property, 98. 
CHAPTER  IX 
NATURAL  LAW 
Poltt~cal  theory of  the Fathers m  the main homogeneous,  102-natural  law 
in  the  Fathe~s  has the same character as in Cicero,  102-they  connect 
thls wlth St Paul's phrases m the Epistle to the Romans, 105-St  Isidore 
adopts  the distinction  between  the ?us naturale  and  the jua  gentturn. 
thlough hl~n  this passes Into the theory of  the Middle Ages,  106 
CHAPTER  X. 
NATURAL  EQUALITY  AND  SLAVERY 
The Fathers in the maln carry on the conceptions  of  the New Testament and 
the  contemporary  philosophers,  Ill-summary  of  this  In  a  passage  of 
Ambrosiaster, 112-men  are by  nature free and equal, 114-this  equality 
and freedom in one sense permanent,  the soul is always free, 115-slavery 
is not unlawful, ~t is caused by sin, and is a system of remedial discipline, 
116-the  Church recognises and sanctions the existence of  slavery, 120- 
masters are responslMe for the spiritual wellbemg  of  then slaves, 123- 
~nflnence  of  the Church continues  to mitigate the hardships  of  slavery, 
123 
CHAPTER  XI. 
NATURAL  EQUALITY  AND  GOVERNMENT. 
Man is by nature soclable, 125-  coerclve  government of  miln  by  man is not 
natural  or  primitive,  126-this  ia  the consequence  of  sin,  aud  a divme 
remedy for sln, 128 xli  CONTENTS.  xiii 
CHAPTER  XII. 
THE  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY. 
Uncertainty  as to theory  of  early Fathe~s,  132-later  Fathers treat pr~vate 
property as lawful, but not prlmlt~\e  or natu~al,  135-l~m~t~tion  of  nghts 
of  p~operty,  almsglv~ng  an act of  justice, not of  chanty, 137-~elat~on  of 
thls concept~on  to the theory of  property  In  St Thomas  Aqu~nas,  139- 
St Augustine's treatment of  pr~vate  propelty,  an instltut~on  of  poslt~ve 
human  law,  139-St  Is~do~e  of  Seville's treatment of  pr~vate  property, 
lnterpretatlon  uncerta~n,  142-summary  of  patrist~c  theory  of  slavery, 
government,  and property in relatlon  to dlstinctlon between the natural 
and the conventional state, 144 
Clrurch  d~sputes,  179-St  Ambrose's  treatment  of  subject,  clvll  luler 
subject  to Chu~ch  dlscipllne,  180-c1v11  ruler  has  no  jnr~sdlct~on  In 
splntual  matters,  182-right3  of  Church  property,  182-definlt~on  of 
relat~ons  of  Church  and  State  In  fifth  century,  184-Emperor  has  no 
author~ty  In spiritual matte~s,  and 1s  subject to Church authorlty In such 
th~ngs,  186-defin~t~ons  of  Pope  Gelaslus  I ,  190-the  anthontiea  of 
Church  and State are d~v~ne,  CO oldinate,  and  each Independent  of  the 
other In ~ts  own sphere, subject In the sphere of  the other,  191 
PART  IV. 
THE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  IHE NINTH  CENTURY. 
CHAPTER  XI11 
TRB SACRED  AUTHORITY  OF  THE  RULER. 
The clv11 ruler  the representatme of  God, 147-Ambroalaster's  phrase,  the 
Vlcar  of  God,"  149-he  1s  God's  ~epresentat~ve  whether  he  is just  or 
unjust,  150-St  G~egory  the Great and the theory of  the ''Dlvlne  R~ght," 
l52 -  quest~on  whethe1  th~s  theory  ~nfluenced St Gregory's  conduct 
towards the Emperor, 153--c~rcumstances under whzch the theory grew 
np ;  anarchls~n  In early Chnstlan soc~et~es,  157-pat~onage  of  the Church 
by Constantine  and his  successols, 158-~nfluence  of  Old Testament con 
cept~on  of  the L'L~rd's  ano~nted,"  158. 
CHAPTER  XIV 
AUTHORITI  AND  JUSTICE. 
The normal view of  the Fdthers, the end of  the State 1s justlce,  161-emphat~c 
asse~tzon  of  this by St Ambiose, 162-St  Augustme's theory of  the State, 
164-ellmlnates  the eleiilents of  law and justl~e  from Clcero's defin~t~on  of 
the State, 165-St  Augustme s vlew does rrot represent the normal theory 
of  the  Fathers,  nor  has  ~t much  ~nfluence  on  the Mlddle Ages,  168- 
Cass~odorus  laqs much s.tress on jushce,  170-St  Is~dore's  definit~on  of  the 
State agrees w~tli  C~ce~o's,  171-h~s  clear  dlstlnct~on  between  the king 
and the tyiant, 152-the  theory of  just~ce  counteracts that of  the "Dlvlne 
Rlght,"  174 
CHAPTER  XV. 
THE  THEORY  OR  1Hh  XELAllOh  OI  CHURCH  AND  SPATE. 
Kelatlon  of  th~s  subject  to polit~cal  theory,  li5-convers~on  of  Constantlne 
made the snbject ~mportaiit,  176-normally  churchmen refuse to recognise 
any authorlty of secular ~uler  In Church matters (Rufinus, Hoslus, Luclfer 
of  Caghan), 176-ambiguous phrases of  Optatus and Ambroslaster, 178- 
persecution  d~d  actually  tend  to  make  the secular  ruler  an arblter In 
CHAPTER  XVI 
NATURAL  EQUALITY  AND SLAVERY 
Comnarison of  the character of  polltlcal theo~y  of  n~nth  century wlth that of 
the Fathers, 195-equallty  of  liuman  nature, 199-theo~y  of  slaveiy the 
same as that of  the Fathers, 201-emphat~c  sanct~on  of  slave~y  by Church 
In the Illnth century, 204-mfloence  of  the Chu~ch  cont~~lues  to make for 
mlt~gatlon  of  cond~tlons or  sla\.e~j, 208 -  Smaragdus  Abbas  deslles 
aboht~on  of  slavery,  208 
CHAPTER  XVII. 
THE  DIVINE  AUTHORITY  OF THE  KING 
Covernlnent  a  consequence  of  sln,  but  a  dlvlne  mst~tutlon,  210-ongln  of 
soclety and the State, 211-Hmcmar  of  Rheims, &C., on d~vlne  nature of 
civil  power,  212-slgn~ficance  of  phrases,  "Kmg  by  divine glace,"  &c 
and of  consecration of  klngs and emperors  214-the  k~ng  1s  the "V~car 
of God," 215-rebell~on  against the klng 1s rebelhon agalnst God, 216 
CHAPTER  XVIII. 
THE  THEORY  OF  THE  KING  AND  JUSTICE 
The wrlte~s  of  the mnth century use the language of  St Glegory the Great, 
but  the11  actual  theory  of  the  State 1s  different,  219-influence  of  St 
Isldo~e's  definltlon  of  the k~ng  and  the tyrant,  221-influence  of  the 
treat~se,  'De Duodecim  Abus~vls  Sacull,'  222-pol~tlcal  treat~ses  of  the 
century  largely  made  up  of  admonitions  to  the  klng  to follow  after 
lustlce, 22Pstrong phrases of  Hlncmar of  Rhe~ms  and Seduhus Scotus, 
227 xiv  CONTEXTS. 
CHAPTER  XIX 
THE  KIKQ  AND  THE  LAW. 
Justice  embodiect in  the law, 229-Hincmar  of  Rheims looks upon  the king 
as bound  by  the law,  230-the  law in the niuth century  is  the law  of 
the nation,  not merely  of  the king:  difference  between  this conception 
and  that  of  Roman  jurists,  234-formule  of  legislation  in  the ninth 
century, 236-"Quonlam  lex consensu populi et constitutlone regis fit," 
238. 
CHAPTER  XX. 
THE  THEORY  Olp  ThE SOURCE  AND  CONDITIONS  OF  AUTHORITY 
IN  THE  STATE. 
Theory of  sncression and election in  the ninth century, 240-an  apparently 
doubtful  case,  the  "Divisio  Regnorum"  of  Charles  the Great,  241- 
normal  arrangement  of  ninth century, election with mutual promises  of 
king and people, 242-this  almost amounts to a  compact  in some cases, 
244-renewals  of  these  statements  of  mutual  obligation  in  times  of 
trouble, 246-notion  that the king may be compelled to keep his promises, 
248-deposition  of  emperor or king, 250. 
THE  RELATION  OF THE  AUTHORITIEI  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE. 
The theory of the ninth century founded on the definitions of  Pope Gelasius I, 
253-important  comments on these, 255-conlplexity  of  actual relations of 
the two authorities in the ninth century, 257-good  illustration of  con- 
sequent complexity of  theory in Sedulius and Cathulfus, 258-illustrations 
of authority of  civil ruler over ecclesiastics :  the king the "Vicar  of  God " 
in the government of  His Church  (this implies responsibility of  king for 
good order in the Church), 261-this  extends apparently in some sense to 
papacy,  263-authority  of  the  king  in summoning  synods  and  issuing 
canons, 265-authority  of  the king In appointment of  ecclesiastics, 267- 
relation  of  the Emperor to papal elections,  271-illustrations  of  authority 
of  ecclesiastica  over civil ruler ;"the Bishops, the "  Vicars of  God," have 
authority  over  men  of  every rank, 273-the  king subject to the canon 
law:  nature of  its authority, 275-emperor  and king subject  to excom- 
munication, 278-authority  of  ecclesiastics in protection of  the oppressed, 
280-authority  of  Popes and bishops  in appointment  and  deposition  of 
kings and emperors, importance of  unction, 282-the  theory of  the ninth 
century  remains  that  the  two  powers  were  independent,  287 -the 
''  Donation " of  Constantine misunderstood  in later middle ages ;  its real 
purpose  probably  was  to  secure  reversion  of  Byzantine  territories  in 
Italy to the Pope,  287-general  summary of  the political theory of  the 
ninth  century,  290. 
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CHAPTER  I. 
THE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF CICERO. 
BETWEEN  the  active  and  profound  political  thought  of  Plato 
and Aristotle and the energetic  political  speculation  of  modern 
times there lies a great interval of  time and an almost  equally 
great interval of  character.  It  has  often  been  thought  that 
between  these  periods  there was no such thing as a living and 
active  political  theory.  It has  been  thought  that  with  the 
disappearance of  the free Greek communities political  specula- 
tion  became wholly abstract and lifeless ; that the freedom  of 
men's  political  tliought  was first  crushed by the weight  of  the 
great  empires,  and then  lost  in the confusion  of  the barbaric 
invasions in wkrich  the ancient  civilisation  perished,  and that 
in  the  sixteenth  century political  theory  arose  suddenly  arid 
willlout  any  immediate  antecedents,  Leing  grounded  in  part 
upon  original reflection,  abstract  or  relatecl  to  actual  political 
conditions,  and in part on  the recovery of  ancient pllilosophy. 
Such judgments, we are aware, have  long ceased  to be  held 
by those who have any acquaintance with  the characteristics of 
mediaeval  thought,  and  have  been  corrected  by  the work  of 
several writers,  especially in England  by  Mr  R. L.  Poole  in 
his '  Illustrations  of  Medizval Tllought ' ; but they  still  con- 
tinue  to  affect the judgmeut  of  inany, and even those wlio are 
VOL.  I.  A aware  that  in  the  Middle  Ages  political  thought  was  both 
active  and  closely  related  to the actual conditions  of  society 
have  yet  no  very  clear  conception  of  the  relations  of  the 
medizval theory to the ancient, or of  the dependence of  modern 
theory upon the meclizval. 
We think  that  the  conception  of  the  disappearance  of  a 
living  political  theory  in  the  Middle Ages  is  fundamentally 
wrong, and that the more  closely  the political  conceptions of 
the Middle Ages  are examined, the more clear will  it become 
that there is no such gulf  between  ancient and modern political 
thought as has been  imagined.  There are, no doubt, profound 
differences  between  the  ancient  mode  of  thought  and  the 
modern,-the  civilisation of  the ancient world  is very different 
from  that  of  the modern;  but, just  as it  is now  recognised 
that modern  civilisation  has  grown  out  of  the  ancient, even 
so we think it will be  found  that modern  political  theory  has 
arisen by  a  slow  process  of  development  out of  the  political 
theory  of  the ancient  world,-that,  at least from the lawyers 
of  the second  century to  the theorists  of  the French Revolu- 
tion,  the history  of  political  thought  is continuous,  changing 
in form, modified  in content, but still the same  in its funda- 
mental conceptions. 
TVe  are indeed  conscious  of  the fact that between  Aristotle 
and the Roman Lawyers there are profound differences, and we 
would  suggest  that if  there  did  exist  anywhere a  real  break 
in the  continuity  of  political  thought,  it would  be  found  to 
lie here.  We feel, indeed,  that the inquiry on which  we  are 
setting out should have  begun with the successors of  Aristotle 
and Plato, and that there is thus an important omission  in our 
discussion.  But the subject of  the later forms of  Greek Phil- 
osophy  is one which  can  only be  adequately handled  by  tliose 
who  are  inti~nately  acquainted  with  the  greater  philosophic 
literature of  Greece, and we can scarcely pretend  to this know- 
ledge.  We hope that some philosophic scholar will before long 
undertake this task ; and we anticipate  that under such a care- 
ful investigation  much  which  is  at  present  obscure  in  the 
transitions  of  thought  will  be  explained, and  tlrat,  while  the 
fact  of  a  great  change  in  poliLical  theory  during  these  cen- 
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turies will remain clear, the process  of  thought by which these 
changes  came  about will  be  found  capable  of  explanation. 
The  political  theory of  the Middle Ages is founded upon the 
theory represented  by the Roman  Lawyers from  the second to 
the sixth century, and by the Christian Fathers from the second 
to  the  seventh  century,  while it is modified  by  the  constitu- 
tional traditions and customs of  the Teutonic races.  We there- 
fore have to begin our work with an examination of  the political 
theory  of  the Roman  Lawyers.  We shall  next  consider  the 
political  theory  of  the Fathers, endeavouring  to estimate  the 
influence of  distinctively Christian conceptions upon this.  But 
before dealing with these subjects we must make some inquiry 
as  to the antecedents of  these  political  conceptions.  A  com- 
plete  examination of  these  would  involve  that careful  study 
of  the cliaracter  of  the post-Aristotelian philosophy  of  which 
we  have  spoken.  In the  absence  of  this  we  must  content 
ourselves with an examination of  one  or two  Latin writers in 
whom we  can, as it appears  to us, trace  the development of  a 
good  many of  the characteristic conceptions of  the Lawyers and 
the Fathers.  Cicero has left to us in the fragments of  the 'De 
Republica'  and in his  treatise '  De Legibus '  a very interesting 
and significant account of  the political theory fashionable in the 
first  century before  our  era; while  Seneca's  writings  serve  to 
illustrate  some  general  tendencies  of  political  thought  one 
hundred  years later.  With the assistance of  these writers we 
can  in some  measure  reconstruct  the general  outlines  of  the 
political  conceptions  which  influenced  the  Lawyers  and  the 
Fathers.  We can at least learn from  them  the cornmonplaces 
of political philosophy in their days, the notions current among 
the educated men of  the period. 
Cicero  is  a  political writer  of  great  interest, not because he 
-. 
possesses  any great originality of  mind, or any great power  of 
political  analysis, but rather  becanse, in the eclectic fashion  of 
an amateur philosopher, he sums up  the commonplaces  of  the 
political theory of his time.  We feel in reading him that, while 
he has no special contribution of  his own to make to philosophy, 
he  is really as interesting  to us  as if he  had  been  able  to do CHAP,  I.]  THE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF CICERO.  5 
this.  For, when  we  read  him,  we  feel  that we  learn  not  so 
much  what  Cicero  thought as  what  was  generally  current in 
his  time; we learn how  the honourable  and right-minded  and 
reasonably  intelligent  politician  of  his  time  tended  to think, 
what were the conceptions which the public of  that time would 
have  applauded as being just  and edifying with regard to the 
nature of  society and the principles underlying social relations. 
We find these ideas expressed not in any very profound fashion, 
but  with  grace,  with  considerable  clearness  at least  on  the 
surface, and with an abundant and often  impressive rhetorical 
eloquence. 
Among  the  fragments  of  Cicero's  'Republic'  which  St 
Augustine has preserved  for us in the 'De Civitate Dei' none 
is more  important than  a  passage  which comes, he says, from 
the end of  the second  book  of  the (Republic.'l  He tells  us 
that  in  Cicero's  Dialogue  Philus  requests  that  the  subject 
of  justice  sl~ould  be  carefully  discussed,  especially  because  it 
was  a  conlmon  saying of  the  time  that  injustice  was  neces- 
sarily  involved  in  the  administration  of  the  commonwealth. 
Scipio agrees to do this, and lays it down  that no progress  can 
be made with  the discussion  of  the nature  of  the  State until 
it is recognised, not  only that  the popular  saying is false, but 
rather that the truth is that it is iinpossible  for  the State to 
have any existence at all unless it is founded  upon  and repre- 
sents  the highest  justice.  It is this conception  which  is ex- 
pressed  in the definition  of  the State propounded by Scipio : 
"Res publica, res populi,  populus autem  non  oinnis hominum 
coetus quoql~o  mod0  congregatus, sed  coetus nlultitudinis juris 
consensu  et utilitatis  communione  sociatus."  The  common- 
wealth is the affair  of  the people,  but the people  is not  any 
assemblage  of  men,  gathered  together  in any fashion,  but  a 
gathering  of  the multitude  united  together  under  a  common 
law and in the enjoyment  of  a  common  wellbeing. 
Augustine  in  another passage  comments  on this definition, 
and asserts that Cicero defines the meaning of  "  juris consensu " 
when  he  says  that  the  State  cannot  exist  without  justice: 
1  Be Civ. Dei, ii. 21 ; Cicero, De Rep.,  i;. C3.  u4. 
De Rep., i. 25.  39. 
where  there is no justice  there can be nojus, and therefore no 
pqultu, but only a multitude which is not worthy of  the name 
of popt~lus.l  On these grounds, he elsewhere says, Cicero main- 
tained that when the government is unjust, whether  n tyranny, 
an oligarchy, or a democracy, there is no yes  pz~blica  at all; an 
unjust  government  is  not  merely  evil  and injurious,  but de- 
stroys the very  being  of  the  State.2 
Justice  is,  then,  the fouudation  of  law  and  of  organised 
society, and Cicero  is concerned  to explain  that he  means  by 
justice  something which is wholly independent in its character 
of the consent of  man.  Cicero appears to have cited Carneades 
as maintaining  that laws  only arise out  of  the experience of 
utility, and that thus they continually vary in different  places 
and times; that there is no  such  thing as jws  naturale;  that, 
properly  speaking, there  is  no  such  thing  as justice,  or else 
that justice  is  mere foolishness, and the only source of  virtue 
is  human  agreernen~~  Cicero  is  as much  shocked  at these 
sentiments as any moclern  politician  of  respectable  character 
would be, and denounces the theory of  utility as the fonndation 
of  justice with much warmth and eloquence.  It  is not utility 
but nature which is the source of  justice and law.4  Cicero is 
clearly maintaining the same view of  justice  as that of  Chry- 
sippus and the other Stoics as cited by Stobzus  and Plutarch? 
in opposition to the theory of  Epicurus  and such thinkers  as 
Carneades,  who  maintained  that justice  was  the  name  for  a 
convention  devised  among men  for the advancement of  their 
own  utility. 
Justice  is a principle of  nature, a principle which lies behind 
all the order of  the world, the expression  of  a  universal  prin- 
ciple or law of nature-the  ultimate  principle  behind  all law. 
Lactantius has preserved  for  us  a  passage  from  the 'De  Re- 
publica,'  in  which  Cicero  has  with  some  real  eloquence  de- 
scribed this.  There is a law  which  is the same as true reason 
accordant  with  nature,  a  law  which  is  constant  and  eternal, 
l  De Civ.,  xix.  21.  ii. 18. 
De Civ.,  ii. 21.  StoLzus, Ecl., ii.  184. 
Lacbntius,  Div.  Inst.,  v.  17 ;  Plutarch, De Stoic.  Rep., Q. 
Cicero,  De Rep.,  iii.  12.  21.  Diog. Laert.,  X.  150.  " De Leg., i.  14.-16.  Cf. De Fin~bus, 6  INTRODUCTION.  [PART I. 
which  calls and commands to duty, which  warns  and terrifies 
men  from  the practice  of  deceit.  This law  is not  one  thing 
at Rome, another at Athens, but is eternal  and immutable, the 
expression  of  the command  and sovereignty  of  God.'  In his 
treatise  on  laws,  Cicero  carefully  points  out  that  all  civil 
law  is but  the expression  or  application  of  this  eternal  law 
of  nature.  That  which  is  not  derived  from  it  may  have 
the formal  character  of  law but not  its true character.  The 
people  or the prince  may make  laws, but they have not the 
true character of  jus  unless  they are derived from the ultimate 
law.  The original  source  and  the foundation  of  jz~s  must  be 
studied in that supreme law which came into being ages  before 
any State exi~ted.~ 
It  is important,  we  think, to observe  with  some  care  this 
emphatic exposition of  the principle and character of  the law 
of  nature.  Cicero's  treatment  may  leave  a  good  deal  to  be 
desired  in  point  of  clear  analysis,-we  may  indeed  doubt 
whether  Cicero  had  himself  a  clear  conception of  the subject 
with  which  he is dealing.  But we  think  that  we  have  said 
enough  to show  both  the importance of  the theory of  natural 
law in the current philosophical system with which Cicero was 
in sympathy, and also  the close  relation of  this conception to 
the theory of  justice.  The theory  of  natural law is to  Cicero 
the form of  the theory of  justice  in society, and it is also  the 
groundwork upon which the whole  structure of  human society 
rests.  Human  society  is  founded  upon  nature;  its  cause  is 
"  naturalis quaedam  honiinum  quasi  congregatio." 
We nlay  feel that  while  Cicero's  treatment  of  the law  of 
nature represents a stronger einl~hasis  upon the conception than 
that which  is cliaracteristic  of  older  thinkers,  he does not do 
much more than develop conceptions which belonged  to them. 
It  is very different  with  the subject which  we  must next con- 
sider, Cicero's  theory of  human  nature and its relation to the 
institutions  of  society. 
1 Lactantius,  Dir. Inst.,  vi.  8 ; De  42 ;  16. 45.  Cf. De Leg.,  ii. 4. 
Itep., iii.  22  3  De Rep., i. 25.  39. 
qe  Leg., i. 6.  19,  20 ;  10. 28 ;  15, 
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There is no  conception  which  is  more  fundamental  to the 
Aristotelian  theory  of  society  than  the notion  of  the natural 
inequality  of  liuinan  nature.  Upon  this  turns  not  only  his 
theory of  slavery but also his theory of  Government.  To Aris- 
totle the institlition  of  slavery is a necessary condition of  civil- 
ised life and of  a civilised social order, and it is natural, because 
there are some men so inferior  to their fellows as to be  natur- 
ally servile.  And again, to Aristotle the government  of  civil- 
ised society is always the expression of  the superiority of  some 
men  over  others.  The most  ideal governilzent  is that of  the 
best man over his inferiors, next to that is the government of 
the aristocracy ;  but even his ideal commoilwealth is the rule of 
a small body  of  citizens, approximately equal in capacity  and 
education, over  a  great  unenfranchised multitude of  inferiors, 
mechanical persons and slaves.  It  is a  presupposition  of  his 
commonwealth  that there should be  a  reasonable  equality  of 
virtue and capacity among  all the citizens, or at least such a 
measure  of  it  as, under  a  careful system of  public  education, 
will  render  every  citizen  moderateIy  competent  for  the  dis- 
charge of  public  duties.  But this equality is confined  to the 
small body  of  the citizens:  the great majority  of  the persons 
included  in  the  comnlonwealth  are  wholly  inferior  to  the 
citizens and incompetent for the responsibilities of  public duty. 
By nature some men are fit  for rule, others only for subjection. 
There is a naturally servile class, possessing  only a small share 
of  reason,  enough  only  to  render  obedience  to  the developed 
reason of  others.  True excellence or virtue is not  within  the 
reach of  all, but belongs only to a few. 
These presuppositions of  the Aristotelian theory arose natur- 
ally from the circuinstances  of  Greek civilisation, though  they 
had  been  questioned  by  some  writers  before  Aristotle.  In 
general  culture,  and  perhaps  even  more  in  political  culture, 
the Greek belonged  to a  different  world  from  the races which 
surrounded  him.  The  distinction between  the Greek and the 
barbarian  might  be  exaggerated  by  the Greek, but the differ- 
ence  was  real and profound.  In art, in letters, in philosophy 
the Greek  was not merely different from those who surrounded 
him, but  belonged  to another order,  And  in political  matters 8  INTRODUCTION.  [PART I. 
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the subjects of  the barbaric  despotisms of  the East might well 
seem  to  the  Greek  citizen  to  confess  their  naturally  servile 
character, for they did not even possess or desire to possess the 
political  responsibility  of  the  Greek citizen..  Centuries after- 
wards  we  find  a  citizen  of  the Roman  Conlmonwealth laying 
it down  that  the Roman  Emperor  was  the lord  of  free  men, 
while  the  barbarian  ruler  was  the master  of  s1aves.l  What 
Gregory  the  Great  could  say  in  the  decline  of  the  Roman 
Empire with  truth of  sentiment the citizen of  the free  Greek 
state felt as true in every fibre of  his being. 
There is no change in political  theory so startling in its com- 
pleteness  as the change  from  the  theory  of  Aristotle  to  the 
later  philosophical  view  represented  by  Cicero  and  Seneca. 
Over  against  Aristotle's  view  of  the  natural  inequality  of 
human nature we find set out the theory of  the natural equality 
of  human nature.  There is no  resemblance  in nature so great  - 
as that between man and man, there is no equality so complete. 
There is only  one  possible  definition  for  all mankind, reason  - 
is common to all ; men differ indeed in learning, but are equal 
in the capacity for learning,  There is no race which under the 
guidance of  nature canr~ot  attain to virtuet  The same virtues 
are pleasing,  the same vices  are detestable to all  nations; all 
men can be made better by learning the true conception  of  life. 
It is only  the  perversions  which  depraved  habit  and foolish 
conceptions  have brought,  which  cause men  to differ  so much 
from each other.  Nature has given  to all men  reason, that is, 
true reason, and therefore  the true law, which is right  reason 
commanding  and  forbidding2  We shall  see  later how  these 
l  St  Gregory the Great, Ep. xiii.  34. 
'  De  Leg.,  i.  10.  25 - 12.  33 : 
"M.  Sunt  hsc  quidem  magna, 
qus nunc  breviter  attinguntur,  scd 
omnium,  quaa  in  hominum  doctorum 
disputatione  versantur,  nihil  est  pro- 
fecto przstabilius quam plane intellegi 
nos  ad  justitia~n esse  natos,  neque 
opinione,  sed natura constitutum esse 
jus.  Id jam patebib, si hominum inter 
ipsos societatem conjunctionemque per- 
spexeris.  Nihil est enim unum uni tarn 
eimile,  tam  par,  quam  omnes  inter 
nosmet ipsos sumus.  Quodsi depravatio 
consuetudinum,  si opinionum  vanitas 
non inbecillitatem animorum torqueret 
et flecteret,  quocumque  capisset,  sui 
nemo  ipse  tam  similis  esaet,  quam 
omnes  essent  omnium.  Itaque,  que- 
cumque  est  hominis definitio,  uua  in 
omnis valet;  quod argumenti satis est 
nullam dissimilitudinem esse in genere ; 
qus si esseh,  non  una omnis detinitio 
contineret ;  etenim  ratio,  qua  una 
prrestamus beluis, per quam conjectura 
valemus,  argumentamur,  refellimus, 
generalisations  recur  in Seneca,  ancl  it can  scarcely 
be  doubted that we  have  here  presented  to us the founclation 
of  those  dogmatic statements of  the lawyers like Ulpian  ancl 
~lorentinus,~  in which all men are presented  to  us as being by 
nature free, by nature equal.  We are indeed at the beginnings 
of  a  theory of  human nature and society of  which the "  Liberty 
Equality, and Fraternity " of  the French Revolution is only the 
present-day  expression.  To  complete  the parallelism  of  the 
conception, we  may observe that the "Fraternity" of  the Rev- 
olntion  is only a  later form of  Cicero's  phrase:  "  By nature we 
are disposecl to love men ; this is the foundation of  law." 
We have ventured to suggest that the dividing-line between 
the ancient and the modern  political  theory  must  be  sought, 
if anywhere, in the period  between  Aristotle and Cicero.  We 
think that this cannot  be  better exemplified  than with regard 
to  the theory of the equality of  human nature.  Further on we 
shall have occasion  to examine the relation  of  Christianity to 
this conception, but in the meanwhile it must be  noticed that the 
appearance of  this conception is not  consequent  upon  Christ- 
disserimus,  conficimus  aliquid,  con-  arl  reliqua ;  ain  quid requiritis,  id ex- 
cludimus,  certe est communis, doctrina  plicemus  prius.  Att.  Nos  vero  nil~il, 
differens,  discendi quidem facultate par.  ut pro utroque respondeam. 
Nam et  sensibus eadem omnia  compre-  "M. Sequitur igitur ad participan- 
henduntur,  et ea, qus movent  sensua  dum  alium  alio  communicandumque 
itidem  movent  omnium,  queque  in  inter omnes jus nos natura esse factos. 
animis  imprimuntur,  de  quibus  ante  Atque  hoc  in  omni  hac  disputatione 
dixi,  inchoate  intellegentis,  similiter  sic  intellegi  volo,  jus  quod  dicam, 
in  omnibus inprimuntur, interpresque  natura  esse,  tantam autem  esse  cor- 
meutis oratio verhis discrepat sententii~  ruptelam malz consuetudiuis, ut ab ea 
collgruens ; nec  est  quisquam  gentis  tamquam  igniculi  extinguantur  a 
ullius,  qui ducem nactus  ad virtutell1  natura  dati  exorianturque  et  con- 
Pervenire  non  possit.  firmentur  vitia  contraria.  Quod  si, 
"  Nec  solum in  rectia,  sed  etiam in  quo  modo  est  natura,  sic  judicio 
Pravitatibus insignis est humani generis  hornines '  humani,' ut ait poets, '  nihil 
similitude.  . . . Qus  autem natio non  a  se alienum  putarent,'  coleretur  jupi 
cornitatem,  non  benignitatem,  non  eque ab omnibus.  Quibus enim ratio 
Gratum animum et beneficii  n~emorem  a  natura  data est, isdem  etiam  recta 
diligit ?  que superbos,  qus n~aleficos,  ratio data est, ergo etiam lex, quz  est 
9ua: crudeles, quz ingratos non  asper-  recta ratio in jubendo  et vetaudo ; si 
natur,  non  odit l  Quibus  ex  rebus  lex, jus quoque ; et  omnibus ratio ;  jus 
quomomne genus hominumsociatum in-  igitur datum est omnibus." 
terse esse intellegatur, illud estremum  '  Dig., i.  1. 4 ;  i.  5. 4 ;  1.  17. 32. 
est,  quad  recte vivencli  ratio  meliores  De Leg., i.  15. 43, 
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ianity, however true it may be that the progressive  translation 
of  this great abstract conception into such measure of  practical 
reality  as it  may  now  possess  has  been  largely  carried  out 
under  its influence. 
Cicero already speaks with the cosmopolitan accent of  modern 
civilisation ; to him the older conception of  an absolute natural 
difference between the civilised man and the barbarian has become 
impossible.  It  is not difficult to recognise the historical circum- 
stances which probably were in the main instrumental in pro- 
ducing this change.  With the rise of  the Macedonian Empire, 
the  intense  but restricted  culture  of  the Greeks  became  the 
culture of  the world, losing much no doubt in intensity as it 
gained in expansion.  The Greek went out into the world, and 
found that the barbarian whom he had thought to be  incapable 
of  rational cultivation was at least capable of  reproducing  his 
own culture.  The conquest of  the world by Hellenism  had the 
necessary effect of changing the Hellenic conception of  the world. 
The  literature, the art, the philosophy  of  the  Hellenic  world 
might be on a  lower  plane  than that of  the Hellenic  city, but 
it was Hellenic.  If  the Greek himself  was  thus compelled to 
admit  that  the  barbarian  was  capable  of  entering  into  the 
commonwealth of  Greek civilisation, if  the Macedonian  Enipire 
convinced  the philosophers  of  the homogeneity  of  the human 
race, this was  necessarily  and even more  definitely the conse- 
quence  of  the  Roman  Empire.  The  Latin  conqueror  indeed 
was himself,  to the Greek, one of  the barbarians, and more or 
less the Latin recognised this,-more  or less he was compelled to 
recognise that his intellectual and artistic culture came to him 
from the Greek.  The Latin brought indeed, in his genius for law 
and administration, his  own  contribution  to the cosmopolitan 
culture of  the world, but that was  all he brought,  It was im- 
possible  for  him  to imagine himself  to be  the man  possessed 
of reason  and capable of  virtue and to deny these qualities to 
others.  The  Roman  Empire  continued  and  carried  on  the 
work  of  the Macedonian  Empire in welding  the countries  of 
the Mediterranean  basin  into  one  homogeneous  whole.  The 
homogeneity  of  the human  race was in the Roman Empire no 
Dere theory of  the philosophers, but an actual fact of  experi- 
ence,  a  reality in political  and social conditions.  If  the phil- 
osopher had  learned  to believe in the homogeneity of  mankind 
under the Macedonian  Empire, he was confirmed and strength- 
ened i11  his  belief by the experience of  the Roman. 
When  we  turn  to  Cicero's  theory  of  government  we  may 
find what we think are indications of  the influence of  this con- 
ception.  In the  meantime  we  may  point  out  that while in 
Cicero's  writings the relation  between  the theory  of  equality 
and  the theory  of  sla,very is  not  drawn out, it is still  worth 
noting  that in one passage  at least  Cicero  refers  to  the con- 
dition  of  the  slave  in  a  fashion  different,  at least  in  some 
respects,  from  earlier writers,  We must,  he  says,  act justly 
even  to those of  the lowest  condition-that  is, the slaves-of 
whoni-it has been well said that they should be treated as hired 
labourers ; they should be  required to work, but should receive 
just  treatment.l  The  suggestion  that  the  slave  should  be 
regarded in the same light as a  hired labourer comes  from the 
Stoic  Chrysippus,  and  suggests  an  important  contrast  with 
Aristotle's  conception of  the inferiority of  the position  of  the 
mercenary labourer as compared with that of  the slave.  It  is 
certainly worth noting that the slave is recognised  to haire  his 
just rights ; he is looked upon as a man with sonie independent 
personality.  When we  turn to Seneca  we  shall find  that the 
relations of  the theory of  human  equality to the independent 
personality of  the slave is more fully drawn out. 
There are indeed two fragments of  the 'De RepublicaJ which 
would seem to represent a somewhat different attitude to slavery 
from  that  which  we  have  described.  In the  first  of  these, 
described  by  St Augustine,  the question  is  raised  as to  the 
justice  of  the conquest  of  one  nation  by  another, and, as St 
Augustine reports, it is maintained  that such  conquest is just 
because  subjection (se~vitus)  is useful for some men, as tending 
to check the tendency to licence.  In the second passage, Cicero, 
as quoted by Nonius, seems to have been distinguishing between 
the  unjust form  of  slavery,  where  those  who  are capable  of 
being  sui are ulterizu,  and  some  just  form, presumably  when 
those  are slaves  who  are incapable  of  governing  tl~emselves.~ 
'  De Off.,  i.  13, 41,  we  Rep., iii. 24 ;  De Civ, Dei, xix, 21 ;  De Rep., iii. 25, 12  INTRODUCTION.  [PART I. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  in  these  passages  we  find 
Cicero to be speaking under the influence  partly at least of  the 
Aristotelian principle of  the fundamental distinction  in human 
nature; we find hin~  thinking of mankind  as capable of  being 
divided into those who are able to govern themselves and those 
who are not.  But we  venture to think  that such passages do 
not  in any serious  measure  weaken  the effect  of  those  which 
we have already discussed.  It  must be remembered that Cicero's 
eclecticism  is in part the expression  of  a  certain  incoherence 
in his  philosophical  conceptions,  and that it  is  not  a  matter 
for any great surprise that we should  find him holding together 
opinions hardly capable of  reconciliation. 
It must be  observed  that the first quoted passage  n:ay  also 
be  taken as indicating  a  tendency  to  one particular  soliltion 
of  some  of  the difficulties  of  social  theory,  which  became  in 
the  course  of  time  of  the  greatest  importance.  It  will  be 
observed  that Cicero  speaks  of  subjection  as being  a  remedy 
for  the  tendencies  to  licence  and  evil,  and  this  conception 
may be  connected with  Cicero's  theory of  the actual condition 
of  human nature.  In a passage  which we have already quoted, 
Cicero points out that men would  all  be  like each other, were 
it not for  the perversion  caused  by depraved  habit and foolish 
thoughts.  Cicero  at the  same  moment  that he  dogmatically 
maintains the fundamental  similarity of  human nature, admits 
that this  is  affected  by  the fact  that hnman  nature  is  con- 
stantly  corrupted,-that  this  corruption  brings  into  human 
life  conditions  and  distinctions  which  are  rlot  truly  natural. 
Cicero, that is,  draws a  distinction between  the true or  ideal 
character  of  man  and  the actual.  Human nature is  actually 
often  corrupt  ancl  depraved,  the fire  of  life,  of  troth, is  ex- 
tinguished,  and  the  contrary  vices  grow  and  flourish  under 
the influence  of  evil custom.1  St Augustine represents  Cicero 
as  describing  men  as  coming  into  being  not  only  bare  and 
fragile in body, but with  a  soul prone  to  terror, weak  in will 
to labour, prone  to lust, while  yet a  certain  divine fire  dwells 
in them.2  Cicero's  treatment of the subjection of  man  to  rnan 
seems to anticipate  the attitude of  Seneca  and the Fathers to 
l  See p.  8, note 2,  a  De Rep, iii. 1, 
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the  institution  of  slavery  and  to  the  other  institutions  of 
civilised society.  We can see the germs of  a  theory of human 
society which was  ultimately  to  trace the great institutions of 
mankind  to  the  necessity  of  checking  the  faults  of  human 
nature,-which  would  tend  to  look  upon  the organisation  of 
the  State  as the  necessary  consequence  of  the  depravity  of 
human  nature  and  as  its  true  remedy.  The  inadequacy  of 
this  conception  of  the organisation  of  society  is  to  our  own 
mind  sufficiently  obvious,  and  indeed  since  the  "Contrat 
Social"  the  tendency of  political  philosophy  is  obviously  to 
return to the larger view of  the great thinkers who look  upon 
the organisation  of  society rather  as  the method  of  prcgress, 
both  negative and positive,  than as merely the barrier  to vice 
and  disorder.  But  for  eighteen  centuries  political  theorists 
were  governed  in large  measure  by  this conception.  Cicero, 
then,  maintains  the  theory  of  natural  human  equality,  but 
is  partly  conscious  that  this  theory  has  to  take  account  of 
the actual facts of  human  diversity and corruption. 
We go on to consider  his  theory of  the origin  and character 
of  the State.  It would  appear that Cicero was familiar  with 
two  theories:  the one,  that men  were  by nature solitary  and 
had  no  inclination  to  the  society  of  their  fellows,  but  were 
driven  by  the dangers of  life  to  seek  each  other  out  and to 
join together for mutual defence ;  the other, which Cicero  puts 
in the mouth of  Scipio Africanus, who emphatically repudiates 
this conception, and maintains that men  are naturally inclined 
to the society  of  each  0ther.l  MTe  shall probably  not  be  far 
wrong  in supposing  that the first  view  had  been  maintained 
by Carneades and probably  by the Epicureans, while  the view 
of  Cicero  himself  is that of  Aristotle and of  the Stoics.  We 
shall  see  that  Seneca illustrates  very  clearly  a  great  diverg- 
ence  between  the  attitude  of  the  Stoics and  the  Epicureans 
towards the State. 
Society to Cicero  is a  natural institution, and the organisa- 
tion  of  society  in  the State is the greatest  work  to  which  a 
man can  set his hand: human excellence  never comes so near 
De Rep, i.  25.  39, 40 ;  Lactant~us,  Div. Inst., vi. 10. to the  divine  as when  it applies  itself  to  the foundation  or 
preservation of  states.'  Man is naturally niade for society, and 
the great society of  the State has grown up gradually on  the 
foundation of  the elementary  form  of  human  association,  the 
fatnily.2  Cicero evidently follows  the same  tradition as Aris- 
totle.  We also  find  in him  a  conception  of  the development 
of  the State which is worthy  of  notice,  though  its importance 
in political  theory  was  scarcely  perceived  until  the historical 
movement  at the end of  the eighteenth  century, when  Burke 
recognised  its profound  significance.  We mean the conception 
of  the constitution of  a  State as an organic growth in contra- 
distinction to the conception of  it as a mechanical product.  At 
the  beginning  of  the second  book  of  the '  Rep~blic'~  Cicero 
says  that  he  will  rather  discuss  the  actual  constitutiorl  of 
the  Roman  Commonwealth  than  create  one  out  of  his  own 
imagination,  and mentions  with  approbation  the  opinion  of 
Cato that the reason why the Roman constitution was superior 
to all others was  that it had  not  been  devised by  one  man's 
wisdom  or  created  by  one  man's  labours,  but  rather  by  the 
wisdom  and efforts of  many generations.  It is interesting  to 
observe this judgment,  though  it does  not appear that it had 
any direct and immediate resnlts  in political  thought. 
Cicero,  then,  conceives  of  the  State as being  the natural 
method  of  human  life.  But he is carefnl to  point  out  with 
all the emphasis that he  can  comnland  that the State is not 
any  chance  association  of  men,  whatever  the  methods  and 
objects  of  the  association.  The  State to  be  a  State  must 
be  founded  upon  justice,  upon  law,  and  it  must  exist  for 
the promotion  of  the  common  wellbeing  of  all  its  citizens. 
This is the significance of  that definition  of  the  State m't~ich 
we  have  already  q~oted.~  T11e  Commonwealth  is  the  affair 
of  all  the  people,  but  the  people  is  not  any  asselnbly  of 
men  gathered  together  in  any  fashion,  but is  a  gathering  of 
the multitude  associated  together  under  a  conlmon  law  and 
in the enjoyment  of  a  common  wellbeing.  The  form  of  the 
government  may  vary,  but  the  fonnclation  of  the  State  is 
1 De Rep., i.  7. 12. 
"e  Off., i. 17. 54. 
De Rep., ii. 1. 1-3. 
De Rep., i. 25.  39.  See p.  4. 
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always  this  bond  of  justice  and  the  common  good.  There 
must  be  government  that  the  State  may  have  continuance, 
but this government must always be founded upon, and express, 
the  first  principles  of  the  association.  Government  nlay  be 
in  the hands  either  of  one  person  or  of  a chosen  few  or  of 
the whole  people,  and it will  be  legitimate  if  that first bond 
of association is preserved, the bond  of  justice and the common 
good,  if  the  State  is well  and  justly  governed.  But if  the 
government  is  unjust,  whether  it is  that  of  the  king  or  of 
the  few  or  of  the  people,  then  Cicero  maintains  that  the 
State  is  not  to  be  called  corrupt,  but  rather  that  it is  no 
State at all.1  Who can call that a  commonwealth (respublica) 
where  all  are  oppressed  by  the  authority of  one,  and where 
there is no bond  of  law, no true agreement  and union ?  SO 
far  Cicero  would  seem  to  follow  the  same  general  line  of 
thought  as Aristotle,  the legitimacy  of  a  form  of  government 
is determined  by its end ; so  long  as this is the wellbeing of 
all,  the form  of  the government is comparatively  immaterial. 
But we find  also in Cicero traces  of  a  cotlception  not perhaps 
strictly new, but  receiving  a  new emphasis.  The three forms 
of  government,  he  says,  are only  tolerable;  he  is  not  really 
satisfied  with  any  of  them.  The  least  satisfactory  form  to 
him  is  that in  which  the  whole  power  is  in  the hands  of 
the people.  The  very  equality  of  this  is,  in  his judgment, 
unjust,  since  there  are  no  grades  of  dignity.  But  he  is 
equally  dissatisfied  with  the  mere  aristocracy  or  monarchy ; 
and it is here that his conception  assumes  a  new significance. 
The  most just  aristocracy,  such  as  that of  the Massilians, or 
the  most  just  monarchy,  such  as  that of  Cyrus, is  to  him 
unsatisfactory,  for  under  such  forms  of  government  there  is 
at least an  appearance  of  slavery, and the multitude in such 
a  State can  scarcely  possess  liberty.3 
Cicero's  identification  of  liberty  with  a  share  in  political 
power  is  another of  the indications  of  the essetltially modern 
ne  Rep.,  i.  26.  41,  42 ;  De Rep.,  bmen in ea conditioue similitude quz- 
iii., in St Aug., De Civ., ii. 21.  clam  servitutis,"  and  "  vix  particeps 
De Itep., iii. 31.  libertatis  potest eese multituclo." 
De  tlep.,  i.  26  and  27 ; "  ineat character of his  political  thought.  TVe  seem to be at the com- 
mencement  of  that mode of  thought which  has been  so char- 
acteristic of inodern democracy, that political liberty is identical 
with the possession of the franchise, that even the best govern- 
nient is unsatisfactory which  is not directly controlled  by  the 
people as a whole.  We are not here discussing the value of this 
conception  in political  philosophy, but it is interesting to ob- 
serve  its appearance  in Cicero.  When  we  go  on  to  consider 
the theories of  tlle Roman  Lawyers, we  shall have to observe 
the  fact  that they  knew  of  no  other  foundation  of  political 
authority  than  the  consent of  the whole people, and we  shall 
have to consider the relation of  this to the development of  the 
theory of  consent  or  contract as the foundation of  the  State. 
The  conceptions  of  the  Roman  Lawyers  and  of  Cicero  are 
both related to the t~aditions  of  the Roman Government, to the 
constitutional theory which  had  grown up under the Republic ; 
but we  think that they  are also related  to that conception of 
the natural equality of  men with which we  have already dealt. 
Indeed  it is obvious  enough  that  Cicero's  objection  to mon- 
archy and aristocracy  rests upon  this basis, that every  citizen 
has in him  some capacity for political authority, some capacity 
which ought to find a means of  expression,  Cicero is, in truth, 
dissatisfied  with  all  the  three  simple  forms  of  governnient, 
both  on account of  their inherent character  and because  they 
all have a  dangerous  tendency to perversion : monarchy easily 
passes into tyranny, aristocracy  into  oligarchy, and democracy 
into the rule of, the 111ob.l  He is therefore  himself  in favour 
of  a fourth fornl of  government, compounded of  the three simple 
elements, possessing some of  the virtues of  each, and possessing 
in greater degree  the quality of  ~tability.~  EIis  conception  of 
this is, we  have little doubt, in large measure  drawn  from the 
history  of  Rome, and it is  11ot  very  materially  different  from 
that of  earlier writers.3 
Cicero, then, looks upon the true order of  the State as being 
founded upon the principle of  justice, which is expressed in the 
law;  and  secures  the  common  wellbeins  It should  give  to  - 
every citizen  some  share in  the control of  the public life, and 
'  De Rep., i. 28.  44.  De Rep.,  i.  46.  6%  a  Cf. Polybius, vi.  11. 
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provicle  room  for tlle  exercise and  recognition  of  the varying 
qualities  arid  capacities  of  the  citizens.  The  commonwealth 
is  an  organic  development  out  of  the  natural  association  of 
the family, and at the sanie time it is the expression  of  the 
common will and consent, for every citizen has his share in its 
control.  There is one passage in the '  De Republics ' in which 
this conception seems to be drawn out in a manner which nearly 
approaches the theory of  a c0ntract.I  This judgment seenls to be 
placed in the mouth of  a defender  of  that theory, which, as we 
have said, reduced justice  and virtue to a matter of  agreement. 
It is, however, interesting  to observe  the presence of  this con- 
ception  in the political  theory of  the time; it has antecedents 
in such a description of  the contract as that which Plato gives 
in the "Laws." 
We have thus seen how important  in the political theory of 
Cicero are the three related  conceptions of  natural law, natural 
equality, and the natural society of  men  in the State.  Nature 
is  the test of  tr~lth  and validity in law, in social order, in or- 
ganised society.  We do not mean  that Cicero has a very clear 
and precise coriception  of  the meaning of  nature; generally he 
seems to use it  as expressing the true order of  things, though 
once at least he seems to use  it as equivalent to the primitive, 
undeveloped  0rc1er.~ But generally his  conception of  natural 
law is sufficiently distinct.  Behind all actual laws and customs 
of  men there exists a supreme and permanent law, to which all 
human order, if  it is to have any truth or validity, must conform. 
This ultimate principle  is the law and will of  the power which 
lies behind  all the external forms of the universe, and it is by 
it that all things live,  while  it also manifests  itself, at least in 
part,  to  the  rational  consciousness  of  men.  His conception 
of natural equality is clear  enough.  All men  have reason, all 
men  are  capable  of  virtue.  His conception  is  clear,  but the 
relation  of  his  corlception  to  actual social  conditions  is  not 
'  De Rep.,  iii.  13 : "Sed  cum sliua  tentes,  ex  quo  existit id quod Scipio 
alium tiruct, et horno hominen~,  et ortlo  laudabat, conjunctum civitatis genua" 
Ordinern, turn quia nemo sibi confidit,  Plato, Laws, iii. 684. 
quasi  pactio  fit  inter  populurn  et po-  S De OE., i. 7.  21. 
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justification  of  slavery,  but  he has not  considered  the conse- 
quences of  his own judgment.  He has not drawn out in this 
connexion  that  distinction  between  the  original  condition  of 
things and the conventions  of  human  society  which  is, as we 
venture to think, the first meaning of  the distinction made by 
Ulpian  and the other  lawyers  of  his  school  between  the jus 
naturale and thejus  gentium.  On the other hand, his conception 
of  organised  society in relation to nature is well developed and 
clearly  applied.  He conceives  of  society  as being  natnral to 
man, and of  social organisation  as needing to conform itself  to 
certain principles of  justice and certain characteristics of  hun~all 
nature, if  it is to be  legitimate.  The State must be just  and 
must  also  provide  for  liberty. 
Cicero's  conception of  nature and natnral law  has then its 
ambiguities  and  perhaps  its  incoherencies,  but  it is  evident 
that it is ronnd this conception of  nature that his philosophy of 
society revolves.  "Ex natura vivere  summum bonum," to live 
according  to  nature is the highest  good,  he  says ;l nature is 
the guide of  man, the true test of  justice  and goodness.  But 
nature is not found by man in solitude or  in misanthropy, but 
in the society and the love of his fellow-man. 
1 De Leg.,  i.  21.  56. 
CHAPTER  11. 
THE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  SENECA. 
WHEK  we  turn  from  Cicero  to  Seneca  we  find  ourselves  in 
an  atmosphere  of  a  somewhat  new  kind.  The  change  from 
the Republic to the Empire necessarily brought with it certain 
changes in the idea of  the State, but, what is perhaps more than 
this, we find in Seneca a professed  philosopher of  one definite 
school, who tries  to adjnst his views  of  life and of  society  to 
the general conceptions of  that  school.  Seneca may not be  a 
very  profound  philosopher;  it is  very  possible  to  feel  that 
he  often  mistakes  rhetorical  sentiment  for  profound  ethical 
emotion,  and  that  he  has  little  of  that  power  of  critical 
analysis  which  might  have  given  seriousness  and  force  to 
his  opinions:  he is too  much  pleased  with  the fine  sound of 
his  own  sentiments  to  examine  them  very  carefully,  and 
carry them out to their conclusions.  But still, he does repre- 
sent to us in a  literary form, always interesting and sonietimes 
forcible, the theory of  life  and society  of  the Stoic schools  of 
his  time, and  he  presents  them with a  certain coherence  and 
consequence which  differs not  a  little from Cicero's expression 
of  the preferences  of  a well-mannered and honourable-minded 
philosophical  amateur.  Ancl  yet,  after  all,  while  there  are 
important  differences  between  Cicero  and Seneca  in  political 
theory,  we  think  that  they  are  governed  by  the  same 
general  conceptions,  that  they  illustrate  differenb  forms  of 
the  same  attitude to  the theory  of  society. 
It is somewhat  curious  to  find  that Seneca rarely  if  at all 
refers to natural law, that he nowhere discusses  the conception 
of  law  as  related  to  some  general  principle  of  life  and  the 2 0  TNTRODUCTI  ON.  [PART I. 
world.  We  think  that this  does  not  mean  that  he  has  a 
conception  of  things  different  in  this  respect  from  Cicero. 
For  while  he  does  not  use  the  phrase  "natural  law,"  the 
phrase  "nature"  seems  to  occupy  much  the  same  place  in 
his  mind.  To live  according  to  his  nature  is  the  command 
of  reason  to  man?  It  is  nature  which  teaches  a  man  the 
true method  of  life.2  Anger  is foolish,  for  it is not  naturaL3 
Nature  is the test  of  goodness,  everything which  is  good  is 
according  to  nature,  though  there  may  be  things  in  nature 
too  trifling  to  deserve  the  name  of  Nature  is  that 
which  is  perpetual,  unchanging:  that  which  is  variable 
cannot  be  truly natural5 
We may  at least  gather  from  these  phrases  that  Seneca 
looks upon  nature  as being  or  containing  a  principle  which 
is the test of  truth and goodness, to which man must conform 
himself  if  he would  find  the true method  and quality of  life. 
In the  main  he  seems  to  conceive  of  it as  the  permanent 
principle  and end  of  life,  not as identical  with  its  primitive 
forms.  We shall have to consider  the  question  presently  in 
relation to his conception  of  the primitive character of  society, 
and we shall see then that while  he may  occasionally at least 
use the word  "nature"  as  representing the primitive:  yet his 
general tendency is to look  upon  the completest perfection  of 
human nature in a developed society as being the true "  nature " 
in man. 
The conception  of  human nature in Seneca's writings is very 
similar  to  that which  we  have  studied  in  Cicero.  The con- 
ception  of  the  equality  of  human  nature  is  continued  and 
developed  in  greater  detail,  but  on  the  same  lines  as  in 
Cicero's  writings.  The  slave  is  of  the  same  nature  as  his 
master,  Seneca  says,  and  he  draws out this theory  with real 
eloqnence in the De Beneficiis.  Some, he says, have denied that 
a slave can confer a benefit upon his master.  Those who think 
Ep. iv. 12. 
De Otio, v.  8. 
3  De Ira, i. 6. 
Ep  xx. l. 
Consol.  ad Marciam, vii.  2. 
"p.  xiv. 2.44, "non enim dat natu~a 
virtutern : ars est bonum heri." 
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thus are ignorant of the true principles of  human nature.  It is 
a man's  intention, not his position,  which  gives the quality of 
a  benefit  to  his  action.  Virtue  can  be  attained  by  all,  the 
free, the freedman, the slave,  the king, the exile: virtue cares 
nothing for house or fortune, but only seeks the man.  A slave 
can  be  just,  brave,  magnanirno~s.~  Again,  we  all  have  the 
same  beginnings,  the  same origin; no one  is in truth  nobler 
than  another,  except  so  far as  his  temper  is  more  upright, 
his  capacities  better  developed.  We are all descended  from 
one common  parent, the world;  to  this we  must all trace our 
origin, whether by splendid or by humble  steps.2  It is fortune 
that makes a man a slave.3  Slavery is hateful to all men ; the 
kiudliness  of  a  slave towards  his  master is therefore  only the 
more  admirable.4  And,  finally, slavery  is after all only  ex- 
ternal,  only  affects the body  of  a  man:  he  errs greatly  who 
thinks  that the condition  of  slavery  affects  the whole  man; 
his  better  part  has  nothing  to  do  with  it.  The  body  may 
belong  to a  master, the mind  is its own (szti juris): it cannot 
be  given  into sla~ery.~ 
These  phrases  may  no doubt  be  said  to be  rhetorical,  and 
it would  be  foolish  to overpress  their  practical  significance, 
but  at the same time  they  seem  to  complete  the  impression 
which  Cicero's  writings  have  given  to  us,  of  the  great 
change  which  had  come  over  the  philosophical  conception 
of  human  nature.  It  may  indeed  be  urged  that  Aristotle 
not  only  indicates  that,  eve11  in  his  time,  a  conception  of 
the  unnatural  character  of  slavery  was  already  current, but 
even  that Aristotle  himself  is  somewhat uneasy in his judg- 
ment as to the institution.  Still, Aristotle's  conception of  the 
profound  differences  in  human  nature  had,  as we  have  said, 
its  basis  in what  might  well  appear  to the Greek  mind  the 
actual facts of  life.  Seneca's  treatment of human nature shows 
ns  again  how  completely  the Aristotelian  view  had gone; his 
view  of  human  nature is in all essentials the view  of  modern 
times.  Nothing indeed could be more significant than the stress 
l  De Ben., iii. 18. 
De Ben., iii. 28. 
a  De Ben., iii. 20. 
De Ben., iii. 19. 
De Ben., iii. 20. Seneca  lays  upon  the  freedom  of  the soul.  It is just  where 
Aristotle  found  the ground  and  justification  of  slavery  that 
Seneca  finds  the  place  of  unconquerable  freedom;  the body 
nlay  be  enslaved, the soul  is free. 
It ~nust  not  be  thought that this speculation  upon  slavery 
is  wholly  abstract,  and has  no  practical  significance.  When 
we  consider  the theories  of  the lawyers,  we  shall  have  OC- 
casion  to  compare  the developmellt  of  their  theory  with  the 
actual legal modifications  of  the condition  of  the slave.  It is 
worth  while  to  compare  Seneca's  theory  of  slavery with  his 
conception of  the relations  of  master  and slave in actual  life. 
In one  of  his  letters  he  deals  with  the  question  in  detail. 
He  represents  himself  as  having  heard  with  pleasure  frorn 
his  friend  that  he  lived  on  intimate  terms with  his  slaves: 
he  finds  that  such  conduct  is  eminently  worthy  of  his good 
sense and learning.  He bids  him  remember  that if  they  are 
slaves,  they  are hunlble  friends, nay, rather, they  are fellow- 
slaves.  This man  whom  you  call  your  slave  is  sprung from 
the same source, dnells under and rejoices in the same heaven, 
breathes the same air, lives the same life, dies  the same death 
as  you:  you  might  be  the  slave,  he  the  freeman.  He is a 
slave,  but  perchance  he  is  free  in  his  soul.  Who is not  a 
slave ?  one man is in bondage  to his lusts, another  to avarice, 
another to ambition,  all men  to  their  fears.  Live  with  your 
slaves  kindly  and  courteously,  admit  them  to  your  conver- 
sation, to your  counsels,  to your  meals;  let your  slave rever- 
ence  you  rather  than fear you.  Some  may  argue  that  your 
slaves will  become  your  clients  rather  than  slaves,  that the 
masters  will  lose  their  dignity; surely  it is  enough  that  the 
master  should  receive  the  same  honour  as  God,  who  is 
reverenced and loved.1  We may find much of  merely rhetorical 
sentinlent  in all this, but sentiment  is  only  the reflection  of 
the actual conditions and tendencies of  life.  It has often been 
observed  that, as Roman  society  lost its primitive  vigour  and 
moral  quality,  it  also  grew  more  humane.  Certainly  the 
development  of  the humane sentiment is very  clear.  Seneca 
then  looks  upon  hunlan nature  as fundamentally the same in 
l  Ep.  v.  6. 
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all:  we  again  find  that we  are close  to  the legal  t,heory of 
the original  and natural equality  and liberty  of  men. 
So far Seneca illustrates  the same position  as Cicero.  But 
in his case these conceptions are related to others, which Cicero 
either passes  over or rejects.  Behind the conventional institu- 
tions of  society there lay a condition in which these institutions 
had no place.  Before  the existing age there was  an age when 
men lived under other conditions, in other circumstances, an age 
which was called the golden.  In this primitive age  men  lived 
in  happiness  and  in  the  enjoyment  of  each  other's  society. 
They  were  uncorrupt  in  nature,  innocent,  though  not  wise. 
They  were  lofty  of  soul,  newly  sprung  frorn  the  gods,  but 
they  were  not  perfect  or  completely  developed  in  mind  and 
soul.  They were  innocent, but their  innocence was rather  the 
result of  ignorance than of  virtue ; they had the material out of 
which  virtue  could  grow  rather  than  virtue  itself,  for  this 
properly  only  belongs  to  the  soul  trained  and  taught  and 
practised:  nlen  are born  to virtue  but not in possession  of  it. 
It is important to notice  these  points  in Seneca's  theory,  for 
they servc to differentiate his position from  that of  some  later 
theorists  of  the state of  nature.  In this primitive state men 
lived  together  in  peace  and  happiness,  having  all  things  in 
common;  there was  no  private  property.  We illay infer  that 
there could  have  been  no  slavery,  and there was  no  coercive 
government.  Order  there  was  and that of  the best  kind, for 
men  followed  nature without fail, and the best  and wisest  men 
were their rulers.  They guided and directed men for their good, 
and were  gladly obeyed, as they comlnanded wisely and justly. 
The  heaviest  punishment  they  could  threaten  was  expulsion 
from their  territ0ries.l 
We have  here  a  statement  of  that theory  of  the state of 
nature, which was to exercise  a  great influence  upon the whole 
character  of  political  ~llought  for  nearly  eighteen  centuries. 
It  is true that the conception of  the state of  nature in Seneca 
is not the same as in some other writers ; but the importance of 
the theory  for our inquiry lies  not so  much  in the particular 
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forms in which  men  held it, as in the fact that in all forms it 
assumed  a  distinction  between  primitive  and  conventional 
institutions  which  largely  influenced  the ideal  and sometimes 
even  the practical  tendency  of  men's  thoughts. 
Seneca does not regard this primitive condition as one of  per- 
fection, rather as one of  innocence-we  may say that he regards 
it as representing the undeveloped, not tthe developed, "nature" 
of  man-and  lie  is thus in sharp  contradiction  to those  who 
look  upon  this as the "  natural " condition in the full sense of 
tlie  word.  But still  it was  a  state of  happiness,  of  at least 
negative  virtue  and  goodness.  Men  passed  out  of  it,  not 
through  the instinct of  progress,  but  through  the  growth of 
vice.  As  time  passed,  the primitive  innocence  disappeared ; 
men  became  avaricious, and, dissatisfied with  the cominon  en- 
joyment  of  the good  things  of  the world, desired to hold them 
in  their  private  possession.  Avarice  rent  the  first  happy 
society asunder.  It resulted  that even  those  who were  made 
wealthy became  poor; for  desiring  to possess  things for  their 
own, they ceased  to  possess  all things.  The rulers grew  dis- 
satisfied with their paternal rule ;  the lust of  authority seized 
upon them, and the kingship of  the wise  gave place to tyranny, 
so that men had to create laws which should control the rulers. 
Seneca  thus looked upon the institutions of  society as being 
the resudts of  vice, of  the corruption of  human nature: they are 
conventional institutions made necessary  by the actual  defects 
of  human  nature rather  than  the natural  conditions of  ideal 
progress.  This point is so important in relation to later theory 
that it will be well  to notice  his  conception  of  human  nature 
somewhat  more  fully.  In another  of  his  letters he discusses 
tlie  proper  characteristics of  human nature.  Man, he says, is 
a  rational  animal;  that  is  his  peculiar  quality,  and reason 
bids  man  live  according  to  this  his  true  nature,  a  thing 
which  ought  to  be  most  easy,  but  is made  dificult  by  that 
universal madness which possesses  mankind.l  And in another 
letter  we  find  him  carrying out this idea  in  sentences  which 
remind us forcibly of  Christian theology.  It  was  a  true judg- 
ment,  he  says,  of  Epicurus,  that  the  beginning  of  salvation 
l  Ep.  iv.  12. 
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(sulf~tis)  ia the recognition  of  sin.  If a man does  not recognise 
his faults, he will not  be  corrected;  it is idle to  think of  im- 
provement while a man confuses his evil with good.  Therefore 
let a man accuse himself, judge himself.1 
We have already seen in Cicero some traces of  this theory of 
the corruption or faultiness of  human  nature;  in Seneca it is 
more clearly and explicitly drawn out.  And if  we now put this 
together  with  his  theory of  primitive  human life, we  see  that 
Seneca's view is, in all important points, the same as that of  the 
Christian Fathers, that man was once  innocent and happy, but 
has  grown  corrupt.  And,  further, we  find  that what  Cicero 
only  suggests as the cause of  the subjection  of  man  to man, 
Seneca holds of  the great institutions of  society, property and 
coercive  government, namely, that they are the consequences of 
and the remedies for vice.  Private property is a necessary con- 
dition  of  a  social order in which few men  can rival  Diogenes 
in his  contempt  for  all wealth,  and  the best  thing  is  that a 
mau  should have enough  to keep  him  from  poverty,  but not 
so much as to remove him far from it.2  And in the same way 
organised government and law is a  necessary protection against 
tyranny.  Seneca,  that is,  seems  clearly  to draw  a  sharp dis- 
tinction  between  the conditions  suitable  to man, had  he con- 
tinued  innocent, and  those  which  are adapted  to  the  actual 
facts of  the perversion  and corruption of  human nature.  The 
great institutions  of  organised  society are conventions adapted 
to the latter conditions, good  as remedies, but not properly  to 
be  called  good  in  themselves.  The  coercive  state is a  great 
institution  to which, as we  shall  presently see, men  owe their 
service; but its actual form  is not so much a  consequence  of 
man's  true nature as a  remedy  for  his  corrupted  nature. 
So far Seneca's  view is on the whole  clear, perplexed  only by 
the intrusion of the perpetual paradox of  the promotion of  good 
through evil ; for it must be carefully borne in mind that Seneca's 
primitive man, though innocent and happy, had no  true virtue, 
while  man  as we  know him  is oppressed by  vice  and misery, 
but is yet capable of  virtue.  But here we come  to a point in 
Seneca's  theory which  requires careful  notice, if  we  are not  to 
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~nisapprehend'him,  and in which also we find interesting matter 
for  comparison  with  certain  tendencies  in  the  theory  and 
practice  of  Christianity.  Seneca  uses  phrases  of  great force 
and plainness to emphasise the conception of  the self-sufficiency 
of  the truly wise man.  No one can either injure or benefit the 
wise  man ; there is nothing which  the wise  man would  care to 
receive.  Just as the divine  order  can  neither  be  helped  nor 
injnred,  so  is it with  the wise  man: the wise  man  is,  cxcept 
for  his  mortality,  like to God  Himself?  It is  only  in some 
general, outward, and loose  sense  that it may  be  said that t,he 
wise  man  can  receive  a  benefit.2 
The  conception  of  the self-sufficiency  of  the wise  man  had 
apparently  developed  in the later schools  of  philosophy, and 
at first  sight  it would  seem  as though  this  conception  would 
necessarily greatly affect  the conception of  the relation  of  the 
individual  to  society.  It  seems  clear  that Epicurus  and  his 
school had applied it so as to destroy the notion of  the necessary 
duty of  the individual to society ;  but it is also quite clear that 
the Stoic writers  had  very clearly and emphatically repudiated 
the  Epicurean  view  upon  the  latter  point,  and  that,  while 
generally maintaining  the conception that the philosopher was 
independent of  the help of  society, they taught the imperative 
duty of  serving society. 
We should venture to suggest that this fact is closely  con- 
nected with the character of  the Stoic ethical ideas, at least as 
they are represented  by  Seneca.  In one of  his  letters Seneca, 
discussing  the  nature  of  liberal  studies,  seems  to  deny  any 
value to those which are not related to the moral life ;%is  tone 
indeed  is  curiously  like  that  of  many  religious  writers  on 
education.  Seneca seems undoubtedly to look  upon  knowledge 
as advantageous  only  so  far  as it tends  to  make  man  better. 
He looks upon the philosophic life of  meditation as the highest 
life; but he justifies the view by the argument that in the long- 
run it is the pllilosopher with his contemplation  of  nature and 
goodliess  who  does  most  for  the service of mankind.  Nature, 
he says, meant that man should both act and coritemplate, and 
l Ad Serenum, "Nec injuriam,"  &C.,  "e  Ben., vii. 4,  &c. 
viii.  a  Ep. xiii. 3. 
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indeed  men  do  both,  for  there  is  no  contemplation  without 
action.' 
The wise man, therefore, in Seneca's view may give his time 
to contemplation, but this does not mean that he is exempt from 
the obligation  to the servico  of  society.  There is in Seneca's 
mind  no  real  inconsistency  between  his  view  of  the  self- 
sufficiency  of  the  wise  n~an  and  his  general  theory  of  the 
relation of  man to society.  He has given  ample expression to 
this  theory  in several treatises.  Man  is  by  nature  drawn  to 
love his fellow-man : man is born  to  mutual service or helpful- 
nessa2  The Stoic doctrine is tliat  man  is a  social animal, born 
to serve the common good ;  and in his definition  of  the highest 
good  in his  treatise  on  the  Blessed  Life  it is  interesting  to 
observe that the temper of  mind which constitutes this includes 
the qualities ef humanity and helpfulness.  The highest  good 
is a  temper which despises the accidents of  life, which rejoices 
in virtue, or, the unconquerable temper of  a  man  experienced 
in  life,  tranquil in action, of  a  great hutnanity  and  care for 
those with whom  he is  ~oncerned.~  Seneca  is  clear  in main- 
taining  tliat  man  is born  to  live  in  society  and to serve it: 
his  necessities  may  not  drive him  to  this,  but  the  true dis- 
position  of  soul  will  do  so. 
The wise  man, therefore,  is driven to take  his  share  in the 
work  of  society  and, if it is  possible,  of  the  State.  Part of 
a  treatise  which  he  devoted  to  this  subject,  the  'De  Otio,' 
has  come  down  to  us, a.nd  furnishes  us  with  a  fairly  corn- 
plete  picture of  the current  opinions  on  the subject.  There 
was  evidently  a  very  clear  difference  between  the Stoics and 
Epicureans  upon  the subject.  Epicurus had  said,  "The  wise 
man  will  not  take  part  in  the  business  of  the  common- 
wealth, unless some special cause should arise."  Zeno, on the 
other  hand,  had  said,  "The  wise  man  should  take  part  in 
the business  of  the commonwealth, unless  some  special  cause 
should  prevent  llim."  Seneca  admits  that  there  may  be 
conditions of  public life which  make it impossible for  the wise 
man to do any good in puljlic  aEairs, and in such a case he will 
De Otio, v. 8.  De Clementia, i.  3,  2. 
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withdraw from them.1  But even  this does not mean that he 
will  cease  to  serve  the  State.  The  philosopher  and  moral 
teacher serve the commonwealth as well as the politician ;  even 
under the thirty tyrants Socrates was  able to be  of  use  to the 
Republic.2  The true rule of  man's  life is that he should be of 
use  to his  fellow-men, if  possible  to many; if  this cannot  be, 
then  to  a  few  at least  of  his  neighbours.  If  even  this  is 
impossible, then let a man improve  himself,  for  in doing  this 
he is really working for the public good, for just as a man who 
depraves  himself  defrauds others of  the good  he  might  have 
done them, so a  rnan who  studies his  own iinprovell~ent  really 
serves others, because  he is rendering liimself  capable of being 
of  use to tl~em.~ 
Seneca then clearly maintains that the wise man is constantly 
bound  to the service of  society, and even if  possible to that of 
the State.  But he bids  men  remember, if  it seems impossible 
to serve the State, that there are after all Iwo commonwealths, 
the one  that of  the State in which we are born, the other the 
greater corninonwealth  of  which  the gods  are members as well 
as men, a commonwealth whose bounds are only to be measured 
with the circuit of  the sun ;  and he doubts whether the greater 
commonwealth  may not  be  best  served  in retirement, in phil- 
osophic meditation upon virtue, upon God and the world.4  Such 
philosophic meditation is itself  action ; nature calls us both  to 
act and to contemplate, and this contemplation  cannot be with- 
out action.6  Zeno and Chrysippus worked  more  for mankind 
than if  they had  led  the armies of  a nation  or  held  its offices 
or  made its laws:  they  made  laws not for  one  state but  for 
mankind.G  This conception  of  the universal  conlmonwealth is 
interesting  and  suggestive,  in  its  relation  to  the  theory  of 
human  nature, which  we  have  already considered.  We  nay 
perhaps  feel  that Seneca's  mode of  handling  the subject sug- 
gests to our minds some doubt whether his l~old  upon the con- 
ception  of  the organic relation of  human nature and progress 
to the organised society of  the State is quite certain.  Had the 
1 De Otio, iii. 
2  De Tranquillitate, v. 
De Otio, iii. 
De Otio, iv. 
9e  Otio, v.  8. 
De Otio, xxxii. 
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materials  been  more abundant, it would  have  been  interesting 
to consider its relation  to such a conception as that of  Origen, 
who  defends  the Christians  against  Celsus, who blamed  them 
for their  reluctance  to  take  office and  bear  arms:  he  urges 
that they are niembers of another society (u&a~~~a  rrarpl8o~), 
and that their service in the Church of  God is directed towards 
the salvation of mankind.'  There have, no doubt, been always 
traceable in the political theory of nlediaevnl and modern  times 
two  tendencies  of  thought, the one national, the other cosmo- 
politan, and though it is perfectly true that these ideas are not 
incompatible with each  other, yet historically they have some- 
times come into conflict. 
Seneca, then, has a very clear general view as to the necessity 
of  the State, of  its fundainental  importance in human life : lie 
is ever1 anxious  to  clear  the philosophers  of  his  time  of  the 
charge  which  seems  to  liave  been  commoilly  made  against 
them, that they  were  disloyal,  or  at least  indiflerent,  to  the 
State; he  urges  that no men  are  rnore  grateful to the State 
than  the philosophers, for it is under its protection  that  they 
are  able  to  enjoy  leisure  For  philosophic  meditatioa2  He 
fully recognises  that the State is  necessary  under  the actual 
conditions of  human  nature, if  only as a  remedy for  the cor- 
ruption  of  human  nature. 
With regard  to  the conception  of  liberty and the best form 
of  government  Seneca  seems to  waver  and hesitate.  If  Lac- 
tantius  is correct  in  attributing  to  Seneca  a  fragment which 
he  has  preserved, he gives  an account of  the expulsion of  the 
Tarquins, representing it as due to the hatred  of  slavery, and 
says that the Roman people determined to make the law rather 
than the king supreme.  The  Roman  Commonwealth  reached 
its maturity under this free government; but at last, when  ib 
had  conquered  the world,  it  turned its arms  upon  itself  and 
finally returned  as to  a  second  childhood  under  the rule  of 
one man.  Rome lost its liberty, and its old  age was  so infirm 
that it could not stand without  the support of  a  The 
l  Contra Ceisum, viii.  73.  76.  S  Lactantius, Div. Inst.,  vii. 15. 
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same  conception  of  the end  of  the Republic  1s  presented  in 
another place, where  Seneca praises  Cato, who, when his sword 
could  not give his countiy liberty, turned it upon  himself  and 
so liberated himself ,l and agaln, when  he speaks of  the same 
Cato  as  having  struggled  to  maintaln  the tottering  common- 
wealth, and when  it  fell, as  falling  with  it-for  Cato did  not 
survive liberty, nor  liberty Cato2  In these  passages  Seneca 
seems to think  of  liberty  as  being  related  to  a  certaln  form 
of  government, and that thls government is the only one suited 
to the character of  a rnature natlon. 
But in another  treatise  Seneca's  tone is  markedly different. 
He speaks Indeed in praise and admiration of  Brutus, but adds 
that in slaylng Czsar he gieatly erred, both  as a  philosopher 
and as a practical statesman  Brutus had  forgotten  the Stoic 
doctrine when  he allowed  himself  to  be  teirified  by the mere 
name of  king, for the best form of  State is the just  monarchy 
And he showed himself  a mail of  little  iiisight  into  the actual 
conditions of  Roman Society, when he refused  to recognise that 
the ancient character of  the Ronian people was gone, and that 
men  were  contending not  as to whether they should be  sub- 
jected  to  some  one  man, hut  only as  to  whom  they  should 
serve.s  Seneca gives us to understand that the technical Stoic 
doctrine  of  goveinment, lilie  the Aristotelian, treated the foim  - 
of  government as being a matter of  indifference  so  long  as its 
end was just, and the contrast with  Cicero's  view  is at least 
worth noting. 
His acquiescence  in the practical  necess~ties  of  Itoman llfe 
is also worth  observing,  and we  may  reasonably connect wlth 
this a very interesting  treatment of  the place  of  the Emperor 
in the State, which we find  in the 'De Clementia'  Seneca is 
recommending  clemency  to the Emperor,  and  appeals  to  his 
sense  of  responsibility,  to the  magnanimity of  soul  whlch  so 
great an ofhce requires.  The Prince should show himself  such 
towards hie  subjects as he would wish  the gods  to be  towards 
himself.'  He should remember that he out of  all nianlcind  has 
l "  Quare ahqua ~ncommoda,"  &c  11  De Ben, 11  20. 
Ad Serenum, "  Nec injur~am,"  &c,  '  De Clementia, 1.  7. 
l1 
CHU.  11 ]  THE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  SENECA  3 1 
been chosen to act in the place  of  the gods  the life and death, 
the fate and lot, of  all n~en  are 111  his hands  He is the source 
of  the lams wh~ch  he has drawn out of  darkness and obscurity, 
and  he  will  keep  himself  as though  he  were  to  render  an 
account to those  laws.2  The ruler, whether he is called  prince 
or king, or by whatever  other  name  he is known,  is the very 
soul  and  life of  the  commonwealth  He is  the bond  which 
keeps  the  State together,  and to 111s  protection,  therefore,  all 
the  people  will  devote  themselves3  Nothing  can  check  his 
anger,  not  even  those  who  suffer  under  his  sentences  will 
resist, how great then will be  his magnanimity  if he restrains 
himself  and uses his powei  well and gently 
These  phrases  are  evidently  rhetorical,  and  it  would  be 
unwise  to lns~st  too  much  upon  them,  but their  recognition 
of  absolutism,  and their tendency  to thlnk  of  this  as resting 
in some sense  upon the divine providence, are at least worth 
noticing  When  we  come  to  discuss  the  theories  of  the 
Chiistian  Fathers,  we  shall  have  to  consider  very  carefully 
this theory of  the divine  source of  government  and the divine 
authority of  the ruler  It  would  be  going  too far to say that 
Seneca  has any clearly defined  conception  of  this kind in his 
mind,  but it  is at least interesting  to  observe  111s  tendency 
towdrds this, and it may very well  be  compared with a simllar 
tendericy in Pliny's Panegyrlcus 
When we look back and try to sum up the general iesults of 
our examination of  Seneca's  polltlcal  theory,  we  see that the 
most  impoitant  difference  between  him  and  Cicero  1s  to  be 
found in  his  developed  theory  of  the  primitive  state of  in- 
nocence,  the  state  before  the  conventional  institutions  of 
society existed, and the consequent  theory  that these institu- 
tions are only the results of, and the remedies for, the vices  of 
human  nature  In the  course  of  our  investigation  we  shall 
have to consider the history of  this theory, to pursue it through 
many forms.  We must  again  obserie that, in Seneca's  judg- 
ment, the fact  that the innocent  and unconveiltional state was 
'  De Clement~a,  1  l , "qul  ~n terrls  De Clamentia, 1  3  and 4. 
deorum vlce fungerer 7  '  '  De Clernent~a  I  5 
De Clementia, 1  1  '  Pl~ny,  Paneg>ricus, 1. primitive  does  not  at all  mean  that  it  was  the  complete 
expression  of  the true nature of  man; on  the contrary, while 
we rnust admit such an occasional ambiguity in his  use  of  the 
phrase "nature" as we have pointed out, it is quite evident that 
Serieca  conceived  of  the primitive state as being one in which 
man  was  yet undeveloped  and imperfect, and that, while  the 
actually existing conditions of  society may be  unnatural in so 
far  as they  arise  from  the vices  and perversions  of  human 
nature, yet they are natural in so far as they are the methods 
by  which  man  may,  under  the  actual  conditions  of  life,  go 
forward and advance towards  perfection. 
PART 11. 
THE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  THE  ROMAN  LAWYERS, 
CHAPTER  111. 
THE  THEORY  OF THE  LAW  OF NATURE. 
WE have  in the previous  chapters  attempted to examine  the 
general  character  of  political  theory in the first century before 
Christ, and  the  first  century  after,  in order  that we  may  be 
better  able  to  understand the historical  position  and signifi- 
cance  of  the conceptions of  the Roman Lawyers of  the Digest 
and the Institutes of  Justinian, and the Christian Fathers from 
the first to the seventh century.  It will not be doubted by any 
one who is acquainted with the political theory of  the medi~val 
writers  that their conceptions are based in large measure upon 
the Lawyers and the Fathers.  They may often cite these in a 
very external and mechanical fashion, and, as we  hope  to show 
later, their political theory is as much affected by, and as closely 
related  to,  the  actual  conditions  of  their  own  times,  as  any 
other  living  system  of  political  thought,  yet  the  descent 
of  their  theories  from  those  of  the Lawyers  and Fathers  is 
unmistakable. 
In this section of  our work we propose to examine the general 
character  of  the political  theory  of  the lawyers.  We cannot 
nsefully  approach the Fathers  until we  have done  this, for it 
is  clear  that  the  theory  of  the Fathers  is  primarily  derived 
from that  current in their  time.  We shall have  to  consider 
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how  far these general conceptions of  their time  are modified 
under the influence of  strictly Christian or Jewish conceptions, 
but we  think it is certain  that the general structure of  their 
theory  is  in  no  way  original.  How  much  they  may  have 
derived  directly  from  the lawyers it may  be  difficult  to say, 
but we  must study the lawyers in order that we may come to 
some  conclusion  as to  the  general  character  of  the  political 
theory  of  the  Empire  apart  frorn  Christian  influence.  The 
Digest and the Institutes of  Gaius and Jnstinian are the best 
guides  which  we  have for  this inquiry, while  it may  be  true 
that there are a  good  many points  in which the Fathers may 
be thought to be  nearer  the general  opinion of  their time than 
the lawyers. 
It has been  sometimes supposed  that the jurists  are in the 
main disciples  of  one pl.lilosophical  school-that  they do more 
or less consistently adhere to the Stoic tradition.  We venture 
to think that there is no  sufficient  evidence for  such a judg- 
ment, that there is no sufficient reason for saying of  the lawyers 
as  a  body  that  they  belong  quite  distinctively  to  any  one 
philosophical  school.  It is  indeed  possible  that  some  of  the 
lawyers came  nearer  to this position  than others; the obvious 
divergence  among  the lawyers  on  the great  question  of  the 
jzcs  natzwale  ]nay  have  some  relation  to  disputes  which  are 
rather  philosophicd  than  legal.  But  in  the  main  it  would 
seem  that it is  best  to  regard  the  lawyers  not  as professed 
philosophers but rather as intelligent and able men, who when 
they turned frorn  the suficiently engrossing practical work  of 
the interpretation and application  of  law to the changing  con- 
ditions of  Roman Society and speculated  up011  the foundations 
of  Society  and  social  life,  took  up  the  conceptions  current 
among educated  men without very carefully  inquiring how far 
these were the doctrines of  one school of  philosophers rather than 
of  another.  Indeed one is more than half  disposed to think that 
Ulpian, who, if  any jurist,  might  be  thought to show  a specu- 
lative turn, intends to depreciate philosophy, when he somewhat 
pointedly contrasts the true philosophy of  the lawyer as such, 
the  study of  justice,  of  the lawful  and the unlawful,  of  the 
method  of  deterring men frorn  evil and drawing them to good, 
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with some feigned  and presumably unprofitable  system, which 
he does not further define.l  At the same time, it is true that 
in  some  very  important  points  the  Jurists seem  to follow a 
tradition  which  is the same as that  of  the Stoics, that  their 
conception  of  justice  and  of  the  nature  of  law  is  obviously 
related to that of  the Stoics and opposed to such views as those 
of Epicurus and the later Academics. 
The  lawyers, tlien, are not, properly  speaking, philosophers, 
or even  political  philosophers.  There is little or  no trace  in 
their work of  original reflection upon the nature of  Society and 
its institutions ; they seem to use the commonplaces of  the polit- 
ical  thought of  their  time just  as any intelligent  man  might 
use those of  the present day : natural law and natural equality 
do not perhaps mean much more to them than evolution or pro- 
gress mean to the modern  politician.  But it must at the same 
time be  recognised  that  the use  which  they made  of  certain 
conceptions not only serves to show us the general  tendencies 
of  political  thought in their time, but did much to give those 
conceptions  a  clearlless  and precision which  hitherto  they had 
scarcely possessed. 
We are fortunate in being able to examine the political theory 
of  the Roman Lawyers at two distinct periods, widely separated 
from each other  in time.  In Justinian's Digest are preserved 
fragments of  the worlr  of  the great lawyers of  the second  and 
the early  years of  the third  century, and in the Institutes of 
Justinian we have a handbook of  law drawn up by the lawyers 
of  Justinian's  Court in the sixth century.  In  the Code we have 
a  collection  of  the most  important  Imperial constitutions be- 
longing to the period  from Hadrian to Justinian, which  serve 
in some measure to illustrate the principles  of  law expounded 
in the Digest and Institutes.  We are thus able  to study the 
political  theory  of  the lawyers,  not  as a  thing  fixed  and un- 
alterable,  but  as living  and  changing;  we  are  able to  some 
extent  to  discover  which  of  the various  legal  theories  of  the 
second  century did  as a  matter  of  fact dominate the general 
course of thought: for though it is true that the writers of  the 
Institutes seem almost nervously anxious to combine the most 
Dlg.,  i.  1.  1. divergent views of  the great lawyers of  the second and third 
centuries into one whole, yet they are unable to prevent us from 
conclriding with some reasonable confidence as to the character 
of  their own opinions.  We are also able within the second and 
third centuries to trace in some measure the course of  political 
theory  and  to  study the conflict  of  opinion  between  various 
legal schools.  The selectionsl  of  which the Digest is made up 
are fortunately always cited with the names of  the authors, and 
though Justinian  warns us that by his authority the compilers 
of  the Digest were empowered to omit, and even alter, anything 
that seemed to them unwise or erroneous in the ancient writers, 
yet we have no reason to think that this power was very largely 
exercised.  We are able  in a  few  cases,  especially  in that of 
Gaius, whose Institutes have  been  preserved for us, to compare 
the original work  of  the great  lawyers with  the selections of 
the Digest; and though,  as  we  shall have  occasion  to notice, 
some  changes  seem  to have  been  made, yet our impression  is 
that  the  compilers  of  the  Digest  did  not  avail  themselves 
greatly  of  this  authority  to  alter  the  selections  which  they 
made,  at least  on  those  matters  with  which  we  are  here 
concerned. 
The first subject which  requires  our attention when  we  ap- 
proach  the political  theory  of  the lawyers  is  their theory  of 
natural law, its relation to the law of  nations and to the civil 
law.  The subject is certainly perplexed  and dificult, for  we 
may doubt whether any of  the lawyers had very  clear  concep- 
tions  upon  the matter, and it has  been  rendered  even  more 
obscure  by the attempt of  the compilers  of  Justinian's  Insti- 
tutes  to  combine  conceptions  of  the subject  which  are really 
incoherent, if not contradictory.  There is no doubt that we find 
in the great lawyers of  the second and third centuries not one 
view, but two.  There can be  no reasonable doubt that Gaius 
in the middle of  the second  century recognised  no opposition 
between  the jus  natuvale  and the jus  gentium;  while  Ulpian 
at the  end  of  the second  century  sharply  distinguishes  the 
one from the other.  UTe  shall endeavour to point out what we 
'  Cod.,  i.  17. 1, 7.  (Prefixed to Digest.) 
think  to  be  the significance  of  this  change  of  view  arid  the 
reasons  which  convince  us  that  the view  of  Ulpian  is that 
which  ultimately prevailed  and  so  became  the foundation  of 
the medizval  theory  upon  the subject. 
We cannot  approach the subject better  than  by  examining 
the views  of  Gaius upon  the ~ZLS  gentium.  In the first words 
of  his Institutes, which are also  embodied in the Digest, there 
are two propositions which  are of  the greatest importance: the 
first, that the jus  gentium is universal, embodies principles which 
are recognised by all mankind ;  the second, that these principles 
have  been  taught men  by naturalis 7atio.l  We must turn to 
other  passages  for  additional  details  with  regard  to  the jus 
gantium.  In a  section  of  the  Digest  taken  from  a  work  of 
Gaius which  has not  been  preserved, and in which  Gaius dis- 
cussed  the origin  of  property in various  things,  we  have  the 
important statement  that  the jus  gentium  is coeval  with  the 
human  race,-embodies  those  principles  which  from  the first 
beginnings  of  human  life  were  taught  to  mankind  by  their 
natural  rea~on.~  In a  third  passage  Gaius  connects  with the 
jzds  gentium  another quality of  great importance.  Property by 
"tradition,"  he says, belongs  to the jus  gentium, and is clearly 
consistent  with  natural  eq~ity.~ 
When we put together these various conceptions which Gaius 
connects with the jus  gentium,  we  see that he  conceives of  it 
as  that  body  of  principles  or  laws  which  men  have  always 
learned from their reason to recognise  as useful  and just.  The 
jus  gentizm is primitive, universal, rational, and equitable. 
Uaius,  Inst.,  i.  1 ; Dig.,  i.  1.  9 : 
"  Omnes populi qui legibus et moribus 
reguntur,  partim suo proprio,  partim 
communi omnium hominum jure utun- 
tur; nam quod  quisque populus  ipse 
sibi jus  constituit,  id ipsius proprium 
eat,  vocaturque  jus  civile,  quasi  jus 
proprium civitatis ; quod vero naturalis 
ratio  inter  omnes  homines constituit, 
id  apud omnes  populos  perzque cus- 
toditur vocaturque jua  gentium, quasi 
quo jure omnes gentes utuntur. " 
a  Dig.,  xli.  1.  1:  "Quaruudam 
reruru  dominiurn  nancisci~uur jure 
gentium,  quod  ratione  naturali  inter 
omnes homines perEeque servatur, quar- 
undam  jure  civili,  id  est  jure  pro- 
prio  civitatis  nostrz.  EC  quia  anti- 
quiua  jus  gentium  cum  ipso  genere 
humano proditum est, opus est, ut de 
hoc prius referendum sit. " 
Dig.,  xli.  1.  9,  3 : "Hae  quoque 
res  quae  traditione  nostrae fiunt jure 
gentium nobis adquiruntur : nihil enim 
tam  conveniens  est  naturali  sequitati 
quam voluntatem domini volentis rem 
suam in alium transferre ratam haberi." 38  POLITICAI,  THEORY  OF  ROMAN  LAWYERS.  [PART  11. 
Gaius does  not  often  use  the phrase jus  natzsmle, but from 
those passages  in his writings where it occurs we  conclude that 
it has much  the same meaning to him as ratio natuvalis.  In 
his Institutes he speaks in one  sentence of  property as being 
alienated and transferred by "  tradition " under the  jzss  naturale, 
and in the next, refers to this as agreeable to natzsmlis rati0.l 
There is no trace  in any writing  of  Gaius which  has survived 
to us of  any opposition  between  the jus  gentium  and the jus 
natzsrale;  such an opposition would  indeed seem  to be  wholly 
incompatible  with  the  character  of  the  jzcs  gentizcm  as  he 
conceives  it. 
It would  seem, then,  that  the jus  gentium  of  Gaius is not 
greatly different from natural law  as we  have  seen that Cicero 
understood  it, except that, as we  may  perhaps  say,  Cicero  is 
thinking of  this as a part of  the eternal law of  God, while Gaius 
is only thinking of  law in relation to the world.  But they agree 
in thinking of  law as a rational and just principle of  life which 
is not enacted  by  men, but is the expression  of  the universal 
and natural reason  and  sense  of  justice.  The  theory  of  law 
which is held by Gains, then, is not limited to the conception of 
the positive  law of  any one state, but is founded upon  a  con- 
ception  of  law,  universal,  primitive,  and  rational.  We shall 
see  later that the civil law of  any particular  state is at least 
in some measure dominated by this general principle of  law. 
We may  infer  that Gaius  is,  like Cicero,  a  follower  of  the 
Stoic theory  of  law  and justice,  regarding  them not  as some- 
thing which men create for their own utility, but as something 
which  they learn.  Law in its general sense  does  not  express 
the will of  man, but is rather  that which  he rationally appre- 
hends and obeys.  The conception of  the jus  gentium which we 
derive from an examination of  these  passages  of  Gaius is the 
same as that expressed  in the definition  of  the j~s  naturale, 
which Paulus, a lawyer of  somewhat later date, gives  us.2  We 
have  no  reason  to think that Paulus drew any distinction  be- 
1 Gsius, Inst., ii. 65 and 66.  dicitur,  ut est  jus  naturale.  Altero 
2  Dig.,  i.  1.  11 :  "Jus  pluribus  modo,  quod  omnibua  aut pluribus  in 
modis dicitur :  uno modo, cum id quod  quaque  civitate  utile  eat,  ut esC  jus 
semper  wquum  ac  bonum  est  jum  civile." 
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tween the ,jus naturale  and the .jus gentizcnz,--we  have  no  evi-  .  . 
dence that he did  so; and in any case this definition does  not 
seem  to  take  any  such  distinction  into  account,  and  indeed 
seems clearly, at least for the purpose in hand, to exclude it. 
Gaius then recognises no distinction between the  jus  natzcrale 
and the jus gentizsm.  In the beginning of  the third century we 
find three lawyers who do clearly oppose the jus gentium to the 
jus  natu~ale  or natura.  Tryphoninus  says that liberty belongs 
to the  jus  nnturale, and that lordship was introduced from  the 
jus  gentiu7n.l  Florentinus asserts that slavery is an institution 
of  the jus  gentium, by  which  one man  is,  contrary  to nature, 
subjected  to another.2  Ulpian  expresses the same opposition 
when he says that the manumission of  slaves belongs to the  jzcs 
gentiunz, for  by  the j?cs  naturale all men  were  born  free arid 
slavery was  unknown ; but  when  slavery came  in by  the jus 
yenti~cw,  then  manumission  also  came  in?  Ulpian  has  also 
drawn out the distinction between  the jzcs  gentir~nz  and the jus 
naturale in set terms.  Private law, he says, is tripartite-it  is 
gathered from natural precepts, or those of  nations, or civil laws ; 
there are three kinds of  jus,  the jus  naturale, the jz~s  gentium, 
and  the jus  civile.  And  he  goes  on  to  define  their  several 
characters.  The jus  naturale  is that which  nature has taught 
all animals ;  it is not peculiar to the human race, but belong3 to 
all animals.  From  this  law  springs the  union  of  male  and 
female, the procreation  and bringing  up of  children.  The jzjiu 
gentium, on the other hand, is that law which  the nations  of 
mankind  observe:  this is different from natural law, inasmuch 
as that belongs to all animals, while this is peculiar to men.' 
l  Dig., sii. 6.  64 : "  Ut enim libertas 
naturali jure  continetur  et dominstio 
ex  gentium  jure  introducta  est."  (I 
owe this reference to an article on  the 
"History  of  the Law  of  Nature : a 
preliminary study," by Sir F.  Pollock.) 
Dig.,  i.  5.  4 : "Servitus  eat con- 
stitutio juris gentium, qua quis dominio 
alieno contra naturam subicitur." 
3  Dig.,  i.  1.  4 : "  Manumissiones 
quoque juris  gentium aunt . . . qurc 
res a  jure gentium originem  sumpsit, 
utpote cum jure naturali omnes liberi 
naacerentur nec esset nota manumissio, 
cum  servitus  esset  incognita :  sed 
posteaquam  jure  gentium  servitus in- 
vasit,  secutum  est  beneficium  manu- 
mi~sionis." 
.'  Dig.,  i.  1. 1, 2, 3,  and 4 :  Priva- 
tum  jus  tripertitum  est ; collectun~ 
etenim  est  ex  naturalibus  prsceptis 
aut gentium aut civilibus.  Jus natur- 
ale  est,  quod  natura  omnia  animalia 
docuit : nam  jus  istud  non  humar~i 
generis  proprium,  sed  omnium  ani- 
malium, qus  in terra, qu:e  in mari naa- In  considering this subject we must be careful to keep clearly 
apart the two points suggested by these phrases of  Ulpian : first, 
the definite separation of  the jus  natzcrale from  the jus gentium, 
which  is conllnon to the tliree jurists ; and secondly, Ulpian's 
definition of the jus  naturale, which is peculiar to himself.  The 
first is clear  and  distinct; whatever may be  the character of 
the  difference,  the fact  of  the  difference  is something  quite 
unambiguous.  We  cannot  say  the same  with regard  to his 
definition  of  the jus  naturccle. 
As Ulpian presents this here, the jus  naturale would  seem  to 
be something of  the nature  of  the general instinct of  animals, 
not  properly  speaking  rational  or  ethical; while  he does  not 
actually contrast the ratioud character of  the jus gentizcnt with 
the irrational instinct  of  the jzcs  naturale, at least he says that 
it is peculiar to men.  To consider the definition fully, we must 
notice Ulpian's  use of  the phrases  Natural Law and Nature in 
other places.  The first passage where the phrase  recurs is that 
to  which  we  have already  referred, in which he tells  us  that 
manumission is an institution of  the jus gentium, for by natural 
law all men were born free.l  Another passage which may very 
well be compared with this we find  in the fiftieth  book  of  the 
Digest.  In this Ulpian says, that as far as concerns the civil 
law slaves  are held pro  nullis; but this  is not so by natural 
law,  for as far as natural law  is concerned all men are equaL2 
In another place  he says that a  man  seems  "  naturaliter"  to 
possess  that of  which  he  has the usufruct ;  and  again,  that 
nothing is so natural as that an agreement should be dissolved by 
the same method as that by which it was made ;  and in another 
cuntur,  avium  quoque  commune  est. 
Hrnc  descendit  maris  atque  feminz 
conjunctio,  quam  nos  matrimoilium 
appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio, 
hinc  educatio : videmus  etenim cetera 
quoque  auimalia,  feras  etiarn  istius 
juris peritia censeri.  Jus gentium est, 
quo  gentes  humanse  utuntur.  Quod 
a  naturali  recedere  facile  intellegere 
licet,  quia  illud  omnibus  animalibus, 
hoc solis hominibus  inter  se commune 
sit." 
l  Dig.,  i.  1. 4. 
Dig.,  1.  17. 32 : "Quod  attinet ad 
jus  civile,  servi  pro  nullis  habentur: 
non tamen et jure naturali, quia, quod 
ad jus naturale attinet, omnes homines 
sequales sunt." 
Dig., xli.  2.  12 : "  Naturaliter vide- 
tur  possidere  is  qui  usum  fructum 
habet." 
Dig., 1.  17. 35 : "  Nihil tam natur- 
ale  est  quam  eo  genere quidque  dis- 
solvere,  quo colligatum  est." 
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passage still he says that it is by nature just that a man should 
enjoy another man's  liberality oiily so long as the donor wishes? 
We do not feel very clear as to the judgment which ought to 
be pronounced on the meaning of  natural law and nature in these 
passages : they are not perhaps  absolutely inconsistent with the 
character  of  the precise  definition we have already quoted, but 
yet they leave with  us  the impression  that they do  not quite 
correspond  with  it.  When Ulpian  says that  by  natural law 
men  were  once free and are still equal, it scarcely  seems ade- 
quate to explain this as meaning that  as far as their animal 
instinct  was  concerned  they  were  free  and  equal,  but  by  a 
rational system of  order  they are unequal and some  are slaves 
of  others.  We doubt whether  Ulpian had  really arrived  at a 
complete  and  coherent  conception  of  the  law  of  nature:  it 
would  rather seem  that he had  for  some  reason  judged  that 
some  distinction  between  the  law  of  nature  and  the  law  of 
nations should be made, but that he was not very clear as to the 
nature of  the distinction. 
We do not  get much  help towards understanding  this dis- 
tinction from the other jurists.  We have seen that Florentinus 
and Tryphoninus  make  the same distinction as Ulpian, but we 
do not possess any definition either of  the  jz6s  naturale or the  jzcs 
gentium written by them.  We can only say that the character 
of  the opposition between the jus  yentium  and the jus  naturale 
or natura, as they present it, does  not suggest that they under- 
stood jus  naturale  or  natura to be  equivalent  to an animal 
instinct.  Of  the other jurists  of  the second century, as far as 
the fragments of  their work  enable us to judge,  some  appear 
to make no  distinction between  the jus  natzcrale  and the jz~s 
gentium, while others give us no indication of  their view.  Mar- 
cianus  and Paulus  seem  to know nothing  of  the distinction ; 
Pomponius uses the phrase jzcs nalurce, but does not define it.4 
So far, then, as the lawyers of  the second and third centuries 
are concerned,  we  cannot  say  that we  can  get  a  clear light 
upon the nature of  the distinction between the Law  of  Nature 
l  Dig., xliii.  26.  2 : "  Est enim  na-  Vig., i.  8.  2 and 4. 
tura quum  tamdiu te liberalitate mea  Dig., i.  1. 11. 
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and the Law  of  Nations:  the fact  of  the distinction  is  clear, 
the  ground  of  the distinction  reiriains  soniewhat  uncertain. 
We  think  that  we  can  find  an explanation  of  this  with  the 
help of  a  passage  cited  in the Digest from  the writings  of  a 
jurist  of  the  fourth  century,  a  passage  in  the  Institutes of 
Justinian, and  the  definition  of  the jus  nafi~~rule  and the jus 
gentiz~nz  given  by  St Isidore of  Seville,  a  Christian  writer  of 
the beginning  of  the seventh century. 
There is preserved  in the Digest a passage from the writ'ings 
of  Hermogenianus,  a jurist  of  the time of  Constantine, which 
is  undoubtedly  interesting, though  not  free from  ambiguities. 
We  have  here  a  list  of  institutions  which  come  under  the 
jzbs  gentium,l  and  we  have  the  strong  impression  that  Her- 
mogenianus is contrasting these with  other  institutions which 
belong to the jzcs  natu~ale  or giving an account of  the origin of 
institutions which had no existence under the jz~s  naturale.  This 
impression  is difficnlt  to  resist  when  we  conipare  with  Her- 
mogenianus the other passages to which we have just referred. 
In the first  of  these  the  compilers  of  tlie  Institutes,  after 
giving an account of  the jus  natz~rale,  the jus gentizbnz, and tlie 
jus  civile, come  back  to  the subject  of  the jus  gentium  and 
explain  that  it is  a  system  of  law colnmon  to  all mankind 
and represents the experience of  the human race, for in process 
of  time wars, captivities, and slavery arose, and these are con- 
trary to the jus  nat,urale.2  We cannot say that the writers of 
the Institutes had  the passage  of  Herrnogenianus  immediately 
before  them, but there is  certainly a  considerable correspond- 
ence of  thought between their words and his. 
St Isidore also defines the $s  nntzc~ale  and the jus  civile, and 
1 Dig.,  i.  1.  5 :  "Ex  hoc jure  gen- 
tium introducta bella, discreta, gentes, 
regna  condita, dominia distincta, agris 
termini  positi,  sdificia collocata,  com- 
mercium,  emptiones venditiones, loca- 
tiones  conductiones,  obligationes  in- 
stitutse: exceptis  quibusdam qua jure 
civili  introducts sunt." 
Vnst.,  i. 2.  2 : "  Jus autem gentium 
omni  humano  goneri  commune  est. 
Nam usu exigente  ei;  humanis necessi- 
tatibus  gentes  humans  qusdam sibi 
constituerunt :  bella etenim orta sunt et 
captivitates secute et servitutes, qus 
sunt  juri  naturali  contrarie.  Jure 
enim naturali ab initio omnes homines 
liberi nascebantur.  Ex hoc jure gen- 
tium et omnes pane contractus intro- 
ducti sunt, ut emptio venditio, locatio 
conductio,  societas,  depositum,  mu- 
tuum et alii  innumerehiles. " 
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then comes to thejzbs gentizc?~~,  and gives us a list of  tlie institu- 
tions  which  belong  to  this,  such as wars,  captivities,  slavery, 
treaties of  peace, &c.l  Again, we cannot  say that St Isidore's 
definition  is founded  upon  the  passage  from  Hermogenianus, 
but at least it seems to us clearly to belong to  the same tradi- 
tion and to be closely related to the passage in the Institutes. 
The impression which  these passages  leave upon  us is this: 
that the writers have  present  to their  miiids  some  primitive 
circumstances,  sollie  primeval  or  natural  institutions  of  the 
human race, as distinguished  from  even  the oldest  and most 
universal conventional institutions of  human society.  St  Isidore 
indeed  describes  the jus  naturale  as that  which  is  held "in- 
stinct~  naturze, non constitutione aliqua."  We think that the 
position  of  Ulpian,  Florentinus,  and Tryphoninus  may  legit- 
imately be interpreted with their assistance.  We  should suggest 
that the cause whicli  produced  the theory of  a  law behind the 
universal  law  of  all  nations  was  a  judgment,  that  some  at 
least  of  the  institutions  whicli  were  as  a  matter  of  fact 
universal,  and  were  reckoned  to  belong  to  the jus  gentiunz, 
could  not  be  looked  upon  as, properly  speaking,  primitive or 
natural in the full  sense  of  the word.  We venture  to think 
that here we trace the influence of  tliat mode  of  thought about 
the  primitive  conditions  of  hunian  life  which  we  have  seen 
in Seneca, and which we  may gatller was  representative of  the 
general character of  at least some Stoic theories. 
Ulpian  clearly  conceived  of  man  as  having  originally 
been  free,  and  maintained  that  slavery  only  came  in  later.3 
That is,  with respect at least to the institution of  slavery  he 
has in his mind  some  primitive state, before this conventional 
institution was introduced.  Florentinus  and Tryphoninus  do 
not  throw any  clear  light  on  the  sub,jcct, but  they  seem  to 
agree  with  Ulpian.  There  are  no  direct  references,  so  far 
l  St Isidore of  Seville,  Etymologies,  gentium,  quod  eo  jure  omnes  fcre 
V.  6 : "  Jus gentiurn est sedium occu.  gentes utuntur." 
patio,  sdificatio,  munitio,  bella,  cap-  St  Isid., Etym.,  v.  4. 
tivitates,  servitutes,  postliminia,  fed-  Dig., i.  1.  4. 
era  pacis,  induciz,  legatorurn  non  Dig., i.  5.  4. 
violandorum  religio,  connubia  inter  Dig., xii.  6. 64. 
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as we  have been  able  to see, in the lawyers of  the Digest to 
a  primitive  state of  nature; but we  think  that this is really 
implied in the attitude of  Ulpian, Florentinus, and Tryphoninus 
to  slavery.  We should  suggest  that it is  in con~~ex~on  with 
this that the distinction between  the jus naturale and the jus 
gentium  arose.  The  passage  from  Hermogenianus  which  we 
have already cited  seems to us to belong  to a further develop- 
ment of  the same theory.  We shall see in a later chapter that 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Christian  Fathers generally 
accept  the theory  of  the  primitive  state  of  nature  in which 
the conventional institutions of  society did  not  yet exist, while 
they  give  this  theory  a  peculiar  turn  by  bringing  it  into 
connexion  with  the theory  of  the fall. 
We think  therefore  that  the  distinction  made  by  Ulpian 
between  the jz~s  mturale and the jus  gerztium is really connected, 
though Ulpian  may not have been  fully conscious of  the fact, 
with  a  tendency to conceive of  some  state of  nature  as lying 
behind  the actual conditions  of  human  life.  Ulpian's  defini- 
tion of the  jus naturale is not governed by this mode of  thought ; 
but we would suggest that this should be taken mainly as illus- 
trating  the  fact  that  he  had  not  arrived  at any very  clear 
conception  of the whole subject.  At least, whatever doubt we 
may  continue  to  feel as to  the  true significance  of  Ulpian's 
distinction and  definition, there  can  be  little  doubt  that the 
tendency of legal theory was towards the distinction between the 
primitive and the conventional of  which we  have spoken.  The 
Institutes of  Justinian not only reproduce  Ulpian's  tripartite 
definition of jus,  but in the passage we have already cited 1 they 
more or less definitely give us an account of  the process through 
which the institutions of  the jus gentium came into existence. 
What the ultimate significance of  this theory of  natural law, 
as embodying the primitive principles of human life, was to be, 
we shall have  occasion to consider later: we  shall see  in the 
Christian Fathers that  the natural law represents  a  body  of 
principles more or less ideal and adapted to a state of  innocence, 
but not therefore related  to the actually existing condition  of 
imperfection. 
1 Inst., i  2. 2. 
CHAPTER  1V. 
SLAVERY  AND  PROPERTY. 
IN  considering the subject of  natural law and the law of  nationa 
toe have cited many of  the passages which  relate  to the theory 
of slavery and equality.  But the subject is one of  such import- 
ance that even at the risk  of  some repetition we  must examine 
some of  these over again.  We have seen that there is no point 
in which the Aristotelian  mode of  thought is more sharply con- 
trasted with that of  Cicero and Seneca than in the treatment of 
the equality of  human  nature.  We have suggested  that this 
change in the  conception of  the  actual  conditions  of  human 
nature  can  be  accounted  for  in  large  measure  by  the  new 
experience of  the cosmopolitan  Empires,  by  the fact that the 
Greeks  in impressing  their culture upon  the countries  of  the 
Mediterranean seaboard discovered that after all the barbarian 
was possessed  of  reason  and capable of  virtue  and of  culture. 
However the change of  conception may have taken place, there 
is no doubt that it did come about, there is no doubt that both 
Cicero and Seneca bear  evidence to the fact that the older view 
was disappearing.  It  is of  great importance to make ourselves 
clear upon  the position  of  the Roman lawyers with regard  to 
this matter : we  may well  imagine  that the technical  lawyers 
would be the last to yield to the new views, the most  conserva- 
tive  of  conceptions  relating  to  so  great  and  fundamental  a 
social  institution  as that of  slavery. 
When we examine the writers of  the '  Digest '  in their chrono- 
logical order, we discover that the appearance of  the distinction, 
which we  have been  considering, between  the natural law and 
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ance  of  certain  new  phrases  about  l~~unan  nature,  with  the 
dogmatic assertion  of  natural  liberty  and  equality.  It must 
not be  supposed, however, that the older jurists  of  the Digest 
show  us  any trace  of  a  belief  that  slavery is founded  upon 
natural inequality.  If they are silent on the theory of natural 
equality, they are equally silent, so far as we have found, on the 
opposite theory. 
Gaius nowhere gives  us  any complete account  of  the origin 
of  slavery.  He assuules the distinction between  the slave and 
the freeman  as being one of  pri~riary  importance in the classifi- 
cation of  the law of  persons,l and hc gives us an account of  the 
legal position of  the slave and says that the slave is in  potestate, 
and that this condition of  slavery exists under the jz~s  gentiun~, 
that everywhere the masters  have  the power  of  life  and death 
over their slaves, and that whatever the slave acquires belongs 
to his master.Vn another passage of the Digest he is cited as 
laying it down that slavery arises from capture in war.3  This 
is  the only explanation  of  the origin  of  slavery  wllicl~  Gaius 
gave,  so  far at  least  as  the  evidence  of  his  remains  goes. 
Marcianus,  a  later jurist,  is  cited  in the Digest  as laying it 
down  that slaves corrle  into our possession  by  the ji~s  gentiunt 
when  they  are  captured  in  war  or  are  born  of  our  slave 
won~en.~  We may conjecture  that his statement would  repre- 
sent the views  of  Gaius as  well as of  himself.  These jurists 
then  look  upon  slavery as  an institution of  the ,jus gentizcm, 
and taking into account what Gaius meant by the jus gentium, 
we  infer that they looked  upon the institution  as rational and 
just;  but they  must  not  therefore be  understood  to hold  the 
sarne views with regard to the inequality of  human nature as 
Aristotle.  Indeed  it is noticeable  enough  that they have  no 
explanation to offer of  the origin of  the institution, except as 
connected  with  war. 
When we  come  to Ulpian, Tryphoninus, and Florentinus  at 
the close  of  the second  century, we  find that remarkable turn 
of  theory  whose  expression  we  have  already  noticed  in  con- 
Cfaius,  Inst., i.  9 ;  Dig., i.  5.  3.  statim capientium fiunt . . . adeo qui. 
Gaius, Inst ,  i. 52.  Dig., i.  6. 1.  dem ut et liberi  homines  in  servitu. 
Dig.,  xli.  1.  5,  7 : "  Item  quae  tem deducantur." 
cx  hostibus  crtpiuntur  jure  gentium  Dig.,  i.  5.  5,  1. 
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sidering the meaning of  "natural  law."  It will  be  as well  to 
put  together  these  phrases  in  this  new  connexion.  In the 
first place we may perhaps  put the fa~rlous  phrase of  Ulpian: 
"  Quod  ad jus  naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt."' 
It is just  possible  that  this  phrase  is a  little more  technical 
than might at first  sight appear, for  Ulpian  is evidently dis- 
cussing the legal position of  the slave, and tlie equality of  which 
he  speaks  may  conceivably  have  had  primarily  a  technical 
signification,  as equal  in  position  before  the  law.  Still, the 
phrase  is  very  noteworthy  in  its  bold  and  direct  character. 
The impression it  makes is not weakened but rather confirmed 
when we turn to his equally famous phrase, "  cum jure naturali 
omnes  liberi nas~erentur."~  Slavery had  no  place  under  the 
.jus  natu~ale,  but came  in under  the jzcs  gentizcm.  By the law 
of  nature  men  were  free  and  equal. 
When we turn to Florentinus we feel that this  conception  of 
the natural freedom  of  man  is  again  contirmed.  Slavery  is 
au institution of  the jus geiztizcn~  aud contrary to nature.  We 
even seem to trace a half-apologetic tone in the farnous explana- 
tion of  the na:ue "  servus " which  Florentinrls adds.  The slave 
is called so  because  he is preserved  alive and not slain  as he 
nligllt be by the laws of  war.3  Tryphoninus, again, expresses the 
same judgment with great clearness, when he says that liberty 
belongs  to natural  law,  lordship  was  introduced  by  the jus 
yentiz~nz  .4 
l  Pis , 1.  17.  32 : '$Quad  attinet 
ad jus civile, servi pi o nullis habentur : 
non tamen et jure naturali, quia, quod 
ad jus uaturale attinet, omnes horxlines 
requales sunt." 
Dig.,  i.  1.  4 : "  Mdnumibsiones 
quoque juris gentium sunt.  Est autem 
manumissio  de  manu  miqsio,  id  est 
datio libertatis : nam quamdiu quis in 
servitute est,  manui et potestati  bull- 
positus  est, manumissus liberatur  DO- 
testate.  Quae  re8  a  jure  gentium 
or~ginem  sumpsit,  utpote  cum  jure 
naturali omnes  liberi nascerentur  nec 
esset  nota  mannmisiio,  cum  bervitus 
esset incognita : sec1  ~~osteaquam  jure 
gentium servitus invabit,  secutum est 
beneficium  manumissionis.  Et cum 
uno  naturali  nomine  homines  appel- 
laremur, jure gentium tria genera eaBe 
caperunt:  liberi  et  his  coutrariunl 
servi  et tertium  genus liberti,  id est 
hi qui desierant  esse servi." 
Dig, i. 5. 4 : "  Libertas est natur- 
alis  fecultas  ejus  quod  cuique  facere 
libet, nisi  si quid vi nut jure  prohibe- 
tur.  Servitus est constitutio juris gen- 
tiuni,  qua  quis domil~io  alieno  contra 
naturam suk~icitur.  Servi ex eo appel- 
lati  sunt,  quod  imperatores  captivos 
vendere ac per  hoc  servare nec occid- 
ere srdent." 
4  Dig,, xii. 6. 64 : 'l  Ut enim libertas 
naturi~l~  jure  ~v~~tinetur  et dominatio 
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It may  be  urged  that these  are meaningless phrases, illus- 
trating  only  the  progress  of  an  unpractical,  sentimental 
speculation, which had  no  relation  to the actual conditions of 
life.  We think that this would  be  an exaggerated  mode  of 
speaking.  These sentiments, just as those of  Cicero and Seneca, 
were  indeed  held  by men  of  whom  we  may  fairly  say  that 
they never dreamed of  overturning the actually existing  con-  . 
ditions  of  society which were founded  upon  the institution  of 
slavery,  but that is not  the  same thing as  to  say that their 
phrases  were  meaningless  and  had  no  relation  to the actual 
facts  of  life.  We have  seen  that  the  sentiment  of  hunlan 
equality  was  the  result  of  the  actual  experience  of  the 
Mediterranean  world,-that  it only  represents  in  theory  an 
experience in fact.  We venture  to think  that the  theory  of 
equality  could  not  but  react  upon  the  theory  of  slavery, 
could not but alter the judguient  of  men as to its origin; and 
when we turn to examine  the actual conditions  of  slavery  as 
they are illustrated  in the Roman  Jurisprudence, we  see  that 
the change of  theory was at least parallel with a change in the 
conditions of  slavery. 
If we turn back to that plirase of  Gaius in which, as we have 
already seen, he describes  the legal  condition  of  the slave, we 
shall find it useful  to notice  that the words to which we  have 
referred  are followed  by a  sentence in which  he tells  us that 
the unrestricted  power  of  the master  over  his  slave, of  which 
he has just spoken, did not any longer  exist within the Roman 
Empire, and that all excessive cruelty on the part of  the master 
was  pr0hibited.l  In the Digest, where these words are quoted, 
the compilers  seem  to have  inserted "  legibus  cognita"  after 
l Gdus,  Inst.,  i.  53 : "  Sed  lloc 
tempore  neque  civibus  Romanis,  nec 
ullis  aliis  hominibus qui sub imperio 
populi  Romani  sunt,  licet  supra 
modum  et sine causa  in  servos  auos 
szvire : nam ex constitutione sacratis- 
simi  imperatoris  Antonini,  qui  sine 
causa servum suum occiderit non minus 
teneri jubetur, quam qui alienum ser- 
vum occiderit.  Sed et major  quoque 
asperitas dominorum per ejusdem prin- 
cipis  constitutionem  coercetur : %am 
consultus  a  quibusdam  prssidibus 
provinciarum  de  his  servis,  qui  ad 
fana deorum re1 ad statuas principum 
confugiunt,  precepit  ut,  si  intoler- 
abilis  videatur  dominorum  stevitia, 
cogantur  servoq  suos  vendere ; et 
utrumque rectefit : male  enim nostro 
jure uti non deberuus ;  qua ratione et 
prodigis interdicitur bonorurn  suorum 
adminiutratio." 
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'I sine causa " and to have  read "  puniri " for "  teneri," l changes 
which  are interesting as exhibiting the tendency to a growing 
strictness. 
It is certainly worth noticing  that the Roman Law had thus 
begun to limit the strict rights of  the master and to interfere 
in  the  condition  of  the  slave.  In  other  references  in  the 
Digest we  can  trace this  tendency back  to the middle  of  the 
first  century.  Modestinus  tells  us  that,  by  an edict  of  the 
Emperor  Claudius, if  a  slave were  deserted  by  his  master  on 
account of  his  suffering from severe illness, he was  to receive 
his freedom ;  and that  Vespasian decreed the liberation of  slave 
women  whose  masters prostituted  them, when  they  had  been 
sold under the condition  that lhey should not .be pro~tituted.~ 
Ulpian says that Hadrian had banished for five years  a  certain 
lady, who  on  the very  slightest grounds  had  outrageously ill- 
treated  her  slave women.* 
UIpian gives us at length a rescript of  Antoninus Pius which, 
as he understands  it, defines  the law in the case  of  a  master 
outrageously  ill-treating  his  slaves  or  driving  them  to  un- 
chastity.  The  Emperor  is anxious  not  to  interfere  with  the 
rights of  masters, but he judges  that it is to their interest that 
those who are unjustly ill-treated should  be  protected, and he 
therefore, in a particular case referred  to, orders that the slaves 
who had fled to the Emperor's statue-if  it  was found that they 
had  been  treated  with  greater  severity than was just,  or had 
been  infamously  injured-should  be  sold, and not restored  to 
their  masters.6 
It  is natural and reasonable  to connect  these  tendencies  of 
Dig., i.  6.  1, 2. 
Dig.,  xl. 8.  2. 
Dig., xxxvii.  14. 7. 
Dig.,  i.  6. 2. 
Dig.,  i.  6.  2 : ''Si  dominua  in 
servos  ssvierit  vel  ad  impudicitiam 
turpemque violationem  compellat, qu~e 
sint  partes  przsidis,  ex rescripto divi 
Pii ad Blium Marcianum  proconsulem 
Bztica  manifestabitur.  Cujus  re- 
scripti verba  hsc sunt : '  Dominorum 
quidem potestatem  in  suos hervos  illi- 
batam esse oportet nec cuiquam hom- 
VOL.  S. 
inum  jus  suum  detrahi:  sed  domin- 
orum  interest,  ne  auxilium  contra 
ssvitiam vel  famem  vel  intolerabilem 
injuriam  denegetur  his  qui  juste 
deprecantur.  Ideoque  cognosce  de 
querellia  eorum,  qui  ex  familia  Julii 
Sabini ad  statuam confugerunb,  et si 
vel  durius  habitos  quam  equum est 
vel  infami  injuria affect08 cognoveris, 
veniri jube ita, ut in potestate domini 
non  revertantur.  Qui si mes consti- 
tutioni  fraudem  fecerit,  sciet  me  ad- 
miasum  severius  exsecuturum."' 
D the Xonlan jurisprudence  to regulate and ameliorate  the con- 
dition of  the slave with that great change in the conception of 
human  nature of  which  we  have  spoken.  It will  be  remem- 
bered  that Cicero  urges  that the slave should be treated with 
jnstice, and that Seneca  exhorts men to live with their slaves 
as friends  and  companions:  the tendency  of  the Roman  law 
to recognise  certain elementary claims of  humanity is naturally 
to be  related  to  the recognition  of  the fact that the slave was 
essentially of  the same nature and possessed of  the same powers 
of  reason  and virtue as his  master.  We are well  aware that 
the great changes in the position  of  the slave and the gradual 
disappearance  of  slavery in Europe  must  be  traced  in  large 
measure to the operation of  econonlic forces, just as is the case 
with  the disappearance  of  villeinage in later times; but it is 
not therefore necessary to overlook  the influence of  the senti- 
ment of  human nature on social conditions.  The economic and 
ethical foundations of  society are not to be separated from each 
other,  nor  will  historical  truth  be  best  served  by  insisting 
exclusively  on one aspect  of  human  life alone. 
Whatever  may  be  our  judgment  upon  the matter, it is at 
least  of  importance  to  observe  the  fact  that  the  lawyers, 
as well  as  those  writers  whom  we  have  already  examined, 
clearly indicate  that the theory of  natural inequality had dis- 
appeared, and that at least by the end of  the second  century 
the theory of  a natural  equality and natural liberty of  human 
nature was firmly established.  In later chapters we shall have 
to consider the relation of  these theories to Christianity, but in 
the meantime we must make it clear to ourselves that Christiau- 
ity did not produce these theories  of  human nature, but rather 
brought  the same  theories  with  it, whether  derived from  the 
same general  sources or  having antecedents  of  their own  we 
shall have to consider.  It  may with much force be urged  that 
in  this  matter  Christianity  turned  what  was  to some  extent 
an abstract theory into somethir~g  which  is continually tending 
to make itself  real  in outward  fact; but when  this is  urged, 
those  practical  tendencies  of  the  Roman  Jurisprudence,  of 
which  we  have spoken, must  not be  overlooked. 
Our  examination of  the theory of  slavery lias then resulted 
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in  our  finding  that  at least  with  regard  to  this  institution 
we  may  very  well  conjecture  that  the  tendency  of  Ulpian, 
Tryphoninus,  and  Florentinus  is  to  contrast  the  actual  con- 
ditions  of  society with some  primitive  state in which  such an 
institution  did  not  exist.  We  have  seen  that  in  Seneca's 
theory  this primitive  condition  is contrasted  with  the actual, 
with  special  reference  to  the  absence  of  the  institutions  of 
property and coercive government.  With regard  to  that par- 
ticular  form  of  property  called  sla,very,  we  may  feel  that 
Ulpian,  Tryphoninus,  and  Plorentinus  tend  to  the  same 
opinion. 
We must  now  consider  the legal  view  of  the origin  of  the 
institution  of  private  property.  We do not discuss  the legal 
conception of  property,-such  a  discussion  would  take  us far 
away from our subject,-and  we endeavour to confine  ourselves 
to an inquiry into the view  of  the jurists  as to the origin of 
property  and its relation  to natural lam. 
The  earliest  writers  whom  we  have  observed  to  be  cited 
in the Digest on the subject are Labeo  and Nerva  Filius, two 
jurists  of  the  first  century.  Paulus  quotes  both  these 
writers,  and we  gather  that Labeo  and Nerva  Filius  treat of 
property  as arising  naturally  from  the occupation  or capture 
of  that which  previously  had  belonged  to no 0ne.l  We may 
compare  a  passage  from  Neratius,  a  jurist  of  the  time  of 
Trajan,  from  which  we  gather  that some  things  are  brought  ' 
forth  by  nature  which  are  not  in  the  dominion  of  any one, 
and that these, as fishes  and wild  beasts, become  the property 
of  any  one  who  captures them.Vhis is  the  foundation  of 
the  treatment  of  the  origin  of  property  by  Gaius.  In that 
passage  to  which  we  have already referred  this is drawn out 
with  much  detail.  It  is  by  the  law  of  nations  that  we 
acquire the possession  of  many things, such as wild animals and 
'  Dig.,  xli.  2. 1  : "Posseseio  appel-  Nerva  filius  ait ejusque  rei vestigium 
lata  eat,  ut  et  Lnbeo  ait,  a  bedlhus  renlanere in  hi^,  qus terra rnari ccelo- 
quasi positio, quia naturaliter terletur  que  capiuntur : nam  hsc  protinus 
ab  eo  qui  ei  insistit,  quam  Greci  eorum  fiunt,  qui  primi  possesbionem 
K~TOX+Y  dicunt.  Dominiumque  re-  eorum adprehenderint." 
run1  ex  naturali  possessione  ccepisee  Wig., xli. 1. 14, 1. the property  of  our enemies;  and it is  by  the  same  law  of 
nations  that we  acquire  things  by  "tradition":  other  things 
we  acquire  by  the civil  law? 
If  we  turn now  to Marcianus  we  find  that  he maintains 
the  same  view  and  tells  us  in  set  terms  that some  things 
are by natural law  common  to all, some are private pr~perty.~ 
We have  already  seen  that  the jus  naturale  of  this  passage 
seems  to  be  the same  as  the jus  gelztiurn  of  other  passages 
from  Marcianus,-that  he  does  not  distinguish  between  the 
two.  Paulus also  tells  us that certain methods  of  acquiring 
private property belong to the law of  nations and are natural.' 
It would  seem clear, then, that those  writers who make no dis- 
tinction between  the jus  natu~ale  and the jus gentium  looked 
upon  the institution  of  private  property  as  being  primitive, 
rational,  and equitable. 
We turn now  to those  writers  who  make  this  distinction. 
It must be  observed  that we  have  very  little information  as 
to their conception of  the origin of  the institution of  property. 
We have only noticed  two passages  from their writings which 
seem to bear on this.  The first of  these is contained in a defini- 
tion  of  Precarium  by  Ul~ian.~  This definition  does  not  help 
us very  much; it would  be  quite improper to conclude from 
it that  he looked  upon all forms of  private property as belong- 
ing  to the jzcs  gentium.  The  other  passage,  which  is from 
l Dig.,  sli. 1. 1 : "  Quarundam  re- 
rum domiuium nanciscimur  jure  gen- 
tium, quod ratioue naturali inter omnes 
homines permque  servatur, quarundam 
jure civili, id eat jure proprio  civitatis 
nostrs. . . . Omnia igitur  animalia, 
qus  terra, mari, cceloque capiuntur, id 
est fera bestiae et  volucres  pisces  capi- 
entium fiunb  . . ." 
xli.  1.  3: "  Quod  enim  nullius  est 
id  ratione  naturali  occupanti  con- 
ceditur.  . . ." 
xli. 1. 5, 7 :  "Item qus  ex hostibus 
capiuntur,  jure  gentium statim capi- 
entium fiunt.  . . ." 
xli.  1.  9,  3 : "Ha  quoque res,  qus 
traditione  nostrs fiunt,  jure gentium 
nobis adquiruntur :  nihil enim tam con- 
venieus  est  naturali  aquitati  quam 
voluntatem  domini volentis  rem suam 
in  alium  transferre  ratam  haberi." 
Cf.  Gaius,  Inst., ii.  65-69. 
Dig.,  i.  8. 2 : 'l Qumdam naturali 
jure communia  sunt omnium, qusdam 
universitatis,  quadam  nullius,  plera- 
que  singulorum,  quse variis  ex causis 
cuique adquiruntur." 
Dig.,  xviii.  1. 1, 2 : "  Est autem 
emptio juris gentium."  Dig., xix. 2. 1  : 
"  Locatio  et conductio  cum naturalis 
ait et omnium geutium." 
Dig., xliii. 26. 1 : "  Precarium eat, 
quod  precibus  petenti  utendum  con- 
ceditur  tamdiu,  quamrliu  is  qui con- 
cessit  patitur.  Quod  genus  llberali- 
tatia ex jure  gentium descendit." 
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~lorentinus,'  seems  to  show  that  his  general  theory  of  the 
origin  of  private  property  was  much  the same  as that of  the 
writers  whom  we  have  before  examined.  We  should  con- 
jecture  that  Florentinus  is  describing  one  of  the forms  of 
appropriation of  things  which  were  before  nullius.  However 
this  may  be,  one  thing  is  clear,  that  Florentinus  treats  of 
one form of  private  property as belonging  to the jz~s  naturale. 
The  institution  of  private  property,  then,  to  Florentinus  is 
primitive and natural, and not  like  that of  slavery,  which  is 
contrary to nature.  So far then as our evidence goes, we  can 
only  say  that  Florentinus  agrees  with  the  other  writers  in 
looking  upon  property  as a  natural  institution,  even  though 
he  differs  from  them  on  the  relation  of  the jus  gentium  to 
nature;  and  that  with  respect  to the position  of  Ulpian  we 
have no information. 
It  only  remains  again  to  consider  that  passage  from  Her- 
mogenianus  which we  ha~e  already had  occasion  to examine 
in  connexion  with  the  question  of  the  contrast  between  the 
institutions  of  the jus  gentizcm  and those  of  the jus  naturale. 
Again we  have to lament our ignorance of  the general  position 
of  Hermogenianus.  We cannot but retain the impression that 
he is  contrasting  these  institutions  with  others  which  belong 
to the jus  naturale or to the jus  civile.  We have at least to 
notice  the  description  of  the  donzinia  distincta  as belonging 
to the jus  gentiurn, and we  have  the impression  that he looks 
upon  this  form  of  property  as  belonging  to  a  condition  of 
things not  perhaps  entirely  primitive,  Our  interpietation  of 
Hermogenianus  is naturally affected,  as we  have  already said, 
by  a  conlparison  with  the  Institutes  of  Justinian  and  the 
Etymologies of  St Isidore ;4  but we  have already cited  these 
and we  need  not  again  go  over  the ground. 
Our exa~niriation  of  the Roman Lawyers with regard to the 
origin  and  character  of  private  property  has  yielded  us  the 
following  results.  Those  lawyers  who,  like  Gaius,  make  no 
Dig.,  i.  8.  3 : "Item  lapilli, gem-  regna condita,  dominia distincta, agris 
ms  ceteraque, qus  in litore invenimns,  termini positi,"  &c. 
jure naturali nostra statim fiunt."  a  Inst., i.  2. 2. 
a  Dig.,  i.  1.  5 : "Ex hoc jure  gen-  St  Iaidore,  Etym., v.  K 
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distinction  between  the jus  nnturale  and  the  jzcs  ge~tium 
clearly look upon the institution of  private property as rational, 
just,  and  primitive.  They  know  nothing  of  any condition of 
human life where private property did not exist.  It  is likewise 
clear that Florentinus, although he distinguishes between nature 
and the jus gentium, also holds that private property is natural, 
belo~ging  to thej~u  naturnle, and therefore primitive as well as 
rational.  The  position  of  Ulpian  and Hermogenianus is un- 
certain.  We have no means of  arriving at any confident con- 
clusion  with  regard  to their  views,  although  we  may  incline 
to think  that Hermogenianus  very  possibly  reckoned  private 
property  as belonging  to  the jus gentium  and  not  to  the jus 
naturde. 
The Lawyers, then, do not, so far as the theory of  property 
is concerned,  give us much help in studying the development 
of  the  theory  of  a  state or  condition  of  nature.  We have 
seen  that  with  regard  to  the institution  of  slavery  Ulpian, 
Tryphoninus, and Florentinus certainly seem to incline to con- 
trast  the  primitive  with  the actual, but there is  no evidence 
of  any tendency  to  develop  this  with  reference  to other in- 
stitutions.  We have seen that this theory was current among 
the Stoic  thinkers ; we  shall  find  it again  in the Fathers, and 
we  shall  see that Ulpian's  distinction  of  the jus naturale from 
the jus  gentitcm  is  one  of  the  conceptions  which  ultimately 
gave  it  clearness  and  precision.  But,  except  with  ~eference 
to  slavery,  it  does  not  appear  that  even  the  school  (if  we 
may  call it so)  of  Ulpian  developed  the  theory  of  the state 
of  nature with  any clearness, or indeed  that the conception  is 
very  distinctly  present  to  their  minds  at all,  for  even  their 
treatment of  slavery tends rather to fall in with such a theory 
than to be definitely and consciuusly, by them, related to it. 
CHAPTER  V. 
THE  THEORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  LAW. 
WE have seen  with  what  emphasis Cicero  maintains that a11 
law is derived  from  the one  eternal law of  God, which  is the 
same as the principle of  justice  and reason in man's  heart; we 
have  seen  how  indignantly  and  scornfully he repudiates  the 
notion that unjust laws are true laws (jura), how emphatically 
he maintains  that  neither kings nor people  can  make that to 
be law which is not the expression of  the eternal principles of 
justice.  We have  now  to consider what  is the principle  and 
defi~lition  of  the civil law in the great jurists.  We must adopt 
the chronological  method in examining our subject, for though, 
as we think, there is little trace of  variation among the lawyers 
on this subject, yet we cannot but recognise the fact that there 
are some ambiguities in their statements, and at any rate we 
cannot  arrive  at the same  certainty  with  regard  to some of 
them as with  regard  to others. 
We commence our inquiry with Gaius, and, indeed, a sentence 
of  his Institutes indicates the legal  conception of  the relation 
between  the  positive law of  the State and  the  principles  of 
reason, as clearly as any passage  we  can find.  He is speaking 
of  the guardianship or tutelage of  those who are under age, and 
says it ought to be  a  principle  of  the law of  every State that 
those under age should be under guardianship, for this is agree- 
able to natural reas0n.l  Natural reason is the guide and director 
of  all civil legislation ; this natural reason is itself  the source of 
l  Gaius,  Inst., i.  189 : "  Impuberes  rationi  conveniens est,  ut is  qui per- 
quidem  in tutela  esse  omnium  civit-  fect~  ;etatis  non  sit  alterius  tutela 
atum jure  contingit,  quia  id  naturali  regatur." the jus  gentium, and therefore controls both the general law of 
mankind and the particular law of  any one State.  The concep- 
tion  of  law as necessarily conformed  to some general principle 
apart from the caprice of  any individual or group of  individuals 
is sufficiently indicated in this phrase. 
The matter is, howe~  er, much more  completely developed  by 
Marcianus early in the third century.  He cites two most im- 
portant  Greek  definitions  of  law,  whose  significance  for  our 
purpose is very  great.  He first  cites a  definition  of  law put 
forward  by  Demosthenes  and then one  of  Chrysippus,  whom 
he describes as "philosophus  sumins stoics sapientis."  Mar- 
cianus  makes  no  comment  on  these  two  definitions,  and 
we  may  take it  that  he  accepted  them  as representing  his 
own  conception  of  the  subject.  It  is evident  enough  that 
the  standpoint  of  the  two  writers is not  by  any means  the 
same ; but:  at the same time, there is a very substantial agree- 
ment between them on some of  the most important points of  the 
conception of  law.  In the first place, they both of  them regard 
law in the general sense as being something which is related to 
the divine or universal order as well as to the regulation of  any 
particular  State.  Every law,  Demosthenes says, is discovered 
and given  by God; while  Chrysippus treats  law  as the ruler 
of  all  things  both  divine  and  human.  Law,  according  to 
Demosthenes, is intended for the correction of  offences;  while 
Chrysippus  says  that  it  is  the  norm  or  standard  of  things 
just  and  unjust.  Both  Deniosthenes  and  Chrysippus  bring 
their  definitions  into relation  with  civil  law, by defining law, 
in  the  sense  in  which  they  are  using  the  term,  as  being 
that which all in the State must obey and as belonging to all 
living creatures which  are by  nature political.  To these Inore 
general  conceptions  Demosthenes  adds  certain  specific  condi- 
tions  of  the civil  law-namely,  that it should be set forth by 
the wise man, and should  be  agreed to by the whole State: to 
these we shall have to return when  we consider the nature ancl 
source of  authority in the State.' 
1 Dig.,  i.  3.  2 : "Nam  et Demor-  BcuOar  8th sohhh, ~al  pdhrura 8.~1  72s 
thenes  orator  sic  definit:  roirb ~DTI  2~71  vdpos  ri;pqua  pkv  wal  6Gpov  @€a;, 
vdPor, 4 sdv~as  dvOpL6xovs spou$nrr  nrl-  Bdypa a& Lv@p&swv qpovlpwr Paavdp@wp 
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These  definitions of  Demosthenes  and Chrysippus  bring out 
very  clearly what we have already seen is indicated  by  Gaius, 
that civil law is to be regarded, not primarily as expressing  the 
will  of  any  community or person  in  a  community, but as the 
particular  application  in  any community  of  the principles  of 
the universal  reason  and justice.  This is indeed substantially 
the same  view  as  that  of  Cicero.  We do  not  suggest  that 
Marcianus is to be  considered  as a  strict disciple of  the Stoic 
school;  but  clearly  enough  he,  like  Cicero,  follows the Stoic 
conception  of  justice  and law,  as contrasted  with that of  the 
Epicureans  or  the later Academics. 
So far we  have examined the opinions of  those to whom the 
distinction between the jzcs  natu~ale  and the jus  gentiurn had no 
special meaning, and we have seen that this does not in the least 
affect their view of  the relation  between the civil law  and the 
general or universal principles of justice.  We turn to the view 
of  Ulpian,  as representing  the new  theory,  and we  find  him 
maintaining the same view with greater detail, but on the same 
general lines. 
The  compilers  of  the  Digest  open  that work  with  a  very 
significant and important statement by Ulpian on this subject.l 
Nothing  could  well  be  clearer  than  the  general  tendency  of 
these sentences.  The jurist  must  understand that law is the 
art of  the good  and  just,  that it is  his  duty to  study  the 
meaning  of  this,  to  distinguish  the just  from  the  unjust,  to 
draw men  to  do what is good.  The  law, that is,  which  the 
jurist  has  to deal  with,  is not  to be  looked  at simply as a 
6; 7i)v CICOUU~WV ~al  i~ouulwv  kpaprqph- 
TWY,  T~AEWS  82 uuvB$~q  KOLV~,  ~a@'  $v 
tlnaur  ?T~OU$KEI  @v  TOTS  hv  rc  X~AEL. 
Sed et philosopbus summas stoicae sapi- 
entire Chrysippus sic incipit libro, quem 
fecit  aspi vdpov:  d  vdpos  adv~wv  8u~l 
Baurhshs  @r;wv 7c  ~al  ivBPwn~vwv  npay- 
phrwv. Bri 6i  aLrbv npourd~~v  7a  rSvar 
70~  KUA&  Ka17i)V aluxpBv Kal  bpxov.ra 
Kal  ~yrpdra,  Kal  KaTa ro6ro wavdva  76 
l Dig.,  i.  1  1 : "  Juri operam  da- 
turum prim nosse oportet, unde nomen 
juris descendat.  Est autem B justitia 
appellatum : nam ut eleganter  Celsus 
defiuit, jus est ars boni et  squi.  Cujus 
merito  quis  nos  sacerdotes  appeLleC : 
justitiam  namque colimus,  et boni  et 
squi notitiam  profitemur,  aequum  all 
iniquo  separantes,  licitum  ab  illicito 
discernentes,  bonos  non  solum  metu 
pcenarum,  verum  etiam  prremiorum 
quoque exhortatione efficere cupientes, 
veram  nisi  fallor  philosophiam,  non 
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series  of  positive  regulations  of  any  particular  society,  but 
rather as the expression of  the perpetual  l~rinciples  of  justice 
and goodness. 
These views are further illustrated in the well-known phrases 
in which  Ulpian  attempts to  define the nature  of  justice, the 
main  principles  of  law (jus),  and the true character  of  juris- 
prudence.l  These famous phrases, repeated constantly through- 
out the Middle Ages  and later, rnay suggest to us that Ulpian 
was rather a facile and rhetorical than a profound thinker upon 
law : we may feel  that these  sentences, for all their admirable 
sound, carry us little further, and  that we  do not  know much 
more  about  the nature of  justice  than we  did.  But regarded 
historically,  these  words  are  of  the  greatest  importance,  not 
merely as assuring us of  Ulpian's position, but as forming one of 
the most  important links in the chain by which  tlle theory of 
law of  the ancient world was handed down to medizval and so to 
modern thinkers.  The general view of  Ulpian, then, is obviously 
the same as that of  Marcianus  and that which is indicated in 
the sentence of  Gaius which we have already quoted. 
We have,  however, another statement  of  Ulpian's  in which 
the relation between the civil law and the natural law is more 
specifically,  but  also  more  ambiguously,  dealt  with.2  We 
cannot but regret  that the compilers  of  the Digest  have  not 
preserved  for  us a  more  detailed  explanation  of  these  some- 
what  ambiguous  phrases.  They  are  obviously  capable  of  a 
meaning  in  harmony  with  the  conclusions  which  we  have 
drawn  from  the  statements  we  have  already  examined,  but 
they might also bear  a  somewhat different  construction.  It is 
easy enough to understand  what Ulpiari means when he speaks 
of the civil law as being something added to the jz6s  conwnune, a 
phrase which  seems to mean  simply the jz~s naturale  and  ks 
yentizun, as being uriiversal in their application, but it is not so 
l Dig.,  i.  1.  10 : "  Justitia  est con-  a Dig.,  i. 1. 6 : "  Jus civile est, quod 
stans  et perpetua volontas jus  suum  neque in totum a naturali re1 gentium 
cuique tribuendi.  Juris  pracepta sunt  recedit, nec per omnia ei servit : itaque 
haec; honeste vivere, alterum non lzedere,  cum  aliquid  addimus  vel  retrahirnus 
auum cuique tribuere.  Juris prudentia  juri  communi,  jus  proprium,  id  eat 
eat divinarum atqne humanarurn rerum  civile  efficimus." 
notitia, justi atque injusti scientia." 
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easy to understand what he means by the jus  civile as sornel!ling 
which may take away from the jus  comnzzcne. 
The  first phrase which suggests itself as possibly furnishing 
us  with  the  means  of  coiilment  on  Ulpian's  words  is  that 
phrase  of  Florentinus  which  we  have  so  frequently  cited,' 
slavery  is an  institution of  the jus  yentium  and contrary  to 
nature.  It is true  that  Florentinus is here  speaking  of  the 
relation  of  the jus  yentium  to nature, but it would  seem  that 
the words  niight be applied to the relation  of  the jus  civile  to 
nature.  Ulpian  has expressed  the same opposition, with  ref- 
erence to the same institution.  By the jus  nnturale, he says, 
men were  born  free ;  by  the jus  gcnti~tm  they  are enslaved ; 
and  in another place, as we  have  zeen, he has contrasted  the 
relation  of  the jus  civile  with that of  the jus  naturale  on the 
subject of  the equality of  mea3 
We seem to find in these phrases of  Florentinus  and Ulpian 
illustrations  of  what  Ulpian  may  mean  by  the civil  law  as 
taking away something from the jus  ltaturale;  but we are still 
far from clear  as to how this is to be  explained in conformity 
with the general conception of  law which he seems to maintain. 
The word jus  is, he has told us, taken from justitin; jus  is the 
"ars  boni  et ~qui"  ; of  the  lawyers he has said, "justitiam 
namque  colimus  et boni  et ~qui  notitiam  profitemur."  Jus- 
tice,  then, must  reside either  in the jus  nutswale  or  the jtu 
yentiz~m  or the 9s  civile, or  in all of  them.  It is possible  to 
maintain  that Ulpian  does  not  connect  it specially with  the 
jus  natu~ale. We have seen that his definition  of  that system 
of  law leaves  us very uncertain whether  he had  any clearness 
of conception about it; but it is very difficult to suppose that in 
that case he did  not find justice  in the jus  gentium, where, as 
we have  seen, it would  appear  that the lawyers who  take  the 
same view as Gaius, found it. 
We should suggest that the explanation may again  be  found 
in the relation  of  the conceptions  of  Ulpian  and  Florentinus 
to the theory of  a  natural state antecedent to the conventions 
of  organised society;  and that, just  as Seneca  looks  upon  the 
institutions  of  property  and  organised  government  as  the 
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result  of  the  progress  of  vice  among men,  and  yet  regarci; 
them as adapted to, and therefore justifiable  under, the actual 
conditions  of  human  life,  so  Ulpian  and  Florentinus  may 
conceive of  the jus  civile  as differing from the jus naturale, as 
the conditions  of  the conventional life differ from those of  the 
natural, and yet as being just  under  the actual conditions of 
human  life.  We shall see  that this is the explanation which 
the  Christian  Fathers  furnish  of  the  contrast  between  the 
primitive or natural conditions  of  human  life  and the actual; 
and the fact  that in this matter  Seneca  seems to represent a 
current Stoic tradition encourages us to think that the lawyers, 
like Ulpian and Florentinus, may have been influenced by some 
such ideas, even though they were not very clearly conscious of 
their influence. 
There remains to be considered a sentence of  Paulus, a con- 
temporary of  Ulpian.  We  have already mentioned this phrase, 
and  must  now  reconsider  the  passage  with  relation  to  the 
subject we have in hand.  Paulus says that we may define law 
in different fashions: in one way when we speak of  that which 
is always just  and good, this is jus naturale;  in  another  way 
when we speak  of  that which  is useful  to all or  the majority 
in any State, this is jus civi1e.l  At first  sight we  seem  here 
to have  a  frank  recognition  of  the utilitarian  and  interested 
character  of  civil  law, and might  feel inclined  to think  that 
Paulus  must represent  that  tradition which  so  much  angered 
Cicero,  that law is merely that which  is convenient  to  those 
who have power in any State.  It  is of  course  possible, though 
not probable, that this may be the case.  We do not know that 
there is any reason  to maintain  that such  opinions were  not 
current at the time when Paulus wrote, and that he might  not 
have been  influenced  by them.  At the same time, in the ab- 
sence of  any other clear trace of  such a view in the Digest and 
Institutes, we feel  rather  disposed  to think  that Paulus used 
these words without any great care, and that we therefore must, 
1 Dig.,  i.  1.  11 : "  Jus  pluribus  modo,  quod  omnibus aut  pluribus in 
mod18 dicitur, uno  modo, cum id quod  quaque  civitate  utile esb,  ut  esb  jus 
semper  equum  ac  bonum eat jua  dici-  civile." 
tur,  ut  est,  jus  naturale.  Altero 
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not press their significance to those conclusions which might be 
drawn from  them.  We think that he very probably intended 
nothing  more than a contrast between the perpetual principles 
of justice embodied in, or represented by, what he calls the jzcs 
naturale, and the temporary and changing application of  those 
principles as adapted to the varying circumstances  and varying 
desires of  the members of  any State. 
We have  seen  then,  that,  except  so  far  as  there  may  be 
some  doubt  about the position  of  Paulus, the Roman Jurists 
of  the second  century hold a  clear view of  the relation of  the 
civil law to the principles of justice ; whether these are looked 
upon as embodied in thejus naturale or the jzcs  gentium.  They 
hold with Cicero that the civil law is organically related to the 
ultimate  law of  reason  and justice;  that it is not  merely the 
expression  of  the  capricious  will  of  the  lawgiver,  but  con- 
stantly tends, at least, to  embody, to apply $0  the actual con- 
ditions  of  life,  principles  which  are  of  perpetual  obligation. 
We have seen that it is possible  that the judginent of  some of 
these may have been perplexed by their own distinction between 
the jzcs  natzcrale  and the jus gentium, that they may have felt 
that actually existing or universal institutions could not be con- 
sidered  to  belong  to  the  primitive  arid  perpetual  principles 
of  life, while they were not  prepared  to  condemn them.  This 
only  illustrates  a  perplexity  of  mind,  which  was  indeed 
a  natural result  of  the  perpetual  ambiguity  in  the  concep- 
tion  of  social justice  in relation to  the ideal justice,  whether 
this  is  regarded  as  belonging  to  the  past or  to  the future. 
The  regulations  of  society  ought  to be  just,  and yet we  are 
constantly  compelled  to  amend  them.  Their  claim  to  the 
obedience of  man is founded upon the fact  that they represent 
justice,  and yet they never  are in  the complete  sense of  the 
word  just.  The  perplexity  with  regard  to  the past  found  a 
solution for  many centuries in the theory of  a  change in the 
condition of  human nature, in the judgment  that principles of 
perfect  justice  which  were  adapted  to a  condition  of  perfect 
innocence  cannot well  be  adapted  to a  condition  of  vice  and 
imperfection.  In  the eighteenth century, when  many thinkers 
understood  very  imperfectly  the  social  significance  of  the faultiness  of  human  nature,  the  difficulty  resulted  in  the 
revolutionary  bias  given  to  the conceplion  of  the  return  to 
nature.  Gradually  men  have turned  back  to the conception 
of  perfect  justice  as  belonging  to  the  future,  as  being  the 
ideal  towards  which  the  institutions  of  society  tend,  the 
principle which governs their development ;  but the difficulties 
of  the actual  condition  have  not  therefore  been  completely 
solved.  It  is a thing worthy of  note  how few have  recognised 
the significance of  the most resolute modern attempt to suggest 
a  solution,  the attempt  made  by Rousseau  in  his  theory  of 
the "General  Will."  In England  Professor  T. H.  Green and, 
recently,  Mr  Bosanquet  are among  the  very  few  who  have 
recognised  the real importance  of  that theory. 
CHAPTER  VI. 
THE SOURCE  OF  POLITICAL  AUTHORITY. 
WE have still to consider  the theory  of  the Roman  Lawyers 
with  regard  to  one  very  important  subject,  the  source  of 
authority in the State.  It will  be remembered  that we  found 
in Cicero  a  very interesting  tendency towards a conception  of 
liberty, as identified with a  share in the control of  the State. 
The Roman  Lawyers of  the second  century and onwards deal 
briefly indeed, but very distinctly, with the question of  the ulti- 
mate source of  authority in the State, and we think that, so far, 
they do very clearly carry on the tradition represented by Cicero. 
They do not conceive of  the Roman citizen as having any direct 
share in the actual administration of the Commonwealth, but in 
their view the Roman citizens are the sole  ultimate source of 
authority, whether legislative or administrative.  The relation of 
their view to that of  Cicero  is interesting, but much more im- 
portant  is the connexion  between  their theory  and the demo- 
cratic theory  of  medi~val  and modern  times.  The medizval 
theory  of  the social contract, which,  so  far  as we  know,  was 
first put forward definitely in the end of  the eleventh century, 
may  have  relations  with  such  ancient forms of  the theory  as 
are perhaps  suggested  by Cicerol and had  been  developed  by 
Plato:  and  perhaps  by  authors  whose  works  have  now  dis- 
appeared.  We shall see  that the n~edizval  theory  is  related 
primarily  to  the traditional  ideas  of  the  Teutonic  races  on 
government, and to the course of  the history of  the Teutonic 
empire  and  kingdoms.  But  at the  same  time,  the  theory 
of  the  Roman  Lawyers  with  respect  to  the  people  as  the 
Cicero, De Rep., iii.  13.  2  Plato, Laws, iii.  684. sole  ultimate source of  authority in the State seems  to us to 
be  clearly  an  undeveloped  form  of  the theory  of  contract. 
We might  call  it  the  theory  of  consent,  which  is  not  the 
same thing as the theory of  contract in any of  its forms, but 
is the germ out of  which  the theory  of  contract might very 
well  grow.  When  we  discuss  the theories  of  the mediaeval 
writers in detail  we  shall have  to consider  what  traces there 
are of  the direct influence  of  this aspect  of  the legal view, we 
shall certainly recognise that they were acquainted with it.  In 
the meanwhile  we consider  the Roman Lawyers as expressing 
one aspect of  the theory out of  which the mediaeval and modern 
democratic conception of  the State has grown. 
Few phrases in  the  Digest  are  more familiar  than that of 
Ulpian, "  Quod  principi placuit, legis  habet  vigorem " ;  l  some- 
times at  least it has been  forgotten that Ulpian continues, "  ut- 
pote cum lege regia, qu~  de imperio ejus lata est, populus  ei et 
in eum  omne  suum  imperium  et potestatem conferat."  Few 
phrases  are  more  remarkable  than  this  almost  paradoxical 
description of  an unlimited personal authority founded  upon  a 
purely democratic basis.  The Emperor's  will is law, but only 
because the people  choose  to have it so.  Ulpian's words  sum 
up in a  single phrase the universal theory  of  the lawyers; so 
far  as  we  have  seen, there  is  no other  view  known  to  the 
Illoman jurisprudence.  From Julianus, in the earlier part of  the 
second century, to Justinian himself  in the sixth, the Emperor 
is the source of  law, but only because  the people  by their own 
legislative act have made him so.  The matter is of  such import- 
ance that we  must justify this judgment by an examination of 
all the writers of  the Digest who, so far as we have found, refer 
to the question. 
The earliest discussion, in the Digest, of  the authority which 
lies behind the civil law of  Rome is, so far as we have seen, con- 
tained  in a  citation  from  Julianus, a  jurist  of  the period  of 
Hadrian and the Antonines.  He is cited to illustrate the place 
of  custom in law, and says that custom  has rightly the force of 
law, inasmuch as law derives its authority from the people, and 
it is immaterial whether the people  declares its will by vote or 
l  Dig., i.  4. 1. 
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by  cust0m.l  It  is  certainly  interesting  to  observe  this  un- 
compromising  and dogmatic  statement of  the authority of  the 
people in malring and unmaking laws (leges).  It might indeed 
be urged that lez is the distinctive name for  the legislation of 
the populz's,  and that we  must not therefore  press the phrases 
of Julianus to mean that leges  are the only forms of  law.  We 
shall presently see that Gains, in his classification of  law, dis- 
tinguishes  the  lex  from  other  forms  of  law:  whether  this 
distinction is here present to the mind of  Julianus may perhaps 
be  doubted; but  if  it is,  we  shall  also  probably  judge  that 
Julianus, like Gaius, looks  upon the lex  of  the whole people as 
the  original  form  of  law, from  which  all  other  forms  are 
descended. 
Gaius has furnished us with a general definition of  the nature 
of  the civil law in that passage which we  have had occasion  to 
quote several times.2  We must now examine the words  with 
which he carries out the definition in detail, with regard to the 
Roman State.3  It  might seem at first sight that there are here 
as many  authorities  as  there are forms of  law,  but  a  closer 
l  Dig.,  i.  3.  33 :  'l Inveterata 
consuetudo pro lege non iulmerito cus- 
toditur,  et hoc est  jus  quod  dicitur 
moribus constitutum.  Nam cum ipse 
leges  nulla  alia ex causa nos teneant, 
quzm quod judicio populi receptae sunt, 
merito  et  ea,  qu~e  size  ullo  scripto 
populus  probavit  tenebunt  omnes : 
nam  quid  interest  suffragio  pbpulus 
voluntatem  suam  declaret  an  rebus 
ipsis et factis  ?  Quare rectissime etiam 
illud  receptum est, ut leges non solum 
suffragio legis Iatoris,  sec1  etiam tacito 
consensu  onlnium  per  deauetudinem 
abrogeutur. " 
"~aius,  Inst.,  i.  1. ; Dig.,  i.  1.  9 : 
"  Quod  quisque  populus  ipse  sibi  jus 
con~tituit,  id iprius proprium est, voca- 
turque  jus  civile,  quasi jus  proprium 
Civitatis." 
Gaius, Inxt.,  i.  3 -7. : "  Constant 
Butem jura  populi Romani  ex legibur, 
Plebiscitis,  senatus - consultis,  consti- 
tutionibus  principum,  edlcti-  erjrum 
VOL.  I. 
qui  jus  eclicendi  habent,  responsis 
prudentium.  Lex  est  quod  populus 
jubet  atque  constituit.  Plebiscitum 
est quod plebs jubet  atque constituit. 
.  . .  Unde  olim  patricii  dicebmt 
plebiscitis  se  non  teneri,  quia  sine 
auctoritati  eorum  facta  essent : sed 
postea  lex  Hortensia  lata  est,  qua 
cautum  est  ut plebiscita  universum 
populum  tenerent ; itaque  eo  mod0 
legibus  exacquata  sunt.  Senatus-con- 
sulturn est quod  senatus  jubet  atque 
constituit,  idyue  legis  vicem  obtinet, 
quamvis fuerit quacsitum.  Collstitutio 
principis  est  quod  impelator  decreto, 
vel edicto, vel epistola conatituit,  nec 
umquam  dubitatum  est, quin id legis 
vicem obtiueat, curn ipse imperator per 
legcm imperium accipiat.  Jus autem 
edicencli  habent  magistratus  populi 
Romani.  . . .  Itesponsa prudentium 
sunt  seutentie  et  opiniones  eorum 
quibus permissum  est jura  condere." observation  shows us that ultimately  these come  back  to the 
authority of the whole po2julas.  It is they and they alone who 
have  the  power  of  making  a  lex,  and  all other  authority  is 
derived from this.  Thus the plebiscitum,  or  law  made  by  the 
plebs alone, without the other classes, only has the force of  law 
because this was decreed by the lex HOI-tensia.  The constitution 
of  the prince, in the same way, has the force of  law because the 
emperor receives his imperium, per  legem.  The magistrates have 
the*  edicendi, but this no doubt is derived from their election. 
The Responsa  Prudentium, if  they all agree, have the force of 
law, but this is because such an authority is given to the juris- 
consults.  The only form of  law of  which we cannot definitely 
conclude, from this statement of  Gaius, that its authority can 
be traced back  to the people, is the Senatus conszcltum.  Gaius 
does not define the mode in which this form of  law came to be 
recognised as such.  Pomponius suggests that it was due to the 
growing difficulty of  getting together the pop~~lzts  as the Roman 
population increased :l  both lle and Gaius seem to look upon the 
legislative authority of  the Senate as tacitly recognised, though, 
as Gaius seems to indicate, at  first there was hesitation about it. 
The  same  theory  of  the source  of  authority  is  put  before 
us in that very interesting account of  the origin  and develop- 
ment  of  the  Roman  legal  system,  by  Pomponius,  a  con- 
temporary of  Gaius, to which we have just referred?  In this 
we have a  succinct history of  the Roman  law from  the time 
of  Romulus  down to the organisation  of  the Imperial system. 
The  most  important  points  in this  are  as  follows.  At first 
there was no certain lex or jus in the State, and all things were 
directed by the kings.  Roinulus first began to propose  definite 
laws (leges)  to the people.  After  the expulsion  of  the lrings 
these  laws  went  out  of  use,  and  for  some  time  the  Roman 
people  wits  overncd rather  by  uncertain  usages  and customs 
than by definite laws.  At last tell men were  appointed to pro- 
cure laws from the Greek cities, that the State might be founded 
on  laws  (leges), and they  were given  supreme authority in the 
State for a year,  to put tliese  into order  and to correct them if 
necessary, and to interpret them with such authority that there 
Dig., i.  2. 2, 9.  Dig., i. 2.  2. 
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be no appeal from them.  These laws, to which the name 
of the laws of the Twelve Tables was given, were finally adopted. 
They needed to be interpreted by the great lawyers, and out of 
this  interpretation  grew up that form  of  jus  connected  with 
the prz~dcntes,  the jus which  is "  proprium jus  civile, quod sine 
scripto in sola prudentium interpretatione consistit."  Then on 
the basis of these laws were founded the "  legis actiones."  Later 
it came about that there was a  dispute betweell  the plebs  and 
the patrcs, and the plebs made laws for themselves which were 
called  plebiscita.'  When  the plebs  had  been  brought  back 
and much discord  had arisen with respect to these plebiscita, it 
was finally agreed that they should be recognised  as leges, and 
this was sanctioned  by  the lex  Horten~ia.~  Then, the people 
growing so numerous that it was difficult to gather together the 
populus, or even the plebs,  the very necessity of  the case made 
it necessary that the Senate should be charged with the care of 
the State, and the Senate began to issue decrees: this form of 
law was  known  as Senatus consultz~m.~  At the same time the 
magistrates  who declared  the law issued  their edicts, that the 
citizens might know exactly the jus under which cases would 
be  decided.  Finally it became necessary that one man should 
be  charged with the care of  the State;  a  prince  was  created, 
and he was given the authority, that whatever he should ordain 
should have the force of  law.4 
It is interesting to observe  the  laborious  care  with  which 
Pomponius explains each new development in the legal system. 
By his  presentation of  the subject we  see again that, with the 
exception  of  the Senatus consultzcm, every form  of  law derives 
Dig.,  i.  2.  2,  8 : "  Evenit  ut plebs 
in  discordiam  cum  patribus  perven- 
iret et secederet sibique  jura  constit- 
ueret  que jura  plebiscita  vocdntur." 
Dig.,  i.  2.  2,  8 :  "Pro  legibus 
placuit et ea observari lege Hortensia : 
et ita factum est, ut inter plebiscita et 
legem  species  constituel~di  intereaset 
Poteatas autem eadem esget." 
Dig.,  i.  2.  2,  9 : "  Necessitav  ipsa 
curam reipublica: acl  senatum deduxit; 
iLa  ccepit  senatus  se  interponere  et 
quidquid  constituisset  o'uservabatur, 
idque  jus  apellabatur  ~enutus  con- 
sultum." 
Dig.,  i. 2.  2, 11  : "Novissime, sicut 
ad  pauciores  juris  constituendi  viaa 
transisse  ipsis  rebns  dictantibus vide- 
batur  per  partes,  evenit.  ut  necease 
esset  reipublicz  per  unum  consuli 
(nam  senatu~  non perinde omnes pro- 
vincias  probe  gerere  poterat) : igitur 
constitute  principe  datum  est  ei  jua 
ut quod constituisset,  rdtum esset." its anthority  ultimately  from  the populus.  This is  especially 
important with respect to the Imperial power, and here indeed 
Pomponius's  phrases  are almost  apologetic in their anxiety to 
account  for  the  legislative  authority  of  the  Emperor.  The 
historical  value  of  Pomponius's  account  is  of  course  a  very 
different matter  from its interest  to us: so  far, indeed, as we 
are concerned, this is quite immaterial ;  we are only concerned 
with  his  narrative as illustrating  the  political  theory  of  the 
second  century,  and for  that purpose  it is invaluable. 
Early  in  the  third  century  we  come  to  Marcianus,  whose 
citations from Demosthenes  and Chrysippus we  have  already 
examined  in  another  connexion.  We must  return  to  the 
first  of  these  in relation to oar present  inquiry.  His words 
are  as  follows:  "  This  is  law  which  all  men  should  obey 
for  many reasons, and especially because  every law is a  thing 
found  and given  by  God,  a judgment  (6drypa)  of  wise  men, a 
correction  of  voluntary  and  involnntary  transgressions,  a 
common agreement of  the State, in accordance with which  all 
those  who  are in  the State should live."l  We have  already 
discussed  the significance  of  the first  part  of  this definition: 
for our present purposes the important  phrases are two-that 
a law is something decreed or advised by wise  men, and some- 
thing adopted  by  the common  agreement of  the State.  This 
latter part of  the definition  is adopted  by Papinian, a contem- 
porary  of  Marcianus:  his  definition  is,  with  slight  modifica- 
tion,  evidently  talten  from  that  of  Dem~sthenes.~  In this 
definition,  then,  it is clear  that the immediate  source  of  the 
authority of  the law of  any State is the agreement of  the whole 
State, and we  may  take it that it governs  the short general 
description of  the civil law given by Papinian in another place, 
where he deals with it in very much the same terms as Gaius: 
we are entitled  to interpret  this  classification by  the definition 
to which we have just referred. 
We have, then, come down to the time of  Ulpian, with whose 
l  Dig.,  i.  3. 2.  See. p.  56, note 1.  munis reipublicae sponaio." 
Dig.. i.  3. 1 : "Lex est commune  Dig.,  i.  1.  7 : "  Jus autem oivile 
pr,eceptum,  virorum prude~~tium  con-  est  quod  ex  legibus,  pleb~s scitia 
sultum,  clelictorurn  qute  sponte  vel  senatus consultis,  decretis  principunl, 
ignorant~a  coi~trahuntur  coercitio, corn-  auctoritate prudentium  venit." 
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sentence on the Imperial authority we commenced our inquiry. 
We are now in a position  to recognise that his statement, that 
the authority of  the prince  is derived  from  the fact that the 
people have by the lex regia conferred on him all their anthority, 
is strictly in harmony with the political theory of  all the earlier 
jurists.  But we call trace the same theory down to the time of 
Justinian himself.  In  a rescript of Theodosius and Valentinian 
of  the year 429, the relation  of  the Imperial authority to the 
law is expressed  in very clear and forcible terms.  Theodosius 
and Valentinian say that the prince is bound  by  the laws, for 
his authority is drawn from the authority of  the law.1  Nothing 
could well  be plainer  than  this statement, nothing could  show 
more clearly that the theory of Ulpian is still the theory of  the 
fifth century.  And, finally, in the rescript which is prefixed to 
the Digest, we find Justinian himself  referring in explicit terms 
to the ancient law by which  the Roman  people transferred  all 
their authority and power to the Emperor? 
It is true that in Justinian we also find some trace of  a con- 
ception out of which there grew another theory of  the author- 
ity of  the ruler.  The first words of  the rescript we  have just 
quoted are, "  Deo auctore nostrum gubernantes imperium, quod 
nobis  a  caelesti majestate traditum est.'j3  In another  rescript, 
also prefixed  to the Digest,  we read,  "quia  ideo  imperialem 
fortunam rebus humanis  deus przposuit, ut possit omnia quae 
noviter contingunt et emendare et componere et rnodis et regulis 
competentibus tradere."4  In another place  still, he speaks of 
God subjecting all laws to the Emperor, whom He has given to 
men  as a living law.6  These phrases  may  be  compared with 
those  of  Seneca and Pliny, to which we  have already referred? 
l Codex, i.  14. 4 : "  Digna vox majes- 
tate  regnantis  legibus  alligatum  se 
principem  profiteri:  adeo  de auctori- 
Late  juris  uostra  pendet  auctoritas. 
Et  re  vera majus imperio est submittere 
legibua principatum.  Et oraculo prte- 
Wntis  edicti  quod  nobis  lice~e  non 
Patirnur indicamus." 
Cod.,  i.  17.  1,  7 : "Cum  enim 
lege antiqua, que  regia nuncupnbatur, 
Omne  jus  omnisque  potestas  populi 
Romani in imperatoriam branslata sunt 
potestatem." 
Cod., i.  17. 1. 
Cod., i.  17. 2,  18. 
Novel.,  CV.  4: ndvrwv  62  631  7Gv 
~ipqpCvwv $@v  4  Baa~A;ws P[?lp?juBw 
rhx~,  ij  YE  KG; ahobs  d  Orbs 703s vdpovs 
ilrrit??lrtc  vdpov  aL~+v  ZpJ/vxov  Kara- 
~~p~ar  dvepdrrols. 
See p. 31. and with the patristic conception of  the relation  between  God 
and the ruler, which we  shall presently have to examine; but 
in themselves the words of  Justinian can hardly be  pressed  to 
mean more than  that the providence  of  God  rules  even  over 
the matters of  the State. 
From the second century, then,  to the sixth, we  have  seen 
that the Roman law knows one, and only one, ultimate source of 
political  power,  and  that is the authority  of  the people.  It 
may of  course be said that this is the merest  abstract theory, 
that during  this  time  the  Imperial  power  was  obtained  by 
every method, but never by that of  popular  appointment;  that 
the legislative  authority  of  the people was only a name and a 
pretence, and it must be noticed  that Justinian  seems even to 
speak  of  the Emperor  as  the  sole1 legis  lator, as though, in 
fact,  the legislative  action  of  the Roman populus  had wholly 
ceased.  But still the theory of  the ultimate authority of  the 
people  subsisted, and  so  came  down  till  it touched  the new 
Teutonic theory of  law and political authority, a theory which 
again  knew nothing  of  any legislative  anthority in the State 
apart from  the whole  body  of  the State. 
We think  that the legal theory, that all political  power  is 
derived  from  the people, is  at least one  of  the sources  froin 
which the theory of  the social contract sprang.  It is far from 
being the same theory, but it seems to us  to represent an ele- 
mentary  form  of  the  same  conception.  The Roman  lawyers 
indeed  usually  deal  with  the  matter  only  from  the point  of 
view of  the Roman  Comnionwealth, but this is not always the 
case.  Papinian,  and Marcianus  in his  citation from Demos- 
thenes? define law in terms of  universal application.  And, after 
all, the Empire was to the Roman much the same as the world. 
The principles which belonged to it were at least the principles 
of  the civilised world, and their application to the conditions of 
the world at large was natural and easy. 
1 Cod.,  L 14. 12, 3 and 4.  Q See p.  68. 
CHAPTER  VII. 
WE  have so far examined mainly the jurists of  the second  and 
third centuries, and have endeavoured to make ourselves clear as 
to the general character of  the political theory which they rep- 
resent.  We have observed that their theory is not  something 
fixed,  but  that  we  can  trace  the  changes  of  legal  opinion, 
in  the  course  of  these  centuries,  with  regard  at  least  to 
some  subjects.  It is for  our  purpose  important that we  are 
able to compare  these views with  those  of  the lawyers of  the 
sixth century as embodied in the Institutes of  Justinian.  From 
such  a  comparison we  are able  to  arrive at some conclusions 
with regard to the permanent tendencies of  the legal traditions, 
to  judge,  with  respect  to  certain  of  them,  which  ultimately 
tended  to  predominate.  It must  at the  same  time  be  con- 
fessed that the compilers of  the Institutes were so  anxious to 
express themselves  in the phrases  of  the great lawyers of  the 
second and third centuries that it is often difficult to be quite 
certain as to their own opinions.  It  is difficult to imagine that 
the compilers were not aware that the passages they quote from 
different writers often represent views inconsistent with  each 
other, and yet  they do actually son~etiines  join together  in the 
same passage citations which are completely out of  harmony. 
This carelessness of  construction is nowhere more  noticeable 
than it is  with reference  to the theory of  the law of  nature. 
We think that the opinion  of  the authors of  the Institutes on 
the subject is clear and distinct, but it must be admitted  that 
occasionally they embody in their work  phrases which  belong 
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shown  by  a  few  sentences:  "Dicendum  est  igitur  de  jure 
privato, quod est tripertitum ; collecturn est enim ex naturalibus 
praeceptis aut gentium aut civilibus."  l  This dogmatic statement 
of  the threefold character of  law is followed by the definition of 
the jus  Vzaturale which is cited in the Digest  from Ulpian, and 
then by the definition of the  jus gentium from Gaius's Institutes, 
and a description  of  the jus  civile;"hey  add that account  of 
the  jus gentiunz  which we have had occasion to notice beforc3 
The fact that the con~pilers  of  the Institutes follow Ulpian 
in distinguishing the jus  gentiunz from the jus  nutzwale  is cer- 
tainly  clear  enough.  It is  true  that  the  first  two  passages 
we  have just  mentioned  are quoted  directly from Ulpian, but 
the  last  mentioned  is  not  taken  from  any  known  source 
(with  the  exception  of  the  words,  "  Jure  enim  naturali  ab 
initio,"  &C.)  We  have  already  suggested  that  it  may  be 
related  to that passage  from  Hermogenianus4 which we  have 
already mentioned, but the explanation  of  the origin of  the in- 
stitutions is not contained in the passage from Hermogenianus, 
as  we  have  it in  the Digest.  At  any  rate,  whether  these 
phrases  are wholly  borrowed  or partly  original,  they do very 
clearly show that the compilers  of  the Institutes distinguished 
between  the jus  natzcrale  and  the jus  gentium, and  the  last 
passage  gives  us  some  indication  of  their  conception  of  the 
nature of  the distinction. 
Before we  discuss  the meaning  of  the jus  lzaturale  in  the 
Institutes, we  must  examine  one passage which seems directly 
to  coiltradict  those  which  we  have  just  considered.  T11is 
passage is contained in the first title of  the Second Book of  the 
Institutes, a title which deals with certain  general questions  of 
pr~perty.~  This passage is evidently founded upon those words 
l  Inst., i.  1. 4. 
Inst., i.  2. 
Inst., i.  2.  2 : "  Jus  autem gentium 
omui  humauo  generi  commune  est. 
Nam usu  exigente et humanis  necessi- 
tatibus  gentes  humans quzdam sibi 
constituerunt :  bella etenim orta sunt et 
captivitates secuts et servitutes, qus 
sunt  juri  naturali  contrarie.  Jure 
enim uaturali ab initio omnes hominq 
liberi nascebantur.  Ex hoc jure  gen- 
tium et omnes psne contractus intro- 
ducti sunt, ut emptio venditio, locetio 
conductio,  societas,  depositum,  mu- 
tuum et alii  innumerab~les." 
Dig., i.  1. 5.  See p.  42, note 1. 
S Inst , ii.  1.  11  :  "  Singuloium 
autem  hominum  multis  modis  ~es 
fiunt:  quarundam  enim  rerum  do- 
minium  nanciscimur  jure  naturalt, 
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of  Gaius's  in the Digest, which we  have already several times 
had  occasion  to  quote:  but  the  compilers  of  the  Institutes 
have  made  several  important  changes.  In the  first  place, 
they  have  substituted  the  words  "jure  naturali,  quod  sicut 
diximus  appellatur jus  gentium " for Gains's words, "  jure gen- 
tium, quod  ratione  naturali  inter  omnes homines perEque ser- 
vatur."  Next,  they have written " Palam  est autem vetustius 
esse naturale jus,  quod cum ipso genere humano rerum natura 
prodidit" in place of  Gaius's "Et quia antiquius jus gentium cum 
ipso  genere humano  rerum  natura proditum  est "; and finally, 
they have added the last clanse.  The two latter points are in- 
teresting, but the real difficulty is raised by the first sentence. 
We have just seen that the authors of  the Institutes separate 
the  jus  maturale from the jus  gentiunz.  It is difficult to under- 
stand what they can mean by saying that the law of  nature is 
called  the jzhs  gentium:  they  not  only say this, but add that 
they have  said it already, while we  can  find  no  trace of  any 
such statement in the earlier parts of  the Institutes.  The form 
of  the statement suggests that we  may have  here  a  quotation 
from some otherwise unknown source.  We can only conjecture 
either that this is the explanation of  the phenomenon, or that 
this is to be found  in the  fact that the passage forms part of 
a title which  deals with  the theory of  property,  consisting for 
the  most  part  of  citations  from  Gaius, Marcianus,  and other 
jurists who  identify the jz~s  naturule  and the jus  gentium, and 
that  the editors have adapted  their language to this fact.  The 
statement is certainly  perplexing, but it seems  impossible  to 
allow  this  phrase  to  change  the conclusion  which  we  derive 
from the clear  and repeated statements which we have already 
examined.  There  can  be no doubt  that normally the authors 
of  the  Institutes did  distinguish  the .jzlzls  natzwale  from  the 
jus  gentium. 
Their  formal definition  of  the j~u  rtntu~nle2  is,  as we  have 
quad sicut diximus appellatur jus gen-  enim jura tunc cmperunt, cum et civi- 
tium,  quarundam  jure  civili.  Com-  tates  condi  et magistratus  creari  eb 
modius est itaque a vetustiore  jure in-  leges scribi coeperunt." 
cipere.  Palam eat autemvetustius  esse  Dig., xli.  1. 1.  See p. 37, note 2. 
naturale  jus,  quod  cum  ipso  genere  a  Inst., i. 2. 
human0 rerum natura prodidit : civilis seen,  the  same  as  that  of  Ulpian,-  that  is,  they  reproduce 
that definition which suggests that the jus naturale means little 
more than the instincts common to all animals.  Bat whatever 
may be  the case  with  Ulpian, this definition  does  not appear 
to present at all a complete account of  the view of  the auth~rs 
of  the Institntes.  At the  close  of  the  same  title they  use 
phrases descriptive of  the  jura natzcrulia which seem to convey 
quite  another conception,  the conception of  their  divine  and 
immutable  character.1  The  matter  nlay  be  illustrated  from 
other  passages.  In the Third Book  of  the Institutes  we  find 
a  phrase  of  much  significance.2  The  "natural  laws"  here 
are  equivalent  to  permanent  and  divine  principles  of  life 
which are superior to the civil  law, and to which  the civil  law 
oclglit  to be  conformed.  In  the same title we  find  the action 
of  the  prstor, in  admitting emancipated  children to a  share 
in the inheritance of  their parents, described  as being  due to 
the sense  of  "naturalis  aquitas."a  Again, the same title and 
the next, in dealing with  the changes  of  the law of  succession 
in relation to females and their representatives, describe certain 
changes in the civil  law as being  due to the feeling that the 
old  law  was  contrary to  nature  and to the  inspiration  of  a 
humaner sense.4  Natural laws are divine  and ought to govern 
and correct all other forms  of  law, for they represent the per- 
manent principles  of  justice  and humanity.  This is evidently 
quite another view  of  the jus  naturalc from that which  may 
seem  to be  expressed  in the formal definition of  Ulpian which 
the  Institutes  cite.  It would  appear,  then,  that  whatever 
uncertainty  we  may  feel  as to  the meaning  attached  to the 
jus  natu~ale  by  Ulpian  and his  contemporaries, by  the sixth 
century  the phrase  was  certainly taking  that meaning which 
l  Inst.,  i.  2.  11 : "  Sed  naturalia 
quidem jura,  quso apud omnes  gentes 
perzque servantur, divina quadam pro- 
videntia constituta semper firms atque 
immutabilia permanent:  ea vero, qum 
ipsa sibi qusque  civitas constituit, scpe 
mutari solent vel tacito consensu populi 
vel alia postea lege lab." 
2  Inst., iii.  I. 11 : 'l Natu~alia  enim 
jura civilis ratio peremere non potest." 
Inst., iii. 1. 9: "Sed  prretornaturali 
zquitate motus dat eis bonorum poa- 
sessionem. " 
4 Inst., iii.  1. 15 : "  Divi autem prin- 
cipes  non  passi  sunt  talem  contfa 
naturam  injuriam  sine  competenti 
emendatione  relinquere."  Inst.,  iii. 
2.  3a,  "  humano  proposito,"  and  7, 
'l humanitate suggerente." 
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it has throughout  the Middle  Ages  and later-that  is,  that 
the jws  nuturule  means that body of  principles  of  justice  and 
reason which  men  can  rationally apprehend, and which  forms 
the ideal norm or standard of  right conduct and of  the justice 
of social institutions. 
We  do not mean that the authors of  the Institntes had arrived 
at any perfectly clear judgment on the matter,-on  the contrary, 
the  fact  of  their  reproducing  Ulpian's  definition  shows  us 
sufficiently clearly that this was  not the case,-but  we  think 
that the tendency of  their  thought is clear enough, that they 
show us the development of  a conception  which  in the second 
century was still unformed  and indistinct.  We  have seen that 
the  jz~s  gentiun~  was  by  Gaius  conceived  as  embodying  the 
principles of  justice  and reason, that indeed the jus  gentiunt in 
Gaius is practically the same thing as the  jus naturale in Cicero. 
The conception, therefore, of  a principle of  law, apprehended by 
reason  as  lying  behind  all  positive  law  and embodying  the 
principles of  justice and reason, was  not  new.  The new thing 
was  simply  the distinction between  this ultimate law and the 
jus gentium. 
We  have  already  considered  the  question  of  the  causes 
which  led  to this distinction.  We think that in the main  it 
must  have arisen  from  the judgment that certain institutions, 
which  were  actually  universal,  could  not  be  looked  upon  as 
having been  primitive or natural in the full sense of  the word. 
It is  round  the question  of  slavery  that  this  distinction,  as 
far as  our  evidence  goes,  seems  to  take  shape  in  the  legal 
writings,  and  this,  again,  seems  to  be  related  to  the  ques- 
tion  of  natural  equality.  Eut the  conception  could  be  ex- 
tended  easily  to  other  conditions  and  circumstances  of  life. 
The distinction between  the jus  naturale  and the jus  gentium 
seems, then, to be very clearly related to the distinction between 
the primitive state of  nature and the conventional organisation 
of  society.  The writers  of  the Institutes do not deal with this 
directly and explicitly, but in two passages  at least they seem 
to come a  good  deal  nearer to it than any writer  cited  in the 
Digest,  with  the possible  exception  of  Hermogenianus.  We 
have already quoted these passages,  but must do so again.  The first comes after the definition of  the tripartite law, and resumes 
the description of  thejzcs gentium which had been first given in 
the words  of  Gaius.  This  passage, which, as we  have already 
mentioned,  is  not  drawn  from  any  known  source,  though it 
reminds us of  Hermogenianus, seems quite clearly  to imply  a 
contrast between  the primitive conditions of  human life and the 
time when the conditions and institutions referred to came  into 
existence.l  The other phrase comes at the end  of  that passage 
which we have already mentioned in discussing the relation of 
the jus  naturale and the jzcs  gelztizcm.2  In this passage, as we 
have  already seen, the authors of  the Inslitutes  have spoken 
of  the jus naturale and the jus gentiz~~~t  as being identical, and 
therefore  the primitive condition is not thought of  under terms 
which  belong in any exclusive sense to the jus naturale.  But 
the writers of  the Institutes do seem  clearly to conceive of  a 
time  when  States  did  not  exist,  nor  magistrates,  nor  written 
laws.  That is, they seem to contrast  the primitive  conditions 
of  human life, in which such institutions as those  mentioned 
did not exist,  with  the later  time  when  they  did. 
The treatment of  slavery in the Institutes is the same as that 
in  Ulpian, Tryphoninus, and Florentinus ;  indeed, with the excep- 
tion of  the words, "  bella etenim orta sunt, et captivitates secutze, 
quz sunt juri naturali  contrariae,"  they simply reproduce the 
phrases  of  Ulpian  and  Florentinus,  "  Jure enim  naturali  ab 
initio omnes homines liberi nascebantur,"  and "  Servitus auteru 
est constitutio juris  gentium, qua quis dominio alieno  contra 
naturam  subjicitur." 
VTe need  not say anything as to the theory  of  property in 
the Institutes : it does not seem to differ in any way from that 
presented  in  the Digest.  The conlpilers  simply put together 
in shorter for111 the same views  as those which we have seen to 
1 Inst., i.  2.  2 : "  Jus  autem gen- 
tiu~n  omni  humano  generi  commune 
est.  Nam  usu  exigente  et hurnanis 
necessitatibus geutes humans qusdam 
sibi constituerunt : bella  etenim  orb 
sunt et captiritates  secute  et servi- 
tutes  qus sunt  juri  naturali  con- 
trariae. " 
Inst., ii. 1. 11 : "  Palam est autern 
retustius  ease naturale jus, quod  cum 
ipso  genere  humano  rerum  natura 
prodidit : civilia enim jura tunc cceper- 
unt,  cum et civitates  condi et magis- 
tratus creari et  leges scribi cceperunt." 
Inst., i.  2. 2. 
Inst., i. 2. 2.  Cf. Dig., i. 1.  4. 
Inst., i.  3. 2.  Cf. Dig., i. 5.  4. 
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be  generally held  by  the jurists  of  the second  and third  cen- 
turies.  They throw no further light on that interesting passage 
from Hermogenianus on which we have commented. 
And again we find the same thing to be the case with regard 
to the theory of  the relation of  the  civil  law  to  the general 
of law : the writers of  the Institutes begin their own 
treatise  with  Ulpian's  definition  of  justice  and of  the general 
character  of  jurisprndence,l  but  they  add  nothing.  Ancl  so, 
again, with  regard  to the source  of  the authority of  the civil 
law.  They define the varieties of  the civil law and the source 
of their authority mainly in the words of  Gaius and of  Ulpian2 
They  represent the same tradition  which  we  have  seen  to  be 
characteristic of  all the legal theory of  Rome from  the second 
century to Justinian, that the Roman people  are the ultimate 
source of  the authority of  the civil law of  Ron~e.~ 
The Institutes  then furnish us with  valuable information as 
to  the  development  of  the  theories  of  natural  law  and  the 
natural  state between  the second  century  and the  sixth, and 
seem  to show  us that, with  regard  to  the other  subjects into 
which we have inquired, the legal theory continues during these 
centuries unchanged. 
Loolring back now on our examination of  the political theory 
of  the Roman lawyers, we feel it in the first place  important to 
observe  how  very small a  place  such theory occupies in their 
work.  We have been compelled to take up a considerable space 
in our discussion of  this, but that is simply due to the fact that 
the subject is obscure, and that there are many points  whose 
interpretation presents some difficulties.  The references  of  the 
lawyers to the theory of politics are few in number, and some- 
what slight, if not superficial, in character.  We cannot pretend 
to think  that the lawyers  contributed  much to the philosophy 
of  the State by  their  own  reflections, but in reproducing  the 
theories current among intelligent men they probably did much 
to give them a precise and definite character, and the mere fact 
of the embodiment of  such theories in the technical law-books 
could not but give  them a new importance and inflnence.  The 
'  Inst., i.  1. 1.  Cf. Dig., i. 1. 10.  Inst., i. 2.  3.8.  Inst., i. 2.  6. influence of  the lawyers in the development of  political theory 
was probably quite out of  proportion to their actual capacity as 
political  thinkers.  Their importance for  our  purpose is obvi- 
ously  very great:  the period  to which  they  belong  is one  in 
which  there seems to have  been very little  formal writing  on 
political  theory, or else the works which  may have dealt with 
this have  disappeared.  The lawyers furnish us with the best 
materials  for  estimating  what  was  the  general  tendency  of 
political theory during these centuries, apart from the Christian 
influences.  When we turn to the Christian Fathers we shall find 
that they provide us with much information on our subject, but 
if  we were  to go  to them without first examining the views of 
the lawyers, we  should  have  some  difficulty in discriminating 
between  conceplions  which  belong  to  the  Christian tradition 
and  those  which  were  the  common  property  of  the  Roman 
world.  The influence  of  the jurists  upon  medizval  political 
thought is very great, certainly very  obvious, and while, as we 
shall  see, the relations between medizval thought and the Roman 
jurisprudence  may  often  be  somewhat  superficial,  yet  its 
influence  is so constant, both  directly and through  the gradu- 
ally  growing  and  developing  body  of  the  Canon  Law,  that 
some  study of  the Roman  law  is necessary  as a  preliminary 
to any complete  examination of  mediaeval  ideas. 
If  now we consider what are historically the most important 
elements in the political theory of  the Ronlan lawyers, we shall 
be  inclined to say that first in order of  significance comes their 
contribution  to the theory  of  the natural law and the natural 
state.  We have seen how these conceptiolls  take shape or are 
implied in the writings of  the jurists of  the second century, and 
are by them transmitted to those of  the sixth.  We have  seen 
that these  conceptions  seem  to be  related  to some judgment, 
instinctive perhaps rather than fully reasoned, that some actual 
institutions of society cannot  be  thought of  as being  strictly in 
harmony with the primitive conditions of  human life, which are 
also conceived of as representing some  ideal  system of  justice. 
We have  seen  that through  Ulpian, Tryphoninus, and Floren- 
tinns the theory of the natural equality and liberty of  mankind 
passed  into the svstenl of the Roman law, and it can hardly be 
doubted that this fact was not without a ~owerful  influence upon 
the course of speculation on the theory of  human institutions. 
Secondly, we  think it is probable  that the influence  of  the 
lawyers  on  future times  was  greater  than  we  might  at first 
think with respect to the theory of  the relation of  law and the 
ultimate principle of justice.  They  contributed at least to fix 
for many  centuries in the minds  of  men  the conviction  that 
the civil  law of  any State represents the practical application 
of  the principles  of justice  and reason.  Cicero and the Stoics 
indeed had maintained this view with clearness and conviction ; 
but whether it would  have become  predominant apart from the 
influence  of  the jurists  may perhaps  be  doubted.  When we 
come  to  discuss  the  theory  of  St Augustine,  we  may  have 
occasion  to observe some signs of  another view. 
And, finally, we think that in the conception of  the Roman 
lawyers as to the source of  authority in the State we probably 
have  one  foundation  of  the  inedizval and modern  theory  of 
democracy.  We shall have to study the immediate sources of 
this in later chapters of  this volume, and in the next volume we 
shall have  to  examine  the medizval conception in detail, and 
shall  then  be  in  a  position  to  estimate  more  precisely  the 
importance  of  the contribution  of  the Roman  lawyers to the 
development of  modern democratic theory.  Rut in the mean- 
while  it is at least well  worth  observing  that, if  the ancient 
civilisation ended in a  system of  monarchical though legal ab- 
solutism, yet the theory of  government which the jurists  of  the 
old  world  handed  down  to  the  new  was  a  theory  in which 
all authority in the State is conceived  of  as coming  from  &lie 
people. PART  111. 
TIIE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT 
AND  THE  FATHERS. 
CHAPTER  VIII. 
THE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF THE  NEW  TESTAMENT. 
WE have so far been engaged upon an inquiry into the political 
theory of  the ancient world, in its last stages indeed, but as ixn- 
affected by any of  those new conceptions which may have come 
into it with Judaism and Christianity.  We have now  to con- 
sider the leading features of  the political theory of  the West as 
we find it in the Christian writers of  the first  six  centuries of 
our era.  We  have to consider what contributions the new mode 
of thought actually made to the general stream of  political and 
social  ideas, how  far it simply coincided with these, how far it 
may have changed them, and how far, even when  it did in the 
main  correspond  with them, it may  have tended to give these 
ideas  a  new  form  or  a  new  force. 
Historians  have  often  spoken  in general  terms of  the far- 
reaching effects of  Christianity  in changing men's  conceptions 
with regard  to  the character, the purpose, and the ruling prin- 
ciples of  human society, and no doubt the influence  of  Christi- 
anity  upon  these  has been  profound  and far-reaching, but we 
think that we have already said enough to show that if  we are 
to arrive  at any just  and well-grounded  judgment  upon  this 
question, we  must  be at pains  to discriminate  very carefully 
VOL.  I.  F those  elements  of  the theory  of  Christian writers  which  are 
really  original  to  them, and those  in which they do but re- 
produce  the  opinions  already  current in  tlie  civilised  world. 
There  are, no  doubt,  certain  elements of  political  and  social 
theory which  are distii~ctive  of  the Christian  writers, but we 
shall have to recognise  a little more distinctly than has always 
been  done  that very  often  they  are simply drawing from the 
common stock of  ideas current in their times. 
We must begin by considering the significance  and scope  of 
the references to the theory of  human nature and society in the 
New  Testament.  But  behind  the  New  Testament  there lies 
the literature of  the Old  Testament, whether belonging to tlie 
earlier history of lsrael or to the period between the Exile and 
the  advent  of  our  Lord.  It is  especially  in  the  literature, 
whether canonical  or  apocryphal, of  this later period, that me 
have to look for the explanation of  many of  the phenomena of 
New Testament  theory : unhappily the field  is as yet but very 
imperfectly  explored.  The  obscurity  of  the  period  indeed 
corresponds  in  time  and  in  in~portance  with  the  parallel 
obscurity  of  the  period  between  Aristotle  and  Cicero,  and 
until more  light has been  thrown  upon these centuries, much 
in the New Testament will remain difficult to understand, and 
still more  difficult  to  explai~l  with  reference  to sources  and 
origins.  Anlong  the many  obscurities of  our subject, perhaps 
the most obscure and perplexing are the questions which  arise 
as to the contact  between  Jewish and Hellenic ideas, and the 
influence  which  the  latter  exercised  upon  the  former.  The 
importance of  the subject has long been recognised with regard 
to the interpretation of  St Paul's conception of  religion and the 
world, but it may be  much more  iniportaut  with  regard to the 
whole of the New Testalvellt tlian we yet understand. 
We find  in the New  Testament matter  of  importance with 
regard  to  the  theory  of  natural  law,  the  theory  of  human 
equality, the theory of  property, and the theory of  government. 
We begin  by examining the theory of natural law. 
The  references  to  this  theory  in  the  New  Testament  are 
very scanty-indeed  we  have  not  observed  any distinct  refer- 
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ence  to  the subject, except in one passage  in St Paul's  letter 
to  the  Bomans;  but  this  reference  is  very  clear  and  dis- 
tinct,  and may  be  taken as presenting a conception  which  is 
constantly assumed  by  St Paul as true and important.  The 
passage  occurs in  a  very  important  and  indeed  fundamental 
discussion of the relation to God of  the Gentiles who have not 
received  a  revealed  law  from  God:  "For  as  many  as  have 
sinned without law shall also perish without law: and as many 
as have sinned under law shall be  judged  by law; for  not  the 
hearers of  a  law are just  before  God,  but  the doers of  a  law 
shall  be  justified:  for when  Gentiles  which  have  no  law  do 
by nature the things of  the law, these, having no law, are a law 
unto themselves ; in that they show the work of  the law written 
in their hearts, their consciellce bearing witness therewith." l 
There  can  be  little doubt  that  St Paul's words  imply some 
conception  analogous  to  the  "natural  law" in  Cicero,  a  law 
written  in  men's  hearts,  recognised  by  man's  reason,  a  law 
distinct from the positive  law of  any State, or from what  St 
Paul recognised as the revealed law of  God.  It is in this sense 
that St Paul's words are taken by the Fathers of  the fourth and 
fifth centuries like St Hilary of  Poitiers, St Ambrose,  and St 
Augustine? and there seems no reason to doubt the correctness 
of  their interpretation.  It would  be  an interesting question to 
discuss  the source of  this conception in St Paul;  how  far it 
came to him from the presumably Hellenic culture of his youth 
at Tarsus,  how  far  from  the  general  stock  of  ideas  current 
among  the more  educated Jews.  For our purpose  it is suffi- 
cient  to observe  that we find the conception in the New Testa- 
ment.  We have  already considered  its character  in the writ- 
ings of  Cicero, and the development  of  the conception among 
the jurists  of  the second  and third centuries.  We shall have 
to  consider  it again in the Christian  Fathers. 
We turn  to the theory of  human nature and equality in the 
New Testament, and first to this as presented in the teaching of 
1 Rom. ii.  12-14.  et Vita Beata,  vi.,  and  Ep  lxxiii.  2; 
St Hilary  of  Poitiera,  Comm.  on  St Augustine,  contra Fauatum  Mani- 
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3ur Lord in the Gospels.  Whatever questions may be raised as 
to the universalist and particularist aspects of  the Gospels, it will, 
we think, now be admitted by all critics that the doctrine of  our 
Lord must have contained the germs of  that universalism which 
ultimately predominated in the Christian Church.  It  is evident 
that more or less clearly our  Lord  must have  taught  the ~OC- 
trine of  the universal fatherhood  of  God, that in His eyes the 
distinctions of  Jew and Gentile were  not fundamental nor  per- 
manent.  The Jewish people are warned that "  many shall come 
from  the east  and  from  the west,  and shall sit down  in the 
kingdom of heaven with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob," while 
the children of the kingdom, the people of  Israel, are shut out.' 
This is only one  example of  a conception which  is continually 
making itself felt in warnings to the Jews, and in the expression 
of  the universal compassion and mercy of  God. 
The same conception is expressed  in set terms by  St Paul, 
"There  can  be  neither  Jew nor  Greek,  there  can  be  neither 
bond nor free, there can be no male and female:  for  ye  all  are 
one  man  in  Christ  Jesus"  but  this  aspect  of  St  Paul's 
teaching  is too  well  known  to  need  any  detailed  exposition. 
It is perhaps  interesting  and worth  while  to notice  that the 
author of  the Acts  of  the Apostles  represents  St Paul as ex- 
pressing the conception of  the universal  fatherhood  of  God  in 
the terms of  a Stoic philosopher  and poet, "  For in him we live, 
and move,  and have our being;  as certain  even  of  your  own 
poets have said, For we are also his offspring."  The doctrine 
of  St Paul with regard to the cornInon relation of  all mankind 
to God is the same as that of  the later philosophers. 
We find, then, as characteristic of  the Christian  faith, that 
same conception  of  the identity of  human  nature over  all the 
world which we  have already considered in Cicero and Seneca. 
We cannot here enter into the question  of  the  history of  this 
conception in the later Judaism.  We can  see  that among  the 
Palestinian Jews there was still in St Paul's time a strong con- 
servative party which  looked  upon these sentiments with sus- 
picion.  Apart  from all the critical dispntes as to the relation 
1 Matt. viii. 11, 12.  and  Col.  iii.  11. 
2  Gal.  iii.  28.  Cf.  1  Cor.  xii.  13;  Actsxvii. 28. 
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of  St Paul to Jewish Christians, there can  be  little doubt  that 
it was the form of his universalism which, more than any other 
cause, tended to concentrate upon him the anger of  the Jews. 
There  are indeed  traces in Hebrew literature from  an early 
date  of  a  tendency  to  transcend  the  national  principle  in 
religion.  Both  in the first  and the  second  parts  of  Isaiah, 
in  connection  with  the  expectation  of  the  deliverer  and 
restorer,  there is  expressed,  however  vaguely,  the  sellse  that 
his  work  will  transcend  the  limits  of  the  people  of  Israel, 
that  it will be his work  to establish righteousness  and equity 
for all mankind, and to extend the knowledge of  God  over  all 
the world.'  How far  these  ideas  grew and developed  during 
that most  obscure  period which followed  the return from  the 
great captivity, how far the nationalism of  the Jews may have 
revived under the stress of  the resistance  to Hellenism  under 
the Rlaccabees, how far the contact with Hellenism, even when 
resisted, may have yet actually tended to break down the Judaic 
isolation,-all  this is a subject still obscure and perplexed.  That 
our Lord took up again the tradition of  the great prophets, and, 
translat'ing it into a  new form, gave it a  profoulid  and perma- 
nent life, seems  clear, as is also the fact that St Paul carries on 
the doctrine  of  our Lord.  The Christian Church then  set out 
on  its history with  a  conception  of  human  nature  which  had 
outgrown  the sense of  national limitations, a conception which 
coincided very closely with the conception of  the contemporary 
philosophy. 
We shall therefore not  be  surprised to find that  the treat- 
ment  of  slavery, and its relation to human  nature, in the  New 
Testament,  is very  closely  analogous  to  that  of  the  writers 
~vhonl  we  have  hitherto  considered.  We have  a  series  of 
interesting  passages  which  deal with  the subject  in St Paul's 
writings, and while  these  leave  a  good  deal  obscure, yet they 
enable  us  to  form a  fairly clear conception  of  the principles 
which  from  the  first  dominate the attitude of  the  Christian 
Church  towards the institution  of  slavery. 
The  earliest reference to the subject by St Paul is contained 
in that passage which we have already considered? in which St 
Cf. especially Isa. xi  9-12 and xlii. 1-6.  a  Gal. iii. 28. 86  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT  AND  THE  FATHERS.  [PART  111. 
Paul  speaks  of  the distinction  between  slave and freeman  as 
one which has no  meaning in relation to God.  This  evidently 
does  not  mean  that Christianity has made the institution  of 
slavery  unlawful,  but  simply that it  has  no  significance  in 
God's  sight,-that  the slave, jnst  as much  as the freeman, is 
capable  of  the religious life, capable  of  knowing  God  and of 
the  life  of  the child  of  God.  We might  translate  St Paul's 
phrase into other terms,-the  slave is possessed of  reason  and 
capable of  virtue.  St Paul would  obviously have  emphatically 
repudiated  the notion  that there is a  natural or inherent dis- 
tinction  in human  nature, which renders some nlen capable of 
the higher  life, while  others must  remain  upon a lower  level. 
The passages in the Corinthian and Colossianl letters to which 
we referred are strictly parallel, but add nothing further. 
In  the letter to Philemon we have a practical commentary on 
this conception, and we have a further development of  St Paul's 
principles with regard to slavery.  St Paul sends a certain Ones- 
imus back to his master Philemon, from whom  he had appar- 
ently  escaped.  He had  fallen  in  with  St  Paul  and  been 
converted to Christianity.  It is very noteworthy that St Paul 
felt it right  to  send Onesimus back to his master, and does not 
even suggest that Philemon should set him  at liberty.  On the 
other hand, St Paul expects Philelnon to  receive Onesimus not 
as a  rnere  slave, a  runaway to be  punished, but  as a  beloved 
brother.  The epistle seems to illustrate clearly two principles : 
that slavery is not in St Paul's  mind  unlawful,  but that the 
condition of  slavery is only external-that  it has no  existence 
in the moral and spiritual life. 
We  have another reference to the subject in the first letter 
to  the  Corinthians,  which  would  be  extremely  interesting  if 
we could be more confident  as to its meaning : "  Let each man 
abide in that calling  wherein he was called.  Wast thou called 
being a bond-servant ?  care not for it :  but if  thou canst become 
free, use it rather.  For he that was called in the Lord, being a 
bond-servant, is  the  Lord's  freedman :  likewise  he that was 
called, being  free, is Christ's  bond-servant.  Ye  were  bought 
with a price ;  become not bond-servants of  men.  Brethren, let 
'  1  Cor. xii. 13 ;  Col, iii. 11.  Or, "Nay,  even if." 
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each  man,  wherein  he  was  called,  therein  abide  with  God."' 
One  general  conclusion  can  clearly enough  be  founded  upon 
this passage, namely, that in relation to Christ it is completely 
indifferent  whether  a  man  is  a  slave  or  a  freeman.  But 
when  we  ask ourselves,  Does  St Paul  in  this  passage  advise 
a  man  to  get  his  freedom  if  he  can, or  does he rather  urge 
upon  him  that  the  whole  thing is so  unimportant that it  is 
not  worth  while  taking  steps  to  obtain  his  freedom ?  we 
find  ourselves  in  much  uncertainty,  and  can  hardly  express 
any decided  opinion. 
Another aspect of St Paul's  conception of  slavery is presented 
to us in two passages, obviously parallel to each  other, but not 
identical.  We may take  first  that in the letter to the Ephes- 
ians : "  Bond-servants, be obedient unto them that according to 
the flesh  are your masters, with  fear  and trembling, in single- 
ness  of  your  heart,  as unto  Christ; not  in the  way  of  eye- 
service, as men-pleasers ;  but as bond-servants of  Christ, doing 
the will  of  God  from  the heart; with good will doing service, 
as unto the Lord, and not  unto men. . . .  And, ye masters, do 
the same  things  unto them, and forbear threatening: knowing 
that both their Master and yours is in heaven, and there is no 
respect  of  persons  with  Him."2  St Paul's  phrases  are very 
general in their character, but three conclusions may be drawn 
from them.  First, that  he  looks upon  the performance  of  his 
work  by  the slave as a  duty in the sight of  God.  Secondly, 
that before God the master and the slave are on the same level. 
Thirdly, it is probably safe to interpret St Paul's  injunctions to 
the masters,  "do the same things unto them,"  as meaning that 
they are to behave towards their slaves with fairness.  Perhaps 
we  may find the best commentary on these words in the parallel 
passage in the letter to the Colossians : "  Bond-servants, obey in 
all things them  that are your  masters  according to the flesh: 
not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singleness of  heart, 
fearing the Lord :  whatsoever ye do, work heartily, as unto the 
Lord, and  not  unto  men ; knowing  that  from  the  Lord  ye 
shall  receive  the  recompense  of  the  inheritance:  ye  serve 
the  Lord  Christ.  For he that doeth wrong  shall receive again 
1 1 Col. vii. 20-24.  8 Eph. vi. 5-9. for the wrong  that he  hath  done:  and there is no  respect  of 
persons.  Masters, render unto your  bond-servants  that which 
is just  and equal; knowing  that ye  also  have  a  Master  in 
heaven." l  The  first  part  of  this passage  is substantially the 
same as that in the Ephesian letter, but in the last sentence 
there  is  a  change  of  phrase  of  some  interest.  Instead  of 
"  Masters, do the same things unto them,"  we have,  "  Blasters, 
render unto your bond-servants that which is just and equal" (7; 
6l~a~ov  rcai  &jv  2ah~~ra).  The words are a little vague, but at 
least they seem clearly to express the principle that justice and 
fairness  is a  quality which  ought  to belong  to the relation of 
master and slave, that a man's  actions in this relation ought to 
have the same quality as that which  belongs  to the other rela- 
tions of  life.  We  are reminded of  Cicero's phrase, "  Meminerimus 
autem etiam  adversus  infimos justitialll  esse  servandam.  Est 
autem infima  condicio  et fortuna ~ervorum."~ 
St Paul's  attitude to  the question  of  slavery  is  obviously 
founded up011 his conviction that all men  are at least morally 
and spiritually  equal  in character.  To  him  all  men  are  in 
God's  sight equal, distinctions  of  condition belong  only to the 
outer  man, men  are to each  other  brothers.  The  conduct  of 
masters towards  their  slaves  nlust  be  governed by  the same 
principles  of  equity and fairness as those  which  govern  their 
relations to other men.  We can hardly say that St Paul goes 
beyond  the  position  of  Cicero  or  Seneca  as  to  the  natural 
similarity and equality of  human nature, or beyond  Seneca  in 
his judgment  that slavery is a  condition which  only affects the 
outer  character  of  the man.  His theory of  human  nature  is 
indeed Irery similar to theirs, and his attitude towards slavery is 
much the same.  Seneca indeed goes sornewliat further than St 
Paul when he recognises that slavery is to all men hateful and 
burdensome ;  as we have seen, St I'aul's  attitude towards the 
question of  the advantages of  emancipation is uncertain.  If  St 
Paul's conception of  slavery was to have a greater  influence on 
the future of  that institution, we must  probably conclude  that 
this was due to the fact that  St Paul's judgment dominated the 
1  Col  iii. 22, iv. 1.  Seneca, De Beneficiis, iii.  19. 
a  Cicero, De Officlis, i. 13. 41. 
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thought  and  the  practical  tendencies  of  the  Church,  while 
Seneca's  was  but  the  sentiment  of  an individual, representa- 
tive probably of  a very general judgment, but not  enforced  by 
an organised common judgment. 
There  are two  references  to  the subject  of  slavery  in  the 
diPastoral"  epistles, but they illustrate not so much the theory 
of slavery as the relation of  the writers  of  the New  Testament 
to anarchical and disorderly elements in the primitive  Church, 
which were probably of  much greater importance than we have 
hitherto recognised.  We shall have  to  deal with  the matter 
immediately in connection with the theory of  government in the 
New Testament.  The passages are in the first letter to Timothy, 
and in the letter to Titus.l  The writer of  the letters exhorts the 
slaves to honour and obey their masters, and particularly not to 
despise  their  masters  if  they  also were  Christians.  We may 
probably infer that the writer felt that there was  some danger 
lest the new sense of  spiritual dignity, and of  spiritual relation 
between  Christians of  all conditions, should tend  violently  to 
destroy the old  social order: he  is afraid lest the conduct  of 
Christian  men  should bring  discredit  or suspicion  upon  the 
religion  of  Christ. 
We turn to the theory of  the institution of  government, and 
here  we  find  certaiu  conceptions  whose  importance  in  the 
history  of  later political  thought  is  very  great  indeed.  The 
most  important  passage  in  the  New  Testament  which  is 
connected  with  this  subject is  that in the thirteenth  chapter 
of  St Paul's  epistle  to the  Romans.  "Let  every  soul  be  in 
subjection  to the higher  powers : for  there is no power  but of 
God;  and  the powers  that be  are ordained  of  God.  There- 
fore lie  that  resistetli  the power  withstandet11  the ordinance 
of  God: and they that  withstand  shall  receive  to themselves 
judgment.  For  rulers  are  not  a  terror  to  the  good  work, 
but  to  the  evil.  And  wouldest  thou  have  no  fear  of  the 
power?  do  that  which  is  good,  and  thou  shalt  have  praise 
from the same : for he is a  minister of  God  to thee for good. 
But if  thou  do  that which  is evil, be  afraid;  for  he  beareth 
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not the sword in vain:  for he is a minister of  God, an avenger 
for wrath to him  that doeth  evil.  Wherefore  ye must needs 
be  in subjection,  not  only because  of  the wrath,  but also  for 
conscience' sake.  For  for this cause ye  pay  tribute also;  for 
they are the ministers of  God's  service, attending continually 
upon  this  very  thing.  Render  to all  their  dues:  tribute to 
whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom;  fear  to whom 
fear; honour to whom honour."l 
This passage, which is of  the greatest importance throughout 
the whole  course of medizval  political  thought,  being  indeed 
constantly quoted from the second century onwards, is indeed 
pregnant  and significant  in the highest degree.  It defines in 
the profoundest  way  the  Christian  theory  of  the  nature  of 
political society, while it furnishes us with the most interesting 
evidence with regard to the condition of the Christian societies 
of  the apostolic period. 
St Paul's  general meaning is plain and distinct.  The order 
of  civil government is of divine institution, a  thing deriving its 
authority and sanction from God Himself; to refuse to submit 
to it is to refuse to submit to God ; obedience  to the State is 
not  merely  a  political  necessity,  but  a  religious  obligation. 
But,  we  may  ask, why  is this so?  Why are we  to take the 
civil  order  of  the State  to  be  a  divine  institution, to which 
we  must  render  obedience  as  to  God  Himself?  Here  also 
St Paul's  answer  is clear  and distinct; it is because  the end 
and  purpose  of  civil  government  is  to  repress  the  evil  and 
to encourage  the good.  The civil ruler is God's  servant for  a 
good  purpose ; the good  man  need  have  no  fear  of  the civil 
ruler,  but  only  the  evil  man.  To  put  this  into  the  more 
technical  phrases  of  political  theory, St Paul  means  that  we 
must  obey  the civil  order,  as having  a  divine  authority, be- 
cause  it  exists  for  the  maintenance  of  justice.  It is  the 
just  end of  the civil  State which  gives it a  sacred  character. 
There  are some other passages  of  importance which  should 
be  considered  along  with  this  one.  In the letter  to Titus2 
we  have  an  exhortation  in  general  terms  to  obedience  to 
authorities, and in the first letter  to Timothy  Christian  men 
l Rom. xiii. 1-7.  a  Titus iii. 1, 2. 
are  exhorted  to  pray  "for  kings  and  all  that  are  in  high 
place;  that  we  may  lead  a  tranquil  and  quiet  life  in  all 
godliness and gravity." l  The  position  of  the ruler  is defined 
clearly, along with the ground of  the attitude of  Christian men 
towards  him. namely,  that it is his  function  to secure  order 
and peace  for  society. 
In the first  letter  of  St Peter  we  have  a  more  complete 
parallel  to the phrases  of  St Paul in  the Roman  letter.  "Be 
siibject to every ordinance of  man for the Lord's sake : whether 
it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as sent by him 
for vengeance on evil-doers and for praise to them that do well. 
For  so  is the will of God,  that by well-doing ye should put to 
silence  the ignorance  of  foolish  men : as free, and not  using 
your  freedom  for  a  cloke of  wickedness,  but as bond-servants 
of  God.  Honour all men.  Love the brotherhood.  Fear God. 
Honour  the ki~ig."~  We have  here  the  same  conception  as 
that of  St Paul, that the authority of  the ruler is divine, that 
obedience is to  be  rendered  to  him  for  the Lord's  sake; and 
the  same  explanation  of  this,  as  resting  upon  the  fact  that 
the function of  the ruler  is to punish  the evil  and  to reward 
the good.  But the passage  is also interesting as suggesting to 
us  some explanation of  the urgency  with  which  St Paul and 
the writer of  this letter deal with the matter: for our purposes 
it is  immaterial  whether  the  author  is,  as  we  should  judge 
probable,  St Peter, or  some  other  and later writer. 
We might very well at first sight wonder what it is that leads 
St Paul and St Peter to insist upon such an obvious truism as 
that the honest  man  should  respect and obey the civil power. 
The first explanation which offers itself is, that they are anxious 
to counteract some  Jewish  antipathy to the Roman  rule, and 
the explanation is consistent with the character of  the persons 
to whom the letter to the Romans and the letter of  St Peter are 
addressed.  It is  fairly  clear  that the Roman  Church,  when 
St Paul  wrote,  consisted  partly  of  Jewish, partly  of  Gentile 
Christians, and it would  seem  that the letter of  St Peter may 
be addressed mainly to Jewish Christians.3  It is indeed  n~ost 
'  1 Tim. ii. 2. 
'  1 Peter ii. 13-17. 
Cf.  1 Peter i. l : drchs~~ois  ;rapcad. 
Ffipors  Grauaopis. probable that the Christian teachers were compelled at an early 
date to deal with this question  of  the relation of  the Church to 
the Roman  Government.  The  Jewish religious  and  political 
leaders had evidently tried to entallgle our Lord in the difficult 
questions  relating  to the Jewish  nationality  and the Roman 
Empire.  There  can  be  no niistake  about  the purpose  of  the 
question  with  regard  to  paying  tribute  to  Cesar;l it was 
obviously  intended  to involve our Lord  in a  charge either of 
want of  patriotism, or  of  disloyalty to the Roman Government. 
The apparent failure of  the attempt evidently did not prevent 
the Jewish authorities from bringing the latter charge against 
our Lord.  It is true that only St Luke's gospel actually records 
the definite form of the charge, "We found this man perverting 
our nation, and forbidding to give  tribute to Czsar, and saying 
that he himself  is Christ a king ;  "  "ut  it is clear from all the 
accounts of  the trial before Pilate that some  such charge  must 
have been  made.  The conlmon  tradition of  all the narratives 
represents Pilate as asking our  Lord  whether  he claimed to be 
the King of  the Jews:  and there seems therefore to be nothing 
improbable in St John's  statement that it was by pressing the 
charge of  disloyalty that the Jewish leaders were able to coerce 
Pilate into ordering our Lord's  cru~ifixion.~  Our judgment is 
confirmed  by the account  of  the insciiption  placed  upon  the 
cross.5  There is some evidence  that this same  charge  of  dis- 
loyalty was brought against the Christians in the later part of 
the first century.  According  to the author of  the Acts of  the 
Apostles, the Jews at Thessalonica  tried to embroil the newly 
founded Christian community in that city with the authorities, 
by bringing against them a charge  closely connected with that 
brought against our Lord.  "These that have turned the world 
upside down are come hither also ;  whom Jason hath received : 
and these all act contrary to the decrees of  Cwsar, saying that 
there is another  king,  one Jesus."  There may be some trace 
of  charges  of  the same kind  in the narrative of  the incidents 
1 Mark  xii  13-17, and parallels.  '  John xix. 12-16. 
2  Luke xxiil. 2.  Matt. xxvn. 37, and parallels. 
Matt.  XXVII.  11 ; Mark xv  2 ;  Luke  P Acts ~511.  6, 7. 
xxiii. 3 , Jolill xviii. 33. 
at Philippi:  and  in  the  charges  brought  against  St Paul at 
Cas~rea.~ 
The Apocalypse also furnishes us with clear evidence that, as 
a matter of fact, the Jewish  hatred of  the Roman  Government 
was at one time, and in some  circles, common  among Christian 
men, when  Rome  first  turned  from its early indifference  and 
careless protection, and became the violent enemy of the Christ- 
ian societies.  Without entering  into any discussion of  the in- 
terpretation  of  the Apocalypse  as  a  whole,  or  any criticism 
of  its sources, it is at least obvious  that  we  have  in it an ex- 
pression  of  the  most  intense  hatred of  the Roman  oppressor, 
which,  even if  it were  Jewish in its original  form,  has been 
adopted by a Christian writer.  It may of  course be urged that 
this represents the feelings of  one section only of  the Christian 
community ;  but even if  this is so, the fact that such sentiments 
were current in any section of  the Christian  societies must be 
taken into account in considering the position of  their leaders. 
It is thus very possible that these  leaders were con~pelled  at 
a very early date to deal  with  the question  of  the relation  of 
their converts to the Roman Government, and the suggestion is 
a  reasonable  one, that we  might  interpret the passages  whose 
significance  we  are discussing,  as being  prinlarily intended to 
check any tendency on the part of  the members of the Christian 
communities to adopt the national  Jewish attitude towards the 
Rornaii  Government. 
But we do not think that this explanation is really adequate 
to  the  interpretation  of  these  passages.  They  seem  to  have 
some  more  general  significance;  there is no trace in them of 
any special reference  to a  Jewish attitude towards the Roman 
Government, such as  we  might reasonably expect to find were 
they intended primarily to detach Christian men from a Jewish 
nationalism.  We think  that  the  full  explanation  of  these 
phrases must be found in a characteristic of  the early Christian 
societies, of  which  there  are numerous  traces  in the apostolic 
letters, and which St Peter seems to indicate in the passage \Le 
have quoted : "For SO is the will  of  God, that with  well-doing 
ye should put to silence  the ignorance of  foolish men : as free, 
l Acts xvi. 20, 21.  a  Acts xx~v.  5. and not  using  your  liberty  for  a  clokc  of  wickedness, but as 
bond-servants of  God." ' 
The freedom  of  the Christian  ivan is one of  the most  im- 
portant  of  the  conceptions  of  St Paul : "  With  freedom  did 
Christ set us free: stand fast  therefore, and be  not entangled 
again  in  a  yoke  of  b~ndage."~  We have just  seen  that  St 
Peter's  epistles  also  recognise freedom  as a true characteristic 
of  the Christian.  Even  St James  uses  the name  of  freedom, 
whatever may  be  the  precise  meaning  which  he attaches  to 
the  phrase.3  But  it is also  evident  that the doctrine of  the 
freedom  of  the Christian  man was  attended  in  the primitive 
Church with the same difficulties  as in later times ; indeed we 
venture to think  that it was  ~recisely  in primitive  times that 
the  difficulties  and  dangers  attending  upon  the  conception 
made  themselves  most  urgently  felt. 
It requires only a  slight study of  the apostolic writings to 
perceive  that if  the early  Christian teachers  had  hard  work 
to  overcome  the  traditional  legalism  of  the Jew,  they  were 
confronted  with  an  almost  equally  dangerous  tendency  to 
anarchism,  especially no doubt  among  their  Gentile  converts. 
The  tendency  shows  itself  first  in  a  disposition  to  slight 
the ordinary duties of life, to refuse submission to the discipline 
of  the common  life.  " We exhort you, brethren," St Paul says 
in his  first  letter  to the Thessalonians," that ye  abound  more 
and more  [in  works  of  love];  and that ye stndy to be  quiet, 
and  to  do  your  own  business,  and to  work  with  your  own 
hands,  even  as  we  charged  And  again, "We exhort 
you,  brethren,  admonish  the  di~orderly."~  And  so  again  in 
the  second  letter,  "Now  we  command  you,  brethren, in  the 
name  of  our  Lord  Jesus Christ, that  ye  withdraw  yourselves 
from  every  brother  that  walketh  disorderly,  and  not  after 
the tradition which they received  of us.  For yourselves know 
how  ye  ought  to  imitate  us:  for  we  behaved  not  ourselves 
disorderly  among  you;  neither  did  we  eat  bread  for  nought 
at any man's  hand, but in labour  and travail,  working  night 
1  Peter ii.  15, 16.  '  1 Theas. iv. 10, 11. 
Gal.  v. 1.  Cf.  2 Cor. ~ii  17.  1  Tlless. v.  14. 
S  Janles i. 25, ii.  12. 
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day, that we  might  not  be  a  burden  to any of  YOU.  . . . 
For even when we were with  you,  this we  commanded you, If 
any will not work, neither let him  eat.  For we  hear of  some 
that walk  among  you  disorderly,  that  work  not  at all, but 
are busybodies.  Mow  them  that are  such we  command  and 
exhort in the Lord  Jesus Christ, that with quietness they work, 
and  eat  their  own  bread.'jl  It  would  appear  that  in the 
Thessalonian  church  a  number  of  persons had  so interpreted 
the Christian spirit of  freedom, and the Christian consciousness 
of the dignity of  the spiritual relation of  man to God, that they 
were  disinclined  to submit to the ordinary duties of  life, and 
to any kind of  human  authority. 
Tlie same tendencies, if  under slightly different forms, exhibit 
tliemselves  in  the  Corinthian  church.  It is  clear  from  any 
examination  of  the  letters  to  this  church  that  St  Paul 
had  a  very  real  difficulty,  especially  with  his  own  Gentile 
converts, to  persuade  them  that  the  liberty of  the Christian 
man did not mean a complete emancipation from all discipline 
and  order  in  life.  It is  clear  that  sorne  at least  of  the 
Corinthian Christians  were  inclined  to press  the principle  of 
the indifference of  external rules  and forms  to  the point  of 
a  complete  disregard  of  the  principle  of  that mulual  sub- 
ordination  of  desires  and  actions  which  alone  makes  social 
life  possible.  "All things  are lawful"  seems  to  have  been 
the  catchword  of  this  tendency.  St Paul argues  that, while 
it is quite true that the Christian  man  is free from the legal 
principle  in  life,  he  must  remeniber  that  his  conduct  must 
be  governed  by  the  fundamental  principles  of  society,  the 
principles of  mutual  love  and consideration.  "All things are 
lawful ;  but all things are not expedient.  A11  things are lawful; 
but all things edify not.  Let no  man  seek  his own, but each 
his  neighbour's  good."  And so with regard  to those spiritual 
gifts  which St  Paul and the Corinthian Christians firmly believed 
that  they possessed,  St Paul tries  to  persuade  them  that not 
the  more  remarkable  and conspicuous, or the more abstractly 
'  2  Thess.  iii.  6-12.  (The  import-  the authorship of  the letter.) 
ance  of  the passage  is  independent of  "  Cor. vi.  12, X. 23. 
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spiritual  gifts were  the  most  valuable,  but  rather  the  gifts 
of  service  and  counsel,  and  that  the  greatest  gift  was  that 
of  1ove.l  Even  in  writing  to  the  Galatian  churches,  when 
St Paul was  stirred  to the very depths  of  his  nature  by the 
necessity  of  counteracting  the  legal  spirit  which  threatened 
to take possession  of  them, St  Paul warns his  converts against 
the  misinterpretation  and  perversion  of  the  conception  of 
liberty, "For  ye,  brethren,  were  called  for  freedom ; only use 
not your freedom for  an occasion to the flesh, but through love 
be  servants one  to another."  There  can, we  think, be  little 
doubt  that  the  early  Church  was  troubled  with  anarchical 
tendencies,  very  similar  to  those  of  some  of  the  Anabaptist 
movements  of  the sixteenth  century,  and that  these  sprang 
from  the same  source.  The  reaction  against the legal spirit 
carried men off  their feet, and St Paul has to take thc greatest 
pains to counteract the possible effects of  his own teaching, just 
as Luther had to do when he wrote his treatise on '  The Liberty 
of  the Christian Man.' 
There is indeed  no  direct  evidence in the New  Testament, 
nor, as far as we have  seen, in the early Fathers, of  an explicit 
repudiation  of  the principle  of  civil  government in  the early 
Church, though  such  a  charge  may have been brought  against 
the  Church;  but  it is at least very  easy  to  conjecture  that 
the  enthusiastic  spirit  of  the  freedom  of  the  sons  of  God, 
of  the members  of  the true kingdom  of  Christ,  might  easily 
pass  into a  contempt for all government, especially when  that 
government  was  in  the  hands  of  unspiritual  persons.  In a 
later  volume  we  shall  have  to  consider  the  significance  of 
Wycliffe's  doctrine  of  civil  lordship:  it is  possible  that his 
view  may  have  been  anticipated  in  primitive  times.  There 
are  even  not  wanting  some  germs  out  of  which  such  senti- 
ments  might  grow, both  in the Gospels  and in St Paul's  own 
writings.  Onr Lord  had  very  sharply contrasted  the spirit of 
the Gentiles  with  the  spirit of  His  Bingdom,  when  he said : 
"Ye  know  that  they  which  are  accounted  to rule  over  the 
Gentiles  lord  it over  them;  and  their  great  ones  exercise 
authority over them.  But it is not so among you:  but whoso- 
1 Cor. xii. and xiii.  Gal. v. 13. 
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ever would  become  great among  you, shall be  your  minister: 
and whosoever  would  be  first  among you, shall be  servant  of 
all." l  It is not difficult  to understand  how such a  conception 
might  lead  men  of  a  rash  and  impulsive  disposition  into a 
contempt  for  all secular  authority.  In St Paul's  first  letter 
to  the  Corinthians  we  have  a  reference  to  the  relation  of 
Christians  to  the law-courts,  whicli  might  quite  possibly  be 
understood  as  indicating  a  certain  tendency  to  slight  the 
ordinary machinery of  the secular power.  " Dare  any of  you, 
having  a  matter against  his  neighbour, go  to  law  before  the 
unrighteous,  and  not  before  the  saints?  Or  know  ye  not 
that  the  saints  shall  judge  the  world ?  and  if  the  world 
is  judged  by  you,  are  ye  unworthy  to  judge  the  smallest 
matters '2"  No  doubt  St  Paul's  words  are  aimed  at the 
contentious  unbrotherly spirit which  prevailed  in the Church, 
but  there  is,  probably  unintentionally  and  unconsciously,  a 
slightly  depreciatory  accent  in  the  reference  to  the  secular 
courts, perhaps  a  slight  confusion  with  regard  to  the  nature 
of  civil justice. 
It seems most  l~robable,  then,  that  St Paul's vindication  of 
the authority of  the civil ruler, with the parallel expressions of 
St Peter's epistle, were intended to counteract some  anarchical 
tendencies  in  the  early  Christian societies, were  intended  to 
preserve the Christian societies from falling into an error which 
would have destroyed the unity of  11nman life, and would  have 
tended  to  put  them into a  ruinous  opposition to the general 
principles  of  human progress.  We shall have occasion  to see 
how this question is developed in the writings of  the Fathers, 
and we  shall then recognise  both  how  important it was  that 
St Paul  had  so clearly  laid  down  the true principles  of  the 
religious conception  of  the state, and also how even  the clear- 
ness  of  his  treatment  failed  to  save  later  Christian  thinkers 
from a  perversion  of  this conception. 
When  we  now  consider  the relation  of  this  theory  of  the 
nature  of  government  to  the contemporary  philosophical  con- 
ception of  the state, we find that it is both  old  and new.  It  is 
Mark  X. 42-44.  Cf. Matt. xx. 25, 26 ;  Luke xxii. 25, 26. 
V Cor. vi.  1-8. 
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essentially the same  theory as that of  the Stoics, that man  is 
by nature  a  social creature, that government is an institution 
necessary to the proper development  of  liu~nau  life.  St Paul 
is translating  the  philosophical  conception  into the Christian 
conception  of  the  divine  order,  and  the translation  has  its 
real  importance,  but  fundamentally  the  conception  is  the 
same.  It is  new  in  expression  but  the  same  in  substance, 
and  even  the  expression  is,  as  we  have  already  seen,  to 
be  found  in such contemporary writers as Seneca  and Pliny? 
We shall  have  presently  to  consider  the  theories  that grew 
up  on  this  translation,  but  we  shall  see  throughout  our 
work  that  the  translation  was  necessary  if  Christian  civil- 
isation  was to  inherit the  philosophical  tradition  of  Aristotle 
and  the  Stoics.  We  must  remember  that  clearly  enough 
the Epicurean  tradition  was  not  the same as the Stoic, that 
the  attitude of  the philosophers  of  that  school  towards  the 
organised  State was  at least  one  of  indifference,  and,  as we 
have just  seen, there  were  elements in the Christian  concep- 
tions which  might have  tended towards a  similar position.  It 
is therefore  a  matter of  the greatest importance that St Paul 
should  have  recognised  the  gravity  of  the  question,  and 
should  have set  forth  his  views  with  such  distinctness and 
penetration. 
We have still to consider the theory of  property  in the New 
Testament.  A  great deal has  been  said  about what  has been 
called  the communism  of  the  early  Church,  and it has been 
thought that we  see the beginnings  of  this  in the condition 
of  the Church  of  Jerusalem as described  in the first chapters 
of  the Acts.  We must begin  by examining  the exact nature 
of  the accounts of  this which are given to us.  The first  refer- 
ence is at the end of  the second chapter : "  And all that believed 
were together, and had all things common ; and they sold their 
possessions  and goods, and parted then1 to all, according as any 
man had need."  The next reference is in the fourth chapter: 
"And the multitude  of  them that believed  were  of  one heart 
and soul: and not one  of  them said that aught of  the things 
See p.  31.  Act8 ii. 44,  45. 
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which  he  possessed  was  his  own ;  but  they  had  all  things 
common.  . . . For  neither was  there  among  them  any that 
lacked : for as many as were possessors of  lands or  houses sold 
them, and brought  the prices  of  the things  that were sold, and 
laid them at the apostles' feet: and distribution was  made unto 
each, according as any one had need." l 
There is no doubt that if  these words  stood  alone we  should 
conclude that a complete communistic system was established in 
the Church  of  Jerusalem, and we  might  almost conclude that 
conformity to this was one of  the regular tests of  men~bership. 
But we  must look at the general narrative  a  little more care- 
fully, and our first impression will then be a good deal modified. 
One of the most dramatic incidents in the story of the primitive 
Church is the narrative  of  the falsehood and death of Ananias 
and Sapphira, and in this narrative we observe  phrases which 
materially affect our judgment  of  the condition of  the Church. 
"A  certain man named Ananias, with Sapphira his wife, sold  a 
possession, and kept back part  of  the price, his wife  also  being 
privy  to  it,  and  brought  a  certain  part,  and laid  it  at the 
apostles' feet.  But Peter said, Ananias, why hath Satan filled 
thy heart to lie to the Holy Ghost, and to keep back part of  the 
price of  the land ?  Whiles it remained, did it not remain thine 
own ?  and after it was sold, was  it not in thy power ?  How is 
it that thou hast conceived this  thing in thy heart ?  thou hast 
not lied unto men, but unto God." 
It is at least clear from this narrative that there was no com- 
pulsory system of  communism in the Church, that submission 
to it  was not a condition of  membership of the Christian society 
in Jerusalem, and we are compelled to reconsider the judgment 
which  we  might  be  inclined  to  found  upon  the passages first 
quoted.  It  would  seem safest  to conclude  that the first  wave 
of  enthusiasm in the Christian society  in  Jerusalem  led  to a 
sudden  development  of  the  charitable  impulses of  the  com- 
munity  to  such  a  point  that  at  least  for  the  time  the 
Christian  society might  well  have  appeared  to  be  living  in 
a  complete  community  of  goods,  but  that  this  condition  of 
things  was never  developed into a  complete system, and that 
1 Acts iv. 32-35.  '  Acts v.  1-4. the surrender of  individual  property  was  never  a  condition 
of  church membership. 
The narrative of  the Acts  throws no light upon  the continu- 
ance of  this  state of  things in Jerusalem.  There  are  many 
traces in the letters of  St Paul of  great  poverty in the  church 
of  Jerusalem,  a  poverty  probably  due  mainly  to  the  crowds 
of  Jews, many of  them  doubtless of  very small  resources, who 
from time to time made their way to Jerusalem, from  all parts 
of  the Empire, to attend the great  festivals;  and we  find  St 
Paul  engaged in collecting  money  in  the  churches which  he 
visited, for  the  rel~ef  of  this poverty,  but  there  is nothing to 
show us whether the Church  in Jerusalem  itself  continued  to 
be  under  the same  conditions  as at first  or  not 
It may perhaps be said  that there  are traces in  the Gospels, 
and especially in the Epistle of St Jan~es,  of  a tendency to look 
upon the rich as being, by the very fact of  their riches, evil, and 
the  poor  as  being,  by  reason  of  their  poverty,  good.  It  is 
certainly noteworthy at least that St James represents the true 
disciple as being poor, and  oppressed  by the rich, and that he 
proclaims the coming judgment of  God upon the ric11.l  And in 
the Gospels there is more than one trace of  a tendency to regard 
the condition  of  the rich  as being,  normally  at least, full of 
danger:  and the condition of  the poor ds being  one of  blessed- 
ness?  (In  St Matthew's  gospel this poverty  is  explained in 
a spiritual sense.)  In one well-known  passage our Lord  tells 
the rich  young  ruler  that for him  the way  of  perfection  lies 
in the renunciation  of  all  his  ~ealth.~  It  is  of  course  true 
that the  interpretation  of  the  passage  has  been  the  subject 
of  much  dispute :  we  shall see presently in what very various 
fashions  the  Fathers deal with  it, hut the general impression 
which  we  derive  from  the  Gospels  is  certainly  that  wealth 
is  at least  a  difficulty  in the spiritual life. 
When  we  consider  the  condition  of  the  Christian  Church 
outside of  Judaea, we  find no  trace  of  any such system  of  the 
common life  as may  have  existed  in  some  loose  fashion  in 
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Judaea.  St Paul, in his various letters, constantly exhorts his 
disciples to liberality, especially towards the poor  Christiails in 
Jerusalem:  but also in more general terms ;  but there is little 
trace  of  a  community  of  goods in the churches  to  which  he 
writes,  unless we  may conjecture  that the idle  and  disorderly 
life of  some of  the Christians at Thessalonica may be related to 
a somewhat indiscriminate  system  of  almsgiving  in that com- 
munity.  St Paul's  emphatic words, "If  any will  not  work, 
neither let him  eat,"3 may imply that the benevolence  of  the 
brethren was encouraging a certain number of  Christians in idle 
and  thriftless ways.  We have discussed  the traces of  certain 
anarchical tendencies in the primitive Christian societies, and it 
is quite possible that this spirit was fostered by a charity which 
may sometimes have been almost reckless.  But in all this there 
is no  trace  of  any strict community of  goods, any notion  that 
the ownership of  property was something illegitimate. 
So far as the New Testament is concerned, we can hardly say 
that there is any theory of  property of  a strict kind : the Gospels 
and St Jamee may tend to represent the sense of  the dangerous 
responsibilities and temptations which wealth  brings ; the Acts 
and the Epistles show us  that the Christian societies, from  the 
outset, felt the imperious claims of  the brotherhood, and inter- 
preted  them as  meaning  that it was  the duty of  a  Christian 
man to see that his brother was not in want.4  We shall return 
to the subject  again when we  deal with the theory of  property 
as it is presented in the early Fathers. 
1 1  Cor.  xvi. 1 ; 2  Cor.  vui.  Cf.  S  2 Thesn.  iii.  10.  Cf. 1 Thesa.  iv. 
Rom. sv. 26 ; Gal. ii. 10.  9-12. 
1 Tlm. vi. 17-19.  * l John ill. 17. 
1 Jamea ii. 5, 6 ;  V.  1-6.  '  Mark  X. 21 ;  Matt. xix. 21 ;  Luke 
9 Mark  x 25 ;  Luke xviii. 24.  xvi~i.  22. 
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CHAPTER  IX. 
NATURAL  LBW. 
WHEN  we consider  the character of  the political  theory of  the 
Christian  Fathers we  find  ourselves  in face  of  a  considerable 
difficulty  in arranging  our materials.  The writings which  we 
have  to consider  extend over  a  period  of  some  six centuries, 
from  St Clement  of  Rome and the 'Teaching  of  the Twelve 
Apostles' in the first  century to St Isidore of  Seville in the 
beginning  of  the  seventh,  and  they  represent  very  various 
standpoints.  Some  of  them  are written  by  men  who  have 
nothing  of  a  philosophical  habit  of  thought;  while  others 
represent  the more  or  less  reasoned  reflections  of  men  who 
might  be  good  or  bad  philosophers,  but  who  were  at  any 
rate thinkers.  Some of  them, that is, simply seem  to show us 
what notions were current among  Christian  men, others must 
be taken also to represent the particular  turn given  to these 
by  the  individual  writers.  We are  compelled  to  recognise 
considerable diversities of  opinion  among  these writers, and we 
have eadeavoured to note these when they occur, and to discuss 
the relations of  the different views to each other : at the same 
time, we think that it is true to say that in the main the Fathers 
represent  a  homogeneous  system  of  thought,  and  we  have 
therefore usually arranged our materials under the same general 
system which we  have so far followed, not under the names of 
the individual  writers, while we  have  usually endeavoured  to 
present their opinions in some roughly chronological order. 
We have  seen  the importance  of  the  development  of  the 
theory of  natural law in the Roman jurists, we have seen  how 
at the close  of  the second  century  the law of  nations  is dis- 
tinguished  from  the law of  nature, and how this distinction is 
fixed with  more or less complete definiteness in the sixth cen- 
tury.  We must now consider the treatment of  this subject in 
the Christian  writers of  these centuries.  We have  observed 
the general characteristics of  the theory of  Cicero with  respect 
to the natural  law, that there is a  law behind  all the positive 
ordinances  of  human  society,  a  law  which  is written in the 
hearts of  all men, drawing them  to good, forbidding them to do 
evil,  a  law  which  is itself  the expression  of  the reason  and 
nature of  God  Himself, and that from this all the true laws of 
men are derived.  We have also seen that at least in one great 
passage  St Paul  indicates  that  he  also  conceives  of  such  a 
principle as existing in the heart of  every man-that  every man 
does in his  heart  know the law of  God, which forbids  man  to 
sin, and coinlnands hinl to do what is right.  Whether St Paul's 
conception  should  be  traced  to  the  natural  development  of 
Jewish  thought,  or to the influence of  that  Hellenic culture 
which  had already strongly affected  Judaism, or to  the special 
circumstances of  his  own  education  at Tarsus, is,  as we  have 
said, difficult  to determine.  For  our  purpose, indeed, we  may 
suppose that it was  derived  from  any or all of  these sources. 
It will be obvious to any one who studies the phenomena, that 
here is one of  the many points  where the Christian conception 
and that of  the Western world at large coincided.  The theory 
of  natural law became  one  of  the commonplaces  of  Christian 
thought. 
In Origen's  treatise  against  Celsus  there  is  an  interesting 
sentence which may be taken as characteristic of  the attitude of 
the Christian thinkers.  Celsus had urged that "Law is king of 
all things," and Origen, after expressing a necessary qualification 
of  the phrase  as liable to misunderstanding,  agrees that that 
which is law in the proper sense of  the word is by nature king 
of  all things,  even  though  there may  be  some who  have like 
robbers  abandoned  the  law  and  deny  its  validity.  The 
Christians, he  says,  have  come  to the knowledge  of  this law 
which  is  by  nature  king of  all  things,  for it is the game  as 
the law of  God, and they endeavour to live in accordance  with it.I  This frank admission of  the truth of  the  conception  and 
the identification of  the law of  nature with the law of  God- 
an identification already made, at least in terms,  by  Cicero- 
is representative of  the common  attitude of  Christian writers 
towards this conception. 
Even  Tertullian,  who,  if  any  man, represents  the extreme 
opposition  to  the  ideas  of  the  Greek  world,  uses  language 
which  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  philosophers.  Nature, he 
says,  is  our  first  school:  we  know  God  first  by  nature. 
~ature  is  the  teacher,  the  soul  the  disciple.  Whatever 
liature  taught,  it was  taught  by  God.2  Lactantius, with  his 
usual  somewhat  captious  way  of  dealing with ancient  philos- 
ophy, when  discussing  Zelio's  principle of  living according to 
nature,  complains  at first  that  this  is  too  vague:  there  are 
many  varieties  of  nature,  he  says,  and  the  phrase  might 
mean  that men  are to live like beasts; but finally he adll~its 
that, if  the principle means that man, who is born  to  virtue, 
is  to  follow  his  own  nature, it  is  a  good  prin~iple.~  These 
Fathers, that is, admit that there is a  law  written  by  nature 
in  men's  hearts  which  is the  true  rule  of  human  life  and 
conduct. 
The view of  the later Fathers is the same.  The writer known 
as "Ambrosiaster,"  in his  commentary on  St Paul's  Epistle to 
the Romans, gives us an interesting tripartite definition of  law, 
and a statement of  the relation  of  the law of  nature to the law 
of  Mo~es.~  The definition is interesting, but more significant 
is  the  conception  of  the relation  of  the Mosaic  Law  to  the 
natural  law,  as  being  something  intended  to  supplement  as 
Origen, Contra Celsum, v.  40. 
L Tertullian,  De Corona,  v.  and vi. 
De Test. An., 5.  (Prom Dr Fairbairn's 
'  Christ in Modern Theology,'  p. 96.) 
Lactantius,  Div.  Inst., iii.  8. 
Ambrosiaster,  Com.  in  Ep.  ad 
Rom., iii. 20 : "  Triplex quiden lex est, 
ita ut prima  pars  de sacrament0 div- 
initatis  sit Dei :  secunda  aubem  rlue 
congruit  legi  naturali,  que interdicit 
peccatum : tertia  vero  factorum,  id 
est, sabbati, neomenie,  circumcisionis, 
etc.  Hsc est ergo lex naturalis, qus 
per Moysen partim  reformata,  partim 
auctoritate  ejus  firmata  in  vitiis 
cohibendis, cognitum fecit peccatum." 
We should refer  our readers who w~eh 
to know  more  about th~s  writer and 
his  identity  with  the author of  the 
"  Qusstiones  Veteris  et Novi  Testa- 
menti,"  formerly  attributed  to  St 
Augubtine, to an article by Dom. Morin 
in  the  'Revue  d'Histoire  et de Lit- 
terature  religieuse,'  1899 ;  and  to 
Prof.  A.  Souter's  edition  of  the 1 
''  Questiones  Veteris  et Novi  Testa- 
menti,"  and  to  the  same  author's 
"  Study of  Anibrosiaster." 
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well  as to confirm it.  The same conception is expressed in a 
letter of St Ambrose : The Mosaic law was given because men 
had  failed  to obey the natural law.1  Again, St Ambrose says, 
Law  is  twofold,  natural and written.  The  natural law is in 
man's  heart; the written  laws in tables.  All men  are under 
the law-that  is, under the natural law.2  And again : The law 
of  God is in the heart of  the just man.  Which law?  Not the 
written but the natural law, for  law is not  set for the just, but  , 
for the unjust  mm3  The natural law, says St Jerome, speaks 
in our heart, telling us to do what is good  and to avoidwhat 
is  evil;  and,  again,  he  says  that  the  whole  world  received 
the natural law,  and the Mosaic  law  was  given  because  the 
natural law was  neglected  or de~troyed.~ 
It is interesting to notice  that the Fathers frequently, as we 
have  before  said, connect  their  treatment  of  the natural  law 
with  St Paul's  phrases  in Romans.  St Ambrose, for instance, 
says that it is the  Apostle  who  teaches  us that the natural 
law  is in our  heart^.^  St Augustine  also  refers to  St Paul's  - 
words in a passage in which he divides law into three species;B 
and St  Hilary of  Poitiers does the same in describing the general 
scope of  the natural law.  He defines this as being  that a man 
must  not  injure  his  fellow-man,  must  not  take  that  which 
belongs  to another,  must  keep  himself  from  fraud  and  per- 
l St  Ambrose, Ep. lxxiii. 10 :  "  Accipe 
aliud.  Non  fuit  necessaria  lex  per 
Moysen.  Denique  subintravit, quod 
utique non ordinarium sed velut furtiv- 
um  significare  videtur  introitum ;  eo 
quod  in  locum  naturalis  legis  intra- 
verit.  Itaque si  illa  suum servasset 
locum, hec  lex scripta nequaquam esset 
ingressa. " 
"d.,  De Fugs Seculi, iii. 
Id., Enarr. in PS. xxxvi. 31. 
St Jerome, Com. on Gal. iii. 2,  and 
on Isaiah xxiv. 6. 
St Ambrose,  Ep. lxxiii.  2 :  "Esse 
autem  legem  naturalem  in  cordibus 
uodx-is etiam apostolus docet, qui scrip- 
sit quia plerumque  'et gentes natural- 
iter  ea,  que Legis  suut,  faciunt,  et 
cum  Legem  non  legerint, opus tamen 
Legis scriptum  habent in cordibua suis ' 
(Rom.  ii.  14,  15).  Ea igitur lex  non 
scribitur,  sed  innascitur :  nec  aliqua 
percipitur  lectione, sed profluo  quod- 
am  fonte  in  singulis  exprimitur,  et 
humanis ingeniis  hausitur."  Cf.  De 
Jacob et Vita  Beata,'  vi. 
St  Augustine, Contra Faustum  Mani- 
chaeum, xix.  2 : "Sunt  autem  legum 
genera  tria : unum  quidem  Hebre- 
orum, quod  peccati  eh  mortis  Paulus 
appellat  (Rom.  viii.  2).  Aliud  vero 
Gentium, quod naturale vocat :  '  Gentes 
enim,'  inquit,  'naturaliter  que legis 
sunt faciunt ; et ejusmodi  legem  non 
habentes, ipsi sibi sunt lex ;  qui ostend- 
unt opus  legis  scriptum  in  cordibus 
suis' (Rom. ii.  14, 15).  Tertium vero 
genus  legis  est veritas,  quod  perinde 
significans, apostolus dicit ;  Lex enim 
spiritus vitae  in Christo Jesu liberavib 
me a  lege  peccati  et mortirr"  (Rorn. 
viii.  2). jury,  must  not plot  against  another  man's  marriage?  It  is 
interesting to compare this with  the definitions of  the natural 
law by St Ambrose  and by St  Aug~stine.~  It is clear that these 
are derived from Cicero and other ancient writers. 
It  is unnecessary to multiply quotations.  There seems  to be 
no  division  of  opinion  among  the Fathers upon  the  subject. 
Practically  they  carry  on  the  same  conceptions  as  those  of 
Cicero  and the  later philosophers, and while  they bring these 
into connection with the suggestion  of  St Paul, they cannot  be 
said  either to modify  these  inherited  conceptions  or  to carry 
them any farther. 
The  treatment  of  the law of  nat,ure in the Fathers is not 
complete  till we come to St Isidore of  Seville at the beginning 
of  the seventh  century.  Then we find  that distinction which 
we  have  considered  in  Ulpian, Tryphoninus,  and Florentinus, 
and in the Institutes  of  Justinian, restated with great direct- 
ness,  and defined  in a  method  which  is  interesting  and  to 
some  extent  novel.  The importance  of  the  treatment of  the 
natural  law by St Isidore is, however, not  only due to the fact 
that he furnishes us with interesting evidence as to the general 
prevalence  of  the theory  of  law  in this form, and shows us 
that it  was  adopted  by  an  important  Christian  writer.  His 
importance in the history of  the theory of  natural law is much 
greater  than  this.  His  definitions were  finally  embodied,  in 
the twelfth  century, in Gratian's Decretum, and so  passed  into 
the structure of  the Canon  Law,  and  furnished  the  form  of 
l St Hilary of  Poitiers, Tract. on PS. 
cxviii. 119 : "  Lex enim veluti naturalis 
est, injuriam nemini inferre, nil alienum 
prsripere, fraude ac perjurio abstinere, 
alieno conjugio non insidiari.  Novit et 
hauc Apostolus  legem,  dicens.  '  Cum 
enim nationes,  qus  legem non habent, 
llaturaliter  eecuudum  legem  faciunt,' 
etc." 
2  St  Ambrose, De Off.,  iii.  3 : "  Hsc 
utique  lex  naturs eat, qus nos  ad 
omnem  astringit  humanitatem,  ut 
alter alteri tanquam unius partes cor- 
invicem  deferamus.  Nec  detra- 
hendum  quidqlrnnl  putemus,  cum 
contra natur~  legem  sit non juvare." 
St Ambrose,  De  Off.,  iii.  24 :  "Nihil- 
que  judicandum  utile,  nisi  quod  iu 
commune prosit.  . . . Etenim si ulla 
lex  naturs  omnibus,  una  utique 
utilitas universorum,  ad consulendum 
utique omnibus naturs lege constring- 
imur." 
St  Augustine,  De Diversis Questioni- 
bus xxxi. : "  Natura  jus  est quod  non 
opinio  genuit,  sed  qusdam innata via 
inseruit, ut religionem, pietatem,  gra- 
tiam,  vindicationem,  observantiam, 
veritatem." 
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all  the medizval  ecclesiastic~l  treatment  of  the subject ; and 
though, no doubt, with  the reviving study of  the Roman juris- 
~radence,  the same conceptions would probably have appeared, 
yet the fact that they  were  already  embodied  in  St Isidore's 
Etymologies  secured  the unanimity of  medizval theory  upon 
the subject. 
The position  of  St Isidore in the development, especially of 
the  political  theory  of  the Middle Ages, is indeed  out  of  all 
proportion  to the intrinsic merits  or  pretensions  of  his work. 
His  '  Origins,'  or '  Etymologies,'  is really the seventh-century 
equivalent of a modern encyclopzdia.  He suggests the deriva- 
tion of  each word with which he deals, and gives a brief account 
of  the thing which it describes.  It  would be extremely interest- 
ing, were it not here out of  place, to trace the history and origin 
of  such  an  encyclopzdic  work  as that  of  St Isidore.  It is 
evident enough  that in most  points and in general  conception 
it is not  original.  It  seems  to  belong  to  the same  class  of 
work  as  Martianus Capella's  'De Nuptiis  Philologize.'  How 
much farther back this encyclopzdic form of  literature can  be 
traced  we  are not  competent  to say.  It will  be  seen  in the 
course of  our inquiries that St Isidore furnishes the model of  a 
variety of  works of the same kind in the Middle Ages, of  which 
the nearest is Hrabanus Mauras's '  De Universo,'  which belongs 
to the ninth century. 
St Isidore's  work  has therefore  little of  the character of  an 
original  production, and indeed  makes  no claim to this.  For 
our  purpose, indeed, this fact rather  increases than diminishes 
its  importance.  We feel  convinced  in  reading  St  Isidore's 
definitions  that he is giving us not merely his own judgments 
but  the generally current  conceptions of  his  time.  It  niay of 
course be urged that St Isidore, writing as he did in Spain, was 
rather  far removed from the centre of  the culture  of  his  the, 
and that we must be prepared to admit the influence of  the new 
barbarian  circumstances  upon  his  mode  of  thought.  With 
regard  to  some  aspects  of  his  political  ideas  this  may  be 
quite  true,  and  indeed  may  be  a  fact  of  some  importance. 
But with  regard  to the subject which we  are at present  con- 
sidering,  his  treatment of  the  theory  of  Natural  Law,  there 108  THE NEW  TESTAMENT  AND  THE FATHERS.  [PART  111. 
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seems  no  reason  to  think  that  any  such  special  influences 
are at  work  upon  him.  We should indeed  be  glad, if  it were 
possible,  to trace  more  clearly the sources  of  his  theories, for 
much  remains,  to  us  at least, very  obscure;  but  we  see  no 
reason  at all why  we  should  look  for  these  outside  of  the 
limits  of  the Latin  culture. 
St Isidore of  Seville deals with the definition  of  law in the 
following terms:l "  Jus autem naturale est aut civile ant gen- 
tium."  That is, he begins by laying down the tripartite char- 
acter of  law as Ulpian and the Institutes do.  He then detines 
natural law, "  Jus naturale est commune omnium nationurn, et 
quod ubique instinctu naturs, non constitutione aliqua habetur ; 
ut viri eb  feminae conjunctio, liberorum successio et educatio, 
communis omnium possessio, et  omnium una libertas, adquisitio 
eorunl  quae  ccelo, terra, marique capiuntur.  Item depositae rei 
vel commendatz pecuniz restitutio, violentiae per vim repulsio. 
Nam hoc, aut si quid huic simile est, numquam injusturn, sed 
naturale, aequumque habetur." 
It  will  be  evident that the definition  is related to that of 
Ulpian and the  institute^,^ and yet that there are considerable 
differences between them, and these of  some significance.  The 
statement that the jus  naturaie is conlmon to all animals has 
disappeared, and in its place  we  read  that it is common to all 
nations, and that men follow it "  instinctu natur~  non constitu- 
tione aliqua."  We have already had occasion to deal with this 
change, but we must again point out that it seems to represent 
the  fact that while  Ulpian's  definition  suggests  that  the jus 
naturale was something of  the nature of the animal instinct, the 
general tendency of  thought  was to look  upon  it as a body of 
principles  rationally apprehended.  It is true that St Isidore 
says that men  follow  it If instinctu natur~,"  but  this  is con- 
1  St  Isidore, Etymol., v.  4.  conjunctio,  quam  nos  matrimonium 
Wl~ian's  definition is : "  Jus natu-  appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio, 
rale  est, quod natura  omnia  animalia  hinc  educatio : videmus etenim cetera 
docuit : nam  jus  istud  non  humani  quoque animalia, feras etiam istius juris 
generis proprium, sed omnium animal-  peritia  censeri.'"  (Dig.,  i.  1.  1.  3.) 
ium,  quae  in  terra,  qua: in  mari  nas-  The definition in Inst.,  i.  2., is praoti. 
cuntur,  avium  quoque,  commune est.  cally the same. 
Hinc  descendit  mans  atque  ferninse 
trasted, not with reason,  but with "  constitutio aliqua,"  and it 
should  be  observed  that  under  the  definition is included  an 
ethical habit, such  as the  "depositae  rei vel commendatae  pe- 
cuniae  restitutio."  This  has  no  place  in Ulpian's  definition. 
St Isidore  defines  the jzcs  gentium  in  the  following  terms: 
"Jus gentium  est sedium  occnpatio,  e,dificatio,  munitio, bella, 
captivitates,  servitutes,  postliminia,  foedera  pacis,  indutia, 
legatorum  non  violandorum  religio,  conubia inter alienigenas 
prohibita.  Et inde jus gentium, quia eo jure omnes fere gentes 
utuntur." l  We  have  already conlpared this definition  with a 
fragment of  Hermogenianus contained in the Digest, and with 
one part of  the discussion of  this question  in the Institutes of 
Ju~tinian.~  It is difficult to say whether St Isidore's definition 
is directly related  to these,  but there  seems  to  be  a  general 
agreement of  character between them all.  In  passing  we  may 
point out that there is the same contrast  between the natural 
liberty  of  all, under  the jz~s  natzhrale,  and  the slavery  which 
belongs to the jus gentiunz, in St Isidore and in the Institutes ; 
but we shall have to return to this point later.  Thejus civile is 
defined by St  Isidore as follows : "  Jus civile est, quod quisque 
populus, vel civitas sibi proprium, humana divinaque causa con- 
stituit."  This is practically the same as the definition of  the 
civil  law as distinguished  from  the jus  gentium  and  the jus 
naturale in the Institutes of  Gaius and Ju~tinian.~ 
St Isidore of  Seville has  obviously reproduced with  certain 
changes of  detail  the theory of  the tripartite character of  law 
which we have already seen in the works  of  Ulpian and in the 
'  St  Isid., Etym., v.  6. 
L  Hermog.,  in  Dig.,  i.  1.  6 : "Ex 
hoc jure gentium introducta bella, dis- 
crete  gentes,  regna  condita,  dominia 
distincta, agris termini positi, aedificia 
collocata, commercium, emptiones ven- 
ditiones,  locationes  conductiones, obli- 
gationesinstitute :  exceptis quibusdam 
qus  jure civili introducta: sunt."  Inst., 
i.  2.  2: '[Jus  autem  gentium  omni 
humano  generi  commune est.  Nam 
usu exigente et  humanis necessitatibus 
gentes humanae  qusdam  sibi  constit- 
uerunt : bella  etenim  orta  sunt,  et 
captivitates  secuta: et servitutes, qu.1: 
sunC  juri  naturali  contrariae.  Ju~e 
enim naturali ah initio omnes homines 
liberi nascebantur.  Ex hoe jure gen- 
tium et omnes psne contractus intro- 
ducti sunt, ut emptio venditio,  locatio 
conductio,  societas,  depositum,  mut- 
uum et alii innumerabiles." 
St  Isid., Etym., v.  5. 
Gaius, i.  l : "Nam  quod  quisque 
populus  ipse  sibi  jus  constituit,  id 
ipsius  pro~rium  est,  vocaturque '  jus 
civlle,'  quasi jus  proprium  civitstia." 
Cf. Inst., i. 2. 1. Institutes of  Justinian.  With his  work the conception passes 
into  the  common  stock  of  medizval  tradition  on  political 
theory.  The dist~nction  would, however, have  had little  or no 
meaning if  it had not been  closely connected with  that  theory 
of  the  natural  condition, or  state  of  nature, the  state ante- 
cedent  to  the  conventional  institutions of  society,  which  we 
have  already studied in Seneca, and whose  influence  we  have 
recognised in the lawyers.  We must examine this theory as it 
is exhibited to us in the Fathers, but  we  shall  find  it best to 
approach  the  subject  by  considering  their  theory  of  human 
nature  and  human  institutions.  We shall find  that  there is 
continually implied in this a  reference  to  a  condition  of  life 
precedent to and other than that which  now  exists.  We shall 
see that the conception of  the state of  nature is in the Fathers 
identified  with  the eonoeption of  the condition of  mankind in 
the unfallen  state. 
CHAPTER  X. 
NATURAL  EQUALITY  AND  SLAVERY. 
WE have  seen that in the New  Testament  writings  we  find a 
conception of  human nature which is very clear and distinct as 
to the essential and inherent equality of  mankind ;  we find that 
in the teaching  of  our  Lord  Himself  men  are regarded as all 
equally the children of  God, and that in St Paul's writings we 
have  the more technical expression  of  this conception  as signi- 
fying the capacity of  all men  for  the spiritual and moral life. 
Whether a man is slave or free he is still capable  of  the same 
moral  and spiritual life, capable  of  knowing  God  and serving 
Him.  If  he is a slave he must be  treated fairly and reasonably 
by his master, who is no dearer to God than is the slave. 
This conception is carried on with eloquence and force in the 
writings of  the early Fathers-is  indeed implied in all that they 
say.  We may refer to one or two passages which deal with the 
matter  directly:  the first  is  in the little work known  as the 
'  Octavius,' written by Minucius  Felix.  He says that all men, 
without  difference  of  age,  sex,  or  rank,  are  begotten  with  a 
capacity  and power  of  reason  and feeling, and obtain wisdom, 
not  by  fortune, but  by  nature?  It is interesting to observe 
how  close  these  phrases, in spite of  certain  differences, are to 
those of  Cicero and Seneca ; indeed it might be  difficult  to say 
whether the author derives his method  of  expression from the 
New Testament or  from  the philosophers.  Another  passage is 
contained in Lactantius's work, the 'Divine  Institutes.'  He is 
discussing the nature of  justice, and after having given the first 
place  in the conception  of  this to pietas  he goes on  to urge 
Octavms, xvi that the second  part  of  justice  is mqzcitas-that  is, the temper 
which  teaches  a  man  to put himself  on  an equality with his 
fellow-men, the quality which Lactantius says Cicero had called 
mpuabilitas.  God,  who  brings  forth and inspires  men, wished 
them  all to be  equal.  He made  them all for virtue, promised 
them  all immortality.  No  one, in  God's  sight, is a  slave or a 
master ;  He is the Father  of  all men, we  are all therefore His 
children.  Lactantius finds fault with Roman and Greek institu- 
tions as not recognising these principles of  equality sufficiently, 
but it does not appear that he is really attacking the institutions 
so much as what he considers the wrong temper with which men 
regard  these institutions ; for when  he considers the objection 
which some one might make, that the same differences of rank 
and condition  exist also among  Christian people, he replies not 
by denying that the differences exist, nor  by condemning their 
existence, but by urging that Christian people do really recognise 
each other as brothers and equals, that they estimate all things 
by their spiritual and not by their material value? 
Lactantius's phrases are well-meaning and  no  doubt  sincere, 
but they scarcely justify his  attempt to censure the Greek and 
Roman spirit,  and his somewhat inexcusable forgetfulness of  the 
fact that writers like Cicero and Seneca had taken up much the 
same  position  towards  the ineclualities  of  human  condition as 
his own.  Lactantius does not  really condemn the existence of 
the  great  inequalities  of  society,  only  he  wishes them  to be 
corrected  by  the sense of  the fundamental equality of  human 
nature, just  as Seneca had  done. 
In the  later  Fathers  this  conception  of  the intrinsic  and 
primitive equality of  human nature is discussed with much ful- 
ness, but almost always in direct connection with the treatment 
of  the institution of  slavery : they  assert that this equality is 
primitive,  and  also  that  in  some  sense  it  always  continues, 
while they  also develop  with  great  clearness  a theory  which 
is to account for the existence of  this unprimitive and, in  one 
sense, unnatural institution of  slavery. 
We do  not  know  that any passage in the  writings  of  the 
Fathers represents  the general character of  their theory better 
l  Lact., Div.  Inst., v. 15  and 16. 
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than  a  discussion  of  the  subject  by  "Ambrosiaster,"  in  his 
commentary on St Paul's Epistle to the Colossians.  He begins 
by warning masters lest  they be  puffed up with  pride and  for- 
get  that  God  made, not  slaves  and free men, but  all men free. 
Slavery is  the consequence  of  man's  sin;  man,  making  war 
upon  his  fellow-man,  makes  captives,  and  chance  determines 
whether these are to remain  slaves or to be redeemed.  Before 
God the sinner is the slave ; Ham is an example of  this, and the 
ancient  writers who  maintain that the wise were  free and the 
foolish  slaves, really  recognised  this  principle.  Masters  must 
remember that their lordship extends only over the body ; they 
have no authority over the soul, God only is the master of  that: 
let  them  remember  this, and only exact just service from their 
slaves, who are still their equals, not to say their brethren.1 
It will be noticed  that there are really  four distinct proposi- 
tions  with  regard  to  human  nature and  slavery  contained  in 
this passage.  First, that men  as God  made  them  were  free; 
second,  that  this  still  continues  in  some  sense,  the  coudi- 
tion  of  slavery  is  very  largely  one  determined  by  fortune, 
and this condition does not  extend beyond  the body;  thirdly, 
that slavery is the result of  man's  sin and sinfulness, the true 
slavery is  that of  the soul, for the foolish are the true slaves; 
'  Ambrosiaster,  Com. on  Coloss.  iv.  Cui sententis veteres assensere, ita ut 
1 : "  'Domini quod justum est et  aequum  definirent omnes prudentes esse liberos, 
aervia  prabete,  scientes  quod  et vos  stultos autern omnes esse scrvos. . . . 
dominum habetis in cmlis.'  Ne domini  Ostend~t  ergo dominis, quia non  vere 
temporales  superbia estollantur,  prae-  sunt domini  sed quasi per ~maginem  ; 
sumentes  de  dominatu,  mitigat  et  corporum  enim  non  animorum  sunt 
coh~bet  animos  illorum,  ut  adhibita  domini.  Solus enim dom~nus,  et  auctor 
consideratione  hunlarll  generis  anim-  rerum invisibilis Deus, tarn  corporibus 
advertant auctorem  Deum non servos  quam anirnis dominatur :  ut hac con- 
etliberos sed omnes ingenuos condidisse.  siderantes justa ab eis exigant servitia : 
Sed hoc mundi iniqultate factum est,  talia utique qualia et a se ex~gi  voiunt 
ut  dum  alter  alterius  fines  invadit  a  Domino  communi.  Nam  cum  ipsi 
turic captivos ducit itlgenuos ;  unde et  non ut dignnm est, Deo serriant, queni 
manu capt~  dicti  sunt a veteribus inde  non negant omniumpotestatem habere, 
mancipia.  Hic  casus  et  conditio  cujusque  quotidiana  dona  per  minis- 
etiam  nunc apparet ;  alii  redimuntur,  teria creaturae hurnanis us~bus  exhlberi, 
al~i  remanent servi ;  apud Deum autem  a paribus su~s  (ut non dicam fratribus) 
hie  servus  habetur  qui  peccaverit.  tam gravia exlgunt serv~tia,  ut  ferri non 
Deniyue  peccati  causa,  Cham  servus  possint : non  ponentes  in  animo, quia 
audirit:  'Maled~ctus  puer  Chanaam,  et ipsi  vel~nt  nolint,  servi  sunt; et 
8ervus  Rervorum  erit fratr~bus  suis.'  viderint  cu~us  meriti." 
VOL.  I.  H fourthly, that masters  must  treat  their  slaves with  considera- 
tion and forbearance.  All these points can be amply illustrated 
from the works of  the Fathers. 
All the Fathers maintain  that in their original nature men 
were  free  and equal.  Salvian  speaks  of  that  human  nature 
and  condition  which  makes  masters  and  slaves  equa1.l  St 
Augustine,  in  a  very  notable passage,  to which  we  shall have 
to return, lays it down  that  God  did  not make  rational man 
to lord  it over  his  rational fellows,  but only  to be  master  of 
the  irrational  creatures,  and  that  no  one  in that  nature  in 
which  God first made man is the slave either of  man or of sin. 
In the original order of  things men would  have been free and 
equal.2  Gregory the Great insists upon  the same  conception. 
Masters are admonished that they should remember  that their 
slaves are of  the same nature as themselves, lest they should 
cease to recognise  that those whom  they  hold  in bondage  are 
equal with them, through  their share in one  common  nat~re.~ 
In a  passage  in his  work  on  Job,  a  passage  which  is  fre- 
quently referred  to in medi~val  literature, and some of  whose 
phrases have become almost classical, Gregory admonishes great 
men to remember that by nature we  are all equal,  that nature 
brought  forth  all  men  equal,  that  it  is  only  by  a  secret 
dispensation of  God  that some men are set over or are inferior 
to  0the1-s.~  St  Gregory's  phrase,  " Omnes  namque  natura 
aquales sumus,"  is strictly parallel  to Ulpian's " Quod  ad jus 
naturale attinet, omnes homines zquales sunt."  We have just 
seen how St Isidore of  Seville says that under the natural law 
there is " omnium una libertas." 
1 Salvian,  De Gubernatione Dei,  iii. 
28. 
St  Aug.,  De Civ. Dei, xix.  15. 
Gregory  the Great, Liber  Pastor- 
ali~  Curs, Part iii.  5. 
Gregory  the  Great,  Expositio 
Moralis  in  Beatum  Job,  xxi.  15: 
"  Potentibus  viris  magna  est  virtus 
humilitati, consiclerata  squalitas con- 
ditionis.  Omues  namque  homines 
natura  squales  sumus.  sed  accessit 
dispensatorio  ordine,  ut  quibusdam 
prslati videamur. . . . Si enim apud 
semetipsam mens descendit de vertice 
culminic;, citius planitiem invenit natu- 
ralis  aequalitatis.  Nam  uC  prsfati 
sumus, omnes homines natura squales 
genuit, sed variante meritorum ordine, 
alios aliis dispensatio occulta postponit. 
. . . Sancti autem viri cum presunt, 
non in se potestatem orclinis, sed squal- 
ihtem  conditionis  attendunt,  nec 
praeesse  gaudent  hominibus,  sed  pro- 
desse." 
St  Isidore of  Seville, Etym.,  v.  4. 
See g. 108. 
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But, further, this equality is not a  thing wholly of  the past: 
the  inequalities  of  condition  and  life  only  affect  the  body, 
they have  no relation  to the mind  and  soul.  The  slave,  St 
Ambrose says, may be the superior, in character, of  his master; 
no  condition  of  life  is  incapable of  virtue,  the  flesh  can  be 
enslaved, the mind is free.  The slave may really be more free 
than the master.  It is sin which  renders a  man truly a  slave, 
innocence  is  free.  He is  free  under  any  outward  form  of 
slavery  who  is  not  governed  by  the love  of  the  world,  by 
avarice, by fear.  The free man  is he  who  can  look  out  with 
confidence  on  his  actual life and  for  whom  the  future  has 
no  terr0rs.l  St Ambrose's  words  remind  us  very  forcibly of 
those  of  Seneca,  and  indeed  so  far  the  theories  we  are con- 
sidering do not seem essentially to differ from those with which 
we  have  already  dealt.  But they  are reinforced  by  the em- 
phatic assertion  that in Christ we are all one.  St Ambrose in 
another treatise  puts  this very  forcibly.  Neither  family  nor 
rank affect  the true position  of  men.  Slaves or freemen, we 
are all one in Christ ; slavery can take nothing from man's char- 
acter, nor can freedom add anything to it.=  This is expressed 
in another and perhaps more technical fashion by the author of 
one  of  the sermons attributed  to St Augustine,  who  protests 
against  the harsh  treatment  of  Christian  slaves  by  Christian 
St  Ambrose, De Joseph Patriarcha, 
iv. :  "  Catcrum  quod  ad  moralem 
pertinet locum,  quia omnes vult salvos 
fieri  Dominus  Deus  noster,  dedit per 
Joseph etiam iis qui sunt in servitute 
solatium : attribuit magisterium ; uC 
discerent  etiam  in  ultima  conditione 
posse mores esse superiores, nec ullum 
statum  immunem  esse  virtutis,  si 
animus  se  uniuscujusque  cognoscab ; 
carnem  servituti  subditam  esse,  non 
mentem,  multosque  servulos  esse 
donlinis  liberiores,  si  in  servitute 
poslti  a  servilibus  putent  operibus 
abstinendum.  Servile  est  omne  pec- 
catum,  libera  est  innocentia.  Unde 
et  Dominus  ait :  Omnis  qui  facit 
Peccatum,  servus  est  peccati.  .  .  . 
llle vero in quavi~  condlt~one  fiervitii 
semper  liber,  qui  mundi  amore  non 
capitur, avaritis viuculis non  tenetur, 
metu  criminis  non  alligatur,  qui 
securus  spectat  praesentia,  quem 
futura non terrent." 
St Ambrose,  Exhortatio  Virgini- 
tatis,  i.  3 : "  Nullum  ergo  ad  com- 
mendationem  hominis  condicio  affert 
impedimenturn ;  nec dignitas prosapiae 
meritum, sed fides affert.  Sive servus, 
sive  liber,  omnes  in  Christo  unum 
sumus. . . . Nec  servitus derogat nec 
libertas adjuvat.  , . . Apud Chriqtum 
enim  servitus  et libertas  squa lance 
penduntur, nec ullo discerniculo hons 
servitutis et libertatis merita dividun- 
tur :  quia nulla major esC dignitas quam 
servire Christo." masters, and upbraids them for  not considering that the slave 
is their brother by grace, has equally with  them put on Christ, 
partakes  of  the same  sacraments,  has  the same Father, God, 
and should find in his master a  br0ther.l  These Christian con- 
ceptions  do  not perhaps  add  anything in strict theory  to the 
philosophic  conception  of  the  equality  of  man's  nature,  but 
they represent  to us a  mode of  apprehending  this which  has 
probably  had  a  very  great  and  continuous  influence  on  the 
development  of  the  practical  consequences  of  this  theory  of 
human nature. 
Man, then, as God made him was free and equal.  The subjec- 
tion  of  man  to man  is something  which  belongs  not  to his 
original  nature  but  to his present  condition; and more  than 
that, this equality  and freedom  is in one  sense indestructible 
and inalienable:  even  now,  though  his  body  may  be  in sub- 
jection, his mind and soul are free, he is still capable of  reason 
and virtue, he may even now  be  superior to the man to whom 
he is enslaved,  and in his  relation  to God  all  differences  of 
condition  are meaningless.  Men, whether slaves  or freemen, 
are  called  to  one  common  life  in  Christ and God,  called to 
know  God  as the common  Father and to hold  each other  as 
brethren.  We may  stay for  a  moment  to  notice  once  again 
how far we have travelled from the Aristotelian mode of  thought, 
how clearly we are in presence of  what we may call the modern 
conception,  the  fundamental  idea  upon  which  the  modern 
democratic  theory  of  society  depends.  The Christian Fathers 
are clearly restating in their own fashion  the same conceptions 
as those which  we  already  met with in Cicero, in Seneca, and 
in the lawyers. 
But slavery is not, in the judgment  of  the Christian Fathers, 
unlawful  or  improper:  they  recognise  its existence,  they  ac- 
quiesce in its presence, and they furnish a complete theory of its 
origin and a new justification  of its continuance.  Slavery, they 
say, had no place in the primitive condition of  life ;  man, as God 
Pseudo Augustine, Sermones, cxlvi.  frater est.  Etenim sin~iliter  Christum 
3. "Et  quodmagis  dolendem est,  Christ-  induit,  iisdem  participat  sacramentis, 
ianus dominus christisno in his diebus  eodem  quo et tu,  utitur Deo  Patre ; 
servo non parcit, minimerespiciens quod  cur b non utatur ut fratre  ? " 
etsi servus est conditione, gratia tamen 
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created him, was not made to be either the slave or the lord of 
his fellow-man ; but, they add, man has long ago passed  out of 
that primitive  condition, and lives  now  under  other circum- 
stances.  He was once innocent and harmless, now he is vicious 
and inclined to attack and injure his  fellow-man.  Under  the 
primitive  conditions, he needed  no coercive  discipline  to train 
him  to goodness and to restrain  his evil desires; he lived  in 
freedom, and under conditions of  equality, for he had no tend- 
ency to abuse his freedom to the injury  of  his neighbours, and 
therefore  he did not  need  to be  under  the domination  of  his 
fellow-man, lest he should do wrong. 
The Fathers  conceive  of  the state of  man  before  the Fall 
much as Seneca conceives of  the Golden Age:  and they account 
for  the disappearance  of  the primitive  conditions of  that age 
by  the theory  of  the Fall.  By  the Fall  man  passed  ont of 
the state of  nature into the state in which  the conventional 
institutions  of  society  are  necessary.  Slavery  did  not  exist 
in  the  state of  nature  when  men  were  free,  and  in  some 
very  large  sense  equal.  But  the  Fall  brought  with  it  the 
need  of  new  conditions,  of  a  new  discipline,  by  which  the 
new and evil tendencies  of  human  nature should  be  corrected. 
Slavery is a consequence of  the coming of  sin into the world, 
and is also a disciplinary system by which the sinful tendencies 
of  man may be corrected. 
We have  already  seen  how  this  conception  is  stated  by 
l'  Ambrosiaster."  In  general terms he puts the universal theory 
of  the  Fathers,  that  slavery  came  into  the  world  with  sin. 
This  conception  is  drawn  out  with  greater  completeness  by 
St Augustine,  St;  Ambrose,  and  St Isidore  of  Seville.  The 
passage  to which we have already referred in the 'De  Civitate 
Dei,' as illustrating the conception of the equality and primitive 
liberty of  mankind, also contains one of  the best  statements of 
the patristic  theory  of  the  origin  and  rationale  of  slavery.2 
See p. 23.  quam reges hominum oonstituti sunt,  ut 
De Civ. Dei, xis. 15 : "  Rationalem  etiam sic insinuaret Deus quid povtulet 
factum ad imaginem suem noluit (Deus)  ordo creaturarum, quld exigat meritum 
nisi irrationabilibus dominari; non hom-  peccatorum.  Condicio  quippe  servit- 
inem homini, sed hominem pecori.  Inde  utis jure intellegitur imposita peccatori. 
primi  jueti  pastores  pecorum  magis  Proinde nusquam scripturarum legimus 11  8  THE  NEW TESTAMENT AND  THE FATHERS.  [PART 111. 
Man, who was made  in the  image  of  God, and  endowed  with 
reason, was  made to be  the lord of  all irrational creatures, but 
not  of  his fellow-men.  Slavery has been  imposed  by the just 
sentence  of  God  upon  the  sinner: it is  a  consequence  not  of 
man's  nature but  of  man's  sinfulness; by  nature  man  is  the 
slave neither of  sin nor of  his fellow-man.  Slavery is intended 
to preserve  the  true  order  of  life,  which  is  threatened  with 
destruction by sin.  St Augustine looks  upon slavery partly as 
a punishment  of  sin, but also as a  remedy  for  sin, as one  of 
those institutions, unnatural in one  sense, as being contrary to 
the  primitive  conditions  of  human  nature,  but  necessary 
under the actual circumstances  of  society.  St Ambrose  urges 
more than once that sin and vice and ignorance do in themselves 
make a man a slave.  Sin is always servile, innocence alone  is 
free.  "Every one  who  commits  sin is a  slave of  sin."l  It is 
really better for a vicious man to be a slave ; a man who cannot 
rule himself is better under the authority of  a wise man.  When 
Isaac put Esau into subjection to Jacob, he was really conferring 
upon him a benefiL2  The same  conception  is  drawn  out with 
precision  and  clearness  by  St Isidore of  Seville.  Slavery is a 
punishment for sin, but a remedial punishment; it is intended 
servum,  antequam  hoe  vocabulo  Noe 
justus peccatum filii vindicaret, Nomen 
itaque istud culpa  meruit, non  natura.  . . . Prima  ergo servitutis causa  pec- 
catum est, ut homo homini condicionis 
vinculo subderetur; quod  non  fit nisi 
Deo judicante,  apud quem non  est in- 
iquitas et novit diversas pcenas meritis 
rlistribuere delinquentium. Sicut autem 
supernus  Dominus  dicit : '  Omniu  qui 
facit peccatum, servus est peccati.'  Ac 
per hoe multi quidem religiosi  dominis 
iniquis non tarnell liberis serviunt : '  A 
quo  enim  quis  devictus  est,  huic  et 
servus addictus est.'  Et  utique felicius 
servitur  homini  quam  libidini,  cum 
aavissimo dominatu vastet corda mort- 
alium,  ut alias  omittam,  libido  ipsa 
dominandi.  Hominibus autem illo pacis 
ordine, quo aliis alii subjecti sunt, sicut 
prodest humilitas servientibus, ita nocet 
superbia dominantibus,  Wullus autem 
natura,  in  qua  prius  Deus  hominem 
condidit,  servus  est homiuis  aut pec- 
cati.  Verum  et penalis  servitus  ea 
lege ordinatur, qus  naturalem ordinem 
conservare  jubet,  perturbari  vetat ; 
quia  si  contra  eam  legem  non  esset 
factum,  nihil  esset  pcenali  servitute 
cohercendum.  Ideoque apostolus etiam 
servos  monet  subditos  esse  dominis 
suis et  ex animo eis cum bona voluntate 
servire ; ut  scilicet,  si  non  possunb 
a dominis liberi fieri,  suam servitutem 
ipsi  quodam  modo  liberam  faciant, 
non timore subdolo, sed fideli dilectione 
serviendo, donec  transeat  iniquitaa et 
evacuetur  omnis  principatus  et  pot- 
estas  humana  et sit  Deus  omnia  in 
omnibus." 
Sb Ambrose, De Joseph Patriarcha, 
iv.  See p.  115, note 1. 
St  Ambrose,  Ep.  xxxvii., and Ep. 
lxxvii. 6. 
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to correct the evil tendencies of  original sin in human  nature. 
~t is  necessary  that the evil dispositions  of  some  men  should 
be  restrained  by  terror, and yet God  is equally careful for men 
whether they are slaves or free, and it may chance that a good 
man  may be  enslaved  to an evil  master while  he  is really his 
~u~eri0r.l  St Isidore  seems  to  mean  that  slavery  is  one  of 
those  disciplinary  institutions  which  are  necessary  under  the 
actual  conditions  of  human  nature,  which  do, in the general, 
tend  to correct  the  resulb  of  men's  depravity,  though  he  is 
evidently  compelled  to  recognise  that  the  dispensation  of 
Providence  is not  always  adjusted  correctly to the individual 
case. 
This theory  of  the Fathers deserves careful attention.  We 
have  seen  that they use  phrases which  illustrate the sincere 
conviction with which they, like the later philosophers and the 
lawyers,  maintained  the natural equality and liberty of  man- 
kind.  Clearly they all continue to hold firmly to the view that 
human  nature is  fundamentally equal, that there  is no reality 
in such a distinction as that which Aristotle had made between 
the naturally free man and the man who was naturally a slave. 
Men are all possessed of  reason and capable of  virtue; they are 
all  the children  of  God.  But it is also  quite  clear  that the 
Christian  writers  were  no  more  prepared  to  condemn  the 
actual institution of  slavery  as unlawful than were the jurists 
or the philosophers.  In the  writings  of  the jurists  we  have 
St Isidore  of  Seville,  Sententim, 
iii.  47 : "  Propter  peccatum  primi 
hominis humano  generi pcena divinitus 
illata  est servitutis ita ut quibus aspi- 
cit non  congruere libertatem, his mis- 
ericordius irroget servitutem.  Et  licet 
peccatum humans originis per baptismi 
gratiam cunctis fidelibus dimissum sit, 
tamen  equus Deus  ideo  discrevit ho- 
minibus vitam, alios servos constituens, 
alios dominos, ut licentia  male agendi 
servorum,  potestate  dominantium  re- 
stringatur.  Nam  si omnes sine metu 
fuissent, quis esset qui a  malis quem- 
quam prohibeat.  Inde et in gentibus 
principea  regesque electi sunt, ut  terr- 
ore suo populos a malo coercerenb, atque 
ad recte vivendum  legibua  subderent. 
Quantum attinet ad rationem "non esb 
personarum acceptio apud Deum,"  qui 
mundi  elegit  ignobilia  et contempti- 
bilia, et qum non aunt ut ea qua sunt 
destrueret : ne  glorietur  omnis  caro, 
hoc  est  carnalis  potentia  coram  illo. 
Unus  enim  Dominus  equaliter eC  do- 
minis fert consultum et servis.  Melior 
est subjecta servitus quam elata liber- 
tas.  Multi  eniin  inveniuntur  Deo 
Libere servientes sub dominia constituti 
flagitiosis,  qui et si subjecti aunt illis 
corpore, prelati tamen sunt mente." the  apparent  contradiction  stated,  without  explanation, that 
slavery is coiltrary to nature and yet that it exists.  Seneca, at 
least,  among  the philosophers, suggests an explanation of  the 
apparent contradiction.  Institutions which were not necessary 
in the age  of  innocence  became  necessary  as men's  vices  in- 
creased.  The Fathers, bringing to their consideration of  society 
a  dogmatic  theory  of  the  Fall,  are  able  to  apply  the same 
considerations  as those which Seneca  urges, with completeness 
and coherence.  Had Adam  not sinned  and brought  sin into 
human nature such an institution as slavery would have  been 
unnecessary ;  but the Fall, in bringing corruption into the world, 
made necessary  institutions  which  should  correct  and  control 
the sinfulness  of  human  nature. 
Here we  have the explanation of  what at first sight seems a 
paradoxical  contradiction between the principles of  the natural 
law and the actual conditions of  human life.  The later Roman 
jurists  had  looked  upon  the natural  law  as  divine  and  un- 
changeable:  and,  almost  in the same breath,  had  spoken  of 
slavery as an  institution actually existing and yet contrary to 
the natural law.  Directly at least they suggest no explanation 
of  the apparent contradiction.  Seneca had  suggested, and the 
Fathers developed completely, an explanation which  was in its 
own way profound  and philosophical.  The law of  nature in its 
completeness is only  adapted  to  the state of  nature.  In the 
condition of  innocence and simplicity men  needed no coercion 
to make them obey the principles  of  this law.  Rut once this 
innocence  had disappeared  man needed discipline and coercion 
to  make him  obey even  the more general principles of  justice 
and right, and hence much which  is contrary to nature in the 
primitive  condition  is  necessary  in  the  actual  condition  of 
human life. 
Slavery is then, in the view of  the Fathers, a lawful institu- 
tion,  and  they  constantly  urge  upon  the  slave  the  duty  of 
obedience  and  submission.  St Ambrose,  after  admonishing 
masters  to remember that they are of  the same nature as their 
slaves,  bids  the slaves  serve  their  masters  with good  will; a 
man must  patiently accept  the condition in which  he is born, 
'  Inst.,  i. 2. 11. 
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and must obey harsh  as well  as good  masters.l  St  Augustine, 
in one interesting passage which is also  of  some  importance in 
connection with  the theory of  government,  argues that Christ 
makes good  slaves of  bad  ones; that, when they turn to Him, 
He teaches  them,  not  that it is improper  that the righteous 
should  serve the wicked, but rather  that slaves should  follow 
His example in rendering   er vice.^  In  another place, with still 
greater emphasis, he repudiates the notion  that the precedent 
of  the liberation of  the Hebrew slaves in every seventh year 
might be applied to the case of  the Christian slave: the apostle, 
he  says,  had  admonished  slaves  to obey  their  masters,  lest 
Christian  slaves  should  denland  such a  manumi~sion.~  The 
author of  one of  the sermons attributed  to  St Augustine puts 
the matter very forcibly when he bids the slaves love and obey 
their masters from the heart, because  it is God who  has made 
these to be masters and the others  to be  their servants.4  But 
perhaps the most emphatic assertion of  the propriety of  slavery 
is to be found in one  of  the canons  of  the Council of  Gangrae, 
held in the year 362.  In  the third  canon  the anathema of  the 
Church is laid upon any one who under the pretence  of  godli- 
ness should teach a  slave to despise his master, or  to withdraw 
himself  from his service.5 
The  Church,  then,  so  far  from  repudiating  the institution 
of  slavery,  accepted  the  fact, and  framed  its  own  canonical 
regulations in accordance with it.  The history of  the canonical 
' St  Ambrose,  Ep.  lxiii.  112 : 
"Domini  servis  imperate  non  quasi 
conditione  subditis, sed ita ut natura 
ejusdem cujus vos  estis,  consortes  eis 
esse memineritis.  Servi qucclue dominis 
servite cum voluntate ; etenim  unus- 
quisque quod natus est, patienter debet 
suscipere : nec  solum bonis, sed etiam 
aaperis obedite dominis. 
a  St Aug.,  Enarr.  in  Ps.  cxxiv. 
3. 
j St Aug.,  Quastionum in Hept. ii. 
77 :  &us de  servo  Hebrao  prreci- 
piuntur,  ut  sex  annos  ~erviat, et 
dimittatur liber gratis, ne servi  Chris- 
tiani  hoc  flagitarent  a  dominis  suis, 
apostolica  auctoritas  jubet  servos 
dominis  suis esse  subditos,  ne nomen 
Dei et doctrina blasphemetur." 
"seudo  Augustine, Sermone, cxvii. 
12 : "  Obedite  (servi) dominia vestris, 
diligite ex corde, non ad  oculum servi- 
entes,  sed  ministerium  ex  amore 
facientes ;  quia et illos Deus constituit 
ut  vobis  dominentur,  et  vos  ut 
serviatis." 
Concilium  Gangrense,  Canon  iii. : 
EZ  TIS  80Ghov  T~O@~UCL  e~ou~Br[as 
8r8du~or  ~ara@poveiv  ~ZUT~TOII,  ~al  bax- 
wpriv  rijs  ~T~~EU~~S  ~al  U?  per'  ei)uoias 
~al  ~duqs  rtpiis  ry^  iauro;  C~uadrp 
#~un~p~r~iuOar,  8vdlJepa k~o. and secular  legislation with  regard  to the slave who entered  a 
monastery,  or procured ordination, is long ancl  intricate, and it 
is  not  necessary  here  to  deal with  it in  detail;  still  some 
points  in this should  be  observed.  At an  early date  it had 
become  the Church  rule  that  a  slave  could  not be  ordained 
unless he were first set at liberty.  St Leo expressly prohibits 
this? and a  little later the matter is  treated with  considerable 
detail by  Pope  Gelasius I.  In one of  his  letters  he  orders 
a  certain  bishop  to  restore  a  slave,  who  had  been  made  a 
"clericus,"  to his mistress ; but with  regard  to another  slave 
who  had  been  ordained  to  the priesthood  he  orders that he 
shouId  be  sent  back  to  his  mistress,  not  as  a  slave  bnt  as 
a  priest  at the church on her  e~tates.~  In another letter he 
forbids  the reception  of  any slave into  a  monastery  without 
the permission  of  his  master?  This does  not,  however,  rep- 
resent  the universal  character  of  Christian legislation  on  the 
subject.  In  Justinian's fifth Novel the question of  the entrance 
of  slaves into monasteries  is handled  in a  somewhat  different 
spirit.  Justinian  prefaces  his  judgment  on  the subject  by 
the recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  divine  grace  inakes  no 
distinction  with  regard  to  human  conditions;  that  in  the 
worship  of  God  all  distinctions of  male  or female,  slave  or 
free, disappear; and he goes  on  to lay it down that every one, 
whether  free  or a  slave, must  undergo  a  probation  of  three 
years before  being  accepted  as a  monk.  If  within  that time 
a  master  come  to reclaim  his  slave,  and can  prove  that the 
slave  had  stolen  something,  or  had  committed  a  crime  of 
St  Leo, Ep. iv.  Cf. Canones Apost., 
81, and Concil. Tolet., iv. 19, 73,  74. 
St Gelasius I., Ep.  xxi. : "Nuper 
etenim actores illustris feminre Placidire 
petitorii  oblatione  couquesti  sunt, 
SabinumMarcellianensis sive Casilinatis 
urbis Antiochum  servum juris patrons 
sus,  absentis domina occasione captata, 
ad presbyterii honorem  usque produc- 
turn, ejusque fratrem  Leontium  cleri- 
calis otficii privilegio decorasse.  Et  ideo, 
fratres  carissimi,  inter  supradictos 
actores eO  eos,  qui conditionis extrems 
repetuntur, objectam cognitionem vobin 
nostra auctoritate deputamus : et omni 
veritate discussa, si revera objectam s~bi 
maculam  justitire  refragationis  non 
potuerit  ratione  diluere,  Leontium 
clericum,  quem gradus prsfinitus 1eg1- 
bus  non  defendit,  ad sequendam  cog- 
nationis suat necessitatem  mod~s  omni- 
bus redhibete.  Antiochum vero,  quia 
propter  sacerdotium  n~)ii  jam  potest 
retolli, si in  suam ecclesiam in hoc,  in 
quo est, honore desiderat collocare, non 
veluti  reddituln  sibi, sed  habeat  pro 
mysteriorum  celebratioue  susceptum." 
St Gelasius I., Ep. xiv. 4. 
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some kind, and had therefore fled to  the monastery, the slave 
is  to  be  restored  to  him,  on  the  promise  that  he will  not, 
injure  him.  But if  he cannot prove  the charge,  the slave is 
not to be  surrendered  to him, even  if  the master's  demand is 
made  within  the  three  years:  after that, no  demand can  be 
made even on the ground of  any crime committed by the slave 
before his coming  to the monastery.  Only, if  the slave leave 
the monastery to return to the secular life, then the master can 
reclaim  him.l  We shall have to recur to this question of  the 
position of  the slave or serf  with respect to ordination or  en- 
tering  a  monastery  in  later  chapters.  We here  refer  to  the 
rnatter  only as illustrating the fact that the Christian Church 
acquiesced  in the institution of  slavery,  and even fornied  its 
own  internal regulations  in accordance  with the fact, 
Slavery, then, in the judgment of  the Fathers, is a legitimate 
and useful institution.  But the Fathers are very  careful  to 
urge  upon  the masters  that they must show their  slaves con- 
sideration  and  kindness,  and  even  that  they are  responsible 
for the spiritual welfare  of  their  slaves.  St Augustine urges 
upon the masters of  slaves that while with respect to temporal 
matters they may well  distinguish between  their children and 
their slaves, with  regard  to  the  worship  of  God  they should 
take equal  thought  for both:  the true Pater familias will  try 
to bring up his  whole  household  in the  service of  God.2  St 
Gregory  the  Great, in  a  letter  addressed  to  the nobles  and 
proprietors  of  Sardinia,  warns  them  that they  will  have  to 
give  account  to  God  for  all  those  who  are in subjection  t,o 
them ;  it is true that these  are to serve the temporal interests 
of  their lords,  but  the lords  are responsible for  their  eternal 
wellbeing3 
We must  not  be  understood  to  be  discussing the question 
of  the complete  influence of  Christianity on ancient slavery : 
our  work  here  is concerned  with  the theory  of  the  subject. 
So  far  as we  should  venture  an  opinion  on  this  matter,  we 
should  say  that Christianity  was  one of  the  many influences 
which  were  gradually  tending  to  bring  the  slavery  of  thtr 
ancient world  to  an end.  It would  appear  evident  that  tho 
Novel v. 2.  De Civ. Dei, xix. 16.  St  Oregory the Great, Ep. iv. 23. 124  THE NEW TESTAMENT  AND  THE  FATHERS.  [PART  111. 
influence  of  Christianity  tended  to  promote  the  mitigation 
of  the  hardships  of  slavery,  not  only  by  its  exhortations 
to  the  master  to  remember  that  the  slave  was  his  brother, 
but  also  by  promoting  legislation  for  the protection  of  the 
slave  and  by  actually  encouraging  manumission.  The  laws 
of  the Christian Emperors  carry on from the older  legislation, 
and  seem  to  develop  further,  regulations  for  the protection 
of  slave women  and children from prostitution '  and exposure? 
and  it  is very  noticeable  that one  of  the  earliest  laws  en- 
acted  by  Constantine  after  his  conversion  was  that  by 
which  it was  permitted  to  perform  the ceremony  of  manu- 
mission in the Christian Churches?  The theory of  the Church 
may  have looked  upon  slavery  as  legitimate, but it is clear 
enough  that  the  practical  influence  of  the  Church  was  in 
favour of  manumission.  In later centuries we  find  references 
to the manumission  of  slaves  which  imply that this was  con- 
sidered  to  be  a  pious work, likely  to profit  the souls of  the 
persons who  perform it.4  We do not  doubt  that the general 
influence  of  the Church tended  towards the mitigation of  the 
hardships  of  slavery, and even  towards  the  disappearance  of 
the institution.  But the more  clearly we  may recognise  this 
the more  necessary is it  to recognise  also  that  the theory of 
the Church is somewhat  different:  we  think  that it must be 
admitted  that the influence of  the theory may have  had  con- 
siderable effect  both in defending  the actually existing slavery 
of  the ancient  world,  and  in  assisting  in  its  revival  in  the 
fifteenth century when Europeans  came  into contact with the 
negro  races. 
Cod. i.  4.  12, 14, vi.  4.  4.  2.  African%, 64 and 82. 
Wod. i.  4. 24.  Cf. the "Formula3"  of  Marculfus, 
S  Cod. i.  13. 1  and 2.  Cf. Cod. Eccl.  xxxii.  and xxxiv. 
CHAPTER  XI. 
NATURAL  EQUALITY  AND  GOVERNMENT. 
IN dealing with the question of  slavery we  have  anticipated  a 
good  deal  of  what  we  have  to  say  about the relation  of  the 
theory  of  natural equality  to the theory  of  organised  society 
and government.  That natural equality which  is, in the judg- 
ment of  the Fathers, contrary to slavery, is also contrary to the 
subjection of  man to man in government. 
The Fathers maintain  that man is made for  society, that he 
is  by  nature  sociable  and  incliiied  to  love  his  fellow-men. 
Lactantius,  in  commenting  on  a  passage  from  Cicero's  De 
Republica, which  we  have already discussed,  denies  that they 
were  ever  apart.l  It is  indeed  possible  that Lactantius  is  a 
little confused in his judgment  of  human nature.  In another 
place  he seems to mean that man  does  indeed  desire  society, 
but it is on  account  of  the weakness of  his body, which  makes 
him  incapable  of  defending  himself  in  ~olitude.~  Still,  even 
SO,  he maintains that men  are by nature driven to the social 
life.  A  clearer  conception  is  very  forcibly  stated  by  St 
Augustine  in  several  passages.  Human  nature  is,  he  says, 
social~le,  and men  are held  together  by the bond  of  kin~hip.~ 
He approves  of  the conception  that the life  of  the wise man 
is  a  social  life.'  Man,  he  says, is  driven  by  the very  laws 
of  his  nature to  enter  into  society  and  to  make  peace  with 
' Lact., Div. Inst.,  vi.  10.  naturale bonum, vim quoque amicitis ; 
"act.,  De Opificio Dei, iv.  ob  hoc  ex  uno  Deus  voluit  omneu 
'  St Aug.,  De  Bono  Conjugali,  i. :  llomines  condere,  ut in  sua societate 
"Quoniam unusquisque  homo humarii  non  sola  similitudine  generis,  sed 
generis pars est, et sociale quiddam est  etiam cognationis vincula tenerentur." 
human8 natura, magnumque habet  et  4  St  Aug., De Civ., xiu. 5. 126  THE NEW TESTAMENT AND  THE FATHERS.  [PART  111. 
men.1  It is  of  some  importance  to  observe  this  judgment, 
for,  as  we  have  already  said,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
ancient  philosophy  had  spoken  with  a  twofold  voice  on  the 
matter.  The Epicurean had plainly tended to think of  political 
life as at the most a necessity, perhaps an unfortunate necessity, 
arising  from  the infirmities  of  human  nature,  while  the con- 
ception of  the obligation of  political life even for the wise man 
had been carried on by the Stoics, although, as we have already 
seen, it  requires  a  little care  to  recognise  how  emphatically 
they held  this.  Lactantius  may  perhaps  waver  between  two 
opinions,  perhaps  scarcely  recognising  the  significance of  the 
question; but St Augustine, at least, is clear  in his judgment, 
and he is, as far as we  see, the representative  of  the normal 
type of  thought  of  Christian  writers. 
Man  is  by  nature  made  for  society.  But  it  is  not  by 
nature  that  man  is  the  lord  of  man,  it  is  not  by  nature 
that  man  is  in  subjection  to  man.  We  must  recur  again 
to  that  most  important  treatment  of  the  question  by  St 
Augustine,  to  which  we  have  already  referred  in  dealing 
with  slavery.  God  made  rational  beings  in His own image, 
not  to  be  lords  over  each  other,  but  to  be  lords  of  the  ir- 
rational  creatures;  the  primitive  good  men  were  rather 
shepherds  of  their  flocks  than  kings  of  men.2  The  govern- 
ment of  man  by  man is not  part of  the natural order of  the 
world.  In another place  St Augustine speaks in the severest 
terms  of  the  desire  of  domination,  and  treats  it as  arising 
from  an  intolerable  pride  which  forgets  that  men  are  each 
other's  eq~als.~  Gregory  the  Great  represents  precisely  the 
St  Aug., De Civ., xix. 12 : "  Quanto 
magis  homo  fertur  quodam  modo 
naturw  sus  legibus  ad  ineundam 
societatem  pacemque  cum hominibus, 
quantum  in  ipso  est,  omnibus  ob- 
tenendum." 
St  Aug., De Civ., xix. 15 :  "Ration- 
alem facturn ad imaginem suam noluit 
nisi irrationalibus dominari :  non hom- 
inem  homini,  sed  hominem  pecori. 
Inde  primi  jufiti  pastores  pecorum 
magis quam reges horninurn constituti 
sunt,  ut  etiam  sic  iilsinuaret  Deus, 
quid postulet ordo  creaturarum,  quid 
exigat  meritum  peccatorum." 
St  Aug.,  De Doctr.  Christ.,  i.  23 : 
"  Magnum  autem aliquid  adeptum  se 
putat,  si  etiam  sociis,  id  est  aliis 
hominibus,  dominari potuerit.  Inest 
enim vitioso animo id  magis  appetere, 
et  sibi  tanquam  debitum  vindicare, 
quod  uni  proprie  debetur Deo. . . . 
Cum vero ctiam eis qui sibi naturaliter 
pares sunt, hoc est, hominibus, domin- 
ari appetat, intolerabilis animi superbia 
eh  t." 
O~P.  XI.]  NATURAL  EQUALITY  AND  GOVERNMENT.  127 
same  attitude  towards  the  primitive  order  of  human  life. 
In the  passage  already  quoted  in  relation  to  slavery,  he 
points  out  the  immense  profit  that  great  men  will  derive 
from the consideration  of  the equality  of  human  nature,  the 
great  benefit  they  will  gain  if  they  will  recollect  that  in 
the beginning  man  was  set over  the other  animals, not  over 
his  fellow-man.1  It  is  probable  that  Gregory  the  Great  is 
here  following  St Augustine,  but  the  general  source  of  the 
theory  can  hardly be  mistaken:  it is that same  Stoic theory 
of  a  primitive state in which  the conventional  institutions  of 
society  did  not  yet exist,  of  which  we  have  already  spoken 
so  often.  The  primitive  state of  man  was  to  these  Fathers, 
as  it had  been  to  the  Stoics  like  Posidonius  and  Seneca, a 
state without any coercive government:  in the state of  nature 
men did not need this. 
It must be noticed that, at least in St Gregory the Great, this 
does  not mean  that in the  state of  innocence  there  was  no 
order  of  society  or  distinction  of  authority.  In a  letter  ad- 
dressed to the bishops of  the kingdom of  Childebert, in ratifying 
the authority of  Virgilius,  the Bishop  of  Arles,  as represent- 
ing  the  Roman  See,  St Gregory  urges  that  some  system  of 
authority is necessary in every society-that  even  the angels, 
altliough they are free from  sin, are yet ordered in a hierarchy 
of  greater  and less.2  St Gregory's  conception is very  similar 
St  Gregory the Great, Exp. Mor. in 
Job,  sxi. 15 : "  Sancti autem viri cum 
pmsunt, non in se potestatem  ordinis 
sed wqualitatem conditionis attendunt, 
nec  prsesse  gaudent  hominibus  sed 
~rodesse.  Sciunt  enim  quod  antiqui 
patres nostri non tarn  reges hominum 
qUam  pastores  pecorum  memorantur. 
. . Homo  quippe  animalibus irra- 
tionabilibus,  non  autem  ceteris  hom- 
inibus natura prelatus est."  Cf. xxiv. 
25. 
SC aregory the Great, Ep. v.  59 : 
"  Ad hoc dispensationis divinse provisio 
gradus  diversos  et ordines  constituit 
esse  distinctos, ut, dum  reverentiam 
minores potioribus exhiberent  et poti- 
Ores  minoribus dilectionem  impentlcr- 
ent, una concordiw fieret ex diversitate 
contextio  et  recte  officiorum  gerer- 
etur admiuistratio singulorum.  Xeque 
enim  universitas  alia  poterat  ratione 
subsistere, nisi hujusmodi magnus eam 
differentia  ordo  servaret.  Quia  vero 
creatura  in una eademque  wqualitate 
gubernari vel vivere non  potest, czeles- 
tium militiarum exemplar nos instruit, 
quia  dum sunt angeli,  et suut arch- 
angeli,  liquet,  quia non zquales sunt, 
sed in potestate et ordine, sicut nostris, 
differt alter ab altero.  Si  ergo inter hos 
qui sine peccato sunt ista constat esse 
distinctio, quis hominum  abnuat huic 
se libenter  dispositioni submittere, cui 
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to  that of  Seneca and Posidonius,  who, while  they think  that 
tllere  was no organised  coercive  government in the primitive 
age, think that in that time men  freely obeyed the wise. 
To  return, it seems  clear  that both  St Augustine  and  St 
Gregory  look  upon  the institution of  coercive  government as 
not belonging to the primitive state of  man ;  they do not think 
that government of  this kind is a  natural institution ;  but this 
does not mean  that the Fathers look upon the ordered govern- 
ment of  society  among  men  as they  actually  are, as a  thing 
improper  or  illegitimate.  We have  already,  in  considering 
their attitude to the institution of  slavery, recognised that they 
conceive of  the conditions  proper  to human life as having been 
completely altered by the entrance of sin into the world.  Slavery 
was contrary to the natural law  of  the primitive  condition of 
human  innocence,  but is  proper  and even  useful  under  the 
actual  conditions of  human  nature.  It is the same  with  the 
institution of  government.  Coercive government has been made 
necessary through  sin, and is a  divinely  appointed  remedy for 
sin. 
It is interesting  to  find  this conception  developed  by  the 
Christian  writers  from  a  very  early date.  We have  already 
considered St Paul's treatment of  the institution of  government 
and the sanctity which  belongs  to it.  He affirms  its sanctity 
arid explains this as arising  from the fact that its purpose is to 
repress the evil and to reward  the good.  St Clement of  Rome, 
in the great liturgical prayer  which  forms a  concluding  part 
of  his  letter, does  not  go  beyond  St Paul's  conception of  the 
sanctity  of  government:  he  prays  to  God  for  the  rulers  of 
mankind,  as  those  to  whom  God  has  given  authority  and 
glory,  that God  will  give  them  wisd0m.l 
Towards  the end  of  the  second  century  we  have  in  the 
writings  of  St Irenwus a  detailed discussion  of  the origin  of 
government, of  the circunlstances  which  have  made it  neces- 
sary, and of  the purpose  which  it is intended  to serve.  The 
passage  occurs  with  that  apparent  irrelevance  which  is  so 
characteristic of  the writings of  the Fathers, in a  discussion 
of  the mendacity  of  the devil.  Iren~us  begins  by  asserting 
St Clement of  Rome, 61. 
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that the devil was, as always, a liar, when  in the temptation he 
said to oar Lord that all tlie kingdoms of  the earth were his, to 
give to whom he would.  It  is not the devil at all, Irenzeus says, 
who has appointed the kingdoms of  the world, but God, and he 
establishes this by a reference to  the passage  in the Proverbs, 
"Ey me  kings reign  and princes  administer justice,"  and the 
saying of St Paul, already discussed (Rom. xiii. 1,  &C.)  Author- 
ity came from God, not from the devil.  So far we have nothing 
new; but  Irenwus  then  proceeds  to discuss  the causes  which 
made  government necessary, and urges that  this is due to the 
fact  that men  departed from  God and hated  their  fellow-men, 
and fell into confusion and disorder  of  every kind, and so God 
set men  over each other, inlposing the fear of  man  upon  men, 
and sub,jecting men to the authority of  men, that by this means 
they might be compelled to some measure of  righteousness and 
just  dea1ing.l  We have  here  an  explicit  statement that the 
institution  of  government  has  been  made  necessary  by  sin 
and is a  divinely  appointed  remedy  for  sin. 
The Christian writers  of  the same period as Irenzeus do not 
indeed draw out the relation of  government to the existence of 
evil, as Irenzeus has clone, but they agree with him in asserting 
its divine  origin.  Justin  Martyr  lays  great  stress  upon  the 
fact that Christians had been taught  by Christ  Himself  to pay 
taxes  to  the ruler, to "render to  Czsar the things  which  are 
Csesar's,"  and urges that, while Christians can only worship God, 
in all other ways they gladly serve their rulem2  Theophilus of 
Antioch,  another  writer  of  the  second  century,  while  also 
refusing to worship the king,  says that he should  be  honoured 
and obeyed, for at least in some  sense it nlay be  said  of  him 
that he has received  his  authority from God.3  No doubt these 
emphatic assertions  of  the divine  authority of  the ruler, while 
they may have  been partly intended to allay any suspicions  of 
disloyalty, were  also  intended to counteract those tendencies to 
anarchy in the Christian  societies, to whose existence the New 
Testament bears witness.  The Christian writers of  the second 
century, then, clearly carry on the tradition  of  the New Testa- 
'  Irenieus, Aclv. Hzr., v. 24.  3  Theophilus  of  Antioch,  Ad  Auto- 
"uustin  Martyr, First Apology, 17.  lycum, i.  11. 
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ment that the principle of  authority is a divine principle, while 
in the  case  of  Irenaeus  at least  we  see  that this  xileans  that 
government is a  divinely  instituted  remedy  for  the  sin  and 
wickedness  of  men. 
The great  writers  of  the  fourth,  fifth, and sixth  centuries 
carry on precisely  the same conceptions.  Most of  them indeed 
only  deal  with  the  divine  character  of  government,  but  St 
Ambrose,  St Augustine, St Gregory  the Great, and  St Isidore 
develop the conception  of  St Iren~eus  that government is the 
necessary  divine  remedy  for  sin.  St Ambrose  speaks of  the 
authority  of  rulers as being  imposed  upon  foolish  peoples, to 
compel men  even  though  unwillingly  to obey  the wise.l  St 
Augustine, as we have already seen, looks upon the government 
of  men by men as being  contrary to the primitive  condition of 
human nature, but as being a necessary and divinely appointed 
consequence of  and remedy for  sin.2  We give  below  another 
passage from his writings in which his conception of  government 
is very clearly drawn oute3 
St Gregory the Great echoes the sentiments of  St Augustine: 
we  need  only refer  the reader  to the passage which  we  have 
already  quoted in part,  but  we  may  draw  atlention  to  some 
phrases in this which were not specially germane to the subject 
1 St  Ambrose, Ep. xxxvii.  8.  est, hominibus res humanas cum aliquo 
St  Aug., De. Civ. Dei, xix. 15.  honore admiuistrantlbus.  Ex illa vero 
St Aug.,  Quar.  Prop.  ex  Ep.  parte qua cred~mus  Deo, et in reguum 
ad Rom., $2 : "  Quod autem ait, Omnis  ejus vocamur, non nos oportet ease sub- 
anima  potestatibus sublimioribus sub-  ditos cuiquam homini, idipsum in nobis 
dita sit : non est enim potestas  nisi a  evertere cupienti, quod Deus ad vitam 
Deo, rectissime  jam  monet ne quis  ex  zternam donare dignatus est.  Si quia 
eo  quod a  Domino  suo in  libertatem  ergo  putat  quoniam  Christianus  est, 
vocatus ent, factusque  Christianus, ex-  non  sibi esse  vectigal  reddendum aut 
tollatur in superbiam, et  non arbitretur  tributum,  aut non  evfie  exhibendum 
in  hujus vitre  itinere  serraudum esse  honorem debitum  eis qua: 11zc curant 
ordinem  suum,  et  potestatibus  sub-  potestatibus ;  in magno errore versatur. 
lirnioribus, quibus  pro  tempore rerum  Item si quis se putat ease  subdendum, 
temporalium  gubernntio  tradita  eat,  ut etinrn in suam ficlem  habere  piltes- 
putet non  se  esse  subdendum.  CUUI  tatem arbitretur eum qui temporallbus 
enim constemus ex anima  et corpole,  administrandifi aliqua sublunitate pre- 
et  quamdiu in hacvita temporali sumus,  cellit ; in  xnajorern  errorem  labitur. 
etiam rebus ternporalibus ad subsidiurn  Sed  modus  iste  servandus  est  quam 
degende hujus  vitae  utamur; oportet  Dominus ipse  prrescribit, ut re~ldamus 
nos  ex ea  parte, qua:  ad  hanc vitam  Cresari  qure  Czsaris sunt, et Deo quze 
pertinet, subditos esse  potestatibus,  id  Dei sunt." 
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which  we  were  then  dealing with.  Men,  he says, are indeed 
by nature equal, but they are different in condition as a conse- 
quence  of  sin: as all men  do  not  live equally well, one man 
must  be  ruled  by another; there is a  bestial  tendency in the 
human race which can only be kept down by fear.1 
St Isidore of  Seville, in the same passage  in which  he deals 
with  slavery as a  consequence of  and a  remedy  for  sin, also 
deals with government in the same fashion.  The just God, he 
says, has so ordered life, in making some men slaves and some 
men lords, that the tendency to  evil may be  restrained  by  the 
fear of punishment ; and to the same end princes and kings are 
appointed, that  by  fear  of  thein and by  their laws the people 
may be restrained from evil and encouraged to good.2 
It  is unnecessary  to multiply quotations from the Fathers to 
show that they all accept  the theory of  St Paul, that Govern- 
ment  is a  divine institution.  We shall have  to recur  to the 
matter again when we discuss their conception of  the character 
of  the authority of  Government, the question of  its absolute or 
liniited nature, and the propriety or impropriety  of  resistance 
to it.  So far we  are only concerned  to make it clear how it is 
that  we  find  the Fathers at the same time  maintaining  that 
Government is not  natural and primitive, and yet that it is a 
divine  institution.  We have tried  to make it  clear  that this 
apparently  self-contradictory  position  is  really  a  perfectly 
intelligible,  and, on its own  terms, rational one.  For man  is 
not  now  in  the condition  in which  God  made  him:  once  he 
was  innocent  and  harmless,  now  his  nature  is  depraved  and 
corrupted,  and  conditions  which  would  have  been  wholly 
contrary  to  his  primitive  nature  are  now  necessary  and 
useful. 
'  St  Gregory the Great, Exp. Mor., in 
Job xxi. 15 : "  Nam ut przfati sumus, 
Omnes hornirles natura ~uquales  genuit, 
Bed  variante  meritorum  ordine,  alios 
aliis  dispenmtio  occulta  postponit. 
Ipaa  autem diversitas, qua: acceesit ex 
vitio recte est divinis judiciis ordiuata, 
Ut  quia omnis homo iter vitae reque non 
gradltur, alter ab altero regatur. . . . 
Nequaquam  ergo  ~raepositi ex  hoc 
qusrito timore superbiant, in quo non 
suam gloriam, sed subditorum justitidm 
quzrunt. In  CO enini quod metus sibi a 
perverse viventibus exigunt, quasi a non 
hominibus, sod brutis animalibus domi- 
nantur,  quia  videlicet  ex  qua  parte 
bestiales  sunt subditi, ex ea etiam de- 
bent formidine jacere  substrati." 
Vt  Isidore of  Sevrlle,  Yentent., ili. 
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CHAPTER  XII. 
THE  THEORY  OF PROPERTY. 
WE must turn to the  theory  of  property  in  the  Christian 
writers.  We have  already seen  that the New Testament does 
nob  seem  to  contain any  definite theory of  property:  it may 
contain traces  of  a  theory that the perfect man  has little to 
do  with  wealth,  but  the general tendency of  the New  Testa- 
ment writers  seems  to be  to assume the existence of  the insti- 
tution, while they enjoin upon Christian men the duty of  using 
their property especially  for the benefit  of  all the members of 
the Christian societies. 
The earliest  Fathers carry on  these conceptions  very much 
as we find them in the New Testament: on  the one hand they 
do not seem to have  any dogmatic  theory  of  the community 
of  Christian men's  goods;  on  the other hand  they continue to 
insist that the Christian  man is bound  to use  his  property to 
relieve the wants of  his fellow-man, and especially of  his fellow- 
Christian.  The '  Teaching  of  the Twelve  Apostles'  and the 
so-called  Epistle  of  Earnabas  reproduce  from  some  common 
source very emphatic exhortations to liberality in giving, which 
in one  phrase  echo  the words  of  the Acts  of  the Apostles: 
"Thou shalt not turn away from him that hath need, but shalt 
share all things with  thy brother, and shalt not  say that they 
are thine own : for if  ye are sharers in that which is immortal, 
how  much  more  in  those  things  which  are mortal."'  The 
phrase,  "Thou  shalt  not  say that they  are  thine own"  (oh 
dpeiy ii6~a  etva~),  is very near the phrase of  the Acts, "No one of 
them said that ought of  the things which he possessed was his 
'Teaching of  the Twelve Apostles,'  iv. 8.  Cf. Ep. of  Barnabas, six. 8. 
own" (0662  et9  7~ TSV 6~a~~d.v~~~  a6~$  Zheyev  X~LOV etvar, 
&XX' ?TV  a6roTy  d~avra  ICOLV~). 
The  same  conception  is  represented  by  Justin  Martyr  in 
the  second  century.  In his  first  'Apology'  he  contrasts  the 
covetousness and greed of  the ordinary man with the liberality 
of  the Christian.  He says of  the Christians, that they brought 
what  they  possessed  into  a  common stoclr  and  shared  with 
every one in need.l  Justin Martyr again suggests the phrase of 
the Acts.  In the third  century St Cyprian  quotes  the narra- 
tive of  the Acts, and commenting on it says, that such conduct 
is  that of  the true sons  of  God, the imitators of  God.  God$ 
gifts are given to all mankind, the day enlightens  all, the sun 
shines upon  all, the rain  falls and the wind  blows upon all, to 
all men comes sleep, the splendour of  the stars and the moon 
are common to all.  Man is truly an imitator  of  God when he 
follows the equal beneficence  of  God  by  imparting to  all the 
brolherhood the good things which he posse~ses.~  Cyprian does 
i~ot  say that the Christian man  must  share  his  goods  with  all 
the brethren, but clearly he looks  on  this as the most perfect 
way.  This  gradually  became  the  common  view  of  many 
Christian  writers. 
But before  considering  the later Fathers  we  must  observe 
that other  early Christian writers  present us with a somewhat 
difYerent view  of  the  subject.  One  of  the short  treatises  of 
Clement  of  Alexandria  discusses  the  Gospel  story  of  the 
rich young ruler:  and it is both  interesting  and in~portant  to 
observe that Clement treats our Lord's  injunction to the young 
man  to go  and sell all that lie had and to give to the poor  as 
being a metapliorical saying, and as really referring to the pas- 
sions of  the  soul.  He maintains  that there  is  no  advantage 
in poverty unless it is incurred for some special ~b,ject.~  Desti- 
tution  is distracting and  harassing,  and it is much  better to 
have such a competence as will suffice for oneself  and enable a 
man  to help those  who  are in i~eed.~  Riches,  therefore, are 
'  juatill  kartyr,  First  Apol.,  xi".  St Cyprian, De Op. et  Eleem.,  25. 
Cf.  lxvii.,  and Tertullian,  Apol.,  39.  Clem. of Ales., Quis Dives Salvetur, 
I  owe  the last  two  references  to an  5-14. 
nrticle '-y  Dr Cobb  in  the 'Economic  Id., 11. 
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things which may, if rightly used, be serviceable  to  the posses- 
sor and to others, and are  not to be thrown  away.l  Clement's 
interpretation  of  our  Lord's words  is not, so far as we know, a 
cominon one, but it is of  considerable importance. 
The same general  conception  is very strongly held  by Lac- 
tantius.  He discusses Plato's theory of  community of  property, 
and very emphatically repudiates it as impossible  and unjust, 
and urges  that justice  is not  a  matter  of  external  condition 
but of  the soul.2  It  is not property that must be abolished, but 
pride and insolence.  If the rich would lay these aside it would 
make no difference though one man were rich and another 
In  another passage  he discusses the poetical conception  of  the 
Golden  or Saturnian Age.  He looks upon this as no  poetical 
fiction, but a  condition  of  things which really existed and out 
of  which men passed  by reason of  sin and the loss  of  the true 
religion.  Lactantius,  that  is, formally  accepts  that theory  of 
the state of  nature which we have already considered ; but it is 
very noticeable  that he refuses to accept the poetical concep- 
tion of  a complete community of  goods in that age.  He main- 
tains  6hat  we  must  take  this  as  a  poetical  metaphor.  He 
cannot think that even in that age there was  no  such thing as 
private  property,  but  only  that  men  were  so  generous  and 
kindly  that no one was  in want.4 
What are we  to conclude  as  to  the position  of  the earlier 
Fathers with respect to the institution of  property ?  We must 
first  observe  that  their  whole  thought  is  dominated  by  the 
sense of  the claims of  the brotherhood.  Whatever may be  the 
further significance of  tl~e  narrative of  the Acts and the phrases 
of  '  Barnabas ' and the '  Teaching of  the Twelve Apostles,'  this 
at least  is  clear,  that the Christian  societies  recognised  that 
every member had a  claim  upon the others for that which was 
necessary  for  his  maintenance.  Behind  this,  however,  there 
lies a question more difficult to answer, Did the first Christian 
teachers and societies, or any of  then], think that property was 
in  itself  unlawful  or  improper  for  the  true  Christian?  It 
should,  perhaps,  be  observed  here  that  the  very  important 
phrases  of  '  Barnabas'  and the 'Teaching'  are drawn  from  a 
l Clem. of Ales., 14.  Lact., Div. Inst., iii. 21.  Id., iii. 22.  4 Id., v.  5. 
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common  source,  to  which  the name  of  'Two Ways' has  been 
given, and that it has been argued that this work was  a Jewish 
manual  of  moral  discipline.  The phrases  in the Acts  have  a 
very similar ring.  It may be  suggested, then, that the notion 
that the perfect life was  that of  a  society in which  all shared 
equally with  their  brethren  all that  they had, was  one  which 
belonged  to some  form of  the  later Judaism;  and  so  passed 
into  the  Church. 
It is just  possible  that  there  may have  existed within  the 
Church  a  tendency to think  that among  Christian men  there 
should  be  no  private  property.  But what  we  know  of  the 
historical conditions of  the early Christian societies  compels us 
also to recognise  that this conception was not carried  out into 
practice, so far as we know, in any community, not  even in the 
community at Jerusalem.  It would, however, seem  as  though 
there  may very early have  grown up in the  Christian  societies 
a  theory  that, while it was  perfectly lawful  for  the Christian 
man to hold  property, to give  all that one had to the common 
funds of  the society was the more perfect way.  This is not, in- 
deed, a view which was universally held.  Clement of  Alexandria 
and  Lactantius, as we  have  seen, exhibit no special inclination 
towards it, but it seems to underlie the phrases of  St Cyprian, 
it was  developed  by  two  of  the  most  influential  of  Western 
Christian writers,  St Jerome  and  St A~gustine,~  commenting 
on our Lord's words to tlle rich yoang ruler, and it formed part 
of  that theory of  the ascetic life as the more perfect way which 
dominates so mucl1 of  Western thought in the Middle Ages. 
Wlien we turn to the later Fathers we find  that their theory 
of  property is closely  connected  with  the same general philo- 
sophical system as that which governs the rest of  their political 
theories.  In the first place, it seems quite clear that they recog- 
nise that private property is in no way evil if  it is rightly used. 
St Augustine  maintains  this  dogmatically  against  the Mani- 
ch~ans.  Who does not understand, he says, that it is not blame- 
worthy  to  have  such  things  (i.e.,  property  of  various  kinds), 
but  only  to love  them, to  put one's  hope  in  them,  to prefer 
l It may be conjectured that  this was  St Jerome, Ep. cxxx. 14. 
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them to, or  even  to  compare them with truth, justice, wisdom, 
faith, a  good conscience, with love to God and our  neighbours.l 
The same view  could  be  illustrated  from  the other  Christian 
writers, as being the nornlal judgnient of  tlie Christian Churcl~.~ 
Whatever doubt may be entertained as to some primitive Chris- 
tians, there is no doubt about the formal judgment  of  the de- 
veloped  society.  But when  we have recognised  this fact, we 
must  also  observe  that  this  merely  means  that  tlie  Church 
accepted  the  institution  of  property  as  being  in  accordance 
with the actual conditions of  life, just  as it accepted the in- 
stitution  of  slavery or coercive  governlnent : it does  not  mean 
that the Church c,onsidered private property to belong  to the 
natural or primitive condition  of  human life.  It is  true that 
the Fathers deal with this question  in the most  incidental and 
partial manner, and that it is therefore  difficult to express our- 
selves very dogmatically about the theory which lies behind their 
references, but we think that the best  interpretation of  these is 
that they thought that in the primitive  state all things were 
common,-that  it is not the law of  God  but that of  the State 
which directly gives this thing to one man and that to another. 
This view  is more  clearly  expressed  by  St Ambrose  than 
by any other writer.  We may first consider  a very iilteresting 
and  well-known  passage  in  his  treatise  'De  Officiis.'  St 
Ambrose roundly says that private  property  is not  by nature; 
nature only produced a coinmon  right, use and habit produced 
private  right; nature  gave all things to all  men.3  We must 
l  St Augustine,  Contra  Adin~antum 
Manichsi  Discipulum,  xx.  2 : "  Quis 
hic  non  intelligat  non  esse  culpabile 
habere ista,  sed amare et spem in  eis 
ponere,et ea prsferre aut  etiam conferre 
veritati, justitis, sapientice, fidei, bona 
conscientis, charitati  Dei  et proximi, 
quibus  omnibus  anima  pia  dives  est 
in secretis suis coram  oculis  Dei." 
2 Cf.  St Hilary  of  Poitiers,  Com. 
on Matt. xix. 9 ;  St  Ambrose, Ep. lxiii. 
92 ; Salvian,  Ad  Ecclesiam,  i.  7 ; St 
Aug., De Moribus Eccl.  Cath., i.  35. 
3 St  Ambrose, De Off., i. 28, 'l Deinde 
formam  justitia:  putaverunt,  ut  quia 
communia, id est, publica  pro  publicie 
habeat,  privata  pro  suis.  iSe  hoc 
quidem  secundum  naturam,  natura 
enim  omnia  omnibus  in  commune 
profudib.  Sic  enim  Deus  generari 
jussit  omnia  ut pastus onlllibus  com- 
munis  esset,  et terra  foret  omniunl 
quzedam  possessio.  Natura  igitur jus 
commune generavit, usurpatio jus fecit 
privatum.  Quo in loco aiunt placuisse 
Stoicis, quae  in terris gignantur, omnia 
ad  usus  hominum  creari ; homines 
autem homiuum  causa  esse generatos, 
ut ipsi inter se aliis prodesse  possint. 
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not understand  this as n~eaning  that property is unlawful, but 
only that it is not a natnral or primitive institution.  St Am- 
brose  here, as throughout  his  treatise, is  largely dependent on 
Cicero's  treatise  of  the  same  name, and  we  may  be  fairly 
certain that Cicero's words, "  Sunt autem privata rlulla natura," 1 
are the text which he is amplifying.  It  is riot very easy to give 
any very definite meaning to Cicero's phrase : that of  St  Ambrose 
is a good deal easier, for, as we have seen, by his time the theory 
of  the state of nature as contrasted with  the state of  conven- 
tional  institutions  had  become  a  conirnonplace  of  Christian 
political  theory. 
Another  passage  from St Ambrose  will  perhaps  make  the 
matter clearer.  God meant, lie says, the world to be  the common 
possession  of  all men, and to produce  its fruits for all; it was 
avarice  which  produced  the  rights  of  property.  It is only 
just, therefore, that a  mau should  support the poor with some 
share  of  that which was meant for all mankind.2  St Ambrose 
here  comes  very  near  indeed  to  the  form  of  Seneca's  state- 
ment  of  the  origin  of  property,  namely,  that it arose  from 
and we  feel that we  can  hardly  be  wrong  in looking 
upon  the  foundation  of  St Ambrose's  theory  of  property  as 
being  the same as that of  Seneca.  With St Ambrose's  view 
may  be  very  well  compared  that  of  Ambrosiaster.  In one 
passage  he treats charity as St Ambrose  does, as being  an act 
of justice,-for  God,  he says, gives all things  in common  to 
all  men.4 
l Cicero, De Off., i.  7. 
a  St Amb.,  Com.  on  PS.  cxviii.  8. 
22 : ''  Cum  prssertim  Dominus  Deus 
lloster  terram  hanc  possessionem 
omnium  hominum  voluit  esse  com- 
munem,  et  fructus  omnibus  minis- 
hare ; sed avaritia  possessionum  jura 
diitribuit.  Justum  est  igitur  ut  si 
aliquid  tibi  privatum  vindicas,  quod 
generi  humano,  immo  omnibus  ani- 
mantibus  in  commune  collatum  est, 
saltem  aliquid  iude  pauperibus  as- 
llergas ; ut quibus  juris  tui  consor- 
tium debes, his alimenta non deaeges." 
Cf. also St  Amb., De Off.,  i.  11. 
a  Sen., Ep. xiv. 2.  See p.  24. 
Ambrosiaster,  Corn.  on  2  Cor.  ix. 
9,  &c. : "  Misericordia  ergo  hac (i.e., 
almsgiving  to the poor),  justitia  ap- 
pellata  est ; quia  sciens  qui  largitur, 
onlnia  Deum  cornmuniter  omnibus 
dare,  quia  sol  enim  oritur,  et pluit 
omnibus;  et terram  omnibus  dedit ; 
idcirco  dividit  cum  eis,  qui copiam 
terrae  non  habent;  ne  beneficiis  Dei 
privati  videantur.  Justus  ergo  est, 
qui  sibi  soli  non  detinet,  quod  scit 
omnibus  datum ; et justus non solum 
hoc  in  tempore, sed  et in sternum; 
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St Zeno of  Verona, a writer  of  the latter part of  the fourth 
century, might perhaps be taken to illustrate an almost dogmatic 
theory  of  the propriety  of  some  system  of  communism:  he 
is,  indeed,  speaking  mainly  of  a  community of  goods  among 
Christians, founding this upon  the passage  in the Acts which 
we  have  already examined,  but it must  be  observed  that the 
latter words  of  the passage  extend his conception to mankind 
at 1arge.l  We think, however, that St Zeno is speaking prim- 
arily in a practical sense-that  he wishes to put in the strongest 
possible way the obligation  of  charity and active benevolence: 
he  certainly  puts  the  matter  in  a  very  strong way,  for  he 
continues,  after  the  passage  we  have  quoted  in  the  note,  to 
say that the obligation to give  to those  who need  is not to be 
limited even by the duty of  providing for a man's  own family. 
With these views we must compare those of  St Gregory the 
Great.  In  one passage he deals with private property in much 
the same  spirit  as St Anlbrose  and  Ambrosiaster.  He treats 
the earth and its products  as the gifts of  God to all men, and 
therefore regards almsgiving as an act of  justice, not of  charity. 
It  is evident that he does  not  regard  private property  itself as 
wrong, but, on the other hand, he  does  not seem to regard it as 
an absolute right.  On the contrary, if  a  man  uses it only for 
himself, he regards his action as ~njust.~ 
secum  in  perpetuum.  . . . Omnia 
Dei  sunt, et semina  et nascentia  Dei 
nutu  cre~cunt,  et multiplicantur  ad 
usus hominum ;  Deus ergo qui hac  dat, 
ipse  et jubet  de  his  corumunicari  eis 
qui  indigent.  . . . Hec est  justitia, 
ut quia  Deus dat, retribuat ex eo  et 
homo  ei, cui deest." 
l St Zeno  of  Verona,  Trsctatus,  i. 
3. 6 : " Sed,  inquies,  justum  est,  ut 
mea servem, aliena non quaiarn.  Hoc 
etiam Gentes diccre consueverunt.  Ce- 
terum apud Deum quam sit injustum, 
mos videbimus.  Nunc primo omuiurn, 
optime Chi istiane, scire cupio, qus  sunt 
tua cum  sint tinlentibus  Deum  uni- 
versa  communia,  sicut  scriptum  est : 
'  Turba autem eorum, qui crediderant, 
animo ac mente una agebaut '  (Acts iv. 
32), nec fuit inter illos discrimen ullum, 
'  nec quidquam suum  ex bonis putabant, 
qua eis  erant ; sed  erant illis  omnia 
communia,'  sicut dies, sol, nox, pluvia, 
nascendi atque moriendi conditio ;  qu~ 
hunlano generi, sine personarum aliqua 
esceptione, equablliter justitia  est div- 
ina largita.  Cum  11rec  ita sint, procul 
dubio non est a Tyranno di~similis,  qui 
solus habet, quod potest prodesse com- 
modis plurinlorum." 
St  Gregory  the  Great,  Idber 
Regulle  Pastoralis,  iii.  21 :  ' Admon- 
endi sunt qui nec  aliena  appetunt, nec 
sua largiuntur, ut sciant sollicite quod 
ea de  qua sumti sunt, cunctis homiuibus 
terra communis est, et  idcirco alimenta 
quoque  omnibus  communiter  profel t. 
Incassum  ergo  se innocentes  putant, 
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We  should  suggest  that  in  this  conception we  have  the 
beginnings of a distinction which became very important in the 
Middle Ages,  and is very  carefully drawn  out  by St Thomas 
A~uinas-the  distinction between property as a  right of  distri- 
bution,  and property  as a  right  of  personal  use.  St Thomas 
holds  that private property is not an institution  of  natural but 
of  positive law, and that the right  of  property only extends to 
the acquisition and distribution of things:  so far as their use is 
concerned, men are bound to treat them as things pertaining to 
all.  A man has the right to use what he needs, and St Thomas 
does not take this in any narrow sense, but beyond  this a man 
only  holds  his  property  for  the  common  use?  We  should 
suggest  that the passages  of  the Fathers which we  have just 
exanlined  show  us  the germs  out  of  which  this theory  grew. 
Property is not primitive but conventional ; it is  not therefore 
illegitimate, but, on  the other  hand, it is not  an unrestricted 
right:  the  circumstances  of  the world  and of  human  nature 
may make it necessary that men  should take things to them- 
selves from the common stock, but they do this suiject to the 
responsibility of  using all that they do not themselves need, for 
the common benefit. 
St Augustine does  not deal directly with the question of  the 
primitive conditions with regard to property.  But he furnishes 
us  with  a  number  of  very  important  observations  on  the 
immediate  source  of  this right.  His theory of  property is for 
the most  part developed  somewhat  incidentally in his  defence 
qui commune Dei munus sibi privatum 
vindicant ;  qui cum accepta non tribu- 
unt, in proximorum  nece  grassantur ; 
quia tot pene quotidie  perimunt, quot 
morientiurn  pauperum  apud se  sub- 
sidia absconclunt.  Nam  curn quelibet 
necessaria  incligcntibus  ministramus, 
sua  illis  reddimus,  non  nostra  larg- 
imur ; justitia:  debitum potius  solvi- 
mus,  quam  misericordiie  opera  im- 
plemus.  Unde et ipsa Veritas cum cle 
misericordiacaute  exhibendaloqueretur, 
sit,  'Attendite  ne  justitiam  vestram 
faciatis coram haminibus.'  Cui quoque 
selltelltia: etiam Psalmists  concinnens 
dicit : '  Dispersit dedit pauperibus, jus- 
titia  ejus  manet  in  zternum.'  Cum 
enim largitatem impensam  pauperibus 
pramisisset,  non  hanc  vvcare  miseri- 
cordiam  sed  justitiam  maluit ; quia 
quod  a  communi  Domino  tribuitur, 
juatum  profecto  est,  ut  quicunque 
accipiunt, eocommuiliterutantur.  IJuic 
etiam  Salomon  ait,  '  Qui  justus  est, 
tribuet et non cessabit.' " 
l  Cf. Notes in Econ.  Review,  Janu- 
ary  1894,  by R.  W.  Carlyle,  "Some 
Economic  Doctrines  of  St  Thomaa 
Aquinas." 
Cf.  especially  St  Thos.  Aquinaa 
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of  the confiscation  of  the  churches  and  other  possessions  of 
the  Donatists  in  Africa  by  the  Imperial  Government.  It 
would  seem, from  his  allusioi~s  to their complaints, that they 
protested  that  these  confiscations  were  unjust,  and  perhaps 
even  that  they  were  outside  the powers  of  the Government. 
His reply  to their  contentions is founded  upon  the following 
arguments.  Property, he says, may be considered  as an insti- 
tution of  the divine law or of  the human law.  By the divine 
law property is either all in the hands of  God, for  "the earth 
is the Lord's  and the fulness thereof,"  or else all things belong 
to  the  righteous,  and  the Donatists  are  not  righteous.  By 
human  law property  belongs  to  this  or  that individual,  but 
what  human  law has  given  human  law  can  take  away.  St 
Augustine  also maintains that the right  of  property is limited 
by the use  to which it is put: the nlan who  does  not use his 
property  rightly  has no real  claim  to it.l 
l St  Augustine, Epist., xciii. xi. : "  Et  Vultis legamus  leges  imperatorum, et 
quanlvis res qusque terrena non recte  secundum ipsas  agamus  de villis.  Si 
a quoquam possideri possit, nisi vel jure  jure humano vultis possidere, recitemus 
divino, quo cuncta justorum  sunt, vel  leges imperatorum :  videamus si volue- 
jure humano, quod in potestate regum  runt  aliquid  ab  hsreticis  possideri. 
est terrae;  ideoque res vestras falso ap-  Sed quid mihi est imperator l  Secun- 
pelletis,  quas  nec  justi  possidetis,  et  dum jus ipsius possides terram.  Aut 
secundum  leges  regum  terrenorum  tolle jura  imperatorum, et quis  audet 
amittere jussi estis,  frustraque dicatis  dicere : mea  est illa villa, aut meus esh 
'nos eis congregandis laboravimus,' cum  ille  servus,  aut domus llec mea  est  ? 
~criptum  legatis,  '  Laborcs  impiorum  Si autem ut telleantur  ista ab homin- 
justi  edent "'  (Prov.  xiii.  22).  ibus,  jura  acceperunt  regum,  vultis 
Tract. vi. in Joannis Evangelium, 25 :  recitemus leges,  ut gaudeatis quia vel 
"  Ecce  sunt villa: : quo jure  defendis  unum hortum habetis, et non imputetis 
villas ?  divino  an  humano ?  Iiespon-  nisi  mansuetudini  columbs,  quia  vel 
deant : Divinum  jus  in  Scripturis  ibi  vobis  permittitur  permanere ? 
habemus,  humanum  jus  in  legibus  Leguntur  enim  leges  manifests,  ubi 
regum.  Unde  quisque  possidet  quod  przceperunt  imperatores, eos qui prs- 
possidet ?  Nonne jure Ilumano ?  Kam  ter  Ecclesiz  Catllolicre communionem 
jure divino, Domini esL  terra et pleui-  usurpant sibi nomen  Christianum, nec 
tudo  ejus : pauperes  et divites  Deus  voluut  in  pace  colere  pacis  auctorem, 
de  uno  limo  fecit,  et pauperes  et  nihil  nomine  Ecclesirc  audeant  possi- 
divites  una  terra  supportat.  Jure  dere. 
tamen  humano  dicit,  Het  villa  mea  26 :  "  Sed quid nobis et imperatori ? 
est,  hrec  domus  mea,  hic  servus  Sed jam  dixi, de jure  humano agitur. 
meus  est.  Jure ergo  humane,  jure  Et tamen Apostolus voluit serviri reg- 
imperatorum.  Quare ?  Quia ilxa jura  ibus,  voluit  honorari  reges,  et dixit 
humana  per  imperatores  et  leges  '  Regem  rere~emini!  Noli  dicere : 
szculi Deus  distribuit gene~i  humano.  Quid  mihi  et regi?  Quid  tibi  ergo 
It is clear  from these statements that St Augnstine regards 
property as normally an institution of  human and positive law. 
His distinction between the j~u  diviwcnz and the jzcs  huntantcm 
is not indeed the same as that between thejus nntu~ale  and the 
jus  civile, but at least  it is parallel to it, and it suggests to us 
very strongly that St Augnstine recognises  no proper right in 
things except that which  is given  by the State.  This view is 
by no means on the same lines as that  of  the lawyers, who re- 
garded some form of  private  property as being by natural law: 
he does not indeed  contradict the legal theory of  "  occupation " 
and the right which can  be  acquired  in the res nzcllizcs by him 
who "occupies"  it,l  but his phrases suggest that this theory is 
not at all in his mind.  Incidentally it is interesting to observe 
in the passage first quoted that the Donatists are represented as 
urging  an  argument  very  analogous to that  on  which  Locke 
founds his theory of  property, namely, that they had  acquired 
their  property  by  labour.  St Augustine  brushes  this  aside 
unsympathetically by an  appeal to the Scripture, which  says 
that the just  shall devour  the labour of  the wicked. 
et possessioni?  Per jura  regum pos- 
sidentur  possessiones.  Dixisti,  quid 
mihi  et  regi?  Noli  dicere  posses- 
siones  tuas ; quia  ad  ipsa  jura  hu- 
mana  renuntiasti,  quibus  possiden- 
tur possessiones.  Sed de  divino jure 
ago, ait.  Ergo Evangelium recitemus : 
videamus quo usque  Ecclesia Catholics 
Christi est, super quem venit columbo 
quae  docuit; :  'Hic  est  qui  baptizat.' 
Quomodo ergo jure divino possideat qui 
dicit, Ego baptizo :  curn dicat columba 
'Hic  est  qui  baptizat,'  cum  dicat 
Scriptura 'Una eat; columba mea,  una 
est matri suz.'  Quare, laniasti colum- 
bam ?  Imo  laniastis  viscera  vestra : 
nam  vobis  laniatis,  columbs  integra 
perseverat.  Ergo fratres mei, si ubique 
non habent quod dicant, ego dico quod 
faciant :  veniant  ad  Catholicam,  et 
nobiscum  habebunt non solum terram, 
set1 etiam  illurn  qoi  fecit  ccelum  et 
terram." 
Epist.,  cliii.  6 : 'l Jamvero  si  pru- 
denter  intueamur  quid  scriptum  est. 
'  Fidelis hominis totus mundua diviti- 
arum est, infidelis  autem nec obolus ;  ' 
nam omnes qui sibi videntur  gaudere 
licite  conquisitis,  eisque  uti nesciunt, 
aliena  possidexe  convincimus ?  Hoc 
enim certe alienum  non est, quod jure 
possidetur ;  hoc autem jure quod juste, 
et hoc juste  quod bene.  Omne igitur 
quod  male  possidetur,  alienum  est ; 
male  autem possidet  qui male utitur. 
(Cf. St  Isid. of  Seville, Etym., v. 25.) 
Sermo, L.  c.  2. ; "Aurum  ejus pro- 
prium est, qui ill0 bene utitur, adeoque 
verius est Dei.  Illius  eat ergo aurum 
et argenturn,  qui  novit  uti  auro eh 
argento.  Nam etiam inter ip-OS  homi- 
nes, tunc quisque habere aliquid diceu- 
dus est, quando bene utitur.  Nam quod 
juste non troctat, jure non tenet.  Quod 
autem  jure  non  tenet,  si  suum  esse 
dicerit, non  erit vox  justi  possessoris, 
sed impudentis incubatoris improbitas." 
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We  think that when we consider St Augustine's treatment of 
property  alongside  of  that especially  of  St Ambrose,  we  may 
feel fairly confident that they represent a tradition which differs 
materially from that of  the jurists, a tradition probably derived 
from the same sources as the view of  Seiieca-that  is, that they 
would, with Seneca, have classed  the institution of  property as 
one  of  those  which  belong  to  the  conventions  of  organised 
society, and not to the primitive conditions of  the human race. 
At the same time, it must be  observed  that St Augustine's 
views  on  the limitation  of  the rights of  property, by  the use 
to  which  it  is  put,  finds  a  parallel  in a  phrase  of  Gaius, 
treating  of  the limitation  of  the rights  of  masters  over  their 
slaves : " Male enim nostro jure uti non debemus,"l--a  phrase 
repeated  in slightly  different  terms  by  the compilers  of  Jus- 
tinian's  Institutes: "Expedit  enim  reipublics, ne  quis re sua 
male  utatur.jJ2  St Augustine's  phrases,  however,  are  much 
wider  in  scope,  and indicate  a  much  more  developed  theory 
than  those  of  the lawyers.  We think  that this is to be  con- 
nected with the theory of  St Ambrose  and other Fathers, that 
the things of  the world do not cease to be held for the common 
good, because  it is now  lawful for  particular  persons  to hold 
them as their own  private  property, and that this conception 
finally  takes  a  definite  form in  the  distinction  between  the 
right of  property as an authority in distribution  and the right 
of  property as one of unlimited use. 
We are now in a position to examine the meaning and signif- 
icance of the references to the theory of  property in St Isidore 
of Seville.  We  have  already discussed his definition of  the jzts 
nnturale ;  we must now recall the words of this : "  Jus  naturale 
est  commune  onlnium  nationum,  et  quod  ubique  instirictu 
naturze,  non  constitutione aliqua  habetur; ut viri eb  femins 
conjunctio, liberorum susceptio et educatio, conlmunis omnium 
possessio, et omnium una libertas,  adquisitio eorum qu~  ccelo 
terra marique  capiuntur.  Item deposit=  rei vel commendatae 
pecuni~  restitutio, violentie per vim repulsio.  Nam hoc aut 
si quid huic simile est, numquam injustun~,  sed naturale aequum- 
que  habet~r."~  What  does  St Isidore  mean  by "comrnunis 
l  Gaius, Insb., i. 53.  '  InaQ.,  i. 8. 2.  St lsido~e  of  Seville, Etym ,v.  4. 
omnium possessio"?  In the  Middle  Ages  he was  no  doubt 
taken as meaning the common possession  of  all things ;  l  and if 
that interpretation  is correct, St Isidore  sets forth  in technical 
language  the  theory  that  by  natural  law  all  things  were 
comInon, and there  was  no  private  property.  But it  is not 
quite certain  whether  this is the correct  interpretation of  the 
The  words can  be  taken  to  mean  simply that by the 
law of nature there is  a  form  of  property common to all men. 
This would not necessarily exclude torms of  property belonging 
to groups of  men or to individuals. 
It is not very easy to determine which interpretation is the 
correct one.  The nearest parallels to St Isidore's  phrase are to 
be  found  in the Digest  and the Institutes; in the former  we 
have  Marcianus's  phrase : " Qu~dam  naturali jure  communia 
sunt ornnium, quzdam universitatis, qu~dam  nullius, pleraque 
sing~lorum."~  Here the phrase  itself  makes it clear  that the 
genitive omnizbm is possessive ; certain things are common to all. 
In the Institutes  3 we have Marcianus's  phrase repeated  with a 
few  variations,  and throughout  the discussion  of  property  we 
find the genitive case used in the same sense-e.g.,  "  Communia 
sunt omnium hzc  " ; "  Singulorum autem hominum multis modis 
res  fiunt."  As far, then, as the  grammatical  construction  is 
concerned, the precedents in legal phraseology  seem to point to 
the genitive case in St Isidore's  phrase as being possessive.  It 
must  be  observed,  however,  that  the  legal  phrases  are  not 
absolutely parallel : commzbnis is not  connected  with possessio.  . 
But,  further, St Isidore goes  on to  mention  certain  methods 
of  acquiring  property,  "  Acquisitio  eoruni  quae  ccelo,  terra, 
marique,  capiuntur," *  and  certain  moral  rules  which  only 
exist  in a  condition  of  things  where  private  property exists, 
"  Depositae  rei vel  comn~endat,.e  pecunice  restitutio,"  and  all, 
it must  be  noticed,  as  belonging  to  the jzks  nattwale.  It is 
difficult to understand this, if  St Isidore means  to say that by 
natural law all property is common to all: at  the most, it Illay 
'  Cf. Gratian, Decretum, Dist. i. and  "Digest,  i.  8. 2. 
vili.,  and Alexander  of  Hales, Summa,  3  Inst., 11  1. 
part  ui.  Qusst.  xxvi ;  Ifemb.  ill.,  4  Cf.  St Iyldole on "  Posaesaionefl, 
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be  suggested  that St Isldore  is inconsistent with  himself, and 
tliat it  is idle to expect a  thorough and completely thought- 
out  explanation  of  the subject  from  him.  It must  also  be 
observed  that St Isidore  in  his  definition  of  the jzis  gentium 
does  not  indicate  that  private  property  belongs  to it, as  he 
does. for instance, with  regard to slavery, and that there is no 
reference to property in his definition of  thejus civi1e.l 
It seems to us that for the present we  must take it as uncer- 
tain  whether  St Isidore  follows  the tradition  of  the Fathers 
and the Stoics in thinking that private  property is not an insti- 
tution of  the natural law, or the general tradition of  the lawyers 
that  even  by  the natural law some  things  belonged  to indi- 
viduals.  The  general  tendency  of  the  Fathers is,  we  think, 
clear, and in the l~istory  of political theory this is the important 
point. for we  are thus able  to  discover  the origin  of  the dog- 
matic and developed mediaeval theory. 
We can  now look  back  over  certain  general  characteristics 
of  pntristic political theory, arid we  think it has become plain 
that  this  turns  upon  the  distinction  between  the  primitive 
or  natural  state, with its natural  law and institutions, and the 
actual state, with  its conventional institutions adapted  to the 
new  characteristics and circumstances of  human  nature  and 
life. 
With regard  to the theory of  human equality and the insti- 
tution of  slavery, the theory of  coercive  government,  and the 
theory of  property, we  have  seen  that the patristic view turns 
upon this distinction between the natural and primitive, and the 
conventional and actual.  Neither slavery, nor government, nor 
property  are institutions  of  the natural  law, and they did  not 
exist in the natural state.  There was a time when men were in- 
nocent-when,  therefore, these institutions did  not  exist, when 
they were  not  needed.  Out  of  those  conditions men  passed 
through  sin, their nature was  changed  and corrupted, avarice, 
hatred, and the lust of  domitiation possessed them.  New insti- 
tutions, founded in some measure upon these vices, were needed 
to  correct  these  same  vices.  Slavery  and  government  and 
l  St Iaidore of Seville, Etym., v.  6  and 5. 
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private property are institutions arising  from  the vicious  tend- 
encies  of  human  nature,  as it is,  but they  are  also  the  in- 
struments by which  these vices  are corrected.  The state and 
condition of  nature is by the Fathers identified with  the state 
and condition of  urifallen man. 
It is  evident,  we  think,  that  under  some  difference  of 
the  Fathers  are  really  carrying  on  the  same 
theory  as tliat of  the Stoics as represented  by  Seneca.  The 
relation  of  this to the political theory of  the lawyers  is more 
complex,  but  it is  clear  that  they  are  related,  and  that,  in 
some measure  at least, it is justifiable  to  explain the two sys- 
tems by comparing them with each  other.  We think  that the 
fact that the entire patristic theory turns upon the distinction 
between the natural  and the conventional state, expressed  in- 
deed under the terms of  the theological conception  of  the Fall, 
but  obviously reflecting, not  any exclusively Christian concep- 
tion, but rather some widespread  assumption  of  popular philos- 
ophy, encourages us in thinking that llie sanle type of  thought 
lies behind the obscurer references of  the lawyers 
It appears to us that it is correct to say that in considering 
the  meaning  of  justice  in  human  life  tliese  thinkers  found 
themselves colnpelled  to recognise  that there was  an apparent 
inconsistency between some  of  the great institutions of  society 
and that natnral or essential  equality of  humau nature which 
they  had  learned  from  their  experience  of  the  universal 
empires.  Slavery, therefore, which Aristotle  could  explain by 
a  theory  which  was  at least  in many  respects  reasonable,  to 
them  was  a  real difficulty, and what they thought of  slavery 
would  naturally  extend itself  to  government.  On  the  other 
hand,  they  recognised  instinctively,  if  we  may  use  such  a 
phrase,  that  human  life,  as  it  actually  is,  needs  discipline, 
needs  an  order  enforced  by  coercion.  And  thus  they came 
to make a distinction between  an ideal, which  they think of as 
also  the primitive  condition  of  man, and the actual.  Ideally, 
man, following his truest nature, obeying the laws of  reason and 
justice,  which  he always, in  some  measure,  recognises, would 
have  needed  no  such  coercive discipline.  13ut, being what he 
is,  a  creature wl~ose  Lrue  iustincts  and  nature  ale collstantly 
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overpowered by his lower nature, it is only by means of  a hard 
discipline that he can be kept from an anarchy and disorder  in 
which all men would  be reduced to an equal level of  misery and 
degradation.  Their theory is properly a justification  of  coercive 
government,  but,  naturally enough, the  institntion  of  slavery 
being actually in existence, alid appearing, as it must  naturally 
have done to them, to be essential to the whole  fabric of  civil- 
ised  life,  they  interpreted  it  as  another  form  of  discipline. 
Private  property  also,  with  its  enormous  inequalities,  they 
could  not  accept  as a primitive  and natural institution.  In a 
primitive  or  natural  state the rigltts  of  property  could  have 
been  nothing  more  than the right  to use  that which  a  man 
required.  But again, in face of  the actual condition of  human 
nature,  in view  of  the avaricious  and  covetous  tendencies  of 
human nature as it actually is, they found that a formal regula- 
tion of  the exercise of  the right to use was necessary.  Private 
property  is really  another disciplinary institution intended  to 
check  and counteract the vicious  dispositions of  men. 
The thinkers of  this pl~ilosopl~ical  tendency, then, find a just 
nieaning  in the great  institutions  of  human  society,  human 
nature being  what  it actually  is,  but  they conceive  of  these 
institutions  as being  dominated  by  the end which they serve. 
They  are intended  to correct  the vicious  dispositions  of  men. 
They are  only justified  as  far  as they actually do  this.  The 
equality  of  human  nature  still dominates all just order.  All 
institutions  must  be  reconciled  with  this  in  some  sense. 
Government  is  intended  to  correct  the  evil  tendencies  of 
man, but  should  respect  his  true qualities.  Slavery  is jus- 
tifiable  as a  necessary  discipline  of  human  life, but  the man 
continues in the slave.  The institution of  private proporty is 
necessary  to  reduce  the  contradictory claims  of  men  to some 
order, but the good  things  of  the world  are still intended  for 
the use  of all.  The  theory  of  Natural  Law  and the Natural 
State is then  partly a  theory of  the origin  of  human  life  and 
institutions, but it is also a theory of  the principles of  justice, 
by which  all the actual  institutions of  life are to be tested and 
corrected. 
CHAPTER  XIII. 
THE  SACRED  AUTHORITY  OF  THE  RULER. 
WE have now to consider  the theory of  the nature and imme- 
diate source of  authority in the Christian writers.  We have 
seen  that in their view  the institution of  Government is not 
primitive, but is made necessary by the vices of  human  nature. 
But Government is a  divine  institution,  a  divine  remedy  for 
man's sin, and the ruler is  the representative of  God, and must 
be  obeyed  in the name  of  God.  It will  be  easily understood 
that the conception was capable of  a development which should 
make the king or ruler the absolute and irresponsible representa- 
tive of  God, who derives his authority directly from God, and is 
accountable  to  God  alone  for  his  actions.  This  conception, 
which  in later  times became  the formal theory of  the Divine 
Right of  the monarch,  was, as we think, first drawn out  and 
stated  by  some  of  the  Fathers, notably  by  St  Gregory  the 
Great.  It must  at the  same  time  be  observed  that  such  a 
concll~sion  was  not  necessary,  nor  was  it at first  actually  de- 
veloped.  The  actual  tendencies  of  the patristic  theories  are 
very  complex; we  can very clearly see  how the theory of  the 
Divine  Right  arose  out  of  the general  theory  of  the sacred 
character  of  the civil  order, but there  are many other tenden- 
cies  in the  political  theory of  the Fathers, and some  of  their 
phrases  and  theories  became  in  later  times  of  the  greatest 
inlportance  in counteracting  the arguments  of  the  absolutist 
thinkers. 
We begin  by  examining the  development  in  the Christian 
writers  of  the theory of  the authority of  the civ~l  ruler, as the 
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the  strong  phrases  used  by  the  early  Christian  writers  to 
express their sense  of  the duty of  obedience  to  the civil ruler. 
We referred  to  the words of  Tlieophilns of  Antioch, in which, 
while  repudiating  the  worship  of  the  king,  he acknowledges 
that Government is in some sense cominitted  to him  by  God, 
and that Christian inell  will  therefore  honour and obey 11irn.l 
We should observe that Ireneus, with whose  discussion  of  the 
origin and object of  Government we dealt fully, makes a state- 
ment with regard to civil rulers which is of  great importance in 
relation to certain developmerits of  the later theory.  He has 
pointed  out that God  has  given  men  rulers  as a  remedy  for 
man's  sin  and vice,  but  he  adds  that  often  God  gives  men 
evil rulers to punish their  wickednem2  The ruler  is not only 
the minister of  God's remedy for sin, but the instrument of  His 
punishments.  We  may doubt  whether  Irensus had  in  his 
mind  the conclusions  whicll  might  be  and  ultimately  were 
connected with this view, but it is at least important to observe 
its appearance  thus early in Christian  theory.  St Optatus of 
Milevis, in his treatise on the Donatist schism in North Africa, 
expresses  the conception,  that the  ruler  is  the representative 
of  God,  in a  still more  explicit  fashion.  It appears  from  a 
passage  in  this  treatise  that  when  the  Imperial  authority 
interfered  on behalf  of  the Catholic party,  the leader of  the 
Donatists  indignantly  protested  that  the  Emperor  had  no 
concern  with  Church  affairs.  St Optatus  replies  by  urging 
St Paul's  commands  to  Christian men, that they  should offer 
up prayers for  kings  and those in authority, and asserts that 
the Empire  is  not  in  the  Church,  but  the  Church  in  the 
Empire, anci  that there is no one  over  the Emperor but God 
only, who  made  him Ei~iperor.~ 
1 Theophilus  of  Antioch,  Ad  Aut., 
1.  11. 
Vreneua, Adv. Her., v.  24. 
S St  Optatus of Milevis, '  De Suhibnla 
Donatistarum,'  iii.  3 : "  Qui  cunl  ad 
Donaturn,  patrem  tuum,  venirent,  et 
quare  venerant  indicarent,  illo  solito 
furore  succensus, in hzc  rerba prorupit : 
Quid  eot  imperatori cum  ecclcsid 2 ' 
. . . Jam  tunc  meditabatur,  contra 
precepta apostoli Pauli, potestatibus et 
regibus injuriam facere, pro quibus, si 
al~ostolum  audiret, quotidie rogare de- 
buerat.  Sic enim docet beatus aposto- 
lus  Paulus : '  Itogxte  pro  regibus  et 
potestatibus, ut  quietanl et  tranquillanl 
vitam cum  ipsis  ag.arnus.'  Non  enirn 
resl~ublica  est in Ecclesia, ~ed  Ecclesia 
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This theory of the ruler as the representative of  God  is most 
clearly expressed in a phrase used for the first time, as far as we 
have  been  able to see, by Ambrosiaster, if  we  may assume  the 
correctness of the identification of the author of  the '  Qoastiones 
Veteris et Novi  Testamenti,'  once  attributed  to  St Augustine, 
with the author of  the commentaries on St Paul's Epistleg, once 
attributed to St  Ambr0se.l  In  one passage lie says that the king 
is reverenced  on  earth as the "Vicar  of  God," and in another 
passage  he  draws  out  his  conception  in  a  very  curious  dis- 
tinction.  The king has "the im~ge  of  God  as the Bishop has 
that of  Christ." Ve  shall find this distinction again in Cathul- 
fos in the ninth cent,ury :  it is very interesting and curious, but 
we  do  not  pretend  to  be  able  to  interpret  it.  The  title of 
"  Vicar of  God" is important, as summing up the conception that 
the authority of  the ruler is derived from God Himself.  In  the 
Middle Ages it might mean much more than  this, but  it would 
be improper to read later conceptions into a writer of  the fourth 
in republics est, id est, in imperio Ro- 
mano; quod Libailurn appellat Christus 
in  Canticis  Canticorurn,  cum  dicit: 
'Veni,  sponsa mea, inventa de Libano,' 
ill  est,  de  imperio  Homano:  ubi  et 
sacerdotia sancta sunt, et pudicitia, et 
virginitas,  que in  barbaris  gentibus 
non  sunt; et si  esseut,  tuta esse non 
possent.  . . . 
"  Carthaginis principatum se tenuisse 
crediderat : et cum super imperatorem 
non  sit nisi  solua  deus,  qui fecit im- 
peratorem,  dum  se  Donatus  super 
irnperatorem  extollit, jam  quasi homi- 
num  excesserat  metas,  ut prope,  se 
Deum,  non  hominem  astimaret,  non 
reverelldo  eum,  qui  post  Deum  itb 
nominibus  timebatur." 
See p. 104, note 4. 
a  Ambroaiaster,  Questiones  Veteris 
et  Novi  Testamenti,  xci.  8 :  "Rex 
eninl adoratur in terris quasi vicarius 
Dei.  Christus  autem  poat  vicariam 
impleta  dispensatione  adoratur  in 
eelis et in terra." 
Xxxv. : I'Qua  ratione  David  Saul, 
Pstquam  Deus ab eo recessit. Christum 
Domini vocat, et  deferbei? Non nescius 
David  divinanl  csse  traditionem  in 
officio  ordinis regalis,  idcirco  Saul  in 
eadem adhuc traclitione positum hono- 
rificat,ne Deoinjurianl facere videretur, 
qui  his  ordinibus  honorem  decrerit. 
Dei enim imaginem habet rex, sicut et 
episcopu~  Christi.  Quamdiu  ergo  in 
ea traditione est, honorandus est, si non 
propter se, vel propter ordiuenl.  Unde 
Apostolus  omnibus  inquit,  '  Potesta- 
tibua  sublimioribus  subditi  estate. 
Non est enim potestas, nisi a Deo : que 
enim  sunt,  a  Deo  ordinatz  sunt.' 
Hinc est Gentilem, in potestate tamen 
positum,  honorificamus,  licet  ipse 
indignus sib,  qui Dei ordinem  tenens 
gratixs  agib  diabolo.  Potestas  enim 
exigit,  quia meretur  honorem.  Nam 
ideo  Pharaoni future farni~  somnium 
revelaturn  esb : et  Nabuchorlonosor, 
aliis  secum  adstantibus,  solus  filium 
Dei vidit in  camino ignis,  non  utique 
merito  suo,  qui  in  id010  se  adorari 
voluit,  sed  merito ordinis  regalis." 
Cathulfus in M. G. H.  Epist., vol. 
iv. ;  Ep.  var.  Car. Regn. Script., 7. century.  In  the last passage he also discusses tlie question of  the 
conduct of David towards Saul, ai~d  there is considerable signif- 
icance in his discussion.  He evidently thinks that the divine 
character of the office of  kingship cannot be  lost  owing  to  any 
misconduct of  the ruler.  The sanctity of  the office  gives sanc- 
tity to  any ruler, even though an idolater.  It  is clear that the 
writer is much influenced by the Jewish conception of  kingship, 
but of  this we shall have more to say presently. 
We must, however, observe  that in another of  these "Quest- 
ions" the author seems to take up a somewhat different position. 
He  evidently believes  that there  may be  a wholly evil form  of 
authority which is not from God, but it is extremely difficult to 
say what he understands this to be, and what is the test of  its 
character.  It does not appear to consist in its unjust character 
or  actions, for the  writer  says expressly that a  man sitting on 
the throne or chair of  God may oppress the innocent ; and that 
we must then say that the judgment,  but not the throne, is un- 
just.1  The  phrases  are very  obscure,  but  may  tend  in  some 
measure to qualify the judgment which we  might have founded 
on the preceding passages. 
We  have then a theory that the ruler is the representative of 
1 Ambrosiaster,  Qusst.  Vet.  et 
Novi  Test.,  cr.  5 : "  Hanc  dicimus 
cathedram  pestilentiae  quse  extra Dei 
ordinationem est,  qus ad hoc  utique 
inventa  est,  ut  inde  iniqua  exeant 
judicia : propterea pestileutie cathedra 
dicta est, qure est corruptio qure parit 
mortem,  sicut  et iniquitas  damnati- 
onem,  Non  est  ergo a  Deo  qua:  est 
cathedra mortia.  Nam Moyses accepit 
cathedram  vitre.  Ad  hoc  euim  data 
est, ut auctoritas in ea sit justi judicis 
vel creatorie Dei.  Unde dicit Dominus, 
'  Super  cathedram  Moysi  sederunt 
Scribe  et Pharisaei ' : et  Apostolus, 
'  no11 est ' inquit '  potestas nisi a Deo : 
qus  enim sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt." 
Unde dicit ad principem  plebia : '  Tu 
quidem sedes iudicans secuudurn legem 
et  contra  legem  jubes  rne  percuti.' 
Quod dixit, 'secundum legem,'  justam 
et  salutarem  cathedrs  auctoritatem 
significavit.  Illud  autem  quod  ait, 
'  contra legem jubes me percuti ' illum 
ipsum  injustum  judicem  ostendit, ut 
in  Dei  cathedra  uedens  judicaret  in- 
juste.  Hinc est unde et Daniel 'Dei 
est'  ait  'regnum,  et cui  vult  dabit 
illud.'  Sicut  ergo  terreni  impera- 
toris auctoritas currit per  omnes,  ut 
in  omnibus  ejus  sit  reverentia;  ita 
Deus  instituit,  ut ab ipso  rege  Dei 
auctoritas  incipiat,  et  currat  per 
cuuctos : quamvis  frequenter  mundus 
hoc  non  intelligat, et alii se subjiciat 
in postestate positus quam debet, tamen 
institutio est ut  unus sit qui timeatur. 
Ubi  ergo  hsc institutio  non  est,  ibi 
cathedra pestilentis reperitur.  . . . 
Itaqne si in Dei  cathedra  sedentes, 
innocentes  opprimaut,  injustum  erit 
judicium  non  cathedra.  Ubi  enim 
cathedra  pestilentiae  est,  non  potest 
judicium  non  esse  iniquum." 
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God, and that whatever his coilduct  may be, he does  not eease 
in some  sense  to have  this character.  St Augustine expresses 
the same conception with a certain added  emphasis.  He men- 
tions Nero as an example of  the worst  type of  ruler, but adds 
that even such rulers receive their power through tlie providence 
of  God,  when  he judges  that  any  nation  may  require  such 
St Isidore of  Seville  expresses the same view, and 
even thinks ib  necessary  to explain away a passage of  Scripture 
which, as it appeared to him, might be interpreted as contradict- 
ing the theory.  The prophet IIosea, as he quotes him, had said 
of certain kings that they reigned, but not by the appointment 
of  God.  St Isidore  explains  that this  means  that God  had 
given them to their people in His anger.  He quotes the same 
prophet as saying, " I shall give them a king in my wrath," and 
concludes that a wicked ruler is appointed by ~od  just as much 
as a good ruler.  The  character  of  the ruler  is adapted to the 
character of  the people : if  they are good, God will give tlleni a 
good ruler; if  they are evil, He will set an evil ruler over them.2 
How far St Augustine  and  St Isidore foresaw  the conclusions 
that might  be  founded  upon  such  statements it is difficult to 
say.  St Augnstine does not, so far as we have seen, discuss the 
question in detail; and  St Isidore, as we  shall  see l>resently, 
l St  Aug., De Civ. Dei, v. 19 :  'l Etiam 
talibus tamen  domirlancli  potestas non 
datur  nisi  summi  Dei  providentia, 
quando  res  humanas  judicat  talibus 
dominis dignas.  Aperta de hac  re vox 
divina est loquente Dei sapientia : 'Per 
me  reges  regllant  et tyranni per me 
teneilt  terram.'  Sed  ne tyranni non 
pessimi  atque  improbi  reges,  sed 
vetere  nomine  fortes  dicti  existi- 
mentur  (uncle  ait  Virgilius :  'Pars 
mihi  pacis  erit ilextram tetigisse tyr- 
anui '),  apertissime  alio  loco  de  Deo 
dictum est : '  Qui reguare  facit  homi- 
llern hypocritam propler perversitatem 
populi.'  Cf. De Civ.,  v.  21. 
a  St Isidore  of  Seville,  Sententis, 
iii.  48 : "  Dum Apostolus  dicat ; non 
est  potestas  nisi  a  Deo,'  quo  modo 
Dominus per Prophetam de quibusdam 
potestatibus dicit : '  Ipsi regoaverunt, 
eed non ex me.'  Quasi diceret, non me 
propitio sed etiam sumlne irato.  Unde 
et  inferius per  eumdem prophetam ad- 
didit : '  Dabo,'  inquit, '  tibi  regem  in 
furore  tneo.'  Quo  manifestius elucet 
bonam  malamque  poteetatem  a  Deo 
ordinari ;  sed  bonam  propitio,  malam 
irato.  Reges, quando boni sunt, mun- 
eris est Dei, quando vero  mali, sceleriv 
est populi.  Secuudum  enim meritum 
plebium disponitur vita rectorum, test- 
ante Job, '  Qui regnare facit hypocritam 
propter  peccatum  populi.'  Irascente 
enim Deo,  talem rectorem  populi  sus- 
cipiunt, qualem pro peccato merentur. 
Nonnunquam pro malitia plebiunl etiam 
reges mutantur, et qui ante videbantur 
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we  cannot  but  be  in  some  measure  astonished  at  the  ex- 
tremely  deferential,  sonletimes  al~llost  servile,  tone  which  we 
find, at least occasionally, in his letters to the Eniperors.  We 
may  take as an example a  letter  addressed  to Anatolius,  the 
representative  of  the  Ronlan  Church  at Constantinople, with 
regard  to  the wish  of  the  Emperor  that John the Bishop of 
P~ima  Justiniana should  be  deposed  on  account  of  his  bad 
health.  Gregory protests  against such action  as being wholly 
contrary to the canons, and unjust, and says therefore  that as 
far  as he  is  concerned  he  can  take  no  part  in  such  action. 
But, he  concludes,  it is  in  the  power  of  the Enlperor  to do 
what he pleases,-he  must act according to his judgment:  what 
the Emperor  does,  if  it is canonical,  Gregory  will  follow;  if 
not  canonical,  he  will,  so  far  as  he  can  do  so  without  sin, 
ei1dure.l  The tone of  the  letter is not undignified, but it is a 
little strange to find  Gregory  even  appearing to  acquiesce  in 
an open  breach  of  canonical  rule  by  the Emperor,  especially 
when  we  remember  that  there  was  quite  another  tradition 
in the Western  Church  than this,  as we  shall  presently  see. 
Another  example will  be  found  in  a  letter written  to the 
Emperor  Maurice  with  regard  to  a  law  issued  by  him,  for- 
bidding  the  reception  in  monasteries  of  soldiers  and  other 
persons  who  were  responsible  to  discharge  various  public 
duties.  Gregory  is much  distressed  about the law,  and begs 
Maurice  to consider  what  emperor  ever  issued  such  a  regu- 
lation.  (It  appears  from  Ep.  64  in  the  same  book  that 
Gregory  believed  that  this  had  been  done  by  Julian.)  He 
urges  that  for  some  men  salvation  is  only  possible  if  they 
leave  the world  and  give  themselves  wholly  to  religion,  and 
he  warns  Maurice  that  Christ  will  in  the last  day  demand 
St Gregory the Great, Epist.,  Lib. 
xi.  29,  "  Gregorius  Anatolio  Diacono 
Constantinopolim :  " ". . . Et quidem 
nusquam  canones  prscipiunt,  ut pra: 
sgritudine  episcopo  succedatur,  et 
omnino  injustum  est,  ut si  molestia 
corporis  inruit,  honore  suo  privetur 
aegrotus.  Atque ideo hoc  per  nos fieri 
nullatenus potest, ne peccatum in mea 
anima ex ejus depositione veniat.  . .  . 
Quod  si hoc  petere ille  noluerit  quod 
piissimo domno placet, quicquid  jubet 
facere,  in  ejus  potestate  est.  Sicut 
novit,  ipse  provideat ; nos  tantum- 
modo  in  depositione  talis  viri  non 
faciat  permisceri.  Quod  vero  ipee 
fecerit,  si  canonicum  est,  sequirnur; 
si  vero  cano~~icum  non  est,  in  quan- 
tum sine peccato nostro  portamus." 
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from  him  an  account  of  his  conduct  in  having  withdrawn 
men  from  the  service of  Christ.  And  yet  he concludes  the 
letter  by  saying  that,  in  obedience  to  the  Emperor's  com- 
mands,  lie  has  caused  the  law  to  be  sent  on  to  various 
regions.  He has obeyed  the Emperor,  and has  delivered  his 
soul  by  protesting.'  It is certainly  strange  to  find  Gregory, 
who  feels  so  strongly the impiety of  such a law, still acting as 
an agent for  its promulgation, instead  of  refusiug to do this in 
the name of  the Christian law and his own ecclesiastical  posi- 
tion.  It  is true that we must balance the tone  of  these letters 
with that of  a later one addressed to Boniface, the representative 
of the Roman see at Constantinople, with reference to a question 
1 St Gregory the Great, Epist., Lib. 
iii. 61, "  Gregorius Mauritio Augusto :" 
"  Loi~giuo  viro clarissimo stratore veni- 
ente,  dominorum  legem  mscepi,  ad 
quam  fatigatus  tunc  egritudine  cor- 
 ori is,  respondere  nil  valui.  In qua 
dominorum pietas  sanxit,  ut quisquis 
publicis  administrationibus  fuerit  im- 
plicatua,  ei  ad Ecclesiasticum  officium 
venire non liceat.  Quod valde laudavi, 
evidentissime  sciens  quia  qui  secul- 
arem  habitum  deserens,  ad  Ecclesias- 
tics  officia  venire  festinat,  mutare 
vult seculum, non  relinquere,  Quod 
vero  in  eadem  lege  dicitur,  ut  ei 
in  monasterio  converti  non  liceat, 
omnino miratus sum:  . . .  In qua 
lege  subiunctum est,  ut nulli  qui in 
manu  signatus  est,  conrerti  liceat. 
Quam constitutionem ego, fateor  dom- 
iuis  meis,  vehementer  expavi.  Quia 
per eam cmlorum via multis clanditur, 
et quod  nuncusque  licuit,  ne  liceat 
prohibetur.  Multi  enim  sunt,  qui 
possunt  religiosam  vitam  etiam  cum 
saeculari  habitu  ducere.  Et plerique 
sunt, qui nisi  omnia reliquerint, salvari 
apud Deum  nullatenus possunt.  Ego 
vero  hsc dominis  meis  loquens,  quid 
sum nisi pulvis et vermis ?  Sed tamen 
quia  coiltra  auctorern  om~~ium  Deum 
hanc  intendere co~~stitutionem  sentiu, 
dominis  tacere  non  possum.  Ad  lloc 
enim  potestas  super  omnes  homines, 
pietati  dominorum  meorum  cslitua 
data  est,  ut qui  bona  appetunt  ad- 
juventur;  ut  celorum  via  largus 
pateat,  ut  terrestre  regnum  ccelesti 
reguo famuletur.  Et ecce  aperta voce 
dicitur,  ut ei,  qui  semel  in  terrena 
militia signatus fuerit, nisi  aut expleta 
militia, aut pro debilitate corporis  re- 
pulsus,  Christo  militare  non liceat. 
Ad hac  ecce per me servum ultimum 
suum et  restrum  respondit  Christ,us, 
dicens : "Ego  te  de  notario  comitem 
excubitorum,  de  comite  excubitorum 
cssarem,  de  caesare  imperatorem: 
nec  solurn  hoe,  sed  etiam  patrem 
imperatorum  feci.  Sacerdutes  nleis 
tuze  inanui  commisi,  et  tu  a  meo 
servitio  milites  tuos  subtrahis."  Re- 
sponde  rogo  piissime  d~mine,  servo 
tuo,  quid  veniei~ti  et liaec  dicenti  re- 
sponsurus  es in  judicio  Domino  tuo '! 
. . . Ilequirat rogo domiuus meus, quis 
prior imperator talem legem dederit, et 
subtilius aestimet, si debuit dari. . . . 
Ego quidem jussioni  subjectus eandem 
legem  per  diversas  terrarum  partes 
feci  transmitti,  et  quia  les  ipsa 
omnipotenti  Deo  minime  concordet, 
ecce  per  suggestiol~is mez  pagil~am 
serenissirnis  dominis  nuntiavi.  Utro- 
bique  ergo  qure  debui  exolri,  qui  et 
irnperatori obedieutiam prrebui,  et pro 
Deo  yuod  sensi minirne  tacui." of  the jurisdiction  of  the Bishop of  Corcyra.  It appears from 
this that the Emperor  Maurice  had  given  some  decision  upon 
the subject, and Gregory speaks of  this as wholly void, as being 
"cont~a  leges  et  sncvns  canones."  The  Bishop  of  Nicopolis,  the 
Metropolitan  of  Corcyra,  had  given  a  different  judgment,  to 
which Gregory says he had given his approbation.  But Gregory 
adds that, as the Emperor Maurice had given a decision, he had 
abstained from publishing his own decision lest he should appear 
to act contrary to the imperial comniand and in contempt of it. 
He therefore  instructs Boniface to do wliat he can to persuade 
the  Emperor  to issue  an  order  confirming  the judgment  of 
Gregory?  Gregory's  tone is very emphatic about the illegality 
and invalidity of  the action of  Maurice, but it must be observed 
that  he  carifully  refrains  from  publicly  denouncing  it,  and 
l  St Gregory the Great, Epist.,  Lib. 
xiv.  8 : ". . .  Hoc  tame11  breviter 
indicamus, quia dum Mauricio quondam 
imperatori  esset  in  przjudicio  Ec- 
clesis Corcyritanze subreptum, nec jus- 
sio ejus, quippe qu~  contra leges et sac- 
ros canones data fuerat, habuisset effec- 
tum, et indecisa inter partes  contentio 
remansisset : aliam  illam  ad  Andream 
quondam  fratrenl nostrum tunc Nico- 
politanum metropolitam jussione~ll  de- 
diese,  ut,  quoniam  utraque  pars  ejus 
eraC  jurisdictioni  subjecta,  ipse  hanc 
causam  coguoscere  et finire  canonice 
debuisset.  Qui  metropolita,  cognita 
causa, prolataque sententia,  cujus tibi 
exemplaria misimus, preclictum Cassiopi 
castrum sub potestate  ac  jurisdictione 
Corcyritani 3:piscopicujus  et  semper fuit 
dicecesis,  esse  distinxit.  Quarn  nos 
sententiam  comprobantes,  apostolics 
Sedis auctoritate prsvidimus confirman- 
dum.  . . . Sed  quiil  inter  ipsa  prim- 
ordia  serenissimo  domno  imperatori 
subreptum est, atque contra judicatum 
Nicopolitani  metropolits quod  ecclesi- 
astica  rectitudine  et canonica  ratione 
suffultum  est,  episcopo  Eurie,  quod 
nec  sine  dolore audire  vel  loqui  sine 
gemitu  possrlmus,  cum majori injuria 
epiacopi Corcyritani  atque clericorum 
ejus antefatum Cassiopi castrum tracli- 
tum memoratur,  ut amota,  quod  dici 
grave est, jurisdictione Corcyritans Ec- 
clesiae, ipse  illic omnem tamquanl prin- 
cipalam habeat potestatem, sententiam 
nostram nullidare prsvidimus, ne contra 
jussionem  clementissinli domni impera- 
toris vel,  quod  absit  in  despectu  ip- 
sius aliquid facere videremur.  Itaque 
dilectio tua pietati ejus cuncta diligen. 
ter insinuet, atque constanter  astruat 
hoc omnino pravum, omnino injustum, 
omnino inlicitum,  et sacris esse valde 
canonibus inimicum :  et  ideo hujusmodi 
peccatum temporibus  suis introduci in 
Ecclesis  prqudicium  non  permittat, 
sed  quid  de  hoc  negotio  judicatum 
antefsti  quondam  metropolitre  con- 
tineat, vel qualiter a nobis ea qus  ab ill0 
decreta  sunt,  confirmata fuelint, sug- 
gerat,  atque id agere  studeat, ut cum 
ejus jussione nostra illic sententia trans- 
mittatur, quatenus et serenitati ipsius, 
sicut diguum est, reservasse et  rational- 
ibiter corresisse  qus male  presumpta 
sunt  videamur.  Qua  in  re  omnino 
opera  danda  est  ut,  si  fieri  potest, 
etiam  ipse  jussionem  tribuat,  in  qua 
ea  qus a  nobis  definita  aunt  servari 
przcipiab." 
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setting  his  own judgment, or that of  the Metropolitan, against 
it; and  hopes  to gain his  point  by  perstlading  the  Emperor 
to agree  with  his judglnent  and to issue  an order  expressing 
this. 
In Gregory the Great, then, we find this theory of  the sacred 
character of  government so developed  as to n1al;e  the ruler in 
all his actions the representative of  God, not  merely the repre- 
sentative of  God  as embodying the sacred  ends for which  the 
government  of  society exists.  The conception is, so far as  we 
have  seen,  almost  peculiar  to  some  Christian  writers.  We 
have  not  observed  anything  which  is  really  parallel  to  the 
conception in the legal writers, and even  in Seneca  and Pliny 
we have only indications of  an attitude of  niind which  might 
be  capable  of  development  in  this  direction.  The  theory 
is  a  somewhat  irregular  and  illogical  development  of  the 
Christian  corlception  of  the  divine  character  of  the  civil 
order. 
It will  naturally  be  asked,  What were  the circunistances 
under which this theory grew up.  We think that we can trace 
the development  of  this conception  to three causes: first, the 
need  of  correcting  that anarchical tendency  in  the  yrimitive 
Church  to  which  we  have  already  referred ; secondly,  the 
relation  between  the Christian Church  and  the Emperor  after 
the  conversion  of  Constantine; and, thirdly,  tlie  illflt~ence  of 
the  Old Testament  conception  of  the position  of  the King of 
Israel. 
We think that the necessity for counteracting the anarchical 
tendencies in the primitive Christian  societies was  probably a 
very real cause  of  the tendency  to  exaggerate or misstate the 
divine authority of the ruler.  We think that the great ernphasis 
laid  upon  the sacred  character  of  the civil  order  in tlie  New 
Testament-au  emphasis  which  is maintained  by  writers  like 
Clement of  Rome and lrenaus-is  a  very real indication  of  a 
danger  which  menaced  the Church, and led  naturally  to just 
the same kind of  exaggeration as did the parallel phenomena in 
the sixteenth  century.  If  we  add  to this tlie  imperious  need 
which  lay on  the Christian  societies  to disarm the hostility of 
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tion  of  the tendency  to  overstate  the sanctity  of  authority in 
the earliest  ages  of  the  Church. 
With the conversion  of  the Empire to Christianity no doubt 
these conditions were greatly altered.  But while, as we shall see 
presently, many of  the Christian writers from the fourth to the 
seventh centuries illustrate conceptions  of  quite another  kind 
from those which we have just discussed, yet in this period, too, 
there were continually in operation circumstances which tended 
to make the attitude of  the Church towards the Emperors one of 
a somewhat servile deference.  We may find an extremely good 
illustration of  the influence of  these circumstances in that pass- 
age from St Optatus  which we have already considered.  In  the 
case  of  the Donatist  dispute  the Empire at last exercised its 
authority to put down what it considered a schismatical faction. 
And it is easy to see from the tone of  St Optatus that this in- 
tervention was unhappily as welcome to many Churchmen as it 
was  dista4teful  to  the  Donatist~.~  Donatus  urged  that  the 
Emperor had nothing to do with Church affairs ; St Optatus bids 
hiin  remember  that the Church is within the Empire, and that 
the Emperor has no superior save God.  The truth is, that with 
the conversion  of  Constantine the Emperor  became  the patron 
and protector  of  the Church, and it would  be  easy enough  to 
trace in many cases  the effect of  this protectorate on the course 
of  Church  disputes.  Churchmen  would  resist  the  Emperor 
when  he  happened  to be  opposed  to their view; but when  he 
agreed with  them, they were  only too apt to fall into the habit 
of  regarding  his  action  against their enemies as that of  a truly 
sacred authority.  The  emancipation  of  the political theory of 
the  Church  from  such  conceptlons  as  those  of  Gregory  the 
Great must  be  traced  in large  measure  to  the actual  contests 
between  the Church  and the Empire. 
It  is, however, posslble that these influences would not alone 
have  been  sufficient to produce so rigorous a theory as  that of 
Gregory the Great, had they not been reinforced  and confirmed 
by  traditions  which  the  Christian Church inherited  from  the 
See p.  145.  property  of  the  Donatlsta,  which  we 
Cf.  the  temper  of  St  Augustine  have already considered.  See pp. 140, 
as  illustrated  in  the  pasaagen  on  the  141. 
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religion  of  Israel.  We can  hardly  doubt  that, directly,  the 
theories of  St Augustine ancl St Isidore on the Divine appoint- 
ment of  even wicked rulers, and St Gregory's theory of  the duty 
of  submission  even  to such  rulers,  are  drawn  from  the  Old 
Testament  conception  of  the  position  of  the  king  of  Israel. 
According  to  the  tradition  of  the  first  Book  of  Samuel, the 
monarchy  was  indeed  instituted  against  the  advice  of  the 
prophet,  who  is taken  as speaking in the name  of  God; but 
the  narrative  of  the  same  book  and  of  the  other  historical 
books makes it very plain  that the king, when once appointed, 
was looked upon as the anointed of  the Lord,-that  his person 
and his  authority were  sacred.  There  may,  indeed,  be  traces 
in the Old Testament of  other views  than this, but this is the 
normal view of  the monarchy in Israel, a view which possessed 
no  doubt  a  special force with  regard  to the monarchy  of  the 
house of  David.  Such conceptions with regard to the sanctity 
of  monarchy were  probably  in no  way  peculiar  to Israel,  but 
belonged  to many oriental nations ; but it was largely through 
the  Christian  Fathers  that  they  came  into  the West.  The 
passages  to  which  we  have  referred  will  make it sufficiently 
plain  that  it is in  relation  to  the  Old  Testament  that these 
views are developed  by the Fathers.  We may at least reason- 
ably say that the tradition of  Israel  provided  the centre round 
which such opinions took definite shape and form. 
In  St Gregory  the  Great,  then,  we  find  in  definite  and 
systematic form a theory of  the source of  authority in Govern- 
ment which is very sharply contrasted with that which we have 
seen to be  characteristic of  the legal  writers.  They  trace  the 
source of  all authority in the State to its fountainhead in the 
people.  St Gregory  traces the authority  of  rulers  directly to 
God.  The history  of  medi~val  political  theory is  very largely 
the history of  the struggle between these  two views, in which, 
however,  for  many  ceuturies,  the  combatants  change  places. 
For, at least froni  the eleventh to  the  fourteenth  century, it 
is the Imperialist party which defends the theory of  the Divine 
authority of  the ruler, it is the ecclesiastical  which  maintains 
that his  authority  is derived from the  people.  We have  to 
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this  we  shall  have  to  examine  in detail  the  history  of  the 
political  ideas  especially  of  the ninth  century. 
Rut before  we  proceed  to do this we  have still to examine 
some  other  tendencies  of  thought in  the  Christian  Fathers. 
We shall  see  that  besides  that tradition  which  we  have  so 
far  been  examining,  there  are  others  which  as  we  think, 
greatly  influenced  the political  theory  of  the ninth century. 
CHAPTER  XIV. 
AUTHORITY  AND  JUSTICE. 
So  far  we  have endeavoured  to  disentangle  the  history  and 
significance  of  a  political  conception,  which,  as it appears  to 
us, was  first, in Western  thought, developed  by  the  Christian 
Fathers,-the  conception of  the Divine authority of  the ruler, 
the doctrine that the ruler is absolute relatively to his subjects, 
responsible only to God.  It would, however, be a great mistake 
to suppose that this theory represents the whole contribution of 
the Christiau Fathers to this portion of  political theory.  There 
are many other  elements in their conception  of  the nature  of 
authority in the State ;  one or two of  the great Fathers, indeed, 
seem  to  tend  in quite another  direction, and with  regard  to 
them all it must be recognised that the elements of  their theory 
on  this matter  are highly  complex, perhaps a  little  confused. 
We  must  consider  some  general  aspects  of  their  thought, 
arranging them  as  well  as we  can. 
While the Christian Fathers as a rule think that the institu- 
tion of  coercive Government is not primitive or natural, in that 
sense, they look upon  the institution as being  good,  inasmuch 
as it is  a  remedy  for  the confusions  and  disorder  which  sin 
has brought into the world.  It is true, as we  have  seen, that 
they sometimes think of  it as being  a  punishment  as well  as 
a  remedy  for  sin; but, normally,  they  think  of  the State as 
an instrument  for  securing  and  preserving  justice,  and  they 
regard  it as the chief  duty of  the king as  ruler  to benefit his 
people by maintaining justice.  We have already observed that 
St Paul's  assertion of  the Divine character of  the authority of 
the State rests  upon  the  assumption that the State  rewards 
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the good  and  punishes  the  evil,-that  is,  that  it  maintains 
justice.' 
In  the second  century we  find  Irenceus  in very plain terms 
threatening  unjust  rulers  with  the judgment  of  God,  assur- 
ing them that God  will  certainly  visit  their  wickedness  upon 
them ;  and if  we  turn to  the Alexandrian  Fathers,  we  find 
Clement  defining  a  king  as one  who  rules  according to law, 
and who is willingly obeyed by his subjects:-that  is, if  we may 
so  interpret Clement's  meaning, a  king is one who follows not 
merely his own caprice or desire, but governs according to those 
rules  of  public  action  which  are designed  for  the  attainment 
and preservation  of  justice,  and whom  his  subjects  willingly 
obey as representing their own just  desires. 
When we pass to St Ambrose in the latter part of  the fourth 
century, we find all these conceptions drawn out and developed 
very clearly and fully.  To St Ambrose justice and beneficence 
form the "  ratio " of  the State : justice  is that which builds up 
the State, while injustice destroys  it.s  This  conception is very 
significant, especially when we  compare it, as we  shall have  to 
do presently, with  St  Augustine's  attempt to define  the State ; 
and it finds its proper  development  in  the  discussion  of  the 
relation of  the unjust person who discharges an oEce of  Govern- 
ment, to the sacred character of  the institution of  Government 
itself.  St Ambrose seems to mean that he only is properly the 
minister of  God who  uses  his  authority well :  the passage  is, 
indeed, somewhat obscure, but that seems to be his meaning. 
Rom. xiii. 1, &c. 
Ireneus, Adv. Her., v.  24. 
Clement of  Alexandria,  Stromata, 
i.  24:  "8aurArirs ~oivvv  r'u~lv  6  lipXwv 
~artl  vdpous,  d  71v ~oii  dPXr~v  EK~YTWY 
lalu77iP~v  Zxwv." 
St Ambrose,  De  Officiis,  i  28: 
"  Justitia  ergo  ad  societatem  generie 
humani, et ad comnlunitatem refertur. 
Societatis enim ratio dividitur in duas 
partes,  justitiam  et  beneficentiam, 
quam eamdem  liberalitatem  et beuig- 
nitatem vocant ;  justitia mihi excel,ior 
videtur, liberalitas gratior." 
'  St  Ambrose,  De  Off.,  U  19 : 
"  Claret  ergo  quoniam  et equitas im- 
peria conlirmet, et injustitia dissolvat." 
St  Ambrose,  Exp. Ev. S.  Lucre  iv. 
5 : "  Denique eo usque a Deo ordinatio 
potestatis ; ut  Dei minister sit, qui bene 
utitur potestate.  '  Dei ' inquit, '  min- 
ister  est  tibi  in  bonum.'  Kon  ergo 
muneris aliqua culpa est, sed  ministri ; 
nec Dei potest ordinatio clisplicere, sed 
administrantis  actio.  Nam  ut  de 
ccelestibus  ad  terrena  dexivemus  ex- 
emplum,  dat honorem  imperator,  et 
habet  laurlem.  Quod  si  quis  male 
honore usus fuerit, non  imperatoris eat 
culpa, sed judicis." 
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But this is not  all that is worth  observing in St Ambrose's 
theory of  the institution of  Government.  It  is interesting to 
notice that he lays some  stress upon  the attitude of  the ruler 
towards liberty.  In a  letter  to  Theodosius, on  the subject of 
certain demands which  had  been  made  upon  the Church, and 
against  which  St Ambrose  protests,  he urges  the  importance 
of  the  permission  of  freedom  of  speech  and  remonstrance; 
and while,  no  doubt, he is thinking  primarily of  the freedom 
of ecclesiastics  in relation  to  the civil  power,  he  shows  some 
sense  of  the  significance  of  the  conception  of  liberty  in the 
political  order:  good  rulers,  he  says, love  liberty,  while  bad 
rulers love  slavery.'  It  would of  course  be very foolish to lay 
too much  stress  on such  phrases; but they are at least worth 
noting,  especially  as similar phrases  are used  both  by Cassio- 
dorus and by Gregory the Great.  Cassiodorus, writing  in the 
name of  Athalaric to a certain Ambrose who had just  been  ap- 
pointed to the quastorship, recalls a saying of  Trajan, in which 
he  had  expressed his  wish  that his  counsellors  should  freely 
advise him, rebuking him if  neces~ary.~  Gregory the Great, in 
a  letter  not  perhaps  very  creditable  to  him,  in  which  he 
expressed to the Emperor Phocas his joy  that he had taken  the 
place  of  Maurice,  hails  his  accession  as promising  to  restore 
liberty to the people  in his  dominions, adding that this is the 
great  difference  between  the emperors  of  the  Commonwealth 
and the kings of  the nations, that the former  are the lords  of 
free men, the latter of  sla~es.~ 
In  later  times  St  Ambrose  was  frequently  quoted  as 
l St  Ambrose, Ep. xl. 2 : "  Sed neque 
impe~iale  est libertatem dicencli  dene- 
gare,  neque  sacerdotale  quod  sentiai 
non dicere.  Nihil enim in vobis imper- 
at01  lbus tam popularis et tarn amabilis 
eut, quam llbertatem etiam in  iis  dili- 
gere, qui ohseciuio militice vobis subditi 
sunt.  Siquidem  hor:  interest  inter 
bones  et malos  plincipes,  quod  boni 
libertatem  amant,  servitutem  im- 
probi.  Xihi1  etiam  in  sacerdote tarn 
periculosum  apud  Deum,  tnm  turpe 
spud homines, quam quod  seutiat, non 
libere denuu  tu~  e." 
'  Cassiodorus,  Varia,  VG. 13 : "Re- 
novnrnus certe dictum illud celeberrimi 
Trajaui ; sume  dietationem,  si bonus 
fuero,  pro republica  et me,  si malus, 
pro  republica  in me." 
St Greg.  the Great,  Ep.  xiii. 34 : 
"  Reformetur  jam  singulis  sub  jugo 
pii inlpelii libertas sua.  Huc  llamque 
inter reges  gentium  et reipublicre  in>- 
peratorcs  clistat,  quod  reges gentiurll 
domini servorum sunt, imperatores vero 
reipublicce,  clomini  liberorurn."  The 
same  phrase occurs in  Ep. xi.  4 . per- 
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maintaining  that  the  king  or  ruler  is bound  by  the  laws; 
and, indeed, there is more than  one passage  which would seem 
to  have  this  meaning.  In one  of  his  letters  he  seems  to  - 
argue that the emperor  who  makes the laws is also bound to 
obey them ;l  and in one  of  his treatises he seems to express an 
opinion of  the same kind.2  It must, however, be observed that 
in  other  places  he  uses  the  ordinary  legal  phrase,  that  the 
emperor  is  legibus  solutus,3  It  is  worth  observing  that  St 
Augustine also deals with the relation  of  the ruler to the law 
in  terms  analogous4  to  those  of  St Ambrose,  and,  in  later 
times, is much  quoted with  St Ambrose.  St Isidore of  Seville 
also  urges very strongly upon  the prince the propriety of  his 
respecting his  own laws.  Subjects will  learn obedience when 
they  see  their rulers  observing the laws.5 
With some  parts  of  St Augustine's  theory of  the State we 
have  already dealt;  but  St Augustine's  theory  has  a  certain 
conlpleteness which we do not find in that of  the other Fathers, 
and, at  the risk of  a little repetition, we  think it well to try to 
consider  briefly  his  theory  of  law  and the State as a  whole. 
TVe  have already seen  that in St Augustine's  view  men  were 
St Ambrose,  Ep.  xxi.  9 :  'l Ubi 
illud constituimus, imperator, quod jam 
ipse  tuum judicium  declarasti ; immo 
etiam  dedisti  leges,  nec  cui  esset 
liberum  aliud  judicare ?  Quod  cum 
prescripsisti  aliis, prescripsisti  et tibi. 
Leges  enim  imperator  fert,  quas 
primus ipse custodiat." 
St  Ambrose,  Apol.  Alt.  Proph. 
Daniel, iii. : "  Quem mihi hujuscemodi 
reperias  virum  qui  in potestate  con- 
stitutus non  magis peccata sua diligat  .  . . qui se legilus obstriugat  suis, et 
quod  per justitiam  non  licet,  nec per 
potestatem licere agnoscat ?  No11  enim 
solvit  potestas  justitiam,  sed  justitia 
potestatem ; ncc  legibus  rex  solutus 
est, sed  leges suo solvit exemplo.  An 
fieri  potest, ut qui de aliis judicat, suo 
ipse sit liber juclicio, et in se suscil~iat, 
in quo et alios astringat ? " 
St  Ainbrose, Apol. Prophet Daniel, 
svi: "  Qusmvis rex legibus abfiolutus"; 
and in the same work, X. : "  Sequitur, 
'Tibi  soli  peccavi,'  Res  utique  erat, 
nullis  ipse  legibus  teuebatur,  quia 
liberi sunt reges a vinculis delictorum ; 
ncque  enim  ullis  ad pcenam  vocantur 
legibus, tuti sub imperii  potestate." 
St Aug.,  De  Vera  Religione,  31 : 
"  Sicut  in  istis  temporalibus  legibus, 
quanquam  de  his  homines  iudicent, 
cum  eas instituunt, tamen  cum fuer- 
int institutz atque firmats, non licebit 
judici  de ipsis judicare  sed secundum 
ipsas. " 
St  Isidore of  Seville, Sent. iii.  51 : 
"  Justum  est  principem  legibus  ob- 
tcmperare suis.  Tunc enim jura sua ab 
omnibus custodienda existimet, quando 
et  ipse illis reverentiam prebet.  Prin- 
cipes  legibus  tenere suis,  neque  in  se 
posse  ditmnare jura  que in  subjectis 
constituunt.  Justa  est  enim  vocis 
eorum  auctoritas,  si  quod  populis 
prohibent,  sibi licere non  patiantur." 
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originally equal, and that the institutions of  slavery and govern- 
ment, in which one man  is the superior of  another, are conse- 
quences  of  man's  sin.  The  subjection  of  man  to man  is a 
and a  remedy  for sin.  It must  be  remembered, 
however,  that this does  not  mean  that  men  were  by  nature 
solitary.  On  the contrary, as we  have already pointed out, St 
Augustine definitely maintains  that by his own nature man is 
driven to seek the society of his fellow-men ; society is natural 
and primitive.  It  is the organised society of  the State, with its 
coercive government and its authority of  man over his  fellow- 
men, which is a conventional institution, and it may be regarded 
partly as punitive, partly as remedia1.l 
It is important,  therefore,  to  consider  how  St Augustine 
defines the State and what  is its relation  to justice.  In the 
second book of  the '  De Civitate Dei '  he gives an account of  the 
discussion of  the nature of  the State in Cicero's 'De Republica,' 
and  quotes  the  definition  of  Scipio:  "  Populum  autem  non 
omnem ccetum multitudinis, sed c~tum  juris consensu et utilit- 
atis communione sociatum esse determinat,"  but postpones  the 
discussion  of  the definition.  We find  this  discussion  in  the 
nineteenth  book.  Here,  after  restating Cicero's  definition,  he 
explains  that  this  means  that  there  can  be  no  true  State 
without  justice:  when  there  is  not justice  there  can  be  no 
jus.  But,  he  objects,  how  can  you  speak  of  justice  among 
men  who  do  not  serve  God?  What  sort  of  justice  is  this 
to  take men  from  the service of  God  and to subject  them  to 
demons?  There is no justice  in men who do such things, and 
there  can  therefore be  no justice  in a society formed  of  such 
men.3  This definition, then, will not work, and he proceeds to 
l  St Aug.,  De  Civ. Dei, xix.  12 and 
15.  See pp. 125, 126. 
St  Aug., De Civ. Dei, ii.  21. 
St  Aug.,  De  Civ.  Dei,  xix.  21 : 
"  Populum  enim esse definivit  ccetum 
multitudinis juris consensu et utilitatis 
communione  sociatum.  Quid  autem 
dicat  juriv  consensurn,  disputando ex- 
plicat,  per lloc ostendens geri sine jus- 
tibia  non  posse  rem  publicam ; ubi 
erg0 jubtitia  vera  non est, nec jufl l~ot- 
est  esse.  Quod  enim  jure  fit,  pro- 
fecto juste  fit ;  quod autem fit injuste, 
nec  jure  fieri  potest.  Not1  enim  jura 
dicenda  sunt  vel  putanda  iniqua 
hominum  constituta, cum  illud etiam 
ipai  jus  esse dicant, quod  de justitiz 
fonte mnnaverit,  falsuruque esse, quod 
a  quibuvdam  non  recte  sentientibus 
dici  solet,  id  esse  jus,  quad  ci,  qui 
plus  potest,  utile  est.  Quocirca  ubi 
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search for some other definition which may make  it possible to 
admit that Rome  had  been  a  true  State.  This is  given  in a 
later chapter of  the same book, and is as follows: "  ~o~ulus  est 
ccetus multitudinis  rationalis rerum  quas diligit concordi  com- 
munione sociatus."  A State may be more or less corrupt, but so 
long ks  it consists  of  a  multitude of  rational beings associated 
together in the harmonious enjoyment of  that which they love, 
St  Augustine  thinks  it  Inay  be  regarded  as  a  State  or 
Commonwea1th.l  This  is  practically  Cicero's  definition,  but 
with  the elements of  law and justice  left  out.  No  more fun- 
damental difference  could  very well  be  imagined,  although St 
Augustine  seems to take the matter  lightly ; for Cicero's whole 
conception  of  the State turns upon  this principle, that it is a 
means  for  attaining  and preserving justice. 
sociatus  ccetus  hominum  non  potest 
esse,  et ideo  nec  populus  juxta  illam 
Scipionis  vel  Ciceronis  definitionem ; 
et si non  populus, nec res populi,  sed 
qualiscumque multitudinis, qus  populi 
nomine  non  digna  est.  Ac  per  hoe, 
si res publica res est populi,  et popu- 
lus non  est, qui consensu  non  sociatus 
est juris,  non  est autem jus, ubi nulla 
justitia : procul  dubio  colligitur,  ubi 
justitia  non  est,  non  esse  rem  pub- 
licam.  Justitia  porro  ea  virtus  est, 
qus sua cuique distribuit.  Qus  igitur 
justitia  est hominis, qus  ipsum homi- 
nem  Deo  vero  tollit  et  immundis 
dsmonibus  subdit?  Hocine  est sua 
cuiyue  distrihuere. . . . Qua  propter 
ubi  homo  Deum  non  servit,  quid  in 
eo putandus est esse justitiz ?  Quando 
quidem Deo  non  serviens  nullo  modo 
potest juste animus corpori aut humana 
ratio vitiis imperare.  Et  si in homine 
tali  non  est ulla  justitia,  procul dubio 
nec  in  hominum  ccetu,  qui  ex homi- 
nibus talibus coustat.  Non cst hic ergo 
juris  ille  consensus,  qui  homiuum 
multitudinem populum facit, cujus res 
dicitur  esse  respublica."  Cf. St  Aug., 
De Civ. Dei, ii.  21, conclusion 
St  Aug ,  De Civ. Dei, xix. 24 : "  Si 
autem populus non isto, sed alio defini. 
atur modo, velut si dicatur : '  Populus 
est caetus multitudinis rationalis rerum 
quas diligit concordi communione soci- 
atus,' profccto, ut videatur qualis quis- 
que populus sit, illa sunt intuenda qus 
diligit.  Quscumque tamen  diligat,  si 
ccetus est multitudinis non pecorum, sed 
rationalium creaturarum et eorum qua 
diligit  concordi  communione  sociatus 
est, no11 absurde populus nuncupatur ; 
tanto utique melior, quanto in melior- 
ibus,  tantoque cleterior,  quanto  est in 
deterioribus concors.  Secundum iutam 
definitionem nostram Romanus populus 
populus est et res ejus sine dubitatione 
respublicn.  Quid  autem  primis  tem- 
poribus  suiv  quidve sequentibus popu- 
lus ille  dilexerit et quibus moribus ad 
cruentissimas  seditionea  atque  inde 
ad socialia  atque civilia  bella  perveni- 
ens  ipsarn  concordiam, qus salus  est 
quodem  modo  populi,  ruperit  atque 
corruperit, testatur historia ;  de qua in 
pracedentibus libris  multa  posuimur. 
Nec  ideo  tamen  vel  ipsum  non  esse 
populum  vel  ejus  rem  dixerimus  non 
esse  rem  publicam,  quamdiu  manet 
qualiscumque  rationalis  multitudinis 
caetus,  rerum  quas  diligit  concvrdi 
communione  sociatus." 
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This definition does not seem to represent a casual or isolated 
judgment  of  St Augustine, corrected  perhaps  at other  times. 
He does not, indeed, so far as we have seen, formally set out to 
define the nature of the State in any other place, but he alludes 
to the matter  more  than  once, and always in the same sense. 
In one letter he says : "What is a State (civitas)  but a multitude 
of men, brought together into some bond  of  agreement ? ''l  and 
again, in another letter, "A  State is nothing else but a harmoni- 
ous  multitude of  men " ;  and again, in one of  his treatises, he 
urges that every one must recognise the importance of  the order 
of  the State, which coerces even sinners into the bond  of  some 
earthly peace.3  These phrases  would not, if  they stood alone, 
be  sufficient  to make  clear  St Augustine's  conception  of  the 
State;  but  when  taken  with  the  definition  which  we  have 
just  considered, they seem  to indicate that his  omissions from 
Cicero's  definition  are  not  accidental,  but  more  or  less delib- 
erate and considered. 
It must  at the same  time  be recognised  that once at least 
St Augustine  uses  a  phrase  which  would  seem  to  point  in 
another  direction.  In the 'De Civitate,'  after  discussing  the 
comparative  advantages  of  great  dominions,  and  of  living  in 
peace  and  goodwill  with  one's  neighbours,  he  draws  out a 
comparison between a band of  robbers or pirates and a kingdom, 
and seems to mean that the only point of  distinction is that the 
latter has the quality of  j~stice.~  Here at least  St Augustine 
expresses  himself  in  the  terms of  Cicero's  conception  of  the 
State.  And  with  this passage  we  may  compare  a  definition 
which  is  obviously closely related  to that of  Cicero,-nothing 
can be properly called jus  which is unjust ;5  and an interesting 
1 St  Aug., Ep. cxxxviii. 2 : "  Quid est 
autem civitas, nisi multitudo hominum 
in  quoddam  vinculum  redactum  con- 
cordis  ? " 
Id., Ep. clv. 3 : "  Cum aliud civitas 
non sit, quam concors  hominum multi- 
tudo." 
S Id., De Genesi  ad Litteram, ix.  ix : 
"An vero  ita quis ciecus est mente, ut 
non  cernat  quanto  terris  ornament0 
4it  genus  humanum,  etiam  cum  a 
paucis  recte  laudabiliterque  vivatur ; 
quautumque valeat ordo reipublics, in 
cujusdam  pacis  terrens  vinculum 
coercens  ctianl peccatores." 
'  Id.,  De Civ.  Dei,  iv.  4 : "  Remota 
itaque  justitia  quid  sunt  regna  nisi 
magna  latrocinia ?  quia  et latrocinia 
quid sunt nisi  parva  regna?" 
6  Id., Enarr. in PS.  CX~V. 15 : "JUS 
et injuria  contraria  sunk.  JUS  enim 
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passage, in which  St Augustine describes  the characteristics of 
justice  in language  taken, in the main,  from Clcero's  treatlse, 
"  De Inventlone," but which in part also suggests the definitions 
of  Ulpian l  These  definitions of justice,  Iiowever, only  show 
that St Angustine follows the general tradition of  the relations 
of  law and justice,  and the nature of  civil justice 
The first mentloned phrase is, as far as we have seen, isolated, 
and can hardly be cited in correction  of  the dellberate and con- 
sidered omission of  the quality of  justice in his formal definition 
of  the State.  It must,  at the  same  time, be  recognised  that 
St Augustine  IS  compelled  to  abstract  the  quality  of  justice 
from  the definition  of  the State, not  by  any course  of  reflec- 
tion upon the nature  of  the State, but by his theological con- 
ception  of justice,--a  conception which  might  be  regarded  as 
true upon  hls  premlsses,  but  which  can  only  be  understood 
as related  to those  premisses 
We cannot express a dec~ded  judgment  upon  the very inter- 
omne quod jus  dlcltur, jus  est  Quid 
si al~qu~s  condat  jus  lniquum 7  Nec 
JUS  dicendum  est,  si  lnjustum  est 
Illud  ergo  Terum  jus,  quod  etiam 
justum  eat  V~de  quid  feceris,  non 
quid patlaris  S1 jus feclstl, injunam 
pateris  SI iujuriam fecisti jus pateris ' 
-Cf  w~th  Cicero  m  De  Civ.  Del, 
XIX  21 
'  De  Div  Quest , xxxi  "  Justitia 
est  habitus  anlml,  communi  utili 
tate conservata  suam culque  tr~buens 
dignitatem  Ejus  in~tium est  ab 
natur~  profectum  delude  quadam 
111  consuetudinem ex utilltatis ratlone 
venerunt  postea  res  et  ab  natura 
profectas  et a  consuetudine  probatas, 
legum  metus  et  rel~gio  sanxit 
Natura jus est, quod non opinlo genu~t 
sed  quaddm innata  vis  inseruit  ut 
rehg~onem,  pietatem, gratiam, vind~ca 
t~onem,  observantiam,  veritatem  Re 
hgo  est  qu e  superlorls  cujusdam 
naturse,  quam  dlvinam  vocant,  curam 
ceremoniamque  affert  P~etas, per 
quam  sanguine  con~unctis  patileque 
benevolens officmm,  et d~hgeiis  tr~bul 
tur  cultus  Gratia, in qua am~cit~arum 
et officiorum,  alterius memorla, et  alter 
ius  remunerandi  voluntas coutlnetur. 
Vlndlcat~o,  per  quam  vis  aut injuna, 
et omnlno omne quod  obfuturum est, 
defendendo  et ulciscendo  propulsatur. 
Observant~a,  per  quam homines al~qua 
dignitate antecellentes,  cultu  quodam 
et  lionore  dignamur  Verltas  per 
quam  immutata  ea  qua  sunt  aut 
fuerunt  nut  futura  sunt  dicuntur 
Consuetudlne  autem  jus  est  quoa 
aut leviter  a  natura tractum  aluit, et 
majus  fecit  usus, ut religionem,  et sl 
quid eorum qua: ante d~xinlus  a natura 
profectum, mzjus factum propter con 
suetudlnem  v~demus  aut  quod  in 
morem  vetustas  vulgi  approbst~one 
perduxlt  Quod  genus  pactum  est, 
par, lex, judlcatum  Pactum est quod 
inter  allquos  convenit  Par, quad  In 
omnes sequale est  Judicatum, de quo 
alicujus aut allquorum  jam  sententiis 
coust~tutum  est  Lege  jus  eat,  quod 
in  eo ~crlpto,  quod  populo  expositurn 
est ut obs~rvet,  contnletur " 
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esting question whether  St Augustine's definition  of  the State 
exercised any great influence upon the course of  political specu- 
lation  We have not  found that this part of  his work is  often 
cited, indeed, we have not come across any instance of  this in 
the  oarlier  Middle Ages  at all.  But it  is  hardly  possible  to 
escape the impression that, however  indirectly, this attitude of 
St Augustine  towards  the  conception of  justlce  m  soclety  is 
related to  that conception of  the unrestricted  authority of  the 
ruler, which, as we  have  already seen,  takes  shape  about this 
period, and was drawn out so sharply by St Gregory the Great 
As we have already seen, the tendency to confuse  between  the 
Divine  authority  of  the  institution  of  government,  and  the 
Divine authority of  the individual ruler, can be  traced  back  to 
very early Christian writers, but m  St Augustine this tendency 
is very much developed.  We have already quoted  one passage 
from  his  writings  which  illustrates this polnt,l  but it will  be 
useful  to cite  some  other passages  in which  he draws out m 
detail his view that the worst, just as much  as the best, kings 
draw theii authority from God Him~elf.~  We have already seen 
that it is out of  this judgment  that  there grows  the dogmatic 
conception of  Gregory the Great, that the ruler must not under 
any circumstances be  resisted.  The  refeiences  to  the subject 
in  St Augustine are too  scanty  to enable  us  to  forin  a  very 
complete  theory  of  the  matter,  but,  so  far  as  they  go,  we 
should be inclined to suggest  that there is some  real  connec- 
See p  151 
St  Aug ,  De Civ  Del  v  21  &us 
cum it? sint, non tribuarnus dandi regu 
atque impeiii potestatem nim Deo veio, 
~UI  dat fellc~tatem  m  legno coelorum 
~011s  piid,  regnum  vero  terrarum  et 
piis et Impus, sicut ei placet, cui  mhil 
1UJuste  placet  Sic etiam  horn1111 
bus,  qui Mario  ipse Gaio  Caesar1 , qui 
Augusto, ipse et h  eroni , qui Ves~?zsla 
nis,  xel  patri  vel  fil~o, suavlsslrnls 
Imperatonbus,  lpse  et  Domit~ano 
crudehs3im0,  et ne  per  s~ilgulos  Ire 
necesse slt, qui Const ~ntino  Chriutiano, 
lI)3e apostate Juliano ' 
Id.,  De  Natura  Boni  contra  Mani- 
chseos,  32  "'A  Deo  esse  et ipsam 
nocendi potestatem  Item quia etlam 
nocentium potestas non est ulsi  a Deo, 
sic  scripturn  est,  loquente  sapientia 
'  Per me reges regnant, et tyrann~  per 
me  tenent  terram'  Dicit  et  apos 
tolus  'Non est potestas  nisi  a  Deo 
D~gne  autern fieri,  m  libro  Job scrip 
tum  est  ' qui  regnare  faiit  Inquit 
'  hom~nem  hypocritanl, propter perver 
sitztem populi '  Et de  populo  Israel 
d~cat  Deus  '  Dedi  eia  regenl  in  lra 
inea  Injustum enim non  est  ut im 
problb  accipientibus  noceudi  potes- 
tatem, et bonorum patientia  probetl~r, 
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tion  between  a  theory  of  the  State which  deliberately  omits 
the  characteristic  of  justice,  and  the  theory  that  the  ruler, 
whether just  or  nnjust, Gust  in  all  cases  be  looked  on  as 
holding  God's  authority.  It would  appear,  then,  that  the 
political  theory  of  St  Augustine  is  nlaterially  different  in 
several respects  from  that of  St Ambrose  and other Fathers, 
who represent the ancient tradition  that justice  is the essential 
quality, as it is also the end, of  the State. 
We have  still to  consider  two Christian writers of  the fifth 
and seventh  centuries who  seem  to  represent the more normal 
conception of  the subject.  The first of  these writers, Cassiodorus, 
does not indeed furnish us with any detailed  definition  of  the 
nature  of  the State, and he uses  phrases which are sometimes 
ambiguous, but he does  in the main seem to present  the same 
judgment  as that of  St Ambrose, on the importance of  justice 
in  the  State.  He defines justice  very  much  in the terms of 
Ulpian, as that habit of  mind which renders  his own  to every 
man ;l he recognises  that it is this which  truly magnifies  the 
ruler, and  causes the State to  prosper ;2 and  he  exhorts  the 
ministers cif  State to just conduct, as that which alone renders 
them worthy  of  the name of  judge.3  Law is the  true instru- 
ment of  social progress, the true method  of  human happiness, 
and this because law represents j~stice.~  He quotes the great 
pasvage  from  St Paul on the authority of  the ruler, with an 
interesting  comment,, pointing out that it is the ruler  whose 
commands  are just  wlio  is to be  obeyed ;S  and, as we  have 
seen, he  describes the character of  the good  prince  as that of 
one who is always ready to hear those who  speak in the name 
of justice,  and who delights in a  counsellor  wlio  will  always 
spcak for the State, even wlle~i  lie has to criticise the ruler to 
Csssiodorus, De Anima, 5. 
2  Cass., Varia, iv. 12, a2d iii. 34. 
a  Cass., Varia, iii. 27. 
4  Cass.,  Varia, iii.  17, iv. 33,  v.  39. 
8  Cass.,  '  Complexiones,  in  Epist. 
Apost.,'  Ram.  xiii.  1 :  " Omnibus 
potestatibus  sublimioribus  subditi 
estote " ; et reliqua.  Omnibus  potes- 
tatibus  justitiam  przcipientibus  dixit 
esse debere subjectos, quoniam potestas 
a  Deo  datur,  et  Deo  videtur  velle 
resistere  qui  ordinationi  judiciaria: 
nititnr  obviare,  dicens  ab eo  propter 
conscientiam  rationabiliter  formidal-i, 
qui in aliquo facinore probatur involri ; 
ideo  enlm  et tributa  solvimus,  quia 
nos principibus subjectos esse eentin~us  ; 
miuistri  euim  Dei  sunt, cum  crimina 
commissa distringunt." 
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liis  face.1  The  true king is one who  can  govern  and control 
him~elf.~ 
On the other hand, Cassiodorus seems to regard  the king not 
only as the source of  law, but as one who normally stands above 
it: the king feels himself  bound by  his own pietas  when  he is 
not  bound  by  anything else;  and  further,  the king is only 
accountable to God-he  may transgress against Him, but cannot 
be  said to sin against  others,  for  there is none  who  can judge 
him.'  It is, however, possible  to interpret  this  last passage as 
merely  representing  the  legal  theory  as  to  the  ruler  being 
lcyibus  SO~ZL~ZLS  and the constitutional conditions which  provided 
no  court  of  justice to which the king was  acconntalsle.  These 
phrases of  Cassiodorus are interesting, but do not  add much to 
;hat  we have already seen in other Christian writers. 
St Isidore of  Seville presents us with  some of  the same am- 
biguities as Cassiodorus, but his treatment of  the subject of  the 
neture of  Government is on the whole clear.  He gives us very 
briefly a statement of  the beginnings of  social life among men. 
1 Cass., Varia, viii. 13.  'Ambrosio, v. 
i.,  quwtori Athalaricus  Rex' : "  Ecce 
iterum  ad quresturam  eminens  evenit 
ingenio.  Redde nunc Pliiium et sume 
Trajanum.  Habes  nlagna  que dicas, 
si  et  tu  simili  oratione  resplendeas. 
Fama  temporum  de  legitima  atque 
eloquenti  jussione  generatur.  Omnia 
si quidem bona cunlulat  lingua diserta 
et  quod  a  nobis  precipitur,  gratia 
dictantis ornatur.  Esto nobis  ad bona 
suggerenda p1 ompti6simus et adversum 
improbitatem  male  prresumentium 
constanter erectus.  Dic etiam auribus 
nostris  quod  est  omnino  pro  nobie. 
Bonus  princeps  ille  est,  cui  licet  pro 
justitia loqui, et contra tyrannice feri- 
tatis judicium  audire nolle  con~tituta 
vetorum sanctionum.  Rcnovamus cel te 
ciictum  illud  celeberrimum  Trajani : 
sume dictationem,  si bonus fuero, pro 
republics  et  me,  si  mnlus,  pro  re- 
public& in  me.  Sed  ~ide  quid  a  te 
Wreramus,  quaudo  nec  nobis  aliquid 
injusturn licere  permittimus.  Decreta 
ergo nostra priscorum resonent consti- 
tuta,  qure  tantam  suavitatem  laudis 
inveniunt,  quantum  saporem  vetus- 
tatis assumunt.  Prrejudicia,  que nos 
horremus,  in  aliis  non  amamua. 
Obligamus  te certe  generalitati, dum 
absolute prrecipimus  jura servare. . . . 
Nam  quid tibi conreniat, vides.  Vox 
legum  diceris,  dum  nos  jura  con- 
damus." 
a Cass., Exp. in Psalt.,  PS. cxxxvii. 5. 
Cass.,  Varia,  X.  16 : "  Imperiosa 
nimium  res  est,  patres  conscripti, 
pietas nostra, quando propria voluntate 
vincimur,  qui  alienis  condicionibua 
non  tenemur.  Nan~  cum  deo przs- 
tante  possimua  omnia,  sole  nobis 
credimus  licere Iaudauda. " 
Cass., Exp. in Psalt., PS. 1.  5 : "Nunc 
ad  exponenda  verba  redeamus.  De 
populo si qu~  erraverit, et  Deo peccat, 
et  regi.  Nam quando rex delinquit, soli 
Deo reus est, quia homincm non habet 
qui ejus facta dijudicet.  Merito  ergo 
rex  Deo tantum se dixit peccasse, quia 
solus  erat  qui ejus potuisset  admissa 
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In his  definition  of  oppidum he says that men were originally 
naked and unarmed, defenceless against the inclemency of  heat 
and  cold,  and  the  attacks of  wild  beasts  and of  other  men. 
At last they learned  to make  for  themselves  huts  in which 
they  might  be  sheltered  and  safe,  and these  were  gradually 
collected  in  towns.'  But much  more  important than this is 
his definition  of  the nature of  the State.  He defines eivitas as 
a  multitude of  men joined  together  by the bond  of  society: 
this is ambiguous, and he might  be  following  St Augustine; 
but his definition  ofpopulus makes his meaning plain.  Populus 
he defines as a multitude of  men joined  together in society by 
an agreement of  law,  and harmonious  fell~wship.~  It is both 
interesting and important  to see  that St Isidore,  whether  in- 
tentionally or not, goes back from the position  of  St Augustine 
to that of  Cicero,  and  makes justice  an essential part of  the 
nature  of  the State. 
St Isidore  carries out  a  conception  of  the same kind in his 
definition  of  the true  king  and the sharp contrast  he draws 
between  him  and the tyrant.  The  king,  he says, derives  his 
name from his function of  ruling, and to rule means to correct : 
if  the king does what is right he will keep his name, if  he does 
evil  he  will  lose  it.  St Isidore quotes  an  old proverb  which 
says,  "  Thou  shalt  be  king if  thou  do  right;  if  not, thou 
shalt not  be king," and he defines  the chief  virtues of  a  king 
as  Justice and  IJietas.*  With this  definition  is  sharply con- 
'  St  Isidore of  Seville, Etym., xv.  2 : 
Oppidum  quidam  ab  oppositione 
murorum  dixerunt :  alii  ab  opibus 
recondendis,  eo  quod  sit  munitunl : 
alii  quod  sibi  in  eo  conventus  habi- 
tantium  opem  det  mutuam  contra 
hostem.  Nam primum  homines  tarn- 
quam  nudi  et  inermes,  nec  contra 
beluas  praesidia  habebant,  nec  recep- 
tacula frigoris et caloris, nec ipsi inter 
se  homines  ab hominibus  satis erant 
tuti.  Tandem naturali solertia spelun- 
cis sylvestribusque tegumentis tuguria 
slbi et casas  virgultis  arundiuibusque 
contexerunt, quo esset  vita tutior, ne 
his,  qui nocere  possent,  aditus  esset. 
Hsc est  origo oppidorum,  qure  quod 
open1 dareat, idcirco oppida  nominata 
dixerunt." 
St Isidore  of  Seville,  Etym.,  xv. 
2 : "  Civitas  est  hominum  multitudo 
societatis  vinculo  aclunata." 
St  Isidore of  Seville, Etym., ix. 4 : 
"Populus  eat  humans  multitudinie, 
juris  conseusu,  et concordi  commun- 
ione  sociatus." 
St  Isidore of  Seville, Etym ,  ix  3 : 
"  lteges a regendo  vocati.  Sicut euim 
racerdos  a  sac~ificando, ita  et rex  a 
regendo.  No11 autem regit qui  non cor- 
rigit.  Recte igitur faciendo regis nomen 
tenetur,  peccando  amittitur.  Unde 
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trasted  that  of  the  tyrant,  the  wicked  ruler  who  cruelly 
oppresses  his  people.'  He carries  out the same conception of 
kingship in greater detail in his '  Sentences.'  In one  place  he 
again says that kings are so  called  from ruling, and lose  the 
name if  they  transgress.*  In another passage, which  we have 
already quoted, he explains that the object for which kings and 
princes were appointed was that the people should be restrained 
from  evil  and  directed  to  good!  The duty  of  the  ruler  is 
therefore  to set forward justice  in trnth and  real it^;^  and he 
will be guilty of  a very great crime if  he appoint unjust  judge^.^ 
And finally, in a chapter already cited, which  is often referred 
to  in  later  times,  having  been  embodied  by  Gratian  in  the 
Decretum, he  maintains  that it is  a just  thing that a  prince 
should  obey  his  own  laws.6 
It  is true that along with these judgments he also  maintains 
with St Augustine that evil kings are sent by God as a judgment 
upon  evil  peoples?  We have  already  quoted  his  words,  and 
have  seen  that  this notion  probably  assisted  in the  develop- 
ment of  the theory that the ruler was in such a sense the repre- 
sentative of  God  that he could in no case be resisted.  But St 
Isidore himself  does not draw this conclusioil ; rather he seems 
in the main  to hold  that the legitimacy of  Government is de- 
termined by its character,-that  it is only as far  as  the ruler 
et apud veteres, tale erat proverbiunn. 
'Rex eris si recte facias, si non facias, 
non eris. 
Regiae  virtutes  prrecipuae  du~, 
justitia  et  pietas.  Plus  autem  in 
regibus  laudatur pietas ;  uam justitiln 
per se sevela est." 
St Isidore of  Seville, Etym. ix.  3 : 
"  Tyranni  Grzece  dicuntur.  Iidem 
Latine  et reges.  Nam  apud  veteres 
inter regem et tyrannum nulla discretio 
erat: ut, 'Pars mihi pacis erit: dextram 
tetigisse  tyranni.'  Fortes enim reges 
tyranni vocabantur.  Nam tiro fortis. 
De  quibus  Dominus  loquitur : '  Per 
me reges  regnant,  et tyranni  per  me 
tenent terram.'  Jam  povtea  in usum 
accidit, tyrannos vocari pessimos atque 
improbos reges luxuriosre dominationia 
cupiditatem, et crudelissimam domina- 
tionem in  populis  exerceutes." 
St  Isidore of  Seville, Sententire, iii. 
48. 
Id., id., iii.  47.  See p. 119. 
'  Id., id., iii. 49. 
Id., id.. iii.  62. 
Id., id., iii. 51 : 'l Justum est prin- 
cipem legibus obtemperare suis.  Tunc 
enim jura  sua ab omnibus custodienda 
existimet, quando et ipse  illis reveren- 
tiam praebet.  Principem legibus teneri 
suis,  neque in  se posse  damnare jura, 
quze  in  subjectis  constituunt.  Justa 
est  enim  vocis  eorum  auctoritas,  si, 
quod populis prohibent, bibi  licere non 
patiantur."  Cf.  Gratian,  Decretum, 
Dist.  ix.  2. 
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promotes justice  that he is to be looked  upon as a true ruler 
at all. 
We have  endeavoured  in  this chapter to put tosether  the 
judgments  of  the Fathers upon the place  of  justice  in society. 
We have  seen  that, with  the exception  of  St Augustine, they 
seem  to show  the persistence  of  the conception  that the end 
of  the State is the attainment of  justice, and that the quality of 
justice  is  essential  to  the  legitimacy  of  any  organisation  of 
society.  We think it is important to observe this, for  in some 
measure  it seems  to counteract that tendency of  some  of  the 
Christian  Fathers  towards  the  theory  of  the absolute Divine 
authority  of  the  monarch,  and  the  consequent  obligation  of 
unlimited obedience.  The truth is, probably, that the Christian 
Fathers had  no clearly and completely developed conception of 
the  nature  of  civil  anthority.  One  or  two  principles  with 
respect  to  this  were  firmly  fixed  in  their  minds,  but  the 
conclusions  which  might  be  more  or less legitimately derived 
from these principles were undefined, and not generally thought 
out, still less  brought into logical  coherence with each other. 
They were convinced of  the Divine  nature  of  the authority of 
the State, they were convinced that disobedience to that authority 
was in normal cases an offence  against God.  Some of  them drew 
from  this the conclusion  that all authority, under  all circum- 
stances, was from God, and that even  an unjust and oppressive 
command  of  the ruler  must  be  obeyed.  On the  other  hand, 
they were  for the most  part  equally clear  that the foundation 
and  end of  civil  authority  was  the attainment of  justice,  and 
some  of  then1  more  or  less  distinctly  apprehended,  as a  con- 
sequence  of  this  principle,  that  an  unjust  anthority  was  no 
authority  at all.  The  great  principles  which  they held  were 
of  the profoundest and most  permanent  significance;  but they 
had not drawn out from them  a  complete  and coherent theory 
of the nature of authority in soc~ety. 
CHAPTER  XV. 
THE  THEORY  OF  THE  RELATION  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE. 
WE have endeavoured to recognise something of  the complexity 
of  the  patristic  conceptions  with  regard  to  the  nature  of 
authority  in  the  State.  We  have  at least  seen  that  while 
there  is  in  the  Fathers  a  tendency  towards  a  theory  of 
absolutism  in  the  ruler,  which  finds  its  complete  expression 
in St Gregory the Great, there are also  other  tendencies which 
seem  to  counteract  this.  These  tendencies  may  be  said  to 
centre round the conception of  justice, in spite of  the fact thab 
St  Augustine's hold upon this conception is so loose;  for in this 
matter,  as in so  much  of  his  theology, St Augustine probably 
represents,  not  the normal,  but a  somewhat  eccentric  though 
influential, mode  of  thought.  We think  it is  correct  to say 
that the Fathers tend to think of  the principle  of  justice  as of 
something which lies outside the power of  the civil authority- 
something which it does not create, and to which  it is in some 
measure  answerable.  We  may  perhaps  justly  consider  that 
there is some relation between this conceptio~i  of  a principle of 
justice outside the civil order and the gradually developing con- 
sciousness that while the civil order is itself  one manifestation 
or  expression  of  the principle  of  justice,  this  same  principle 
finds expression  in another  order,  the eccletiastical, which  is, 
Properly speaking, not so much within  the State as parallel to 
it.  We find in the Fathers the consciousness  that the Church 
has its own laws and principles, its own  administrative  author- 
ity, which  is not  at all to be regarded  as dependent up011 the 
State,  but  as  something  which  stands  beside  it and is  inde- 
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State  are  those  of  two  independent  though  closely  related 
powers,  relations  which  it  becomes  necessary,  as  time  goes 
by,  to understand  and define  more  clearly. 
Before the conversion of  Constantine, indeed, there was little 
question about the relation between the State ancl  the Church: 
the Church was not merely separate, but was generally treated 
by the State as an enemy-an  enemy which it would  be well, 
if  possible,  to  destroy.  The  Church  was  a  voluntary  society 
within the Empire, dependent for every public right that it might 
enjoy upon the grudging consent of  the State.  Christians asked 
for toleration, and maintained that they could not give up their 
faith and worship  at the command  of  any earthly power; but 
toleration  was  all  that  they asked,  and they  asked it  in the 
name of humanity, and on the ground that their religion, so far 
from being hurtful to the State or to good morals, would rather 
tend  to loyalty and good  order.  The  Church was  necessarily 
conscious  of  its  independence,  but  this  independence  was  a 
purely spiritual one, and it claimed no rights or properties of  a 
secular kind, except as derived from the sanction and authority 
of  the State. 
The conversion of  Constantine and the official Christianisation 
of  the Empire brought with them an entirely new set of  circum- 
stances; and  the Church had  to  find  its true place  in these 
with much difficulty and labour.  The  change  which  the con- 
version  of  the Empire brought  about  does not  seem  to have 
been  at all clearly  recoglzised  at first; at least we  have  been 
unable to find any source of  information as to this in the litera- 
ture of  the time.  The actual historical circumstances, however, 
gradually  compelled  men  to form some  sort of  theory  of  the 
relation  of  the two  societies.  The relation of  the Church and 
Church law to the civil authorities was gradually defined ;  great 
questions were indeed left outstanding, but we feel that at least 
some of  the Fathers arrived  at certain more or  less clearly de- 
fined conceptions of  the relations between Cllurch and State. 
We think  that,  while  some  of  the Fathers use  ambiguous 
phrases, there can be no serious doubt that after the conversion 
of  Constantine, as much  as before  it, churchmen  did  normally 
refuse to recognise  any authority of  the civil  ruler  in spiritual 
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matters.  Rutillus  of  Aqnilein  has preserved  in his  history  a 
report  of  a  speech  which  Constantine, as he says, made to the 
bishops  of  the  Church  assembled  in  the  Council  of  Nice. 
According  to this  report,  Constantine recognised  very  clearly 
the liniitations  of  the imperial authority in relation to Church 
order.  He acknowledges frankly that he has no jurisdiction 
over bishops in spiritual matters, whiIe  they have jurisdiction 
over  all Christians.'  A little later than the Council  of  Nice, 
we find Hosius of Cordova, as quoted by St Athanasins, in spite 
of his close  connection  with  the imperial court, repudiating in 
the most  emphatic  terms the notion that the emperor had any 
right  to  interfere  in  Church  affairs.  He warns  Constantius 
not  to intrude into ecclesiastical affairs:  God  had  granted to 
him the kingdom, to the churchmen the care of  the Church; he 
should remember that just as any one who should revolt against 
hinl  would  disobey  God,  so  if  he  presumed  to draw  Church 
affairs  under  his  control  he would  be  guilty of  a  great fault.2 
Hosius's tone is very emphatic, much  more  so  than we  should 
perhaps  have expected from  the somewhat  servile attitude of 
churchmen  like  Eusebius  of  Czsarea,  and it  would  seem  to 
indicate  the presence  of  a  more  general appreciation, at that 
time, of the independence of  the Church relatively to the State 
than has  been always  recognised.  If  such language  could  be 
attributed to Constantine, and used by a friend of  the court like 
'  Rufinus,  Hist. Eccl.,  i.  2 : ''  Deus 
vos  const~tuit  sacerdotes, et  potestatem 
vobis  dedit  de  nobis  quoque  judi- 
candi,  et ideo nos  a  vobis  recte  judi- 
camur.  1'0s  autem  non  potestis  ab 
hominibus judicari.  Propter quod Dei 
sollus  inter  vos  exspectate  judicium, 
et vestrs jurgia  quzcumque sunt, ad 
illud  d~vinum reserventur  exanlen. 
Vos etenim nobis  a  Deo  dati estis dii, 
et  con\ enlens non  est ut homo ~udicet 
Deos,  sed  ille  ~olus,  de quo scriptum 
est : ' Deus stetit in synagoga deorum ; 
in meclio autem deos discernit."' 
How  far Rufinus's  report  is histor- 
ically correct is a  matter on  which we 
express no opinion.  We cite the pass- 
%e  nob  to  illustrate  the  standpoint 
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of  Constantine, but that of  a Western 
churchman like Rufinus. 
Hosius  of  Cordova,  letter quoted 
in St  Athanasius, '  Historie Ar~anol  urn,' 
44 : M?  T;#EL  usavrbv €IS ~b t~lrhqurau- 
TLK~.  pq8;  U;  asp) 70b7wv  ipiv aapa- 
KFAEI~U.  ;AA&  piihhov  aap'  GpEv  u7 
pdv#au~  7ai~a.  20; Braurhsiav  6  Bebs 
c've~~~~rutv'  GpTv  7h  7:s  'EKKA~U~S 
2a;u~svus. Kal  i5uacp 6  T~V  u?v  bpx?v 
67~0Khd~~wv  hv~rh&ycr 79  6ra~acapivw 
@E@,  o8rw  +oflijOq.rr p?  Kal  u3,  7h 76s 
'~KKhquias  cir  i-av~bv  &Xrcwv, d?r668uvos 
&~KA~$~UTL  prydho  y6uy.  'A~~~oTF,  yiy- 
paaTaf,  ~h  Kaluapos  Kaluapr,  Kai  71 
703 eEo7  ~1;  ec$.  067;  TO~PVY  $@;V  tip- 
XELY iai  76s YGS  iteu~rv,  067~  v3 707 
Bupr+u  ;[ovu~av  ~XELS  Bacrrhei. 
M Hosius, we need not perhaps be surprised to tind  a man  of  the 
violent temper of Lucifer of  Cagliari using language ideutical in 
sentiment but somewhat more unqualified in tone, in the height 
of  the contest  of  the Athanasian  party with the Emperor Con- 
stantius.  Without these  phrases  of  Rufinus  and  Hosius  we 
should indeed have hesitated as to the genuineness of  the work 
from which we  quote.  Lucifer  indignantly protests that Con- 
stantius is no judge  of  bishops, but rather  should  obey  them 
and their laws ; and he concludes by saying that the emperor is 
not even a Christian, and appointed  by God  to rule his people,  - - 
but only a heretic and a persecut0r.l  Lucifer's tone is like that 
of  the spurious letters of  Gregory 11.  in the eighth century: 
we  might  even  imagine  ourselves  in  the  early  stages  of  the 
Investiture controversy  of  the eleventh  century. 
Against these passages we must no doubt set certain sayings 
which have a  somewhat different  character.  We have already 
quoted  a  passage  from the writings of  St Optatus of  Milevis, 
in which  we  find  represented  a  different attitude towards  the 
1 Lucifer  of  Cagliari,  'Pro  Sancto 
Athanasio,'  i.  (in  Migne,  Patrol. 
Lat.,  vol.  xiii.  p.  826) : "  Sed  dicis : 
isto  in  loco  Deo  devotissimus  Moyses 
quomodo sacerdotum fecit mentionem, 
sic  et judicis.  Proba  te  super  nos 
factum  judicem,  proba  ad  hoc  te 
constitutnm  imperntorem,  ut  nos 
armis  tuis  ad  omnem  implendam 
voluntatem  amici  tui  diaboli  perclu- 
ceres ; cum  probare  non  possis  quia 
praceptum  sit  tibi,  non  solum  non 
dominari  eplscopis,  sed  et ita  eorum 
obedire statutis, ut si subvertere eorum 
decreta tentaveris, si fueris in superbia 
comprehensu~,  morte  mori  jussus  sis. 
Quomodo  dicere  poteris,  jurlicare  te 
posse de episcopis, quibus nisi obedieris, 
jam,  quantum  apud  Deum,  mortis 
pwna  fueris  multatus?  Cum  11rec 
ita  siut,  tu qui  es  profanus, ad  Dei 
domesticos,  quare istam  sumis  in  Dei 
sncerdotum auctoritatem ?  Cum etiam 
ipsos  judices  Judsos, tuuc quando  in 
lege  manebant  Dei,  ex genere  habere 
permiserit  suo.  '  Si  enim'  inquit 
Moyses  'dixeris,  Statnam  supra  me 
principem, quomodo et reliqure  gentes 
. . .'  Et subsequitur,  cur  noluerit 
al~enigenam  fieri priucipem,  ne scilicet 
ad sectam suam traheret alios.  Prop- 
terea dicit : '  Ne revocet nos in &gyp- 
tum,'  hoc  est,  ad  idolorum  cultum, 
quasi  dicat: Quis est tu, inquam, qui 
tibi usurpasti hanc auctoritatem, quam 
tibi Deus non tradidit, et si traderet, et 
inter te esse permitteret, primo in loco 
Christianum  te esse  oportuerat,  quia 
scelus esset  alienigenam Dei  servos ju- 
dicare, inimicum  religionis  domesticos 
Dei.  Deinde  si fuisses Christianus, et 
te participem  censuisset  Deus  sacer- 
dotibus  fieri  ad  gerendum  populum 
ejus, accipe  qualem te esse prsceperit 
in Deuteronomio.  '  Et  erit cum sederit 
in  principatu  suo, scribe  hoc  in libro 
ante sacerdotes et levitas, et erit cum 
ipso. . . .' Quid tu  hujusmocli habes, nisi 
omnia  contraria,  nisi  cuncta,  qua Dei 
impugnent  domum?  Primo  es hare- 
ticus,  deinde  persecutor  Dei  domesti- 
corum." 
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State, and its interference with  Church matters.  Donatus had 
evidently treated the intervention of  the emperor in favour of 
the Catholic party just  as Lucifer  of  Cagliari had treated  his 
interference against  it, and had  indignantly  argued  that  the 
emperor had no right to interfere in Church matters.  St  Optatus 
urges in reply that the Church is in the empire, not the empire 
in the Church, and seems  to  treat the attitude of  Donatus as 
that of  one who set himself  over  the emperor, while, he urges, 
there is no one over the emperor  but G0d.l  Optatus seems to 
go rather far towards admitting the supremacy of  the imperial 
jurisdiction even in Church matters. 
It  is natural to conjecture that some such notion  lies behind 
that strange phrase of  Arnbrosiaster, to which we have  already 
referred.  He calls  the king the Vicar  of  God, and says that 
he has the image  of  God, and the bishop  has that of  Chri~t.~ 
The  phrase  is  indeed very  difficult  of  interpretation,  but it is 
at least possible that it is intended to signify some superiority 
of  jurisdiction. 
If, then, we find in some of  the Christian writers a very clear 
and explicit declaration  of  the principle that the State has no 
jurisdiction  in  Church  matters,  we  must  also  recognise  that 
others tend to a more doubtful  position.  We rnay in part ex- 
plain the phrases  of  the latter as only referring  to  the power 
of  the State to carry out secular  penalties  for  eccclesiastical 
offences: no doubt  the Catholic  Church, when it invoked  the 
arm  of  the  temporal  power  to put  down  heretics  and schis- 
matics,  conceived  that  its  position  was  secure,-that  it was 
for the Church  to judge  in spiritual matters,  for  the  secular 
Power  to  carry  out  the  consequence  of  its  jcdgments  in 
secular  conditions.  But  actually  the  policy  of  persecution 
did  tend  to  make  the  State the arbitrator between  different 
religious parties.  At the same time, we  do not think there can 
be any doubt as to the normal character of  the Church  theory 
with regard to its relation  to the State.  Indeed, the considera- 
tion  of  the views  of  these writers is, we  think, of  importance, 
rrlainly as preparing us for  the examination of  the much more 
complete treatment of  the subject in the work  of  St A~nbrose. 
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In St  Ambrose the theory of  the relation between the Church 
and State is  more  or  less  clearly  defined.  He is  clear  that 
certain rights of  the Church are sacred  and  inviolable, in the 
very  nature  of  things,  and in accordance  with  the nature of 
God's  ordinance in the world.  He is very clearly conscious that 
the Church has its own jurisdiction, to which all Christian men, 
whatever their rank, are subject, and that the jurisdiction  of the 
State does not extend over any strictly ecclesiastical matters. 
We have already seen that St Ambrose, like all the Fathers, 
recognises  the  divine  character  of  the  civil order of  society. 
He insists that the Christian  man  must  render  obedience  to 
the  civil  ruler  in virtue  of  his  religion : not  even  the priest 
is to act disrespectfully  towards  the civil  ruler,  but,  on the 
other hand, if  the ruler  commits  any grave offence, then the 
priest  must reprove  him?  The  ministers of  the Church have 
jurisdiction  over  all Christian men,  and their jurisdiction ex- 
tends even  over  the Emperor  or  other civil ruler.2  For even 
the Emperor is the son of  the Church, subject to its authority, 
to its discipline : no title, St Smbrose says, is more  honourable 
than that of  son of  the Church,-the  Emperor  is within  the 
Church, not over it.3  We find  it, therefore, very natural that 
we  should hear of  St Ambrose  exercising the last discipline of 
the Church, even  against  so  pious  and orthodox a ruler as the 
great Theodosius.  The  story of  the  exclusion  of  Theodosius 
from the Eucharist is,  of  course,  very  familiar, and it is not 
necessary here to detail  the circumstances.  For the massacre 
St  Ambrose,  Enarr. in  PS. sxxvii. 
43 : "Vides  ergo  quia  regibus  non 
temere  vel  a  prophetis  Dei,  vel  a 
sacerdotibus  facienda injuria  sit ; si 
nulla  sint graviora  peccata, in  quibus 
debeant  argui:  ubi  autem  peccata 
graviora sunt, ihi non videtur a  Sacer- 
dote parcendum, ut justis increpationi- 
bus corrigantur." 
St  Ambrose, Ep. xxi. 4 (Ad Valent. 
11.) : "  Quando  audisti,  clementissime 
Imperator,  in  causa  fidei  laicos  de 
episcopo judicasse.  . . . At certe si vel 
Scripturarum  seriem  divinarum,  vel 
vetera  tempora  retractemus,  quis  est 
qui abnuat in causa  fidei, in causa, in- 
quam, fidei episcopoa  solere de impera- 
toribus Christianis, non imperatores de 
episcopis judicare. " 
St  Ambrose,  Serino contra Ausen- 
tium,  36  in  Ep.  xxi. : "  Quod  cum 
honorificentia imperatoris dictum nemo 
potest negare.  Quid euim honorificen- 
tius, quam ut imperator Ecclesire filius 
eese dicatur?  Quod  cum dicitur, sine 
peccato dicitur, cum gratia dicitur.  Im- 
perator enin~  intra Ecclesiam, non supra 
Ecclesiam  est ;  bonus enim  imperator 
qurerit auxilium Ecclesia non refutat." 
Contrast with St  Optatus.  See p. 148. 
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in ~hessalonica  Theodosius  was  responsible,  and  St Ambrose 
excluded him from attendance at the celebration  of  the Euch- 
arist.  It is perhaps worth while  to  cite some  words  from  St 
Ambrose's  letter  to Theodosius,  and  to  observe  the  mingled 
deference  and  firmness  with  which  St Anlbrose  tells  Theo- 
dosius  that he  cannot  offer  the sacrifice"  if  he is  present? 
It may, perhaps, serve to  bring  out more  clearly the signif- 
icance  of  this  event, when  we  observe  that this  action  was 
not isolated, but that for  a  much  smaller matter, as we  learn 
from a  letter to  his sister, St Ambrose  had  been  prepared  to 
take  almost  the same action.  Certain Christians had  burned 
down a  synagogue  of  the Jews,  and  some  monks  had burned 
down  a  church  belonging  to  adherents  of  the  Valentinian 
heresy.  Theodosias, very justly,  as we  should probably think, 
ordered  the  Christians  to  rebuild  the  synagogue,  and  the 
punishment  of  the  monks.  But St Ambrose  took  another 
view  of  the  matter,  and  regarded  the  action  of  Tl~eodosius 
as  being  contrary to religion.  He wrote  him  a  letter  on  the 
subject, and then preached on the matter in  his  presence, and, 
the sermon ended, demanded of  Theodosius  an assurance  that 
he  would withdraw the obnoxious  order, before  he would con- 
sent to celebrabe  the E~rt-larist,.~  Practically, St  Ambrose was 
St  Ambrose, Ep. li. 13 :  "Ego certe  rem : tecum  autem  aliter  agendum, 
in  omnibus  aliis  licet  debitor  pietati  qui tan1 dura loqueris. 
tu~,  cui  ingratus  esse  non  possum,  28.  Deinde  cum aliquamdiu starem, 
quam  pietatem  nlultis  imperatoribus  dico imperatori : Fac me securum pro 
Pmferebam,  uni  adequabam:  ego  te  offerre,  absolve  animum  meunt. 
inquam,  causam  in  te  contumaci=  Cum assideret, annueretque, non tamen 
llullam  habeo,  sed  habeo  timolis ;  aperte polliceretur,  atque ego starem, 
ofierre  non  audeo  sacrificium,  ai  disit  se  eme~ldaturum rescriptum. 
volueris  assistere."  Statim dicere coepi,  ut omnem  cogni- 
St  Ambrose (to his sister), Ep.  xli.  tionem tolleret ; ne occasione  cognitionis 
27: "Ubi descendi, &it  nlihi :  De nobis  comes  aliqua  Christianos attereret in- 
Proposuisti.  Respondi : Hoc  tractavi,  juria.  Promisit  futurum.  Aio  illi : 
quad  ad  utilitatem  tuam  pertineret.  Ago fide tua ;  et  repetivi.  Ago fide tua. 
Tune ait : Re vera de syilagoga repar-  Age, inquit, fide mea.  Et  ita ad altare 
anda ab episcopo durius statueram, sed  accessi, non aliter  accessurus nisi mihi 
emendatuln est.  Monachi multa scelera  plene  promisisset.  Et vere  tanta ob- 
faciunt.  Tunc Timasius magister equi-  lationis fuit grstia,  ut sentirem etiam 
et peditum ccepit adversum mona-  ipse  eam Deo  nostro  commenclatiorem 
esse  rehementior.  Respondi  ei :  fuisse gratiam, et clioinam  prreaentiam 
cum  imperatore ago,  ut oportet ;  non  defuisse.  Omnia  itaque  ex sen- 
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threatening Theodosius with  exclusion  from attendance  at the 
celebration of  the sacrament. 
St Ambrose, then, is very clear  in his  assertion  of  the prin- 
ciple that the Church  exercises jurisdiction  over  all  Christian 
men, even the most exalted-even  over  the chief  of  the State. 
And  at the same  time he asserts,  with  equal  emphasis,  the 
principle  that in  religious  matters  the civil  magistrate  has 
110  authority  over  ecclesiastics.  lye have  cited  one  of  the 
emphatic passages  in  which  St; Ambrose  asserts that in mat- 
ters  of  faith the layman has  no jurisdiction  over  the priest? 
He evidently traces this rule  to the divine  law, and that law, 
he urges, is greater than the imperial ;  but he  also  urges that 
the principle  has  been  admitted  by  the imperial  legislation. 
In the letter from which we  have just  cited  St Ambrose urges 
U 
this point with great persistence.  He had  been  requested to 
appear  before  the Imperial Court,  and he  refuses  to  comply, 
on  the  ground  that  this  was  an  infringement  of  a  law  of 
Valentinian I.3  We do not  propose  to enter into the history 
of  ecclesiastical  exemption  from  secular  jurisdiction,  a  sub- 
ject  of  formidable  complexity,  but  it  is necessary  to observe 
it as  illustrating  the  development  of  the  position  of  the 
Church  as  being,  within  its own  sphere,  independent  of  the 
State. 
It is not only in relation  to  the jurisdiction  of  the Church 
over  the  laity  in  spiritual  matters,  and  its  independence 
See p.  180, note 2. 
St  Ambrose,  Ep.  xxi.  10  (Ad 
Valent. 11.) : "  Ecce,  imperator, legem 
tuam  jam  ex  parte  rescindis :  sed 
utinam non ex parte, sed in unirersum ! 
legem enim tuan~  nollem esse supra Dei 
legem.  Dei lex nos docuit quid sequa- 
mur,  humanse  leges  hoc  clocere  non 
possu11t." 
St  Ambrose,  Ep.  xxi.  2  (Ad 
Valent.  11.) : "  Cui  rei  respondeo,  ut 
arhitror, competenter.  Nec  quisquam 
coutumacenl  judicare  me  debet,  cum 
hoc  asseram,  quod  augustce  memoria 
pater  tuus  non  solurn  sermone  re- 
spondit, sed  etiam  legibus  suis sanuit. 
Iu causa  fidei  vel  ecclesiastici alicujus 
ordinis  eum  judicare  debere,  qui  nec 
munere  impar  sit, llec jure dissimilis ; 
haec enim verba rescripti sunt, hoc  est, 
sacerdotes  de sacerdotibus voluit judi- 
care.  Quinetiarn  si alias  quoque  ar- 
gueretur  epibcopus,  et  morum  esset 
examinanda  causa,  etiam  hac  voluit 
ad episcopale judicium  pertinere.  . . . 
5.  Eris Deo favente, etiam senectutis 
maturitate  provectior,  et tunc de hoe 
censebis  qualis  ille  episcopus  sit,  qui 
laicis jus sacerdotale substernit.  Pater 
tuus, Deo  favente, vir  maturioris  mvi, 
dicebat : non  est nleum  judicare inter 
episcopos ; tua  nunc  dicit  dementia. 
Ego debeo judicare.  . .  ." 
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of  the civil  ruler in all such  matters,  that we  can  recognise 
in  St Ambrose  the  sense  of  the  existence  of  a  power  and 
law  which  is  altogether  outside  of  the  sphere  of  the  civil 
ruler.  We can  see in his  writings the beginning  of  the im- 
portance  of  those  questions with  regard  to Church property, 
round which SO much of the controversies of  later times turned. 
We have  fortunately a  tolerably full account  in St Ambrose's 
own  writings  of  the position  he took  up,  when  the emperor 
wished  to insist on his  giving up one or more of  the churches 
in his  diocese for the use  of  the Arians.  In a  letter to his 
sister  he  gives  an account  of  the discussion  between  himself 
and  the  oilicials  sent  to  demand  this.  They  insisted  that 
he  should  acquiesce  promptly, for  the  emperor  was  within 
his rights, for  all things  were  in his  power.  He replied  that 
if the emperor were to demand his private property, he would 
not  refuse  it; but  those  things  which  were  divina were  not 
subject  to  the  imperial  power.  Further  on,  however,  he 
qualities  this  statement  by  urging  that  the  emperor  cannot 
lawfully  seize  a  private  house,  much  less  the  house  of  God. 
When he is again urged to surrender a church, he replies that 
it is neither lawful for him to surrender it nor  for  the emperor 
to accept  it.  The emperor, if  he wishes to reign  long, must be 
subject  to  God, and obey  the rule to  give  to Czsar  what  is 
C~sar's  and to God what is God's.  Palaces belong  to the em- 
peror, churches to the priest, and he cannot surrender a churcll.' 
'  Ep. xx. 8 : "  Convenior  ipse a corn-  auferendam ?  Allegatur  imperatori 
itibus  et  t~ibunis,  ut  basilic=  fieret  licere  omnia,  ipsius  esse  universa. 
matura  traditio,  dicentibus  impera-  Respondeo, noli te gravare, Imperator, 
torem jure  suo uti, eo  quod in  potes-  ut putes te in ea, quae  divina sunt, im- 
tate ejus esseut  omnia.  Respondi,  si  periale aliquod jus habere.  Noli te ex- 
a  me  peteret,  quod  meum est, id est,  tollere, sed si vis diutius imperare, esto 
fu~ldum  meum, argenturn meum, quid-  Deo  subditus.  Scriptum est, quie Dei 
vib  hujusmodi meum, me  non refragn-  Deo, quse C~salls,  Czsari.  Ad impera- 
turum ; quamquam  omnia  quae  mei  torem  palatia  pertinent, ad sacerdotem 
aunt, essent pauperum : verunl ea quae  Ecclesiz.  Publicorum  tibi  nloenium 
Wlft divina, imperatorice  potestati  non  jus commissum est, non sacrorum.  . . . 
essi:  subjects. . . .  22.  Tradere  basilicam  non  possum 
19. Mandatur denique:  Trade  bag-  sed  pugnare non  deheo.  . . - 
ilidam.  Respondeo : Nec mihi fas  est  23.  Si  hzc  t~rannidis videntur, 
trddere,  nec  tibi  accipere,  Imperator,  habeo  arma,  sed  in  Christi  nomine ; 
exl'edit.  Domum  privati  null0  potes  habeo  offerendi  mei  corporis  potest- 
jur e  ternerare,  domum  Dei  existimas  atem.  Quid moraretur ferire, si tyran. 184  THE KEW  TESTAMENT AND  THE FATHERS.  [PART 111. 
In the public  discourse  which  St Ambrose  delivered  upon 
the  same  subject  he  repeats  the  same observations,  but also 
throws  some  further  light  upon  the  question  of  what  he 
understood  to  be  the  Church  property,  which  was  sacred  to 
God.  He  protests  his  habitual  respect  for  the emperor, but 
the demand for a church he cannot comply with.  But, he adds, 
the lands of  the Church pay tribute to the emperor; and if  the 
emperor  wishes  to take  these, he will  not  resist.'  Evidently 
he draws a distinction  between  the churches and other ecclesi- 
astical  property.  The  distinction  is  one of  some  importance 
with regard to later developments of  the relation of  the State 
to Church property. 
St Ambrose, then, is clear that there are distinct limitations 
to the imperial authority when the emperor comes into relation 
with religious matters.  The Church  has its own  position  and 
authority, which  is  independent  of  that  of  the  State.  We 
' 
think that it is not unreasonable  to judge  that there was  some 
relation between these clear convictions of  St  Ambrose and that 
tendency which  we  have  already observed in him to limit the 
absolute authority of  the civil ruler, even in secular  matters- 
at least, to conceive of  his authority as limited by the principle 
of  justice, and perhaps as limited by the laws of  the State. 
In the latter part of  the fifth  century  the question  of  the 
relation  between  the authority of  the State and  that  of  the 
Church  is  discussed  very  fully,  especially  in  the  letters and 
treatises of  Pope Gelasius I. ; and these not only show us how 
clearly  the question  was  then  apprehended,  but  also  lay  the 
foundations  on  which  the  theory  of  the  ninth  century  was 
based.  It  is  true  that  these  discussions  and  definitions 
num putaret 7  Veteri jure a sacerdoti- 
bus donata imperia, non  usurpata:  et 
vulgo  dici  quad  imperatores  sacer- 
dot~um  magis  optavelulit,  quam  im- 
perium  aacerdotes.  . . . Addidi  quia 
numquam  sacerdotes  tyranni fuerunt, 
sed tyrannos sspe sunt passi." 
St  Ambrose, Sermo contra Auxen- 
tium, in Ep.  xxi.:  "  Scitis et vos  ipsi 
quol ~mperatoribus  solea~n  deferre non 
cetlere : suppliciia  me libenter  offerre, 
nec  metuere qus parautur. . . . 
33.  Agri  Ecclesiae  solvunt  trib- 
utum : xi  agros  desidelat  imperator, 
potestatem habet >indieandorum; uemo 
nostlum intervenit.  Potest pauperihus 
collatio pupuli redundare : non faci,mt 
de agr is in1 icliam, tollant eos, si libiturn 
cst  imperatori : non  dono  sed  r on 
nego." 
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go  to  establish  a  theory  of  a  strict  dualism  in  society,  and 
they  are not  therefore  in  accord  with  the tendency of  those 
rnedi=val  thinkers who  thought  of  society as organised  under 
the terms of  a complete unity.  The development of  the theory 
of  unity in society is one of  the most important of  the move- 
ment~  which  we  shall have to study,-one  of  the most  inter- 
esting aspects of  mediaeval political theory:  we are at the same 
time  not  certain whether  its  historical  significance  has  not 
been  to some extent exaggerated,-whether  scholars  have  not 
sometimes  mistaken  the formal  or  superficial  tendencies  of 
medizval  political  thought  for  the fundamental.  We are not 
quite sure whether the real importance of  the conception of  an 
absolute or  formal unity  in society,  either in mediaeval  or  in 
modern  political theory, is quite what some may imagine.  But 
this is a subject about which we shall have more to say in later 
volumes.  The discussions  and definitions of  the fifth  century 
belong to a stage in the development  of  political theory  when 
the conception of  dualism in society was taking shape and mak- 
ing itself  felt as of  importance in practical  adrniliistration:  we 
can  at the same time recognise  in them some of  the elements 
out of  which, in later times, the theory of  the complete  unity 
of  society was to be constructed. 
The  historical  circumstances  which  produced  the literature 
which we have now to examine were of  a highly complex kind. 
The Council of  Chalcedon had tried to end the disputes of  the 
Alexandrian  and Antiochene schools in the Church by a defin- 
ition  of  the doctrine  of  the union  of  the hurnan  and  divine 
natures in our  Lord,  which  was  intended  equally to condemn 
the extreme or  so-called  monophysite  tendency  of  the Alex- 
andrian and the extreme or so-called Nestorian tendency of  the 
Antiochene  school.  In the main,  u~hile  its  decisions  resulted 
in the separation  from  the Church  of  a  certain number of  ex- 
tremists  at each end, the decisio~ls  of  Chalcedon  did conclude 
the historical settlement of the terms of  the faith of  the Church 
with regard  to our Lord's  nature.  But it was  more  than two 
centuries before the disputes on the subject in the Church were 
set at rest.  The monopliysite tendency was so strong, especially 
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parently of  Acacius, Patriarch of  Constantinople, issued a state- 
ment known  to  us as the "Henoticon,"  in which  he tried  to 
state the doctrine  of  our  Lord's  nature in  such  a  way  as to 
conciliate  the Egyptians.  In the West, however, and  notably 
by the Bishops  of  Rome,  these  proceedings were  looked  upon 
with the greatest disfavour, and Felix 11. finally anathematised 
Acacius.  It  is not clear that Felix or his successor, Gelasius I., 
actually excommunicated  either Zeno  or  any of  the other  em- 
perors who  remained  in  communion  with  Acacius,  and  with 
Peter,  the Patriarch  of  Alexandria;  but practically  all com- 
munion  with  those  who  held  to Acacius  was  broken  off,  and 
the Emperors and tlie  Bishop  of  Rome  found  themselves  in 
formal  opposition  to each  other. 
The  circumstances  of  the  time  were  no  doubt  favourable 
to the development  of  an independent attitude in the Western 
Church, for this was the period during which the Gothic invasions 
and occupation  had  practically destroyed all the  power  of  the 
Byzantine emperor in Italy.  This  may perhaps  partly explain 
the confidence of  the tone adopted by  the bishops  of  Rorne  to- 
wards the emperors, though it would be a mistake to think that 
such an attitude towards the civil ruler was unprecedented : we 
have  indeed  seen  something  of  the same kind in the case of 
St Ambrose. 
We may perhaps with advantage notice  some details in the 
theory of  Felix 11. and Gelasius I. with  regard  to the relations 
of the Church and the emperor  before we  discuss  their formal 
definitions  on  this  subject.  They  both  assert  with  great 
emphasis the subordination even of  the emperor to the Church 
in spiritual matters.  Felix exhorts Zeno to remember that it is 
well  for him if he strive to submit  his  royal will to the priests 
of  Christ:  when  the  things  concerning  God  are in  question, 
the  king  should  learn  rather  than  presume  to  teach.l  I11 
1 Felix II., Ep. riii. 5 : "  Ccrtum est  Ecclesis formam  sequi,  non  huic hu- 
enim,  lioc  rebus  vestris  esse  salutare,  mnnitus sequenda jura pracfigere, neque 
ut cum de causis Dei  agitur, et juxta  ejus  sanctionibus  velle  dominari,  cui 
ipsius  constitutum  regiam  voluntatenl  Deus voluit olementiam tuam pie de- 
sacerdotibus Christi studeatis subdere,  votionis colla submittere : ne dum men- 
non  preferre, et sacrosancta  per eorum  sura  ccclesti~ dispositionis  exceditur 
prahules  discere  potills  quam  doce~e.  eatur in contuuieliam disponentis." 
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the  tenth letter of  Pope Gelasius the same thing is said, with 
a  little additional precision  and a special assertion of 
the authority  of  the apostolic see.  The secular power  should 
learn, not judge, of divine things from the bishops, and specially 
from  the Vicar  of  St Peter:  not  even  the most  powerful  of 
Christian  rulers  of  the world  may  draw  such  things into his 
hands.'  The subject is drawn out in greater detail in the first 
letter  attributed  to  Gelasius,  a  letter  thought  to  have  been 
written  by him in the name of  Pope  Pelix 11.  to the Eastern 
bishops.  The  emperor  has  no  authority, Gelasius  urges,  to 
consider  the cause of  an ecclesiastic or to receive him to com- 
munion:  this is contrary to all church order.  The emperor is 
the son, not the ruler, of  the Church : God gave the authority of 
ruler in His Church to bishops and priests, not to secular rulers 
or  to  the  civil  law.  The  emperor  has  indeed  received  his 
authority  from  God,  and  should  therefore  not  set  himself 
against  tlie  divine  order.2 
1 Gelasius I., Ep. X. 9 : "Si quantum  ponenda sunt, pertinere,  non  ad ssculi 
ad religiouem pertinet, non nisi apostoli-  potestates ;  qua, si fideles sunt, Ecclesia 
ce  sedi juxta  canones  debetur  sunima  sue et sacerdotibus  voluit  esse  sub- 
judicii  totius ; si  quantum  ad  ssculi  jectas.  Non  sibi vindicet alienum jus, 
potestatem, illa a  pont~ficibus  et prae  et n~inisterium,  quotl altero deputatum 
cipue  a  beati  Petri vicario  debet cog-  est ; ne contra eum tendat abrupte, a 
noscere,  qua  divina  sunt,  non  ipsa 
eadem  judicare.  Xec  sibi  hoc  quis- 
quam  potentissimus sacculi, qui tame11 
Christianus  est,  vindicare  prssumit, 
nisi  religicnem  forsitan  persequens." 
Welasius I., Ep.  i.  10,  Ad  Epis. 
copos  Orientales :  'l An  imperator 
illum  discussit  atque suscepit ?  Con- 
stat interim illum ecclesiasticis regulis 
no11  receptum : ab ecclesiastics  igitur 
regula  receptio ejus omnis  alieua  est. 
Quad  ~i  dixeris :  '  Sed  imperator 
cathollcus  est' ;  ~alva  pace  ipsius 
dixerimus,  filius  est,  non  pracsul  Ec- 
clesie : quod  ad religionem  competit, 
discere  ei convenit  non docere ; habet 
Privilegia  potestatis sus, que  adminis. 
trandis  publicis  rebus  divinitus  con- 
secutus  est ; et  ejus  beneficlis  non 
ingratus contra  dispositionem  ccelestis 
ordinis  nil  usurpet.  Ad  sacerdotes 
enirn  Deur  volult,  qua  Ecclesia  dis- 
quo  omnia  constituta sunt, et contra 
illius beneficia pugnare vide~tur,  a quo 
propriam  consecutus  est  potestaten~. 
Non legibus publicis, non a potestatibus 
ssculi, sed a pontificibus et  sacerdotibus 
omnipotens Deus  Christiane religionis 
dominos  et sacerdotes  volu~t  ordinari, 
et  discuti recipique de errore remeantes. 
Imperatores Christiani subdere debent 
exsecutiones  suss ecclesiasticis  prssul- 
ibus,  non  prsferle.  Nulla  ergo  nec 
certa discussio  est, nec  manere  potest 
ista  susceptio  ejus, quem  Ecclcsia  suis 
legibus  nec ordine cornpetenti  nec dis- 
cussit  omnino  nec  communioni  res- 
tituit.  Ideoque  potius  errori  ejus 
communicavit  Acacius  catholicamque 
fidem ei prostituit, quam illum ad com- 
n~unionem  catholicarn rerocarit ; cujus 
ruim con est ordinata receptio, sequitur 
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As we have said, we do not find  in these letters  any trace of 
a  definite or explicit excomn~unication  of  the emperor; but it 
is evident from then1 that they do not look upon the emperor as 
in any way exempt  from  the operation of  such  general discip- 
linary  measures  as  they  had  taken.  Felix  II. seenis  to  put 
before the Emperor Zeno  the choice  between  comnlunion with 
St Peter or  with  Peter of  Alexandria;'  and while Gelasius I. 
expresses  himself  in  courteous  and  friendly  terms,  and  re- 
pudiates the notion  that he  has  condemned  the emperor, yet 
we  think  that  his  phrases  practically  mean  that  cotnmunion 
with the excommunicate separates the emperor from the Roman 
Ch~rch.~ 
The attitude of  Felix  and Gelasius  towards the emperor  is 
courteous,  and even  deferential,  but  it  is  at the  same  time 
quite firm.  It  is clear that while they were reluctant to break 
with the emperor, to have  an open  quarrel with him, they had 
no hesitation in resisting him.  It is, in this connection, there- 
fore, very interesting  to find that we have in one of  the letters 
of  Gelasius  perhaps the first example of  a regular enumeration 
of  occasions on which churchmen had, as he thinks, been  com- 
pelled to resist  and reprove the secular ruler.  Gelasius begins 
by  referring  to  the rebuke  of  David  by  the prophet  Nathan, 
and then mentions  the public  separation  of  Theodosius  from 
the  communion  of  the Church  by  St Ambrose,  the rebuke  of 
Theodosius  the younger  by St Leo,  the action  of  Pope Hilary 
'  Felix  II.,  Ep.  viii.  2: "Unde 
quoniam adhortationem meam duxistis 
onerosam, in vestro relinquo  delibera- 
tionis  arbitrio,  utrum  beati  apostoli 
Petri an Alexandrini Petri cuiquam sit 
eligenda communio." 
Gelasius  I.,  Ep.  X. 2 : "Quid  sibi 
vult autem, quod diserit imperator, a 
nobis  se  irreligiose  damnatum,  cum 
super hac payte  et decessor meus non 
solum nlinime nomen ejus attigerit, sed 
insuper quando principia adeptus regie 
potestatis exseruit, in ejus se rescripsit 
imperii  pronlotione  gaudere : et ego 
nulla ipsius unquam scripta percipiens, 
honorificis eum, ut nostis, litteris salu- 
tare cnraverim  ?  Decessores mei sacer- 
dotes, qui prievaricatorihus se communi- 
cn-se  propria  voce  confessi  sunt,  a 
communione  apostolica  subnloverunt. 
Si isti placet se miscel e damnatis, nobis 
lion  potest  imputari ; si  ab eis  velit 
abscedere,  tanto  magis  a  nobis  non 
potest  esse  darnnatus,  sec1  potius  ad 
gratiam sincerz communionis admissus 
Ad  senatum  vero  pertinet  Romanum, 
ut memor  fidei, quam a  parentibus se 
suscepisse meminit, contagia vitet com- 
munionis  externs, ne  a  communione 
hujus sedis apostolics, quod absit, red- 
datur exte~uus." 
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against  the Emperor  Anthemius, and of  Pope  Simplicias  and 
Pope  Felix  against the usurper  Basiliscus  and the legitimate 
Ernperor  Zeno.'  This  enumeration  of  cases  in  which  the 
authority  of  the  Church  had  dealt  with  and  rebuked  the 
heads  of  the civil  government  serves  to  furnish us with  an 
interesting view  of  the circumstances out  of  which  arose  the 
growing consciousness of  the existence of  an authority in the 
Church  independent of, and in its own sphere superior to, that 
of  the State. 
We may  again  note that Pope Gelasius  was  concerned not 
only  to  assert  the  authority  of  the  Church  in  all  spiritual 
matters,  but  also  to  establish  the  principle  that  the  civil 
power  had  no jurisdiction  over  ecclesiastical  persons,  at least 
in  spiritual  matters.  We have  a  letter  in  which  he  indig- 
nantly protests  to the Eastern bishops against their suffering 
ecclesiastical  persons  to be tried  by  secular authoritiese2  We 
Gelasius I., Ep. sxvi. 11 : "  R'athan 
propheta palam publiceque in facie regi 
David  et commissum pronuntiavit er- 
rorem, et  ipsum commississe non tacuit, 
et confessione correctum consequentei- 
absolvit.  Beats memoris Ambrosius, 
Mediolanensis  sacerdos  ecclesis,  ma- 
jorem Theodosium imperatorem a com- 
munione  publice  palamque  suspendit, 
atque ad  pcenitentiam  redegit  regiam 
potestatem.  Beats  memoris  papa 
Leo,  sicut legitur, imperatorern Theo- 
dosium  juniorem  Ephesino  latrocinio 
libere  coarguib  excedentem.  Sancts 
memoriie  quoque  papa  Hiiarius Anth- 
emium imperatorem, quum Philotheus 
Macedonianus ejus familiaritate sufful- 
tus diversarum  conciliabula  nova  sec- 
tarurn  in Urbem vellet  induccre,  apud 
beatum Petrum apostolum palam, ne id 
fieret, clara voce const~  inxit in tantum, 
ut non  ea Eacienda  cum interpositione 
Bacramenti idem promitteret imperator. 
Sancte  memorire  nih~lomiuus papa 
Simplicius,  et  post  eum  sancta  me- 
mo&  paps Felix, non solum Basiliscum 
t~rannum, sed  etiam  imperatorem 
Zenonem  pro  iifidem  ipsis  excessibus 
auctoritate  libera  siepius  increpasae 
noscuntur ; flectique  potuisset,  nisi 
Constantinopolitani  priesulis  accender- 
etur instinctu,  qui  particeps  externs 
comnlunionis  effectus,  necessario,  in 
quod inciderat, jam  fovebat, malens in 
sum  prsvaricationis  obstinatione  pcr- 
sistere,  quam  cul-andus  acl  salubria 
remeare,  sicub  ipse  rerum  probavit 
eventus."  For  a  discussion  of  the 
authenticity of  this passage, we would 
refer  to Thiel's  Preface  to his edition 
of  these letters. 
Gelasius  I.,  Ep.  xxvii.  S :  "Cur 
igitur compassi  non estis tantis fratri- 
bus  vestris.  Cur non  adiistis  imper- 
atorem l  Cur non Ecclesire  causam et 
sacerdotii  miserabilem  decolorationem 
continuatis  vocibus  deflevistis ?  alle- 
gantes ; numquam  de pontificibus  nisi 
Ecclesiam  judicasse ;  non  esse human- 
arum legum  de talibus  ferre  senten- 
tiam  absque  Ecclesia  principaliter 
coustitutis pontificibus : obsequi  solere 
principes Christianos decretis Ecclesis, 
non  suam  prsponere potestatem, epis- 
copis caput subdere principem solitum, 
non de eorum capitibus judicare." are  not  prepared  to  express  a  definite  judgment  upon  the 
extent of  the immunity which Pope Gelasius claims for ecclesi- 
astics : it is enough for our purpose to observe  how vigorously 
he repudiates  the idea of  the State having any authority over 
them, in matters, at any rate,  belonging  to  the Church. 
The  theory  of  the  relation  of  the  two  authorities,  the 
Church  and  the  State,  is  definitely  set  out  in  the  fourth 
Tractate and the twelfth  letter of  Pope  Gelasius.  Together 
these  furnish  us with  a  statement  of  the  actual  spheres  of 
the two  powers, and also with  some explanation of  the cause 
of  their separation.  Before the coming of  Christ, Gelasius says, 
there were some who were justly and legitimately both kings and 
priests, such as Melchizedek; and Satan imitated this among 
the unbelievers,-hence  it was  that the pagan  emperors  held 
the office  of  Pontifex  Maximus.  The  true  and  perfect  king 
and priest was Christ Himself, and in that sense in which His 
people  are partakers of  His nature  they may be  said to be  a 
royal and priestly  race.  But Christ, knowing the weakness of 
human nature, and careful for the welfare of  His people, separ- 
ated the two offices, giving  to each  its peculiar  functions and 
duties.  Thus the Christian emperor needs the ecclesiastic  for 
the attainment of  eternal life, and the ecclesiastic depends upon 
the  government  of  the emperor  in temporal  things.l  There 
l  Gelasius  I.,  Tractatus  iv.  11: 
"Quodsi  hsc tentare  formidant,  nec 
ad sua pertinere cognoscunt modulum 
potestatis, cui tantum de humanis rebus 
judicare permissum est, non etiam pra- 
esse divinis ; quomodo de his, per quos 
divina  ministrantur,  judicare  prs- 
sumunt  ?  Fuerint hec ante adventum 
Christi,  ut quidam  figuraliter,  adhuc 
tarnen  in  carnalibus  actionibus  con- 
ntituti,  pariter  reges  exsisterent  et 
pariter sacerdoten,  quod eanctum Mel- 
chisedech  fuisse  sacra  prodit  hibtoria. 
Quod  in suis quoque diabolus imitstus 
eat,  utpote  qui  semper  qus diviiio 
cultui  conrenircnt  sibimet  tyrannico 
spiritu viudicare  contendit,  ut pagalli 
imperatores iidem et maximi pontlhces 
dicerentur.  Sed quum ad verum \en- 
tum est eumdem  regem  atque ponti- 
ficem,  ultra sibi  nec  imperator  ponti- 
ficis nomen imposuit, nec pontifex regale 
fastigium  vindicavit : (quamvis  enim 
membra ipsius, id est, veri regis atque 
pontificis,  secundum  participationem 
nature  magnificz  utrumque  in  sacra 
generositate  sumpsisse  dicantur,  ut 
simul  regale  genus et sacerdotale sub- 
sistant) :  quoniam  Christus  memor 
fragilitatis  hum~ns, quod  suorum 
saluti  congrueret,  dispensatione  mag- 
nifica temperavit, sic actionibus propriis 
dignitatibusque  distinct~s  ofticid  potes- 
tates utriusque  discrevit,  suos  voleus 
medicinali bumilitate salvari, non  hu- 
mana superbia rursus iiitercipi :  ut et 
Chriitiani imperatores pro sterna rita 
poutificibus indigerent, et  pontifices pro 
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are, then, two authorities  by  wliich  chiefly  the world  is  ruled, 
the  sacred  authority  of  the  prelates  and  the  royal  power; 
but  the burden  laid  upon  the priests is the heavier, for  they 
will have to give  account in the divine judgment, even for the 
kings  of  men: thus it is  that the emperor  looks  to them for 
the means of  his salvation, and submits to them and to their 
judgment  in sacred  matters.  The authority of  the emperor is 
derived  from  the divine order, and the rulers of  religion  obey 
his  laws:  he  should  therefore the  more  zealously  obey  them. 
If the bishop  is silent when  lie ought to speak for  the divine 
he  will  run  great  danger,  and  so  also  will  he  who 
contemns this authority instead of  obeying it.  If  the faithful 
owe obedience to all priests, how much more do they owe it to 
the bishop of  that see which God has set over all priests? 
The most  important points in these definitions  of  the char- 
acter  ancl  relation  of  the two powers  are,  first,  the dogmatic 
statement and careful explanation of the fact that in Christian 
temporalium cursu rerum imperialibus  ab eis causas tus  salutis exspectas, inque 
dispositionibus  uterentur :  quatenus  sumendis ccelestibus sacramentis eisque 
spiritalis actio a carnalibus distaret in-  ut  competit  disponendis,  subdi  te 
cursibus, et 'Deo  militans  minime  se  debere cognoscis religionis ordine potius 
negotiis  sscularibus  implicaret,'  ac  quam przesse, itaque inter h.ac  ex il- 
vicissim non ille rebus divinis pr,esidcre  lorum te pendere judicio,  non illos ad 
videretur, qui esset negotiis sa~ularibus  tuam velle redigi voluntatem.  Si enim 
implicatus : ut et modestia  utriusque  quantum ad ordinem  pertinet publicz 
ordinis  curaretur,  ne  extolleretur  discipline, cognoscentes imperium tibi 
utroque  suffultus, et competens  quali-  superna dispositione collatum,  legibua 
tatibus  actionum  specialiter  professio  tuis ipsi quoque parent religionis anti- 
aptaretur."  stites, ne re1 in rebus mundanis excluse 
l  Gelasius I., Ep. xii.  2 : "Pietatem  videantur  obviare sententiz; quo,  oro 
ham precor,  ne  arrogantiam  judices  te, decet  affectu  eis  obedire,  qui pre- 
divine rationis officium.  Absit, quaso,  rogandis  venerabillbus  sunt  attributi 
a Roman0 principe,  ut intimatam suis  mgsteriis 1  Proinde sicut non leve dis- 
sensibus veritatem arbitretur injuriam.  crimen  incumbit  pontificibus,  siluisse 
Duo  quippe  sunt,  imperator auguste,  pro divinitatis cultu, quod congruit ; ita 
cluibus  principaliter  mundus  hie  his, quod absit, non mediocre periculum 
'~gitur: auctoritas sacrata pontlficurn,  est,  qui,  quum  parere  debeant,  des- 
et  regalis  potestas.  In quibus  tanto  piciunt.  Et  si cunctis generaliter sac- 
@avius est pondus sacerdoturn, quanto  erdotibus  recte  divina  tractantibus 
etiam  Pro  ipsis  regibus  hominum  in  fidel~um convenit  corda  submitti, 
divine reddituri sunt examine rationern.  quailto potius sedis illius prssuli con- 
NOsti  enim,  fili  clementissime,  quod  sensus  est  adliibendus,  quem  cunctis 
lieet  Presideas  humano  generi  digni-  sacerdotibus et Divinitas summa voluit 
rerum  tamen  prssulibus  d~vin-  przeminere,  et  subsequens  Ecclesiz 
devotus  colla  submittis,  atque  generalis  jugiter  pietas  celebravit 2" 192  THE NEW  TESTAMENT  AND  THE  FATHERS.  [PART  III. 
society the spiritual and the temporal powers are intrusted to 
two different orders, each drawing its authority from God, each 
supreme in its own  sphere,  and  independent,  within  its own 
sphere, of  the other.  We shall have frequent occasion in later 
chapters to observe the importance of  this conception of  a  two- 
fold authority in society-this  attempt to divide the whole field 
of  human activity into two separate parts, and to establish an 
independent authority  for  each  part.  We shall see  how  the 
ninth-century writers in particular take these statements as the 
normal expression of  their own  position, and we shall have to 
consider how  this is related to the theory of  the later Middle 
Ages.  But, secondly, it is necessary  to observe  that Gelasius 
is also conscious of the fact that while these two authorities are 
each independent of  the other, and supreme in their own spheres, 
they  are  also  dependent  upon  each  other, and  cannot  avoid 
relations with each other ;  so that while each is supreme in its 
own  sphere, each  is also  subordinate in relation to the other 
sphere.  The king is subject to the bishop in spiritual matters, 
the bishop to the king in temporal matters.  Gelasius is con- 
scious of  the fact that no division between the two  powers can 
be complete-that  we  are compelled  to recognise the fact that 
each  has,  in certain relations,  authority over  the other ; and, 
more than this, we may say that Gelasius perhaps feels that the 
question  which  is the  greater  of  the  two  cannot  be  wholly 
avoided.  He restricts  himself,  indeed,  to  arguing  that  the 
burden  laid  upon  the ecclesiastics is the heavier; but we can 
see in his words  the beginning  of  a  tendency whose  ultimate 
development  we  shall have to trace in the scholastic writers. 
The  definitely  dualistic  theory  of  authority  in  society  has 
rarely  been  more  clearly  set  out  than  by  Gelasius,  but  his 
definitions  show  us  the  difficulties  with  which  that  theory 
has  constantly to contend. 
In the Fathers, then, we see clearly the first  development  of 
those difficult questions concerning the relations of  the temporal 
and spiritual authorities in society, round which so much of medi- 
~val  political theory was to take shape.  There  can, we  think, 
be  little doubt  that in the end nothing contributed so much to 
emancipate the judgment  of  theologians from the tendency to 
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recognise an absolute  authority in  the monarch, as the cleally 
felt necessity  of  defending  the  independence  of  the  Church. 
~t was  this, probably more  than any other  single cause, which 
con~pelled  the ecclesiastical thinkers to analyse again, and more 
completely, the source and character of  civil authority.  There 
is,  indeed,  in  the  Fathers  little  trace  of  any  very  direct 
connection  between  the general  course of  political  theory and 
these  questions  of  the relations  of  Church  and State, though 
it is  noteworthy  that  St Ambrose,  who  is  the  first  careful 
exponent  of  the  independence  of  the  Church,  is  also  that 
one  of  the  Fathers  who  seems  most  conscious of  the limita- 
tlons of  the imperial  authority  even in secular  matters.  But 
we  think  that  it is  very  necessary  to  take  account  of  the 
patristic  theory  of  the  relations  of  Church  and  State ; for, 
however  little they may have  anticipated the ultimate signif- 
icance  of  these  questions, we,  when  we  look  back  from  the 
standpoint  of the ninth century or  of  the later Middle Ages, 
can  see  that here  are  the  beginninqs  of  one  of  the  most 
impoltant elements of  the  later poll~ical  theory. PART IV. 
THE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  THE  NINTH  CENTURY 
CHAPTER  XVI. 
NATURAL  EQUALITY  AND  SLAVERY. 
WE have  examined  the history  of  the political  theory of  the 
ancient  world  in its last stages,  and the modifications  intro- 
duced  into  this  theory  by  Christianity.  It is,  we  think, 
necessary  for  the  proper  understanding  of  the  course  of 
political  theory  to  keep  very  clearly  before  us  the fact  that 
the political theory of  the Fathers is that of  the ancient world, 
that  the  modifications introduced  by  Christianity  are to  be 
regarded  rather  as modifications  of  detail than as completely 
or fundamentally changing the conceptions which were already 
current.  Unless we  are entirely  mistaken,  the  Fathers  take 
the framework of their political theory whole and ready-made 
from their predecessors  and contemporaries, and do but fit into 
this  framework such conceptions  as are to be  regarded  as in 
some sense peculiar  to themselves.  As  we  have  endeavoured 
to  show,  their  peculiar  conceptions  are,  except  in  regard 
to  two  subjects, not  very important  in character.  The  two 
exceptions to this  general  principle  are  to be  found,  first, in 
the  turn  they  give  to  the theory  of  the sacred  character of 
government, and, second, in their  development  of  the relation 
between  the temporal or civil and the religious or ecclesiastical 
Powers  m  society.  Here, indeed,  they present  to  US the  be- XVI.]  NATURAL  EQUALITY  AND  SLAVERY.  197 
ginnings  of  modes  of  thought  of  the greatest  historical  sig 
nificance,-modes  of  thought whose  development and modifica- 
tions we shall have to trace in considerable detail. 
The Christian Fathers cannot  be  regarded as political phil- 
osophers, but their theory is constantly and organically related 
to a  system  of  political  thought which,  whatever  its merits 
or truth, may be regarded as a philosophlcal system, the system 
which  centres in the theory  of  natural law and the contrast 
between the conventional and the natural  state.  The Fathers 
accept these theories, and, as we  have endeavoured to show, it 
is only in relation to these that their own  conceptions become 
intelligible. 
When we pass  to the political  theory of  the ninth century, 
we  find  ourselves  in  an atmosphere  wholly  different.  The 
elements  of  public  life  are  altered,  the  conceptions  which 
dominate  men's  minds  are in some most important  respects 
new  and strange; we  can  never  forget  that  the  barbarians 
have overthrown  the old civilisation  of  the West.  They may 
sometimes  deck themselves  in the trappings of  the old world, 
they are glad to use old names and to claim the titles of  ancient 
offices,  but  the  world  has  changed.  St Gregory  the Great 
or  St Augustine may have been  very  diirferent  men  from  the 
Roman citizens of  the Republic  or  the Early Empire, but still 
they were primarily Romans, members of  the ancient  common- 
wealth,  sharers  in  the  ancient  culture,  while  the  greatest 
ecclesiastics of  the ninth century, Alcuin, Hincmar of  Rheinzs, 
or Hrabanus Maurus, are at bottom  men of  the new  Teutonic 
tradition, also no doubt the heirs  of  what had  survived of  the 
culture  of  the ancient  world,  but still  primarily  men  of  the 
new  world.  What  is  true  even  of  the  great ecclesiastics  is 
still more  obviously  true of  the greatest  laymen.  The great 
Charles himself  may be the "  Augustus,"  the great and "  peace- 
able" emperor; but he is really  the head  of  the Franks, the 
representative,  the repository  of  the tradition  or  tnt;  greatest 
and most powerful  of  the new Teutonic races ; a great man, 
great ruler, but still a barbarian. 
And the new  world is governed  by new traditions, new con- 
ceptions  of  life and of  law, of  the meaning  and character  of 
the social organisation.  Not  indeed  that there is as yet much 
new theory-the  time for that has not yet come-but  new tradi- 
tions,  new  customs, a new  sense  of  the relations  between  the 
different members  of  the State, these  meet us  at every  turn. 
The world in which we  find ourselves in  the ninth century is 
a  new  world,  is indeed the world  as we  know it now, for it 
cannot be seriously pretended  that between  the ninth century 
and the twentieth there is such interruption of  continuity even 
as there is between  the sixth century  and the ninth.  When 
we study the Carolingian  writers, we feel  at once that we are 
studying the writings of  men  whose  tradition  of  society  and 
government is that out  of  which  our  own  has  directly  and 
immediately  grown.  And  yet  there  are  in  the social  and 
theory  of  the ninth  century  older  elements.  There 
is  a  great  gulf  between  the Teutonic societies  of  the Middle 
Ages  and  the ancient  empire, but  there  are many relations, 
many  traditions  which  have been  carried over  from  the  one 
to the other.  The new  society  has its own  distinctive tradi- 
tions, its own individual characteristics ;  but the men who give 
expression  to these, the articulate representatives of  the new 
society  in  literature,  have  inherited from  the  past  traditions 
and theories which profoundly influence the new society: they 
have inherited  a  framework  of  political  theory  into which, in 
the  end,  they  will  fit  their  own  independent  political  and 
social  conceptions.  The  ninth-century  writers  are Teutonic 
politicians,  but  they  are obviously  also  the disciples  of  the 
Western  Fathers.  Indeed  they  are  always  trying  to  bring 
their own  conceptions  into harmony  with  the theories  of  the 
Fathers.  They seem instinctively to recognise the fact that they 
have  no formal theory  of  their own,  and constantly fall  back 
upon  the  Fathers,  St Ambrose,  St Augustine,  St  Gelasius, 
St  (iregory,  or  St  Isidore,  to  find  a  reasoned  expression  of 
their  own  convictions. 
At  the  same  time,  their  own  conceptions  are  often  very 
difhent  from those  of  the Fathers,  and it is largely  to this 
that  we  may  attribute  that appearance of  incoherence, 
Or  even self-contradictoriness, which  is perhaps  the first char- 
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truth is,  that  some  centuries  were  still to pass before, in the 
hands  of  the scholastic  writers,  the  Teutonic  traditions  and 
the general  principles  of  the  political  theory  of  the Fathers 
and  the Roman  Jurists were  to be  reduced  to one coherent 
whole. 
The  Fathers, as we  have  said,  may  not be  political  philos- 
ophers,  but  in  reading  them  we  feel  the presence  of  a  great 
framework of  political theory to which even their most incidental 
phrases are related.  The Schoolmen of  the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries in their turn produced a complete system of  political 
theory by which  we  may again  interpret  even  the most  para- 
doxical of  their phrases.  But the writers of  the ninth century 
are neither  original  political  philosophers nor  are they as yet 
fully conscious  of  the nature  of  the theory which  lay behind 
the phrases  of  the Fathers.  They  are interested  in, they are 
indeed  profoundly  concerned  with,  the  solution  of  the  in- 
numerable difficulties which presented  themselves  to  the new 
civilisation  of  Europe;  they  are  full  of  interest,  and  often 
exhibit a  considerable analytical  power  in dealing  with  such 
questions  as  the  nature  of  the  royal  power,  the  relation  of 
the  civil  power  to the ecclesiastical, the nature of  the origin 
and authority of  law, and they eagerly  lay hold  of  any straw 
of  traditional authority, or explanation, in the Fathers, or in the 
remains  of  the ancient jurisprudence,  which  may  assist  them 
in the practical solntion of  their difficulties.  But they do not go 
beyond the practical use of  the writings of  the Fathers : they are 
not concerned with, or interested in, the question of  a general and 
systematic philosophy of  political and social relations. 
We shall therefore find that there is much less of  reference in 
the ninth-century writers to the questions of  natural  law, the 
natural condition, the relation between natural and conventional 
institutions, than in the Fathers.  All this we  shall find  again 
when we come to discuss the scholastic political  theory, but in 
the ninth century there is comparatively little reference to these 
matters.  Their  treatment  of  political  theory  is  concerned 
mainly  with  questions  regarding  the  nature  and  source  of 
authority, secular  and ecclesiastical, and  the relations of  tliese 
authorities to each other.  This does not mean that they denied 
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the  truth  of  the conceptions  of  the  earlier  writers;  on  the 
contrary, as we shall see, so far as they do refer  to such general 
as those which  we  have  mentioned,  they  accept  the 
they reproduce the phrases, of  the Fathers. 
There is only one aspect of the patristic theory of  the natural 
conditions of human nature which has an importa~lt  place in the 
ninth-century writings, and  that is the theory of  the  natural 
equality and liberty of man.  Here it is evident that the ninth- 
century writers not only reproduce the views of  the Fathers, but 
that they do this  with  intelligence  and  conviction.  They find 
the authority for  their view  largely in those  passages  from St 
Gregory the Great's writings which  we have in former chapters 
iiad  to consider  carefully; but  it is clear  that the view  of  St 
Gregory  the  Great  and  the  other  Fathers  is  one  which  is 
firmly  held  and understood  by  them as being  the foundation 
of  their conception of  human nature in society. 
One of  the most  representative passages  in the literature of 
the ninth century dealing  with  this subject is to be found in 
Jonas of  OrleansJ treatise for the instruction of  the layman.  He 
warns his  readers  lest  they  should mistake  the differences of 
worldly  dignity  and  wealth  for  a  real  difference  in  nature. 
Human nature always remains equal in its character, whatever 
may  be  the  difference  of  wealth  or education.  It is  only  a 
foolish  and  impious  pride  which  causes  men  to  forget  thcse 
things.  Jonas justifies  himself  in this  view  by  quoting  the 
famous phrase of  St Gregory the Great, "  Omnes ilamque homines 
natura  sequales  sumus," and urges masters to treat their slaves 
with some humanity, quoting from St Paul, and from a sermon 
attributed to St Augustine, in which he dwells on the brother- 
hood  of  Christian  men  by  grace?  The  same  sentiments  are 
'  Jonas  of  Orleans,  De Institutione 
Laicali,  ii.  22 : "  Cavendum  his  qui 
PrBsunt, ne sibi subjectos, sicut ordine, 
'ta  natura  inferiores  se  ease  putent ; 
Provida  namque  dispensatione  divina 
mtum  est,  ut mortalis a mortali, non 
nabura,  sed  quadam  mundana  digni- 
inferior, ut  pote imbecillis a valido 
pia  przlatione  et gubernatione  tuer- 
etur ; ita  tamen  ut natura  semper 
squalis agnosceretur.  Quod  cum ita 
sit, multi rehus perituris, et  cito przter- 
labentihus  tumentes,  tam eos.  quibus 
prssunt, qudm etiam eos, quos potentia 
et honoribue, et divitiis precedunt, sihi 
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to  be  found  in  another  treatise  of  Jonas,  "De  Institutione 
Regia,"  in  which  he  admonishes  the  king  to  appoint  such 
ofXcers  as  wlll  always  remember  that  the  people  of  Christ 
over  whom  they  are placed  are by  nature equal to them? 
We find another careful statement and exposition of  this con- 
ception  of  the equality of  human  nature  in  the  writings  of 
Agobard, Archbishop of  Lyons.  I11  a letter or short treatise on 
the  baptism  of  those  who  were  slaves  of  Jews  he  protests 
strongly  against  some  regulations  of  the Emperor  Lewis  the 
Pious,  which,  as  Agobard  understood,  would  have  prevented 
the  baptism  of  suih  slaves  without  the  consent  of  their 
masters, and he does  this on  the ground  that all men  are  of 
one race, one descent, one ~ondition.~  But we shall come back 
to this passage in dealing with the question of  slavery. 
Hrabanus Maurus, again, quotes St  Gregory the Great, Moralia, 
xxi.  15,  in  his  Commentary  on  the  Book  of  Genecis?  and 
Hincmar of  Rheims quotes the same passage, and also Moralia, 
xxvi. 26, which expresses niuch the same sentimenh4 
It is interesting to observe that the conviction of  the inalien- 
si verbis  agnoscunt,  affectione  tamen 
non agnoscunt.  Quod vitium ex fonte 
superbis  emanare  manifestum  est. 
Cur enim dominus  et servus, dives et 
pauper,  natura non  sunt equales, qui 
unum  Deum non  acceptorem  person- 
arum habent in ccelis." 
Jonas then  quotes  St Paul, Col.  iv. 
1,  and then  St Gregory,  Moral.,  xxi. 
15 : "  Potentibus viris magna est virtus 
humilitatis, considerata squalitas con- 
ditionis.  Omues  namque  homines, 
natura squales sumus,"  &c. 
He  then  quotes  Pseudo  Augustine 
(a  passage  to  which  we  have  befor* 
referred, see p. 116) on the harsh treat- 
ment of  slaves.  Notice especially : "Et 
quod  magis  dolendum est, Christ~anus 
dominus Cbrist~ano  in his diebua scrvo 
non  parcit, minime respiciens, quod si 
servus  est  conditione,  gratia  tamen 
frater est.  Etenirn similiter Christum 
induit,  iirdem  participdt  sacramentis, 
eudem quo et tu utitur Deo Patre, cur 
te no% utatur ut fratre." 
Jonas  concludes:  "His  et cster- 
orum  divinorum  eloquiorum  senten- 
tiis,  potentes  et divites edocti, agnos- 
cant  et servos  suos,  et pauperes  sibi 
natura  equales.  Si igitur servi dom- 
inis natura equales sunt, utique quia 
sunt,  non  se  putent  impune  domini 
laturos,  dum turbida  indignatione  et 
coucitanti animi furore adversus errata 
servorum inflammati,  circa  eos  aut in 
ssvissimis verberibus cedendo, aut in 
membrorum  amputatione debilitando, 
nimii  existunt, quoniam  unum Deum 
habent in ccelis.  Eos vero  qui in hoc 
saaculo  infirmos  abjectosque cultu,  et 
cute et opibus  se impares consp~ciunt, 
natura pares et  equalea sibi esse prorsus 
agnoscant." 
Jonas of  Orleans, De Inst. Reg., v. 
M.  G.  H.  Ep.,  v. ; Agobard  of 
Lyons,  Ep.  vi. 
Hrabanus  Maurua,  In  Genesin1 
11.  c. viii. 
'  Hiucmar, Opus lv. Capit. xiv.;  and 
De Regis Persona,  3. 
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able natural equality of  human  nature has even found a place 
in the technical  legal  doc~unents  of  the time.  In the preface 
to a collection  of  capitularies issued  by the Emperor Lewis the 
pious,  it is  interesting to  read  a  formal  recognition  by  the 
emperor  of  his equality in condition with other  men:  and in 
,  collection made from the canons of  various  councils we  have 
the  same sentiment expressed  at greater  length and in more 
detail, and  Christian men, whether  lay or  clerical, are warned 
to behave towards those who are their inferiors with mercy, for 
they should  remember  that they are their brethren, and have 
one  Father,  that is,  God, and one Mother,  that is,  the Holy 
C h~rch.~ 
The  theory  of  human  equality  is  treated  most  fully  in 
relation  to  the institution  of  slavery.  In the ninth century 
we  find  again  that  apparently paradoxical  combination  of  a 
theory of  equality with an almost  universal acquiescence in the 
institution of slavery.  The explanation is the same in this case 
as  that  which  we  have  already  considered  in  the  Fathers, 
namely,  that  slavery is a  disciplinary  check  upon  the licence 
and  disorder  of  sinful men.  There  is one  writer,  indeed, the 
author of the '  Via Regia,'  Smaragdus, the abbot  of  St Michael 
in the diocese of  Verdun, wi~ose  attitude to the institution may 
be  different; but it will be best to leave him till we have con- 
sidered the general position of  the ninth century. 
Human nature  is  recognised  by  all  tlie  writers  who  refer 
to  the  matter  as  being  equal.  We  have  already  quoted 
M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  137,  Hludowici  Proernium  Gen. 
ad  Cap.  tan?  Eccl.  quam  Mundana: 
"Nobis  prscipue-qui  ceteris mortali- 
bus  conditione  ~equales  existimus  et 
dignitate  tantum  regimiuis  superem- 
inemus." 
M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  154, Cap. e  Conciliis Excerpta, 9 : 
"  Qula  ergo  constat  in  scclesia diver- 
sarum  conditionum  homines  esse,  ut 
nobiles  et ignobiles,  servi,  coloni 
inquilini et cetera hujuscemodi nomina, 
OPortet ut quicumque eis prslati suut 
~lerici  sive  laici,  clementer  erga  eos 
agant  et  misericorditer  eos  tractent, 
sive  in  exigendis  ab  eis  operibus, 
sivi  in .  accipiendis  tributis  et  qui- 
busdam  debitis ; sciantque  eos fratres 
suos esse et  ununl patrem secum habere 
Deum,  cui clamant  'Pater noster, qui 
es  in  ccelis,'  unam  matrem  sanctan~ 
ecclesiam,  qus eos  internerato  sacri 
fontis  utero  gignit.  Disciplina  igitur 
eis misericordissima  et gubernatio op- 
ortuna  adhibenda  est ; disciplina,  ne 
indiscipliuate  vivendo  auctorem  suum 
offendant ;  gubernatio, ne in cotidianis 
ritz commeatibus  przlatorum admia- 
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a  passage  from  Jonas  of  Orleans l  which  illustrates  this, 
and  we  may  now  consider  that  passage  from  Agobard  of 
Lyons  to which we  before referred.  In this passage  Agobard 
expresses  very  clearly  both  the  principle  of  the  equality 
of  the  origin  and  condition  of  the  human  race  and  the 
jtistification  of  slavery as  being  caused  by  sin.  God  is  the 
creator  of  all  mankind,  having  formed  the  first  nian  and 
woman, and from them all men  are descended: it is in conse- 
quence of  men's sins and  of  the secret judgment  of  God  that 
some  men  are exalted  and  others  placed  under  the yoke  of 
slavery.  But  while  God  has  thus  ordered  that men  should 
serve each other with their bodies, He does not allow the inner 
man to be subject to  any one but Himself.  The inner man is 
free.2  It is for this reason  that Agobard protests  so strongly 
against the prohibition  of  the baptism  of  slaves  without  the 
consent of  their masters.  Men,  that is,  are by  nature equal, 
and this equality continues in the soul of  man, whatever may 
be his external condition.  Agobard  reproduces the view of  the 
Fathers with hardly any change.  Slavery is not, as we might 
say, natural, but is an institution adapted to the actual condition 
of  human nat~re.~ 
1 See p.  199. 
2  N.  G.  H.  Ep.,  v.;  Agobard  of 
Lyons, Ep. vi. : 'LDenique  et pie  con- 
siderantibus  perspicuum  est,  quod 
unus  omnipotens  Deus,  omnium  con- 
ditor  eb  moderator  justissimus,  qui 
primum  hominem  de  limo  formarit 
et de costa  ejus adjutorium illi simile 
sibi  fecit,  quique  ex  eis omne  genus 
humanum, quasi ex uno  fonte et una 
radice  propagavit,  omnes  unius  con- 
ditionis  fecerit.  Et  licet peccatis exi- 
gentibus justissimo et  occultissimo ejus 
judicio,  alii  diversis  honoribus  sub- 
limati,  alii  servitutis  jugo  depressi 
sunt,  ita  tamen  a  servis  corporale 
ministerium  dominis  exhiberi  ordin- 
averit,  ut  interiorem  hominem  ad 
imaginem  suam  conditum nulli homi- 
num,  nulli  angelorum,  nulli  omnino 
creature,  sed  sibi  soli  voluerit  esse 
subjectum.  Unde in  lege  sua de hac 
nlentis  servitute,  quce  illi  tantum 
debetur, mandavit : '  Dominum  Deum 
tuum  timebis et illi uoli  servies.'  Et 
apostolus eumdem interiorem hominem 
ab  omni  sexu  diversitate,  ab  omni 
conditionis et generis distantia liberum 
esse  demonstrans  ita  docet " (quotes 
Col, iii. 9, 11).  "Cum ergo hi qui ad 
baptismum  veniunt  per  agnitionem 
creatoris  in  interiore  homine,  qui  ab 
omni  servitutis  conditione  liber  est, 
renoventur,  que ratio esee  potest,  ub 
id servi absque permissione dominorum 
suorum  consequi  prohibeantur,  uec 
servire  eis  Deo  liceat,  nisi  licentiam 
ab hominibus  impetraverint 2" 
Cf.  M.  G. H.  Ep.,  v.;  Agobard  of 
Lyons, Ep. iv. ;  "  De qua re ego quidem 
talem tenco rationem : omnem profecto 
hominem  creaturam  Dei  esse,  eb  in 
unoquoque  homine,  quamvis  seno, 
majorem  portionem  habere  dominum 
CHAP.  XVI.]  NATURAL  EQUALITY  AND  SLAVERY, 
Alcuin and Hrabanus Maurus contrast the primitive domina- 
tion  of  man over the irrational animals with-the later  rule of 
man over man, and trace slavery either to iniquity or adversity, 
and cite the legal explanation of the condition of  the slave, servzcs, 
as that of one who might  have been  slain, but has been spared 
(s8rvatus).'  It is necessary to  observe  that Hrabanus Maurus 
Deum, qui in  utero creavivit, ad lucem 
hujus vite produxit,  concessam vitam 
custodivit,  sanitatem  servavit,  quam 
illum  qui viginti  aut triginta  sol~dis 
datis fruitur  corporis ejus servitio.  Nec 
eat, qui dubitet quod  unusquisque ser- 
vus, membrorum corporis opera carnali 
domino debens, mentis religionem soli 
debeat creatori.  Propter quod  omnes 
sancti prsdicatores,  socii apostolorum 
. . .  omnes  baptizaverunt,  omnes 
in  uno  corpore  redigerunb,  omnesque 
fratres  et filios  Dei  esse  docuerunt, 
its  tamen  ut  unusquisque  in  quo 
vocatus  est,  in  hoc  permaneret, non 
studio  sed  necessitate.  Sed  eb  si 
qui  possent  liberi  fieri,  magis  uter- 
entur.  Im-promptu est etiam ratione 
colligere si qui ethnicorum ad Christ- 
um  fugiunt,  et non  recolligimus  sed 
repudiamus  propter  carnales dominos, 
esse  impium  et crudele cum  humanie 
anima: nullus  esse  possit dominus nisi 
conditor." 
'  Alcuin, Inter. et Reap.  in Librum 
Qeneseos,  Inter.  273 : "  Filii  Jacob 
interrogati  quid  operis  haberent, 
responderunt : Pastores ovium sumus, 
~icut  et  patres  nostri.  Quare  Pat- 
riarchos  primos,  pastores  ovium  et 
non  Reges  gentium  fuisse  legimus 2 
R.  Quia  sine  ulla  dubitatione  justa 
servitu~,  et justa  est  dominatio,  cum 
pecora  homini  serviunt ;  et  homo 
pecoribus dominatur.  Sic enim dictum 
est homini cum crearetur.  '  Faciamus 
horninem ad imaginem et  sinlilitudiaem 
nostram,  et habeat  potestatem  . . . 
Omnium  qus  sunt  super  terram.' 
Ubi  insinuatur rationem  debere dom- 
inari irrationali vita:.  Servum autem 
horninem vel iniquitas fecit vel  adver- 
sit=.  Iniquitas quidem  sicub dictum 
est : "  Maledictus Chanaan, erit aervus 
fratribus suis."  Adversitas vero, sicut 
accidit ipsi Josepb, ut  venditus a fratri- 
bus  servus  alienigena:  fieret.  Itaque 
primos  servos,  quibus  hoc  nomen  in 
Latina  lingua  inductum  est,  bella 
fecerunb ;  cum enim  homo  ab homine 
superatus, jure belli  possit  occidi, quia 
servatus  est,  servus  est  appellatus. 
Inde  et mancipia,  quia  sunt  manu 
capta." 
Hrabanus Maurus,  In Ctenesim IV. 
cap.  ix. : "  Commendatur  In  patri- 
archis,  quod  pecorum  nutritores erant 
a  pueritia sus, et parentibus  suis,  et 
merito.  Nam  hec est sine ulla dubi- 
tatione justa  servitus  et justa  domi- 
natio, cum pecora  homini serviunt, et 
homo pecoribus dominatur.  Sic enim 
dictum est cum crearetur : '  Faciamus 
hominem  ad  imaginem  et similitudl- 
nem  nostram,  et habeat  potestatem 
piscium  mans  et volat~lium cali  et 
omnium  pecorum  qus  sunt  super 
terram.'  Ubi  insinuatur,  rationem 
debere  dominari  irrationabrli  vitze. 
Servum  autem  hominem  homini  vel 
~niquitas,  vel adversitas fecit.  Iniquitas 
quidem, sicut dictum est :  Yaledictus 
Chanaan ; erit  servus  fratribus suis.' 
Adversitas  vero,  sicut  accidit  ipsi 
Joseph, ut venclitus a fratribus,  servus 
alienigen~  fieret, itaque primos  servos 
quibus  hoc  llornen  ind~tum  eat,  in 
Latina  lingua,  bella  fecerunt.  Qui 
enim  homo  ab homine  superatus jure 
belli  posset  occidi,  quia  servatus  eat 
servus  appellatus est.  Inde et man- 
cipia, quaa mauu capti sunt.  Eat etiam 
ordo naturalis in  hominibus  ut servi- 
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in this passage  also gives an explanation of  slavery, which  is 
obviously related to the Aristotelian  theory, that slavery is the 
natural and justifiable  result  of  the superiority  of  some men 
in reason  over others.  It will perhaps be  remembered that in 
Cicerol there are traces of  the survival of  this theory along- 
side of  the doctrine of  natural equality.  Hrabanus recognises, 
indeed,  that  the  actual  facts  of  slavery  are  not  always  in 
accordance with this rational order,  and exhorts the pious  to 
submit in view of  the  rationally  ordered  and eternal felicity 
which awaits them.  The two views are not wholly inconsistent 
with  each  other, the  natural  and  fundamental  equality does 
not exclude differences of  capacity and intelligence.  But this 
is not  the usual line of  thought of  the Fathers or  the ninth- 
century writers.  It  may  be  well  to compare  this with  the 
parallel  theory of  a  natural hierarchy of  order in government, 
stated  by  St Gregory  the  Great,2 while  in  his  general  view 
government, or at least coercive  government, is a  consequence 
of sin. 
Slavery, then, is just and lawful under the actual conditions 
of  human nature.  But this does not adequately represent the 
sanction  given  by  the  Church  of  the  ninth  century  to  the 
institution  of  slavery.  A  letter  of  Hrabanus  to  a  certain 
Reginbaldus  shows us that it  was  maintained  that it was  an 
irreligious as well  as unlawful thing for a slave to attempt to 
escape  from  his  master.  Reginbaldus  had  asked  Hrabanus 
whether it was lawful to say mass for a slave who  died while 
escaping  from  his  master.  Hrabanus  replies that he does not 
find any reason  against this, and orders prayers for  the slave 
unless he has comnlitted some other crime.  At the same time 
he admits that it is a  grave sin to fly from  one's  master.  He 
quotes the canon of  the Council of  Gangrz in which those who 
teach  slaves to despise  their masters and to fly from then1 are 
quia  et  illic  hzc  justitia  esb  ub  arum  carnalium  diversitatem,  ferunt 
infirmior  ratio  serviat fortiori.  Haec  justi temporalem perversitatem, in fine 
igitur  dominationibus  et  servitutibua  habituri  ordinatissimam  et aemplter- 
clara  justitia  est,  ub  qui  excellunt  nam  felicitatem." 
ratione, excellant  dominatione.  Quod  1  See p.  11. 
cum  in  hoc  seculo  per  iniqultatem  See p.  117. 
hominum  perturbatur,  vel  per  natur- 
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and admits that he must be still more deserving 
of anathema who actually escapes from his master.  But he also 
urges  that  the degree  of  the sin depends  upon  the reason  of 
his flight, whether it is due to mere pride or to the cruelty of 
his master.  The fugitive slave should be exhorted to return to 
his master, as Hagar did to Sarah, and Onesimus to Phi1emon.l 
We  have  already  dealt  with  this  canon  of  Gangr~  in 
our  discussion  of  the Patristic theory of  slavery,  and it inay 
be said in explanation of  it that,  considering  the fact that the 
Church  gave  its sanction  to  the institution  of  slavery  as  a 
disciplinary  institution,  such  a  condenlnalion  of  those  who 
incited  slaves  to fly  was  at least  logically  proper.  But  the 
letter  of  Hrabanus  seems  to  indicate  the  presence  among 
Christian men  in the ninth century  of  a  much  harsher view. 
The  question  of  Reginbaldus  clearly  shows that it  was  held 
by some  Christians that a slave who  fled  from his master was 
guilty of  a mortal sin, and Hrabanus's  answer  makes it plain 
that  though  he thought that the precise  degree  or quality of 
1 $1.  a.  H.  Ep.,  v. ;  Hrabanus 
Maul us,  Ep.  30 :- 
"V.  De  servo  autem  qui  fugerit 
dominum mum, interrogabas, si ille in 
ipsa fuga mortuus fuerit, utrum liceret 
pro eo  misaas cantare mt psalmodias. 
Hoc  in  divinis  libris  non  invenirnus 
prohibitum, sed tamen scimus ab apos- 
tolis  fortissime  praeceptum,  ut servi 
subditi  sint in  omni  timore  dominis, 
non  tantum  bonis  et modestiq,  scd 
etiam discolis, et obedientes illis iianb 
in  omnibus. 
In  eanone  autem  Gangrensis  con- 
cilii ita scriptum est : '  Si quis servuin 
sub  pretextu  divini  cultus  doceab 
dominum  contempnere  proprium,  ut 
d~scedat  ab ejus obsequio, nec ei cum 
benevolentia et  omni honore deserviat, 
anathema  sit.'  Unde datur  intelligi 
9uod  si  ille  anathema  meruit,  qui 
docet servum proprium  domiuum con- 
tempnere, et ab ejus obsequio recedere, 
Wanto magis ~lle,  qui dominum suum 
spernit et ejus servitio subdi noluerit 1 
Sed  tamen  distantia  est  inter  eum, 
qui propter  superblam  et ilium,  qui 
propter  neeessitatem  fugit,  coactus 
crudelitate  domini  sui.  Nam  Agar 
famula  Sarz  fugam  iniit,  affligente 
eam  domina  sua,  sed  angelo  ammon- 
ente, ut  reverteretur et fieret  subjecta 
dominatrici  sure, reversa  est ad domi- 
nam suam.  Sic et Honesimus  servns 
Philemonis  effugit  a  domino  suo, sed 
Paulo apostolo docente credidit Christo 
et  baptieatus est et  sic per patrocinium 
apostoli restitutus esb proprio domino. 
Ammonendus  est  enim  servus 
quilibet  fugitivus  per  fideles  Christi 
cloctores,  ubicumque  fuerit  inventus, 
ut revertatur  ad  dominum  suum  et 
fiat ei subjectus, ne forte contempnells 
prsceptum domini, perpetuo anathem- 
ate percutiatur.  Attamen  si  in ipba 
fuga obierit, orandum est pro eo, nisi 
forte aliquo crimine majore implicetur 
aut in perfidiam devolvatur, unde fruc- 
tuosa pro eo non possit esse oratio." 
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the sin depended upon tile motive prompting the slave's escape, 
yet such an attempt was in itself  sinful. 
We may again  find  illustrations  of  the ecclesiastical view of 
slavery in the legislation of  the Church as well as of  the State 
with regard  to the qualifications of  those who  were  to  be ad- 
mitted to ordination.  We could  quote a series of  enactments 
from the Council  of  Frankfurt in 794 to the Council of  Tribur 
in 895 by which the ordination  of  a slave is prohibited  except 
with the consent of  his master.] 
The  Council  of  Frarikirtrt  requires  the  permission  of  the 
master:  but  does  not  say  whether  the slave must be emanci- 
pated, but in all the other  passages we cite it is laid  down that 
the slave should only  be  ordained  when  he has  been  handed 
over by his master to the bishops to be free  for the rest  of  his 
life, and in one passage the  master is warned  that he will then 
lose all rights over  the slave.3  It is perhaps worth  noticing, 
also, that in a  letter  or precept  of  Lewis  the Pious  the slave 
thus emancipated is warned  that in the event of  his  sinning 
against  the sacred  orders which  he  has  received,  he  will  be 
obliged  to  return to his  former   slaver^.^ 
According to one  set of  regulations,  if  a  slave procures his 
ordination by fraud he is to be handed over to his master, or if 
he was ordained in ignorance of  the fact that he  was  a  slave, 
he may be retained in his  office if  his master  consents, or his 
master may reclaim him as a slave.5 
111 G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  28,  112, 
114,  138,  173,  262;  M.  G.  H.  Ep., 
v., Ep. var.  8.  Cf. also Pseudo Isidore, 
Stephen, Dec. 11. 
M.  G. H.  Leg.,  scct.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  28,  Synod  Franc. : "  De  servis 
al~enis  : ut a neniine recipiantur neque 
ab  episcopis  sacrentur  sine  licentia 
dominorum. " 
% G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  112, Statuta Rhispacensia, &C.,  31. 
4M.  G.  H.  Ep.,  V.;  EpVar. 8: 
'<  Proinde has nostrs imperialis et  regis 
auctoritatis litteras tuze sanctitati dan- 
das decrevimus, per quas tibl et succes- 
soribus  tuis  talem  concessam  noveris 
potestatem,  ut servum  ecclesiasticum 
tarn de tua parochia  quam de suffraga- 
neorum  tuorum  necnon  et  de  ju~r 
monasteriorum, qua  In tua dioccesi con- 
stituta sunt, ad prssbiteratus ordinem 
electum coram clero et plebe, presente 
et consentiente  eo,  cujus  dominatui 
idem servus usque in id  temporis erat 
addictus, a  jugo  servitutis  absolvas  et 
perpetuo  libcrum  efficias,  ea  tamen 
conditione, ut  noverit se is qui libertate 
clonatur  in  pristinam  servitutis  con- 
ditionem  relapxurum,  si  sacri  ordinis 
quem  suscepe~  it  praevaricator  f uerit 
conprobatus. " 
WM.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  138,  6 : '' Et si  quilibet  servus 
dominum  suum  fugiens,  aut latitaus 
aut  adhibitis testibus munere conductis 
vel  corruptid  aut  qualibet  calliditate 
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It  is perhaps deserving  of  notice that we find  it alleged as a 
reason for such regulations, that it is improper that the service 
of  God should be  conducled  by men  of  ignoble position.  We 
have  an  excellent commentary  on  such a  view  in  the very 
interesting  account  which  Jonas  of  Orleans  and Agobard  of 
Lyons give  of  the common attitude  of  the wealthy  and noble 
persons  of  their  time  towards  the inferior clergy.  Their ob- 
servations illustrate what seems  to have been  a  real difficulty 
of the time-a  difficulty which alone would have compelled the 
Church to enforce very strict rules about the condition of  those 
who were to be admitted to orders.  Jonas of  Orleans gives us 
a  very gloomy picture  of  the social  condition  of  many of  the 
clergy.  They were often employed by wealthy laymen as their 
stewards, and were considered  unfit  to be  their companions at 
table.1  Agobard is equally gloomy, and even more vivid, in his 
picture.  All great  men,  he  says, have  a  domestic priest,  not 
that they may obey  him, but simply that he may be  useful to 
them  in  performing  religious services and in discharging  any 
secular  function  to  suit their  convenience.  When they want 
a  domestic  chaplain, he saya, they  bring  to the bishop  some 
slave  whom  they  have  brought  up in their  house  or  bought, 
and demand his  ~rdination.~ 
vel  fraude,  ad  gradus  ecclesiastices  quibusdam  laicis  habentur,  ut  eos 
pervenerit,  decretum est ut deponatur,  non  solum  administratores  et  pro- 
et dominus ejus eum recipiat.  Si vero  curatores  rerum  pcuarum  faciant, 
avus vel  pater  ab alia  patria in aliam  sed  etiam sibi  more  laicorum  aervire 
migrans  in  eadern  ~rovincia  filium 
genuerit, et ipse  filius ibidem educatus 
et  ad  gradus  ecclesiasticos  promotus 
fuerit et utrum servus sit ignoraverit, 
et postea  veniens  dominus illius legi. 
bus  eum adquisiverit, sancitum est ut, 
si  dominus  ejus  illi  libertatem  dare 
voluerit,  in gradu  suo  permaneat ; si 
vero  eum  catena  servitutis  a  castris 
dominicis  extrahere  voluerit,  ut 
gradum  amittat;  quis  juxta  sacros 
anones vilis persona  maner~s  sacerdotii 
dignitate fungi  non  potest."  cf. sc 
Gelasius, Ep.  21.  See  p.  122. 
Jonas  of  Orleans,  De Inst. Laicali, 
ii.  20:  "Sunt  etiam  quidam  sacer- 
dotes  divitiis  et  honoribus  mundi 
Carentea,  qui  adeo  contemptui  a 
compellant,  eosque  convivas  mensie 
sus  habere dedigneutur ; qui vi,ldlicet 
habere  sacerdotes  noruine  tenus  sibi 
videri gestiunt, re autem ipsa  propter 
quam  habendi  sunt,  nolunt,  talesque 
intercessores  apud  Drum habere vol- 
unt, quales  esse  prorsus despiciunt." 
M.  G.  H.  Ep.,  v.; Agobard,  Ep. 
11 : '' Unde et contumeliose eos  norn- 
inantes,  quando  volunt  illos  ordinari 
prssbiteros,  rogant  nos  aut  jubeut, 
dicentes : '  Habeo  unum  clericionem, 
quem  mihi  nutrivi  de  servis  meia 
propriis  aut beueficialibus  sive pagen- 
sibus,  aut  obtinui  ab  illo  vel  ill0 
homine, sive  de illo vel  illo  pago, v010 
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The Church of  the ninth century  acquiesced in the existence 
of slavery, and adapted its own legislation to this.  It  is well, 
however, also to observe that the influence of  the Church seems 
still, as in the period  of  the later Empire, to tend towards a 
mitigation  of  the condition of  slavery.  The Church still con- 
tinued to impose its own  penalties upon those who  killed  the 
slave.  We find a Council of  Maintz in 847 A.D.  renewing the 
canons of  the Councils of  Agde and of  Elliberis, which imposed 
the penalty of  excommunication for certain periods upon those 
who killed their slaves intentionally or by accident.l  We have 
already considered that passage  from  the writings of  Jonas of 
Orleans  in which  he protests  against the harsh treatment  of 
~laves.~  It is also interesting to find in the "  Edictum Pistense" 
of  S64 a revival of  a regulation contained in a novel  of  Valen- 
tinian, by which those who  sold  themselves  or  their children, 
because  of  their great poverty or  in time of  famine, could  be 
redeemed  at a  price slightly higher  than that for  which  they 
had sold themselves or their ~hildren.~ 
There  is,  as we  have said,  one writer in the ninth century 
who goes beyond this in his attitude to slavery, and who may 
even  desire  its  abolition.  This  writer,  Sniaragdus,  is  the 
author of  a little treatise or handbook, the 'Via Regia,' on the 
character and duty of  the good  king.  We shall have occasion 
to refer to him again in connection with the theory of  the royal 
power, though  there is in this portion of  his work  little that 
is very different from other treatises. 
1 M. G.  H. Leg.,  sect.  ii. vol.  ii. No. 
248,  2-2. 
See p. 199. 
M. G. H.  Leg.,  sect. ii. vol.  ii.  No. 
273,  c.  34.  "Tamen  illud  capitulum, 
quod cum sanctis ecclesiasticis regulis 
ex  maxima  parte  concordari  inven- 
imus,  hic ponere necessarium duximus 
in  quo  dicit : Ub  quicumque ingenui 
filios  suos,  quod  et de  ipsis  liberis 
hominibus,  qui  se  vendunt, observari 
volumus,  qualibet  necessitate  seu 
famis  tempore  vendiderinb  ipsa  ne- 
cessitate compulsi,  emptor, si quiuque 
solidis emit sex recipiat ;  si decem, duo- 
decim  solidos similiter recipiab ;  aut  si 
amplius,  secundum  suprascriptaui 
rationem  augmentum  pretii  conae- 
quatur.  . . . Et si  quis  dixerit,  quia 
non  vulb  aut tempore  famis  aut pro 
alia necessitate pretium suum dare pro 
libero homine, si semper illum hiervum 
llabere  non  debet,  adtendab  quid  ei 
Dominus  per  apostolum  suum  dicat: 
'  Qui habuerit,' inquiens, '  substantiam 
hujus mundi et v~derit  fratrem suum 
necesse habere et clauserit viscera sua 
ab eo, non  manet caritas Dei in eo.' 
Cf.  Nov. Valeut., iu. Tit. xi.,  Interpre- 
tatio. 
,,,p.  XVI.]  NATURAL  EQUALITY  AND  SLAVERY.  209 
Wit11  regard to slavery the position of  the treatise is different. 
The author quotes a passage from Ecclesiastic~~s,  which  enjoins 
that a slave should be treated  as one's  own soul, as a  brother,' 
and  entreats the king to forbid the making  of  slaves in the 
kingdom-that  is,  we  suppose, he  desires to  prevent  any  of 
the subjects of  the king from being  enslaved by their fellow- 
Then, after quoting a  number  of  passages  from  the 
and apocryphal Scriptures of  the Old  Testament, on 
the subject of  slavery, he urges  that the Christian Inan should 
set his  slaves at liberty, considering  that it is not nature but 
sin that subjected  men  to each other, seeing  that we were  all 
created  equal.  He concludes  by  urging  the king  to  honour 
God  with his  riches and slaves, by giving  alms of  the former 
and  by  setting the latter at liberty.2 
We  think that the author  of  the treatise  feels  that there 
is  something unchristian  in the slavery  at least of  Christian 
men,  and that he  would  like  to see  this  ended.  He  does 
not, indeed, actually ask  the king to abolish  the institution, 
though  he  does  ask  him  to  forbid  the enslavement  of  any 
of  his  subjects;  but  he  does  look  upon  it as being  the true 
mode  of  honouring  God,  to  set  the slave  at liberty.  It is 
certainly interesting to find this view held in the ninth century, 
h11t  we  must  not  make  any  mistake:  this  view  is  hardly 
the normal one; the premisses of  Sniaragcins  are the same as 
those  of  the other ninth-century  writers, but the conclusions 
deduced  by  him  from  them  are  different.  The  theory  of 
slavery in the ninth century is the same as that of  the Fathers : 
slavery is not natural or  primitive, but is a just  punishment of 
man's  sin, and a  remedial discipline  by whlch  his vicious  in- 
clinations may be restrained. 
l  Smaragdus Abbas, Via Regia, 1. 
Smaragdus Abbas,  Via  Regia,  30 ; 
"  Prohibe  ergo  clementissime rex; ne 
in regno tuo captivitas fiat.  . . . Vere 
obedire debet homo  Deo eb  ejus prre- 
cepta  in  quantum  ille  posaibilitatenl 
dederit,  obedire.  Et iuter  alia  pre- 
cepta salutaria, et  opera recta, propter 
nirniam  illius  char~ltem  unusquisque 
liberos debet dimlttere  se~voa,  consid- 
VOL  I. 
erans  quia non illi eos natura subegit, sed 
culpa;  conditione enim equaliter crezti 
sumus, sed aliis alii culpa subacti. . . . 
Honorifica  ergo, justissime  ac piissime 
rex, pro omnibus Deum tuum, quia  ub 
scriptum est, '  Pro omnibus llonorlficavit 
te,' sive iu servis tibi subactis, sive in 
divitiis tibi concessis, ex illis liberos faci- 
endo, ef;  ex istis eleemosynas tribuendo, 
prreceptis illius obedire non ceases." 
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CHAPTER  XVII. 
THE  DIVINE  AUTHORITY OF  THE  KING, 
WE have  seen  that  the  ninth-century  writers  maintain  the 
tradition of  the natural equality of  human nature-an  equality 
which,  in a  certain sense,  is permanent  and inalienable;  but 
we  have  seen  that this is  not  inconsistent  with  their  main- 
taining that slavery  is a  necessary  and wliolesome  discipline. 
It is so  also with  government;  in one  sense  it might seem 
that this is incompatible with the theory of  the natural equality 
of  man, but these writers look upon  it as a necessary discipline 
by means  of  which  life is preserved  and order  is maintained. 
The  State is  a  divine institution; its coercive discipline  may 
indeed be a consequence of  the Fall, but it is the divine remedy 
for the Fall, and as such it must be respected and obeyed by all 
men.  We have seen that in some  of  the Fathers this concep- 
tion is developed into a theory that the person and authority of 
the ruler is so sacred that disobedience to him  or resistance to 
his commands  is  equivalent to disobedience  and resistance to 
God Himself.  By some of  the Fathers the divine  authority of 
the State is transferred whole and entire to the particular ruler. 
This view  is in the ninth century  fornlally  held  by  many, 
perhaps  indeed  by  all writers.  But the  actual  conditions  of 
the  political  life  of  the  time  often  came  into  conflict  wit11 
this  view,  and  while  the  writers  of  the  time  may  have 
continued  to  maintain  it in  form,  they  were  in  fact  often 
compelled  to  adopt  quite  another  attitude  towards  the  head 
of  the  State.  We also  begin  to  find  in  them  the  influence 
of  a  tradition which  does  not  descend  frorn the ancient world 
The ninth-century writers are  for  the most part ecclesiastics, 
but  they  are  also,  at  least  in  Northern  Europe,  men  of 
the  Teutonic  tradition.  And  the  Teutonic  tradition  of  the 
of  the king  is  not  the  same  as  that  of  the Latiri 
Fathers. 
The  conflict  of  these  ideas  is the cause  of  much  apparent 
incoherence and inconsistency : we find the same man speaking 
at one time  as though  the divine  authority of  the king  could 
never  be  resisted,  at another  time  as  if  his  authority  were 
limited  and  restricted.  The  difficulty  also  of  defining  the 
limits  of  the  authority  of  the  ecclesiastical  and  the  civil 
powers produced a  constant  friction, which  tended  to destroy 
any unqualified theory of the absolute authority of  the State. 
We find but little speculation or  theory as to the beginnings 
of  society and the State, and what  little there is, is obviously 
second-hand and borrowed  from  earlier writers.  In a  treatise 
attributed  to Alenin, 'De Rhetorica  et Virtutibus,' there is an 
interesting passage  on  the primitive conditions of  human  life, 
drawn, as the author says, from  ancient sources, in which  nlan 
is represented  as having  originally lived  like  the beasts, wan- 
dering  about  in  the  fields,  without  any  rational  or  moral 
principle or rule of  life.  A great and wise man at last appears, 
and, recognising the qualities and capacities of  human nature, 
gathers men together  into one place, and thus brings  then1 to 
live a peaceable and humane 1ife.l 
'  Alcuin, '  Dialogus  De  Rhetorica  et 
Virtutibus :  ' "  Carolzls. Prlmum mihi, 
magister, hujus artis (vel studli)  initium 
pande. 
"Alb  Pandam  juxta  auctoritatenl 
yeterurn.  Nam  fuit, ut fertur, quad- 
dam  tempus,  cum  in  agiis  homines 
Passim  bestiarum  more  vagabantur, 
net  ratione  animi  quidquam,  sed 
~leraque viribus  colporis  adminis- 
trahant.  Nondum  dirina religio non- 
dum  humani  officii ratio  colebatur, 
ceca  et  temerai-ia  (dommatrix) 
Cupiditas  ad  se  explendam  viribus 
Cor~oris  abutebatur.  Quo tempore qui- 
dam  magnus  et sapiens  cognovit 
materia.  et quanta  ad  maximds 
re3 opportunitas  animis inesset homin- 
um, si quis earn posset elicere et prwci- 
piendo melioremreddere.  Quidispersos 
homines in agris et  in tectia sylvestribue 
abditos  ratione  quadam  compulit  in 
unum locum,etcongregavit eos in unum, 
aliquam quietem inducens utilem atque 
honestam ;  primo  propter  insolentiam 
reclamantes,  deinde  propter rationem 
atque orationem  studiosius audieutes, 
ex  feris  et immanibus mites  recldid~t 
et  manauetos.  Ac mihi quidem videtur, 
domine  mi  rex,  hoc  nec  tacita,  neg 
inops  dicendi  sapientla  pei ficere 
potuisse,  ut homines  a  consuetudiue 
subito converteret  et ad diversas ~ita 
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We find a very similar account of  the primitive condition of 
Inan in Hrabanus Maurns's '  De Universo,'  taken from St Isidore 
of Seville.  Under the definition of  "  oppidum" he tells us that 
in the earliest times men were naked and unarmed and had  no 
protection against the wild beasts, no shelter against the heat or 
cold,  no  safety against  each  other.  As  time  went  on  they 
learned to make  houses  in which  they could dwell in safety, 
and in this way towns began to spring up.' 
We can  scarcely found  any conclusior~s  on  such scanty and 
incidental references to the beginnings of society; it is evident 
that  both  the  author  of  the  'De  Rhetorica'  and  Hrabanus 
Maurus are simply writing down fragments of  ancient descrip- 
tions of  society, which they accept, but upon which they are not 
reasoning.  In  themselves these statements are both too  vague 
and  too  commonplace to enable us to  fix  very  definitely the 
philosophic  tradition to which we might say they belong.  We 
can hardly go further than this, that they represent a tradition 
which  held  that behind  the period  of  the organised  society of 
men  there lay a  time when  there  was  no fixed  order  among 
mankind.  It is a  state  of  nature,  but  not,  so  far  as  these 
passages go, a good or ideal state, but rather one of  disorder and 
misery.  It would  agree  well  enough  with  the conditions of 
human life, as they might  be  pictured  after sin and vice  had 
come into the world, and before the great institutions, by which 
sin is controlled and checked, had been developed. 
We have  seen that the ninth-century  writers maintain the 
primitive or  natural  equality of  men ; but  they recognise that 
the actual coliditions of  life demand government, as they justify 
slavery.  This  is  well  expressed  in a  treatise  of  Hincn~ar  of 
Rheims.  God has set diverse orders in the world, as is sl~own 
Hrabanus  Maurus,  De  Universo, 
xiv. 1.  "  Oppidum quidam ab opposi- 
tione murorum dixerunt : alii ab opibus 
recondendis, eo quocl sit munitum :  quod 
sit  conventus  in  eo  habitantium,  et 
opem  ferat  mutuam  contra  hostem. 
Nam  primum homines,  tanquam nudi 
et inermes, nec contra belluas prssidia 
habebant,  nec  receptacula  frigoris  et 
calo~is,  usc  ipsi  111ter  be  homines  ab 
hominibus  satis  eranb  tuti.  Tandem 
naturali sollertia speluncis silvestribus- 
que tegumentis  tuguria sibi  et casas 
virgultis arunclinibusque contexuerunt, 
quo esset vita tutior, ne his, qui nocere 
possent  aditus esset.  Haec  est  origo 
oppidoruru, qure, eo quod opem daren? 
idcirco  oppida  nominata  dixerunt. 
See p.  172. 
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by t,he apostolic exhortation to obey kings and rulers for God's 
sake; for  although,  as St Gregory  says, nature brought forth 
all  men  equal, sin  has  put  some  below  others,  and  this  by 
~~$8  dispensation, who has ordained  that one  man  should be 
ruled  by  an0ther.l  Indeed  the writers of  the ninth  century 
the  strongest  phrases  of  the  Fathers with  refer- 
ence  to  the divine  nature of  the civil power.  In the middle 
of  the  century  we  find  this  enunciated  with  great  force  in 
the 'Capitula  Pistensia.'  These  lament the disturbances and 
discord  in  the  kingdom,  and  complain  that  some  nlen  will 
not  endure  subjection  to  the  king.  They forget  that,  as  St 
Paul  says,  all  power  is from  God,  and  that  he  who  resists 
the  power  resists  the ordinance  of  God.  God  is  indeed  the 
true  King  of  kings and Lord  of  lords, but  He has  ordained 
that  the  ruler  is to  be  a  true king and lord  in God's  place 
(vice sua) on the earth.  The devil fell  from heaven  because he 
would  not  accept his subjection to his Creator; and so he who 
will  not  recognise  the power  ordained by  God  in  the  world, 
makes himself  the servant of  the devil and the enemy of  God.2 
l  Hincmar  of  Rheims,  Opus  lv.  homines super capita nostra,'-  ' habere 
Capit.  xiv. : '' Ad  quod  instar  sunt  sustinemus,  non  attendentes,  quia,' 
ordines in  ssculo Dei ordinatione dis-  sicut dicit apostolus, 'non  est potestas 
tincti, sicutmonstrat apostolus, dicens :  nisi a Deo, et qui potestati resistit, Dei 
'Suloiecti estote omni human2 creature  ordinationi resistit' ;  quoniam Deus qu~  .  - 
propter Deum, sive  regi  tanquam pre-  essentialiter est '  rex regum et  dominus 
cellenti, sive  ducibus  tanquam  ab  eo  dominantium,'  participatione  nomin~e 
missis' (1 Pet. ii.  13).  '  Liquet,'  inquit  et numinis Dei, id est potestatis sus, 
beatus  Gregorius  (Moral.,  lib.  xxi.  c.  roluit et esse et vocari regem et  domin- 
Is),  'quod  omnes  homines  natura  um  pro  honore  et vice sua regem  in 
Bcjuales genuit sed variante meritorum  terris.  Et  sicut archangelus, qui nunc  -  .- 
ordine, alios aliis culpa postponit.  Ipsa  est diabolus, cum suis sequacibus,  quia 
aukem diversitas,  quz  accessit ex vitio,  per humilitatis  subjectionem  conditori 
divine  judici~ dispensatur,  ut  quia 
Omnis homo sque stare non valet, alter 
regatur ab altero.' " 
M. C.  H. Leg., sect. ii. vol.  ii.  No. 
272,  Capitula Pistensia,  i. : ''Quia  per 
diecordiam et  regnum  istud  tempor- 
ale  imminuitur  et pene  desertum  et 
eternurn  regnum perditum  habemus, 
quia  nec  omnes  reges  esse  possumus 
regem super nos a Deo constitutunl 
-cluia,  aicut  scripturn eat, '  imposuit 
suo subditus esse  noluit et per squall- 
tatem  caritatis  coangelis  suis  socius 
esse  despexit,  de ccelo  cecidit,  ita et 
illi,  qui  potestati  a  Deo  constitute 
propter Deum et in Deo  subjecti esse 
nolunt et pares vel corequales in regno 
habere  non  sufferunt,  per  quanl  de- 
bitam subjectionem et parilem  squali- 
tatem Dei amici et  angelorum consortes 
esse  poteranl,  subjecti diabolo et Dei 
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These phrases  can  be  paralleled  over  and over  again in the 
Capitulariesl  and  in  the  writers  of  the  time,-Smaragdus, 
Sedulius Scotus, Jonas of  Orleans, Hrabanus Maurus, Hincmar 
of  Rheims, Cath~lfus.~  They represent  the accepted view that 
temporal authority is derived from God, and that all men must 
obey the authority for the sake of  God, 
It  is this conception which  is embodied in the phrases used 
by Charles the Great and his successors : "  Karolus gratia Dei 
rex l'; "  Karolus serenissimus augustus, a Deo coronatus magnus 
pacificus imperator, Romanum gubernans imperium, qui et per 
misericordiam  Dei  Rex  Francorum  atque  Longobardorum " ; 
"  Hludowicus,  divina  ordinante  providentia  imperator  augns. 
tus " ; "  Hludowicus  divino  nutu coronatns."  These  phrases 
serve  to  express  the  conception  that it  is  God  who  is the 
ultimate  source  of  all  authority.  This  is  also,  we  venture 
to  think,  the  conception  which  was  ultimately  conceived  to 
be  expressed in the consecration of  the king or emperor at his 
coronation.  We shall have a good deal to say about this later, 
for  the medi~val  interpretations of  the rite and of  the  part 
taken  in it by the clergy are of  considerable importance.  For 
the present  it is  enough  to  observe  that  the introduction of 
a  religious  element  into  the  solemn  appointment  of  a  king 
or emperor,  while  at first  it probably  meant little more  than 
that the blessing of  God was being invoked upon  the monarch, 
was very  soon  taken  to  be  symbolical  of  the  fact  that  it is 
from God  that authority came.4 
M  G  H. Leg.,  sect. ii  Nos.  5,290, 
293,  302. 
E.g., Smaragdua Abbas, Via Rekia, 
18 ; Sedulius  Scotus,  De  Rectoribus 
Christianis, 1  and 19 ;  Jonas of  Orleans, 
De Inst. Regia, 7,8  ,  Hrabanus Maurus, 
M.  G. H. Ep., v.  15, iii. ; Hiucmar  of 
Rheims  De Regis Persons, 1, 8 ;  K.  G. 
H  Ep., iv. Var. Car. Mag. Regn. 7. 
3  M.  G.  H.  Leg., sect. ii. vol. i. Nos. 
19, 45,  132, 134. 
4  From the time of  the coronation of 
Leo 11. ai emperor in the year 473 A.D., 
the appointment of  the emperor in the 
East was accompanied by some reliyinum 
rite8.  How  far  back  this  may  have 
gone  in  the  West  we  do  not  know: 
the earliest  coronation  with  religious 
service  of  which  there ia  trustworthy 
evidence is  that of  Pippin in 752, and 
the earliest  form of  coronation service 
in the West  is that contained  in  the 
Pontifical  of  Egbert, whlch ~t  is thought 
may have been in use in  the first half 
of  the eighth century. 
We  would  refer  the  reader  to  the 
articles  by the Rev.  J. E. Brightman, 
on the Byzantine Imperial Coronations, 
and by the Rev.  H.  A.  Wilson,  on  the 
English  Coronation  Order,  in  the 
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The writers of the ninth century, then, maintain the tradition 
,,f  the  Fathers, that  the  State is  a  religious  institution,  that 
authority of  the civil government is sacred,  and that all 
~hristian  men  should  obey it, as representing  the authority of 
~~d Himself.  But they go much further than this.  We have 
just  considered a passage from the ' Capitula Pistensia,'  and we 
must now observe that the king is here spoken of  as standing in 
~~d's  place (vice sus) in the world.  Smaragdus uses an almost 
exactly similar phrase when  he speaks of  the king acting M pro 
"ice  Christi." l  Sedulius  Scotus  calls  the king the a Vicar of 
God."2  It  is true  that Sedulius  calls  him  God's  vicar in the 
government  of  the Church, a  statement which  we  shall have  " 
to  consider  again  in  connection  with  the  relations  of  the  .  ~ 
ecclesiastical  and civil powers,-but  probably  he includes  the 
State  in the  Church. 
A writer called  Cathulfus, of  whom little is known, and who 
is  represented  in literature  only by a letter or short treatise, 
addressed  to  Charles  the  Great,  uses  a  similar  phrase.  He 
bids the king remember God  always with  fear and love, for he  - 
stanrls in His  place  over all His members, to guard  them and 
reign  over  them.  The bishop  is said  to stand in the second 
place,  to represent  Chri~t.~  Our readers may  remember  that 
the writer  known as Ambrosiaster expresses a  similar thought 
when  he  says that the king, whom  he calls the Vicar of  God, 
has  the "image  of  God,"  and  the  bishop  has the "image of 
Christ."  Whether  Cathulfus  draws  the  phrase  from  Am- 
'  Journal  of  Theological  Studies ' for 
April and July 1901, for a detailed dis- 
cussion of  the exact character and sig- 
nlficance of  the ecclesiastical ceremony. 
'  Smaragdus Abbas,  Via  Regia,  18 : 
"  Pac quidquid potes pro persona quam 
gestas, pro miilisterio regaliquod port68, 
pro nomine  Christiani quod habes, pro 
vice Christi qua fungeris." 
'  Sedulius  Scotus,  De  Rectoribus 
Christianls,  19 :  'l  Oportet  enim  Deo 
amabilem  regnstorem,  quem  divina 
"rdinatio  tanquam  vicarium  suum  in 
rexlmine  Ecclesis  sus esse  voluit,  et 
Potestat~m  ei super utrumque ord~nem 
prelatorum et subditorum  tribuit, u6 
singulis  personis  et  qus justa  sunt 
decernat, et sub sua dispositione prior 
ordo  devote  obediendo  fideliter  sub- 
ditus fiat." 
S M.  G.  H.  Ep., iv.  Variorum Carolo 
Magno Regnante Scripte, 7 : "Men101 
esto ergo semper, rex mi,  Dei regis fui 
cum  timore  et amore,  quod  bu  es in 
vice  illius  super  omnia  membra  ejus 
custoclire  et regere,  et rationem  red- 
dere in die ~udicii,  etiam  per  te.  Et 
episcopus  est in  secundo loco,  in  vice 
Christi  tantum  est." 
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brosiaster  we  cannot  tell,-it  is at least  possible  that  it is 
from him  that the phrases which speak  of  the king acting in 
God's  place  come;  but it is also  possible  that this method  of 
speaking was  traditional  among  Christians, though  it has not 
come  down  to us in any patristic  writer  of  the West, except 
Ambrosiaster.  It  is  important  to  observe  the  phrase  the 
"Vicar  of  God."  We shall  presently  have  to  consider  its 
meaning in these writers in relation  to the Church : in a  later 
volume  we  shall  see  that  it came  to  mean  a  great  deal  in 
the controversy  between  Church  and  State.  It  is significant 
for  us  for  the  moment  as  representing  in  the  most  terse 
form the universal  judgment  of  the  time  that  the  king  is 
the  representative  of  God,-that  it  is  from  God  that  he 
draws his  authority. 
The king thus stands in God's  place, is His representative on 
earth, and the writers  of  the ninth  century  use  very  strong 
phrases to express  their condemnation of  rebellion  against his 
authority.  The Council of  Maintz in 847 inserts in its decrees 
a very strong condemnation of conspiracy and rebellion  against 
the lawful authorities in Church and State, and threatens those 
guilty of  such acts with excomm~nication.~  Some of  the manu- 
scripts which  contain  the documents of  this council  say  that 
these  sentences  come  from  an epistle  of  Hrabanus  Maurus. 
In one  of  his  letters,  written  some  years  earlier,  he  speaks 
very  strongly  on  the wickedness  of  revolb,  and enforces this 
by  a  number  of  quotations  from  the  Old  and  New  Testa- 
ments,  citing especially the conduct of  David, who would  not 
raise  his  hand  against  the  Lord's  anointed,  and  recouilting 
'  M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  248,  Concilium  Moguntinum.  5. 
De  conepiratione : "  Si  vero  pax  et 
concordia  summum  inter  homines  et 
maxime  Christianos bonum  judicatur 
et prsmio  summo remunerandum,  id 
est,  ut ejus merito  filii  Dei voccmur, 
nonne, e contrario discordis et dihsen- 
sionis sunimum  est malum  et summa 
pcena  plectendum?  Ita  ut  sapiens 
dicat animam Domini  illum  detestari, 
qui  inter  fratres  discordiam  seminat 
~tque  ideo filius  diaboli  non  immerito 
nominetur.  Unde  statuimus  atque 
auctoritate  ecclesiastica  confirmamus 
eos, qui contra regem vel ecclesiasticas 
dignitates  sive  reipublics  potestates 
in  unoquoque  ordine legitima  disposi- 
tione  coustitutas  conjurationes  et 
conspirationem  rebellionis  et  repug- 
nantis  faciunt,  a  communione  et 
consortio  catholicorum  veram  pacem 
amantium  summovendos  et,  nisi  per 
pcenitentiam  et emendationem  paci Be 
ecclesiastics incorpaverint, ab omnibus 
filiis pacis sancimus extorres." 
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the  judgments  that overtook  several  of  those  who  in later 
times  rose  in insurrection against their legitimate lords? 
Hincmar of Rheims uses equally strong phrases on the neces- 
sity of  obedience.  In his treatise, '  ~e-~ide  Carolo Rege Ser- 
vanda,'  he also cites  the example of  David's  conduct  towards 
Saul as the true model of  right conduct? and then quotes those 
very  strong words of  St Gregory the Great on which we  com- 
mented in a former chapter, in which he warns sub.jects that if 
they transgress against their rulers, they transgress against God, 
who set them  over  men.3  In  one of  his letters he speaks more 
directly  and strongly still.  Nothing, he says, is done  in the 
world  except by God, or by His just permission.  When kings, 
therefore, reign by God's appointment (ex  illo) it is the work of 
God's  mercy, that their  people  may be safe.  When they rule, 
not by his appointment (non ex  illo), but by His permission, it is 
God's  punishment  on a  sinful people.  The  true believers  do 
not resist the power, which is either given or permitted by  God, 
but, humbling themselves under God's hand, give thanks to Him 
M.  G.  H.  Ep.,  v.;  Hrabanus 
Maurus,  Ep.  15, iii. : "  Quod  autem 
regis  dignitati  honor  sit  a  subditis 
offerendua, et quod  Deo displiceat con- 
tumatia subditorum, ostendit scriptura 
divina  tam  in  sententiis  quam  etiam 
in exemplis.  Nam in Exodo scriptum 
eat :  'Diis  non  detrahes  et  principi 
populi tui non maledices.'  . . . 
"  Horum ergo casum  atque ruinam 
pertimescens  David  unctus  jam  rex 
non  zasus  est  levare  manum  suam 
contra  Saul regem,  sed viris  illis, qui 
eum persuaserunt,  ut Saul quasi sibi 
Oraditum  in  deserto  Engathi  vel  in 
desert0  Ciph  percuteret  atque  interi- 
meret, respondit  dicens, '  Propitius  sit 
mihi  Dominus,  ne  faciam  hanc  rem 
domino meo Christo Domini, ut mittam 
manum meam in eum, quoniam Christus 
Domini  est.'  Et item : '  Quis inquit, 
extendit  manum  suam  in  Christum 
Domini et i~inocens  erit  ?  Vivit Dom- 
inus,  quia  nisi  Dominus  percusserit 
eum, aut dies ejus venerit ut moriatur, 
aut in  prcelium  descendens  perierit, 
Propitius  sit  mihi  Dominus,  ne  ex- 
tendam  manum  meam  in  Christum 
Domini.'  . . .  Nam tyranni, qui contra 
dominos legitimos  subita, insolentia  se 
srexerant, non impuniti evaserant, sed 
justo  judicio  Dei  dampnati  pcenas 
condignas luebant.  Cujus  rei  inditia 
sunt  bella  famosissima  gloriosissimi 
et  fidelissimi  imperatoris  Theodosii, 
clua gessit contra Maximum  tyrannum 
Gratiani  domini  sui  interfectorem 
fratrisque ejus  Valentiniani de  regno 
expulsorem,  quem  sola  fide  major, 
universa  autem  apparatus  belli  com- 
paratione  minor,  sine  dolo  et  sine 
controveraia  Theodosius  clausit, ccepit, 
occidit.  Similiter eC  contra Arbogastem 
atque Eugenium infestissimos tyrannos 
. . . quos utique  christianissimus  im- 
perator,  potentia  Dei,  non  fiducia 
hominis fretus, magis orationibus quam 
armis subegit." 
2  Hincmar  of  Rheims,  De  Fide 
Carolo Hege Servanda, xxxiii. 
3  Hincmar, De Fid. Car.  Reg. Serv., 
xxxiv : "  Nam cum in prepositis delin- 
quimus, ejus ordniationi qui eom  nobis 
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for good princes, and rejoice even while  they groan under those 
who  are permitted  by  God  to  reign  for  their  chastisement. 
They  do indeed  resist wicked works  and  commands, but they 
endure patiently, for  God's  sake, the  evils  which  are  brought 
upon  them  by  wicked  princes?  This  passage  is  the  more 
noticeable that the general purpose  of  the letter is to protest 
against  infractions  of  the privileges of  the clergy by the king, 
These  passages  will  be  sufficient  to  show how  strongly  the 
doctrine  of  the divine  authority of  the civil government, and 
the duty of  obedience  to it, was held in the ninth century.  It 
might seem as though these writers were still wholly under  the 
influence  of  the  extreme  position  of  St Gregory  Ihe  Great. 
We can  indeed  understand  how  they came  to this view.  God 
is the source  of  all authority;  the king as  ruler  derives  his 
power from God, the evil king as much as the good ;  the former 
indeed,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  last  passage  quoted  from 
Hincmar,  holds  his  power  by  God's  permission  rather  than 
by His appointment, but still he holds it by God's  permission 
for  the chastisement  and  correction  of  evil.  Therefore,  they 
say,  we  must  always  obey  the  king,  and  submit  to  him, 
even when unreasonable and unjust, lest we should be found to 
be resisting God.  These writers think that their principles are 
the same  as those  of  Gregory the Great.  We must now con- 
sider other aspects of  their theory of  government, and we shall 
be led to recognise that whlle they repeat these patristic phrases 
with sincerity, their  own  final judgment  is influenced  also  by 
considerations of  quite another kind. 
l  Hincmar  of  Rheims,  Ep.  xv.  Ad 
Carolum  Regem : "  Quia  nil~il  fit  in 
mundo,  nisi  quod  aut  Deus  miseri- 
corditer facit, aut fieri  juste  permittit. 
Cum  itaque  reges  ex  illo  regnant, 
misericordia  illius  est,  ut  salventur 
populi eis commissi : cum vero non ex 
illo, sed permittente justo ipsias judicio 
reges  regnare  videntur,  vindicta  est 
peccatoris populi et regnantis cumulus 
poene.  Sed  fideles  quique  potestati 
aut a Deo collate aut a  Deo  permisse 
non resistunt, cum juxta Petri vocem : 
'Sub manu Dei humiliantur, et  de bonia 
principihus gratias referunt ;  et de his 
qui ad purgationem suam  a  Deo reg- 
nare permissi sunt,  gementes exsultant ; 
sicut scriptum est 'Exsultaverunt  filiae 
Judae in omnibus judiciis tuis, Domine.' 
Sicque non resistunt ordination1 Dei, qui 
novit,  non  mala  facere,  sed  ordinare. 
Resistunt  autem  iniquis  iniquorum 
operibus et mandatis.  Unde scriptum 
est :  Verba  sapientium quasi stimuli, 
et quasi  claves  in  altum  defixi,'  quk 
nesciunt culpas  palpare,  sed pungere, 
et tolerant patienter propter Dominum 
illata mala sibi a principibu~  malis." 
CHAPTER  XVIII. 
THE THEORY  OF THE  ICING  AND  JUSTICE. 
So  far  as we  have  gone  In  our  examination  of  Ihe  political 
theory of  the writers of  the ninth century, we have recognised 
the influence  of  the theories of  St Gregory the Great as to the 
duty of  an unlimited obedience to the civil ruler ; for in the main 
it is his  sentimerits and phrases  which  they are reproducing. 
No doubt they reproduce these with  honesty and sincerity ;  no 
doubt they imagined that they really held just the same opinions 
as  St Gregory.  But when we  examine their writings  further, 
we discover  at once that we  have here only one aspect of  their 
view of  the nature and source of  the authority of  government. 
The  truth is, that while the writers of  the ninth century are 
most  anxious  to  express  thenlselves  in the language  of  the 
Fathers, most anxious to be faithful to the traditions which they 
had inherited from them, their own standpoint is really in many 
ways  a very different one  from  that of  St Gregory the Great. 
The situation of  the ninth century was, in fact, a very different 
one  from  that  of  the  sixth  century.  The  whole  Western 
Church  must  probably  have  been  influenced  by  the  violent 
rupture  between  the  Bishop  of  Rome  and  the  iconoclastic 
emperors.  Italy had  risen  in  revolt  against  the attempt to 
suppress the use  of  images, and the Bishops  of  Rome, though 
they  had  tried  to  moderate  the violence  of  the  revolt?  yet 
had  necessarily  been  compelled  by  their  own  convictions  to 
approve  the Italian  resistance  to  the impious  wishes  of  the 
iconoclastic  enlperors ; and  such  armed  resistance  muat  have 
tended  to  neutralise  the  tradition  of  St Gregory  the Great. 
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The  transference  of  the  empire  from  the Byzantine  to  the 
Frank, and the fact that the Western ecclesiastics had  in the 
ninth century to do, not with the civilised chiefs of  the ancient 
Roman  civilisation, bnt with the half-barbarous Teutonic kings 
and  emperors, must  have  exercised  an even  greater influence 
upon  the  temper  of  the great  churchmen.  They  might  ex- 
press themselves in the most  deferential terms to their rulers, 
but actually they  were  civilised  men,-at  least they had  the 
tradition  of  civilisation,-while  the rulers  were  for  the most 
part  uneducated  and  half-barbarous.  It  must  have  become 
very  difficult  for  the churchmen  to  think  of  an  unqualified 
obedience  to men  who  in some  very important  matters were 
their inferiors.  And there was  yet a third  circumstance which 
profoundly affected  the political conceptions of  churchmen and 
laymen  alike.  They might, as Christians, desire to be faithful 
to  the traditions  of  the Christian  Fathers,  like  Gregory  the 
Gleat, but actually and necessarily they were still more power- 
fully influenced by the traditions of  their own race.  We shall 
have to examine the Teutonic tradition of  Government presently 
in more  detail:  for  the moment it is enough  to  say that the 
Teutonic tradition knew nothing of  an unlimited authority in the 
ruler, but a  great deal of  the relation  of  the king to his great 
or wise  men, and even  to the nation  as a whole; and for the 
most part the churchmen outside of  Italy, and even to a large 
extent in Italy, were men of  the Teutonic race or tradition. 
The situation  of  the ninth century was wholly different from 
that of the sixth ;  and while, as we have seen, the writers of  the 
ninth century, in their anxiety to be faithful to the tradition of 
the earlier Christian writers, constantly repeat  such  phrases  as 
these  of  St Gregory  the Great, they are also  continually and 
quite clearly governed  by other traditions and give expression 
to other principles.  In this and the following chapters we have 
to consider these.  We begin  by examining their conceptions of 
the relation of  government and justice.  We have seen that the 
writers of  the ninth century look upon  the king as the repre- 
sentative of  God, and sometinles speak as though this were true, 
whether he is good or bad, just  or  unjust.  This does not, how- 
ever, mean that they are blind to the difference between the just 
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king and the unjust, whom they do not hesitate to call a tyrant. 
~t is true that some  of  the Fathers had  spoken as though this 
made no difference in the duty of  the subject, and we have seen 
that St Augustine  actually omits  the  characteristic of  justice 
from  his  definition of  the  State;  but,  as we  have  also seen, 
other Fathers represent another tendency, and the influence  of 
one of  these is very strong in the ninth century. 
We have in a previous  chapter mentioned the definitions  of 
civitas and populus  given by St Isidore  of  Seville.  Hrabanus 
Maurus reproduces them,l and it is perhaps worth noticing that 
in doing this he follows St Isidore in his reproduction of  Cicero's 
definition of  the  State as against St Augustine.  We cannot, 
indeed, argue from  this that he intends to repudiate St Augus- 
tine's  definition ;  but the fact may serve  to illustrate what we 
have  already  said, that  St Augustine's definition  of  the State 
does  not  seem  to  have  exercised  any  considerable  influence 
in the Middle Ages. 
We have  also in a previous chapter mentioned the definition 
of  the king given by St Isidore  of  Seville.  Kings, he says, are 
so called from ruling, but he does not rule who does not correct: 
if  the ruler  acts rightly, he will keep the name of  king ; if  he 
transgresses,  he will  lose  it.  There is an  ancient  proverb, 
" Thou  shalt be  king, if  thou  doest  rightly ; if  not, thou shalt 
not be king."2  His definition is constantly referred  to by the 
writers of  the ninth century.  Hrabanns Maurus reproduces it 
verbatim  in  his  'De Universo,'  and it is more or less exactly 
cited  by Sedulius  Scotus,4 by Jonas of  Orleans,5 by Cathulfus? 
Hrabanus  Maurus,  De  Univelso, 
xiv. 1 : "  Civitas  est hominum  multi- 
tudo societatis vinculo  adnnata ;  dicta 
a,  civibus, id est, ab ipsis incolis urbis. 
Nam  urbs  ipsa  mcenia  aunt;  civitas 
autem  non  saxa,  aed  habitatores  vo- 
cantur."  Id., id.,  xvi.  4 : "  Populus 
est  coetus  humanre  multitudinis 
juris  cousenPiu  concordi  communione 
sociatus." 
St  Isidore of Seville, Etym., ix. 3: 
"  lteges a regendo vocati.  Sicut enin~ 
sacerdos  a  sacrificando,  ita  eb  rex 
a regendo.  Non  autem regib qui non 
corrigit.  Recte  igitur faciendo  regis 
nomen  tenetur,  peccando  amittitur 
Unde  et  apud  veteres,  tale  erat 
proverbium : ' Hex ell3  si rccte facias, 
si non facias non eris.' " 
De Universo, xvi. 3. 
De Rectoribus Christianis, 2. 
"e  Instit. Regia, 3 : "  Rex a recte 
regendo vocatur ;  si enim pie, et juste, 
et  misericorditer  regit,  merito  rex 
appellatur ;  si his caruerit nomen regis 
amittit." 
6  M.  a. H.  Ep., iv.  Var.  Car.  Mag 
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and  by  Hincmar  of  Rheims.l  In itself  this definition  might 
mean much or little, but it obtains a very considerable signific- 
ance when we  observe  again  how  sharply the "king"  is con- 
trasted with the "  tyrant."  St  Isidore, in the same place where 
he defines  the  meaning  of  "  king,"  also defines the meaning of 
tyrant."  This  name,  he  says,  had  formerly  been  used  as 
equivalent to that of  king, but in later time was used to denote 
a  wicked  and  cruel  ruler.2  This  definition,  again,  is  repro- 
duced  exactly  by  Hrabanus Mauru~,~  less  precisely  by  Jonas 
of  O~leans  ;*  and  Hincmar  of  Rheims  seems  to  have  it  in 
his  mind  when  he  says that without  clemency, patience, and 
love  a  man  may  become  a  tyrant, but cannot  well  attain to 
the kingd~m.~  St Isidore  of  Seville  adds to his  definition  of 
the king  the observation  that the principal  royal  virtues  are 
jz~stitia and  pi eta^.^  Hrabanus  Maurus  and  Hincmar  of 
Rheims  reproduce  his  phra~e.~ 
The  ninth-century writers  are also  strongly influenced  by a 
work  of  uncertain  date, which  some  of  then1  seem  to have 
regarded as being by St Cyprian, though it was also at various 
times attributed  to Origen, St Augustine, or other Fathers.  It 
seems clear  that the work  is of  a  much  later time than any 
of  these,  and  it  has  been  contended  that  it  belongs  to  the 
l  Ad  Episcopos  de  Institutione 
Carolomanni,  16. 
P St  Isidore  of  Seville,  Etym., 
ix.  3 :  "Tyranni  Qrsce  dicuntur. 
Idem  Latine  et reges.  Nam  apud 
veteres  inter  regem  et  tyrannum 
nulla  dis~retio  erat;  ut  'Pars  mihi 
pacis  erat dextram tetigisze  tyranni.' 
Fortes enim reges ty~anni  vocabantur. 
Nam tiro fortis.  De quibus Dominus 
inquitur:  'Per  me  reges  regnant,  et 
tyranni  tenent terram.'  Jam postea 
in usum  accidit  tyrannos  vocari  pes- 
3imos atclue inprubos reges,  luxuriosze 
dominationis  cupiditatem  et  crudel- 
issimam  dominationem  in  populis 
exercentes. " 
De Univer,~,  xvi. 3. 
De  Instit  Regia,  3 : "  Antiqui 
autem omiles ~cge~  tpranno- vocabant ; 
sei' postea pie, et  juste, et  misericorditer 
regentes  regis  nomen  sunt  adepti ; 
irnpie vel injuste, crudeliterque princi- 
pantibus,  non  regis  sed  tyrannicum 
aptotum est nomen." 
De Divortio Lotharii et Tetbergn, 
Pref. : "Et  licet  sint  alia  virtutes 
sine quibus ad regnum non pervenitur 
seternum,  tamen  sine  his  tribus quas 
pobuimus,  tyrannus  fieri  potest,  reg- 
num  autein  salubriter  nemo  potest 
obtinere  terrenum,  id  est sine  man- 
suetudine  . . . sine  patientia . . . 
sine vera dilectione. " 
Etym.,  ix.  3 : "  Regis  virtutes 
pracipuz due, juetitia  et pietas : plus 
autem in regibus laudatur pietas ;  nam 
ju~titia  per se severa est." 
De Universo, xvi. 3. 
Ad Episc. de Inst. Carol.,  17. 
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sevellth  ce11tury.l  This  treatise,  'De  Duodecim  Abusivis 
sseculi,' which  is of much  value and interest throughout as a 
of  the condition of  society  in  the  period,  whatever 
that  may  precisely  be,  to  which  it belongs,  has  one  chapter 
which is specially  important in relation  to the conception  of 
justice in the State.  The ninth chapter deals with  the unjust 
king,  and  declares  that  the  king  must  not  be  unjust, but 
must  restrain  the  unjust:  it  is  the  proper  purpose  of  his 
office to  rule,  but how  can  he rule  and correct others unless 
he  first  corrects  himself  ?  Justice  in  the  king  means  to 
oppress  no  man  unjustly, to judge  righteously  between  men, 
to  defend  the  weak,  to  punish  the  wicked,  to  protect  the 
Church,  to put just  rulers  over  the kingdom,  to live  in God 
and  the  Catholic  faith,  and  to  keep  his  children  from  evil. 
The  king  who  does  not  rule  according  to  these  principles 
will  bring  many  evils  and  disasters  on  his  country and  his 
descendants.  The  king  should  remember  that as  he has the 
greatest  station among  men, so also he will  suffer  the greatest 
punishment if  he does not do ju~tice.~  Thi3 chapter is quoted 
It has  been  argued  with  great 
force by S. Hellmaun, in his admirable 
edition,  1908,  that this  work  is  of 
Irish origin, and belongs to the seventh 
century. 
De Duodecim  Abusivis Ssculi, 9 : 
"Nonus  abusionis  gradus est rex in- 
iquus.  Quem  cum  correctorem  ini- 
quorum  esse  oportet,  licet  in  semet 
ipso  norninis  aui  dignitatem  non 
custodit.  Nomen enim regis intellectu- 
aliter hoc retinet, ut  subjectis omnibus 
rectoris officium procuret.  Sed qualiter 
alios  corrigere  poterit  qui  proprios 
mores  ne  iniqui  sint  non  corrigit? 
Quoniam  in  justitia  regis  exaltatur 
80lium  et  in  veritate  solidantur 
guLernacula populorum.  Juititia vero 
regis  est neminem  injuste per  poten- 
tianl  opprimere,  sine  acceptione per- 
sonarurn  inter  virum  et  proximum 
mum  judicare,  advenis  et  pupillis 
et  viduis  defensorem  esse,  furta 
cohibere, adulteria purire, iniquos  non 
exaltare  . . . ecclesiaa  defendere 
pauperes  elemosynis  alere,  juetos 
super regni negotia  constituere,  senes 
et  sapientes  et  sobrios  consiliarios 
habel e  . .  .  iraouudiam  differre, 
patriam  fortiter  et  juste  contra  ad- 
versarios  defendere,  per  omnia  in 
Deo confidere, prosperitatibus animum 
non  elevare  cuncta  advqersnria 
patienter  ferre,  fidem  Catholicam  in 
Deum  habere,  filios  suos  non  sinere 
impie  agere,  certis  ho~is  orationibus 
insistere,  ante  horas  congruas  non 
gu~tare  cibum.  . . . Qui vero regnum 
se~unrlum  hanc legeru  non  dispensat, 
multas  nimirum  ad~ersitates  imperii 
tolerat.  Idcirco  enim  ssepe  pax 
populorum  rumpitur  et  offendicula 
etiam de regno suscitantur,  terrarum 
ynoque  fructua  diminuuntur  et ser- 
vitia  populorum  prspediuntur, multi 
et varii  dolores  prosperitatem  regni 
inficiunt.  . . . Ec~e  quantum juslitia 
regis  ssculo  valet,  inturnt~bus  per- 
spicue  patet.  pax  populorum  est, 
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by  Jonas  of  Orleans l  and  by  Hincmar  of  Rheims "n  their 
treatises  dealing  with  the nature of  the royal  authority. 
The  fornlal  treatises  on  kingship in  the ninth century  are 
indeed  very  largely  made  up  of  admonitions  to  the  king  to 
follow  after justice  and  mercy,  to  seek  wisdom  and  to  fear 
God.  Smaragdus bids  the king to love justice  and judgment, 
the  royal  way  trodden  in older  times  by  former kings.  He 
admonishes  him  to  do  justice  to  the  poor  and  the  orphan, 
if  he  desire  that  God  should  establish  his  thr~ne.~  Alcuin 
in  his  letters  continually  urges  upon  the various  rulers  to 
whom  these are addressed the same principle, that their chief 
duty  is  to  do  justice  and  mercy  to  their  peop1e.l  Sedulius 
Scotus, in his  treatise on  the  nature  of  the  Christian  ruler, 
lays much stress on the same  point^.^  He and Cathulfus have 
a very interesting enumeration of  the eight qualities which are 
rnunimentum gentis, cura languorum, 
gaudium  homiuum,  temperies  aris, 
serenitas  maris,  terra:  fecunditas, 
solacium  pauperum, hereditas filiorum 
et  sibimet  ipsi  spes  futura  beati- 
tudinis.  Attamen sciat rex quod sicut 
in throno hominum primus constitutus 
est,  sic et in  prenis, si  justitiam  non 
fecerit,  primatum  habiturus  est. 
Omnes  namque  quoscumque  pecca- 
tores sub se in prssenti habuit, supra 
se modo plagali in illa pcena habebit." 
De Inst. Regia, 3. 
Ad  Episc.  de Inst. Carol.,  7,  and 
De  Regis  Persona,  25. 
"ia  Regia, 8 and 9 :  "Dilige ergo, 
rex, justitiam et judicium,  quse est via 
regia, et a prioribus regibus antiquitus 
trita.  . . . Sed tempera  justitiam  et 
crudelitatem  solliciter  cave  sinistram. 
. . . Si  vis  ergo,  O  rex,  ut  thronus 
tuus  a  Domino  firmetur,  non  cesses 
justificare pauperem et pupillum." 
* M.  G.  H.  Ep.,  iv. ; Alcuiu,  Ep. 
18 : "  Illorum  est,  id  es6,  Sacerdo- 
tum, verba  Dei non  tacere.  Ve~trum 
est,  o  Principes,  humiliter  obcedire, 
diligenter  implere.  Regis  est,  omnes 
iniquitates  pietatis  sus potentia  ob- 
primere ; juutum  esse  in  jndiciis, 
pronum  in  misericordia -  secundum 
quod  ille  miseretur  subjectis,  misere- 
bitur  ei Deus -  sobrium  in  moribus, 
veridicum  in verbis,  largum in donis, 
providum  in  consiliis:  c~nsilia~ios 
habere  prudentes,  Deum  timentes, 
honestis  moribus  ornatos.  . .  . 
Legimus  quoque,  quod  Ilegis  bonitas 
totius  est  gentis  prosperitas,  victoria 
exercitus.  . . . Magnum  est  totam 
regere  gentem.  A  regendo  vero  Rex 
dicitur : et  qui  bene  regit  subjec- 
tum  sibi  populum,  bonam  habet  a 
Deo  retributionem,  regnum  scilicet 
cceleste.  Valde  feliciter  regnat  in 
terra, qui de terreno regno  merebitur 
cceleste.  Orationibus vero  et vigiliis 
eo instantius ad Deum insistere debet, 
quo  non  pro  se  solummodo,  sed  et 
pro  totius  gentis  prosperitate  Deum 
deprecari  debet.  Similiter  Principes 
et Judices  populi  in  justitia  et pie- 
tate populo  przsint.  Viduis,  pupillis 
et  miseris  sint  quasi  patres;  quia 
squitas Pritlcipu~ll  populi est exultatio. 
Ecclesiarum  Christi slnt defensores et 
tutores ;  ut servorum Dei  orationibus 
louga  vivant  prosperitate."  Cf.  Ep. 
30, 64, 217. 
De Rect.  Christ., 2, 3, &c. 
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the  most  firm  supports  of  a  just  king.l  Jonas  of  Orleans, 
as  we  have  already  mentioned,  cites  St  Isidore's  definition 
of  the king and the tyrant, and also the ninth chapter of  the 
treatise  '  De  Duodecim  Abusivis  Saeculi,'  and  himself  urges 
much vigour on the king  the duty of  doing justice.  The 
king's  chief  duty, he says, is to govern the people of  God with 
equity and justice, and to strive that they may have  peace  and 
concord.  He is to prevent  all injustice and to appoint  fit per- 
sons to  administer  the State under him, for he will be respon- 
sible  if  they are unjust.  Such ministers  must  learn  that the 
people of  Christ  are by nature their equals, and that they must 
rule them justly, and not  lord  it over  them or ill-treat them, 
thinking that they belong  to  them, or are put under them  for 
the  glory of  the rulers.  Such  notions  beloiig  to tyranny and 
unjust  power,  and not to j~stice.~ 
1 N.  G.  H. Ep.,  vol.  iv. ; Ep.  Var. 
Car.  Nag.  Regn.  Script.,  7 : "  Sunt 
autem  octo  columna  regis  justi 
propria.  . . . Prima  est  veritas  in 
rebus  regalibus ;  secunda  pacientia 
in  omni  negotio ; tertia  l,..;itas  in 
muneribus ;  quarta persuad~hilitas  in 
verbis ;  quinta  malo~um  corleptio  et 
eonstrictio ; sexta  bonorum  elevatio 
et exaltatio, septima levitas tributi in 
populo,  octava  squitas  judicii  inte: 
divitem  et ~au~erem."  Cf.  Sedulius 
Scotus,  De  Rect.  Christ.,  10. 
l3e  Inst.  Regia,  4 :  "Regale 
miuisteriu~n specialiter  est  populum 
Dei gubernare et regere cum aquitate 
et  justitia, et ut pacem  et concordiam 
habeant  studere.  Ipse  enim  clebet 
prim0  defensor  esse  ecclesiarum  et 
8ervorum Dei.  Ipsorum etiam officium 
est  sdluti  et  ministerio  sacerdotum 
solerter  prospicere,  eoru~nque  armis 
et protectione  Ecclesia  Christi  debet 
tueri : viduarum,  orphanorum,  cater- 
O'umque  pauperum, necnon et omnium 
indigelltium  inopia  defendi.  Ipsius 
eninl  terror  ac studiunl hujuscemodi, 
in  quantum possibile  est, esse  debet : 
Prim0 ut nulla injustitia fiat ;  deinde, 
evenerit,  ut nullo  modo  eam  sub- 
VOL.  I. 
sistere  permittat,  nec  spenl  delites- 
ceudi,  sive  audaciam  male  agendi 
cuiyuam  relinquat ; sed  sciant omnes 
quoniam  si  ad  ipsius  notitiam  per- 
vcuerit  quidquam  mali  quod  ad- 
mlserint,  nequaquanl incorreptum aut 
inultum  remanebit : sed  juxta  facti 
qualitatem  erit  et  modus  just2 
correptionis.  Quapropter  hoc  in 
throno  regiminis  positus  est  ad 
judicia  recta  peragenda,  ut ipse  per 
se  provident  et  perquirat,  ne  in 
judicio  aliquis  a veritate  et aquitate 
declinet.  Scire  etiam  dehet  quod 
causa,  quam  juxta  ministerium  sibi 
comnlissum administrat, non hominum 
sed  Dei  causa  existit,  cui pro minis- 
terio quod  suscepit,  in  ex,~minis  tre- 
mendi  die  rationem  redd~turus est. 
Et  ideo  oportet  ut  ipse,  qui  judex 
eat judicum,  causam  pauperunl ad  se 
ingredi  faciat,  et diligenter  inquirat, 
ne forte illi qui ab eo constituti bunt, 
et  vicem  ejus agere debent in populo, 
injuste  aut negligenter  pauperes  Op- 
preasiones pati permittant. . . . 
'c 5.  His  qus prsemissa  sunt  de- 
claratur  quod  hi  qui  post  regem 
populum  Dei  regere  debent,  id  est 
duce8 et comites,  necesse  est ut tales 
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In another passage  of  the same treatise Jonas urges that juS- 
tice preserves a kingdom, while injustice causes its ruin ;  and he 
prefixes  to another chapter, in which  he urges on subjects the 
religious  obligations  of  obedience to the king, the observation 
that the duty of  the royal  office is to care for the wellLeing  of 
the subjects,  and that therefore, as they desire  that  the king 
should  aid  them, they should  obey and serve him.2  Hincmar 
of  Rheims, as we have already seen, cites St Isidore's definition 
of  the  king and the tyrant,  and  the treatise  'De Di~oclecim 
Abusivis  Szculi'  on the unjust  king, and he repeats  Jonas of 
Orleans' observations on the duty of  kings'  minister^.^ 
We find  Jonas'  statement  of  the nature  of  the  true  king 
and of  his chief  duties reproduced  in the address presented  by 
the bishops  to Lewis t,he Pious in the year 829.  In  this they 
first cite passages from the writings of  St Isidore of  Seville, St 
Gregory  the Great, and Fulgentius of  Ruspe, to illustrate the 
difference  between  the tyrant and the king, and the true char- 
acter  of  the king, and then urge  upon  him  to remember that 
his  chief  duty is to govern with equity and justice,  to defend 
Churches and the servants  of  God, the widows,  orphans, and 
all other  poor  and needy people.  His duty is to  prevent  all 
injustice, if  possible, and if it does occur, to put it down.  He 
should  therefore  be  always ready himself  to hear the cause  of 
the poor, lest ally of  his ministers should act unjustly, or  suffer 
the poor to be oppressed.  Men  of  every rank must remember 
ad  constituendum  provideantur,  qui 
sine periculo ejus, a quo constituuntur, 
constitui  possint,  scieutes  se  ad  iioc 
positos  esse  ut  plebem  Christi  bibi 
natura requalem  recognoscant, eamque 
clementer salvent, et juste regant, non 
ut dominentur  et affligant,  neque  ut 
populum suum astimeat, aut ad suarn 
gloriam sibi illum subjiciant :  quod non 
pertineb  ad  justitiam,  sed  potius  ad 
tyraunidem  et iniquam  potestatem." 
1 De  Inst.  Reg.,  6.  Cf.  De  Inst. 
Laicali, ii. 24. 
De  Inst.  Reg.,  8: "Constat  re- 
galern  potestatem  omnibus  sibi  sub- 
jectia  secundum  iequitatia  ordinem 
consultum  ferre  debere ; et  idcirco 
oportet  ut  omnes  subjecti  fideliter, 
et  utiliter,  atque  obedienter  eidem 
pareaub potestati : quoniam qui potes- 
tati  a  Deo  ordinate  resistit,  Dei 
utique ordinationi, juxta apostoli docu- 
mentum, resistit.  Sicut enim subjecti 
a rege  sibi volunt  pie  et juste  opitu- 
lari, ita specialiter  ei primum  ad sal- 
utem animre sure procurandam, deinde 
generaliter ad honestatem et utilitatem 
regni  secundum  Dei  voluntatem  dis- 
ponendam  atque administrandam,  in. 
dissimulanter atque irretractibiliter  S,:' 
latiunl opportunum debent exhibere 
"lid Ep. de Inst. Carol., 14. 
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that if  they will have to answer for every idle word, much more 
will they have  to give account to God for the office which  EIe 
has intrnsted to them.l 
Hincmar  of  Rheims  and  Sedulius  Scotus  seem  to express 
these conceptions in strouger terrns  than any others.  Hincmar 
quotes,  without comment  indeed,  but  no great  comment was 
1 M.  (4.  H. I,eg., sect. ii. vol. ii. Ko. 
196, Episcoporu~ll  ad Hludovicurn  IUI- 
peratorem  Relatio,  56 : "Ut quid rex 
dietus  sit;  Ysidorus  in  libro  Sen- 
tentiarum scribit :  'Rex enim,' inquit, 
<a  recte agendo  vocatur:  si enim  pie 
et juste et  misericorditer regit, merito 
rex  appellatur : si  his  caruerit,  non 
rex sed tyrannus est.'  Antiqui autem 
ut  idem  Isidorus  in  libro  Ethi- 
mologiarum  scribit,  omnes  reges 
t,yranuos  vocdibant.  Sec1  postea  pie 
et  nlisericorditer  regentibus  regis 
nomen  adeptis,  impie  vero,  injuste, 
crudeliterque principantibus non regis, 
sed  tyrannicum  aptatum  esb  nomen. 
Unde  et  beatus  Gregorius  ait  in 
Moralibus :  'Viros  namque  sanctos 
proinde  reges  vocari  in  sacria  suis 
eloquiis didicimus, eo quad recte agailt 
bensusque  proprios  belle  regant  et 
rnotus  resistentes  eibi  rationabili  dis- 
cretione  componant.  Recte igitur  illi 
reges  vocantur  qui tam semet  ipsos, 
quam  subjectos  bene  gerendo  paei- 
ficare  uoverunt.'  Ad  quid  etiam 
eonstitutus  sit  imperator,  Fulgentius 
in  libro  de  reritate  predestinationis 
et  gratie,  scribit :  '  Clementissimus 
quoque  imperator  non  ideo  est  vas 
11lisericordile preparatum  in  gloriam, 
(Pia  apicem  terreni  principatus  ac- 
cipit,  sed  si  in  imperiali  culmine 
recta fide vivat et vera  cordis  humili- 
hate  preclitus  culmen  regiz dignitatis 
Ranch=  religioni  subjiciat :  si  magis 
in  himore servire Deo, quam in timore 
dolninari  populo  delectetur,  si  in 
e0  lenitas  iracundiam  mitiget,  ornet 
benignitas  potestatem,  si  se  magis 
diligendum, quam metuendum cunctis 
'xibeat,  si subjecti~  halubriter consulet, 
si  justitiam  sic  teneat,  ut  miseri- 
cordiam non  relinquat, si pre omnibus 
ita se sanctie matris ecclesire catholicre 
meminerit  filium,  ub  ejus  paci  atque 
tranquillitati per univeraum  mundum 
prodesse  suum  faciat  principatus. 
Alagis  enim  christianum  regitur  im- 
perium,  dum  ecclesiastico  statui  per 
omnem  terram consulitur,  quam cull1 
in  parte  quacunque  terrarum  pro 
temporali securitate pugnatur.' " 
It is  important  to notice  the way 
in which  the bishops  understand  the 
authors whom they quote.  They con- 
tinue to enforce the same  ideas in  the 
words  of  Jonas  of  Orleans : "  Regale 
narnque  mirlisterium  specialiter  est, 
populum Dei gubernare et regere cunl 
equitate et  justitia et, ut  pacem et con- 
cordiam habpant, studere.  Ipse eninl 
debet primo  defensor  esse ecclesiarum 
et  servorum Dei, viduarum, orfanorum 
ceterorulnque  pauperum  necuon  et 
omnium  indigentium.  Ipsius  enim 
terror  eh  studiuln  hujuscemodi,  in 
quantum  possibile  est,  esse  debet, 
primo,  ut nulla  injustitia fiat, deinde, 
si  evenerit,  ut nu110  mod0  eam  sub- 
sistere  permittat,  nec  spem  delites- 
cendi  sive  audatiam  male  agendi 
cuiquam relinquat. . . .  Unde oportet, 
ut ipse, qui judex  esb judicum causam 
pauperum  ad  se  ingredi  faciat  et 
diligenter  inquirat,  ne  forte  aliqui, 
qui  ab eo  constituti  sunt  eh  vicem 
ejus  agere  clebent  in  populo,  injuste 
aut negligenter  pauperes  oppressiones 
pati  permittaut.  Scire autem  unum- 
yuemque  cujuslibeb  sit ordinisl  opor- 
tet,  quia  si  de  ocioso  sermone  Deo 
rationem  redditurns  est, multo magi8 
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needed  by him, a  phrase  of  St Augustine's  to which we have 
referred in an earlier chapter : "  ltemota itaque justitia, quid sint 
regna  nisi  magna  latrocinia." l  And  Sedulius Scotus, warning 
evil rulers of  the ruin which  impends over them, of  the judg- 
ment  of  God which  awaits  them  both  in  this world  and the 
next, exclaims : "  What are impious kings but the greater robbers 
of  the earth, fierce as lions, ravening like wolves ;  but they are 
great to-day and  perish  to-morrow, and of  them God  has said, 
'They reigned,  but  not  by Me; they arose  as  princes,  but  J 
knew it not.'"  The evil ruler or tyrant is no true king; he is 
only, as Cicero  indeed  had  called  him, a wild  beast, the most 
terrible and loathsome known to the world. 
The writers of  the ninth  century, then, while they reproduce 
the phrases  of  St Gregory the Great with regard to the divine 
authority of  the ruler, and speak  at times as though he must 
under all circumstances be obeyed as the representative of  God, 
are also clearly and strongly influenced  by other considerations, 
partly founded, no  doubt, upon  the authority of  other Fathers 
like  St Isidore of  Seville, but also in large measure related  to 
their own experience and traditions.  They no doubt felt really 
and profoundly the truth which lay behind St Gregory's phrases, 
the truth that authority in the State is sacred ; they had ample 
experience of  the consequences of  discord and civil strife.  But, 
on  the other  hand,  they  had  no  mind  to  submit to  injustice 
or tyranny ;  they were probably clearly enough conscious of the 
fact that many of  the kings whom they had known were cnpric- 
ious and fallible rulers. 
We must turn to the actual conditions of  the government of 
the time, not to discuss the intricacies  of  the Frankish or other 
Teutonic constitutions, but that we may recognise  some  of  the 
principles  which  lay behind  the  constitutiorlal  machinery and 
practice  of  those  times,  and  that  we  may  more  completely 
understand  the  forces which were  moulding  the theory of  the 
State. 
De Regis Persona, 6.  Cf. p  167.  rarum  latrones,  feroces  ut  leones, 
De  Rect.  Chris.,  8 : "Quid  aunt  rabidi  ut ul sl ?" 
auLem  impii  reges,  nisi  majorea  ter- 
CHAPTER  XIX. 
THE  KING AND  THE  LAW. 
WE  have  seen that the writers of  the ninth century look  upon 
justice as something essential to the character of  the true ruler. 
Without justice he is a tyrant and no king.  The conception of 
justice  was  indeed  no  more  clear  in the  ninth century than 
in  the  present  day, or  in  ancient  times;  but we  think that 
justice,  relatively  to  the ruler,  had  a  meaning  in the  ninth 
century whose  importance  is very  great indeed.  No king is 
just  who  does  not  observe and  respect  the  law;  the law  is 
at  least  one  standard  of  justice,  clear,  distinct,  constantly 
appealed  to. 
We have seen in earlier  chapters that in the theory of  the 
Roman  jurists  the  emperor  is the source  of  law.  Justinian 
even speaks of him as the sole "  legis lator."  It is true that, as 
we  have  also  seen, this power  is his  only because  the Roman 
people have chosen  to  confer  their  authority upon  him;  the 
people  is the only ultimate source of  law.  But still the em- 
peror is the actual source of  law.  And the emperor is "  legibus 
solutus," a phrase whose significance it is not easy to define.  It 
may indeed be doubted whether it can be clearly defined.  Per- 
haps it only expresses a conception whose  history can be traced 
in such a constitutional form as that of  the dispensing power of 
the English Crown,-a  power which seems to represent the con- 
sciousness  present,  ho~  ever  vaguely,  to  any more  developed 
reflection upon  law and the State, that there must be a power 
in the  State itself which  can, if necessary, interfere to prevent 
the harsh or inequitable operation of  the law in particular cases ; 
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a  power which, being  in its nature administrative rather than 
legislative, must  be  intrusted  to  the head  of  the State as ad- 
ministrator.  It is the influence,  perhaps,  partly of  this con. 
sciousness,  partly  of  the revived  study of  the Roman  juris. 
prudence, which leads the more systematic political thinkers of 
the thirteenth century like St Thomas Aquirlas to observe that 
the prince cannot properly be  said  to be  under  the law, for he 
must have the power of  dispensing with it.l 
In  the ninth century, however, the king is not the sole source 
of  law, but only has his part in the national relation to it, and 
he is not usually thought of  as above the law, or outside  of  it, 
but as bound to carry it out.  The ninth-century theory of  the 
relation  of  the  king to justice  may  be  reasonably  connected 
with  the theory  of  his  relation  to  law.  Lothair,  Lewis,  and 
Charles, at their meeting at Mersen in 851, put out a  declara- 
tion  promising  their  faithful subjects that for the future they 
would  not condemn, or dishonour, or oppress any man against 
the law  and ju~tice.~  And  when  Lewis  at Coblentz in 860 
repeats the promises of  Mersen, he adds an emphatic assurance 
that his faithful subjects shall enjoy the ancient law, and that 
all shall  receive  justice  and  law.3  Justice,  when  translated 
into  constitutional  tradition,  means,  in  the  first  place,  the 
observation  of  the  national  law :  the  king  is just  when  he 
sees  that this  is  carried  out,  unjust  when  he  acts  in  con- 
tradiction to it. 
In the  treatise  of  Hincmar  of  Rheims  on  the divorce  of 
Lothair and Tetburga we  find a formal discussion of  the nature 
and source  of  the royal  authority, to which we  shall  have  to 
return later, for it contains much which is important.  For the 
'  St  Thom.  Aquin.,  Summa 1, 2,  Q. 
xcvi.  5 ; and  Sum.  2,  2,  Q. lxvii.  4. 
Cf. article by R. W. Carlyle in 'Scottish 
Review,'  Jan.  1896,  "The  Political 
Theories  of  St Thomas  Aquinas." 
%.  G. H.  Leg., sect.  ii. vol. ii. 205. 
6 : "Ut nostri  fideles, unusquisque  in 
suo ordine  et statu,  veraciter sint de 
nobis  securi,  quia  nullum  adhinc  in 
ante  contra  legem  et  justitiam  vel 
auctoritatem  ac  justam  rationem  aut 
damnabimus  aut dehonorabimus  aut 
opprimemus  vel  illdebitis  machina- 
tionibus  affligemus,"  &c. 
M. a.  H.  Leg., secb. ii. vol. ii. 242. 
5 : "Et volumus,  ut vos  et  ceteri 
homines fideles nostri talem legem  et 
rectitudinem  et tale  salvamentum  in 
regnis  nostris  habeatis,  sicut  anteces- 
sores  vestri  tempore  antecessorum 
nostrorum  habuerint .  . . et justitia 
et lex  omnibus  consei vetur." 
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rnonlent we look at it only to see how he deals with the relation 
of  the  king  to  law.  It is contended, he says, by  some wise 
men  that the prince  is  a  king, and that the king is subject to 
the laws and judgment of none save God alone.  This is true in 
one sense, he replies-that  is, if he is a  true king, for the king 
is so called from ruling; and if he governs himself according to 
~~d's  will, and directs the good into the right way, and corrects 
the wicked  so as to drive them from the evil way to the good 
and right one, then he is a king indeed, and subject to the laws 
and judgments  of  none save God.  Whosoever, then, is a king 
in  the  true sense, is not  subject to law, for law is set not for 
the just but for the unjust, for wicked men and for sinners; and 
he who rules himself and others according to the fruits of  the 
spirit is not subject to  law, for "against  such there is no law." 
But the adulterer, murderer, unjust man, the ravisher, and the 
nlan  guilty of  other vices, whoever  he may be, will  be  judged 
by  the  pried1  IIincniar's  treatment of  the question seems to 
indicate that he was i11  some measure conscious of  the difficulty 
of  defining in precise terms the relation of  the king to law ; but 
1 Hincmar of  Rheims, De Div. Loth. 
et Tetb., Qutestio vi. : "  Dicunt quoque 
etiam aliqui  sapientes,  quia iste  prin- 
ceps  rex  est, et nullorunl  legibus  vel 
judiciis  subjacet, nisi  solius Dei. . . . 
"  Resp.  . . . Quod dicitur, quia rex 
nullorunl  legibus vel judiciis  subjacet, 
nisi  solius  Dei,  rerurn  dicitur  si  rex 
est  sicuti  nominatur.  Rex  enim  a 
regendo dicitur, et  si seipsum secundum 
voluntatem  Dei regit, et  bonos in viam 
rectam  dirigit,  malos  autem  de  via 
Prava ad rectam corrigit,  tunc rex est, 
eb  nullorunl  legibus  vel  judiciis  nisi 
solius  Dei  subjacet:  quoniam  arbitria 
Possunt  dici,  leges  autern  non  sunt, 
nisi ill= quze  Dei  suat per quem  reges 
regnant,  et  conditores  legem  justam 
decernunt.  Et  quicunque rex veraciter 
'ex  est,  legi  non  subjacet,  quia  lex 
non  eat  posita  justo,  sed  injustis  et 
subditis,  impiis  et peccatoribus, 
~~eleratis,  con tarninatis,  parricidk  et 
matricidis,  . . . et si  quit1 nliud  San? 
doctrinz adversatur, et his qui operi- 
bus  caruis  serviunt,  de quibus  dicit 
Apostolus [quotes  Gal. v.  19-21]. . . . 
Qui  autem  se  et  alias  secundum 
fructus  Spiritus regit  [quotes  Gal.  v. 
22,  231 . . . legi  non aubjacet  quia 
'  adversus  hujusmodi  non  est  lex.' 
Sed  solo  judicio  Christi  subjacet  a 
quo  et remunerabitur  cujus  est  qui 
carnem  suam  crucifigit  cum  vitiis 
et concupiscentiis.  Alioquin  adulter, 
homicida, injustus,  raptor,  et aliorum 
vitiorum obnoxius quilibet, vel secrete, 
vel publice, judicabitur  a sacerdotibus, 
qui  sunk  throni  Dei,  in  quibus Deus 
sedet, et per quos sua decernit judicia, 
quibus  et  in  apostolis  suis  quorum 
locum  in  Ecclesia  tenent,  Dominus 
dixit  'Si  peccaverit  frater  . . . 
(Matt. xviii.  15,  16).'  Et ne  quis  in 
hoc  sacerdotem  parvipendat  adjunxit 
Dominus [quotes  Matt. xviii. 181.  . . . 
Et item dicit 'qui v03 audit me audit, 
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ib  is fairly explicit as indicating  that whatever  might  be  the 
relation of  the true ruler to the law which he is justly adminis- 
tering, the evil ruler who sets at nought the moral law is liable 
to correction at least by the Church.  We shall have to return 
to this particular aspect of  the question later. 
If  in  this  passage  Hincmar  seems  to  express  himself  in 
the most  cautious  fashion, we  find  him speaking  in more un- 
qualified  terms  in other  places  on  the principle  that it is the 
duty of  the ruler to observe and obey the law.  In  another part 
of  the same  treatise  he quotes a phrase of  St Ambrose which 
we  have  already discussed, "  Leges  enim  imperator  fert, quas 
primus ipse  custodiat,"  and warns  the king that if he breaks 
the laws he may find himself  condemned by the apostle's  words, 
"Thou that preachest a man should not steal, dost thon steal?  "l 
We have considered the meaning which may be attached to this 
phrase as it is used by St Ambrose; Hincmar of  Rheims'  com- 
ment  on  it makes it  fairly clear  that he understands  it in a 
somewhat strict sense.  Hincrnar  also  quotes the passage  from 
St Augustine's  treatise  'De  Vera  Religione'  which  we  have 
already discussed : the citation occurs as part of  a discussion of 
the action of  Charles the Bald in summoning Hincmar, Bishop 
of  Laon, to appear before a secular court, and passing some sort 
of  judgment on him  in his absence.  Hincrnar argues that tliis 
action  is contrary not only to the canons, but also  to laws of 
the emperors from Constantine downwards, and to the promises 
made by Charles himself  to observe  the canons.  Therefore he 
concludes, in a phrase of  St Gregory the Great, "It must be so, 
that whatever  is  contrary to the laws has no  force," and then 
quotes  St Augustine as saying that when  men  make laws they 
judge  what  is good, but when  they have  once  been  made, the 
magistrate cannot judge the laws, but can only act in accordance 
Hincmar of Rheims, De Div. Loth. 
et  Tetb., Qusstio v. :  Resp. : "  Capitula 
sunt  legalia  imperatorum  et regum 
przdecessorum suorum, quid sustinere 
debeat  qui  post  bannum  latronem 
receperit,  et  in  chirographo  regum 
nostrorum  hinc  expresse  decernitur, 
cujus  miuirterium  est  agere  ut  illa 
observentur,  sicut  sanctua  Ambrosius 
ad Valentinianum scribit.  '  Leges enim 
impe13ator  ferat,  quns  primus  ipse 
custodiat,' quas si ipse fregerit, tirnen- 
dum  est  ne  audiat  ab apostolo,  'Qui 
praedicas  non  furandum,  furaris,  qui 
abominaris  idols  sacrilegium  facis.' " 
See p.  164. 
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with them.l  It is clear that Hincmar uses St  Augustine's phrase 
to  confirm his  opinion  that the king  cannot violate  the laws 
tvhich had long been in force as to the relation of  the ecclesias- 
tical and secular  courts.  In the 'De Regis Persona' Hincmar 
quotes  the first part of  the same sayiilg of  St Augustine, and 
then  concludes  that just  laws  which  have  been  promulgated 
must be  enforced by  the prin~e.~ 
But  the  strongest  and  most  noteworthy  statemenb  of  the 
same  view  is to  be  found  in  Hincruar's  treatise  called  'De 
Ordine  Palatii.'  In the eighth chapter  of  this work  we  have 
an  exceedingly important statement of  the writer's  conception 
of  the  relation  of  the king to the law,  and of  the source of 
the  authority of  the latter.  He begins  by a reference  to the 
rule  that no priest  must be  ignorant  of  the canons, and then 
proceeds to say that in like manner the sacred  laws-that  is, 
the  Roman  laws in the 'Lex  Romana  Visigothorum'-decree 
that no one may be ignorant of  the law or despise its decrees. 
This includes persons of  every worldly rank.  Kings, therefore, 
and  the  ministers  of  the commonwealth, have  laws  by  which 
they  must  rule  the inhabitants of  every  province; they have 
the capitularies  of  the  Christian kings, their ancestors, which 
'  Hincmar of Rheims, Pro. Eccl. Lib. 
Def. i. : "  Unde legahs sententia, quam 
ut predecessores  illius,  B.  Gregorius 
111  commonitorio  Joann~  dato decrevit 
esse  canonicam,  dicit :  'Necesse  est 
quod contra leges est actum firmitatem 
non  habeat.'  Et S.  Augustlnus  in 
libro, '  De Vera  Religione,'  dicit,  'In 
istis  temporalibus  legibus  quauquam 
de  his  homines  judicent,  cum  eas 
lnstituunb : tamen  cum fuerint insti- 
tuts atque firmatz non licebit  judici 
de ipsis judicare,  sea secundum ipsas. 
Conclitor tamen legum temporalium  si 
vir  bonus  et sapiens  est, illam  ipsam 
consullt  eternam, de qua nulli anims 
judicare datum est, ut secundum ejus 
incommutabiles  regulas  quid  sit  pro 
tempore  jubendum  vitandumque  dis- 
cernat.  &ternam  igitur  legem  mun- 
animis  fas  est  cognoscere,  nefas 
est  judicare.'  De  qua  B.  Prosper 
dicit :- 
' Lex reterna Dei stabili regit omnia nut~ 
Nec mutat vario teillpore cons~llnm.' 
Nam si imperatores Romanorum suam 
legem ~ternam,  vel perpetuam  appel- 
laverunt, multo  magis  lex  illa ste~na 
est,  quio  esb  Sancto  Spiritu  pro- 
mulgsta." 
"incmar  of  Rheims, De Reg. Per., 
27 : "  Sanctus Augustinus in liLro '  De 
Vera  Religione ' leges  principum  ser- 
vandas  ostendit.  .  In istis,'  inquiens, 
'  temporalibus legibus quanquam de his 
homineq  judicent  cum eas  instituunt, 
tamen  cum  fuerint  instituta?  atque 
firmats non licebit judici  de ipsis judi- 
care, sed secundum ipsas.'  Igitur aut  a 
p~pulo  proinulgatz  justae  legee  ser- 
vands, aut a principe juste ac rationa- 
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were lawfully promulgated with  the universal  consent of  their 
faithful  subjects.  And  he  then  again  quotes  St AugustineYs 
sentence that men judge the laws when  they make them, but 
when  they are once  made,  the judge  cannot judge  them, but 
must act in accordance  with  t1iem.l  We cannot here mistake 
Hincmar's  meaning;  the king's  duty is to govern  according  to 
the laws;  he is no  inore  entitled  than any private  peraon  to 
ignore  the law or  to violate it.  His duty is to carry out the 
law,  not  to act contrary to it. 
In Hincmar's words we  find  not  only a  strong statement of 
the normal  subordination  of  the prince to the law, but a suq- 
gestion of  one important cause of  this subordination.  We think 
that the words which describe the "  capitula " which the king is 
to carry out, as having been made generali consensu fideliunz, are 
extremely significant, aud indicate one of  the strongest grounds 
for  Hincmar's  judgment  that he must keep the law.  The law 
is  not  merely his law, nor  is  it merely by his will that it has 
been made.  So far as laws have beell  made, they proceed  from 
the whole State, they have been made with the general consent 
of  the faithful  subjects of  the king.  It  requires but little re- 
flection to observe how far  this conception  is froin  that of  the 
Roman  jurists.  The  relation  of  the Roman emperor  to lams 
when  promulgated  may  be  a  little  obscure,  perhaps a  little 
doubtful.  Ulpian's  "legibus  solutus,"  and  Theodosius'  ancl 
Valentinian's "  Digna vox majestate regnantis legibus alligataril 
se principem profiteri,"  may represent two different tendencies 
of  thought, but at least the emperor was  normally in his own 
person  the direct source of  law.  To the ninth-century writers 
'  31.  G.  H.  Leg , sect.  ii.  vol.  ii., 
Hlncniar,  De  Ordiue  Palatii,  8 : "  Et 
sicut dictum  est de leglbus  ecclesiar- 
ticis,  quod  nulli  sacerdoti suos  liceat 
canones ignorare nec  quicquam facere, 
quod  patrum  possit  regulis  obviare, 
ita  leg~bus sacris  decretum  est,  ut 
leges  uescire  nulli  liceat  aut  quie 
sunt statuta contemnere 9  Cum enim 
dicitur,  'Nulli  liceat  leges  nesclre  vel 
qurc  sunt  statuts contemnere,'  nulla 
persons iu quocumque ordine mundano 
rncipitur, qu:-  ' ar  sententia non  con- 
stringatur.  Habent  enim  regea  9t 
reipuhlicle  ministri  leges,  quihus  in 
quacumque  provincia,  degentes  regele 
debent,  habent capitula  christlanorurn 
regum  ac progeuitoruul  suorum,  qus 
generali  consensu  fideliunl  suorulll 
teuere  legaliter  promulgaverunt. 
quibus  beatus  Augustinus  dicit,  qul?, 
'licet  homiues  de  his  judicent  cunl 
eas  instituunt,  tameu  cum  fuerlnt 
institutrc  atque  fimlatw,  non  licef~lt 
~udicibus  de  ipsia  ~ucllcare,  5ed 
secundum  ipsas.' " 
Dig. i. 3. 31. 
S  Cod. i.  14.  4. 
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the king had his part in making law, so far as law is made, but 
he  has  only one  part  out  of  many.  Other voices  have  been 
heard  besides  his, the consent  of  othels has to be given before 
anything can become  the national law.  This conception is one 
of the very greatest inlportance in the development of  mediaeval 
political thought, and we must proceed  to examine the legisla- 
tion of  the ninth century to n~alce  ourselves quite  clear  upon 
the  matter. 
We  must  observe  in  passing  that the legal  system  of  the 
ninth century has a  very different  character  from  that which 
we  should attribute to modern law.  The great mass of  the law 
of the early Middle Ages was not, so far as the consciousness of 
men went, made at  all.  It  was a part of  the national or tribal life ; 
it had grown with the tribe, changing, no doubt, but the people 
or  tribe  were  hardly  conscious  of  the  changes.  Such  tradi- 
tional law is contained in most of  the early medi~val  codes, and 
its authority was like that of  nature.  But in the ninth century 
there was  already developed, perhaps  prematurely, the concep- 
tion  that law needs deliberate  adaptation,  or  at least  addition, 
and  therefore,  while  much  of  the  legislation  of  the time  is 
nothing but  the formal reiteration  of  what is supposed  to be 
immemorial  custom, other parts  of  it represent  conscious  and 
deliberate attempts to improve or add to the traditional customs 
of the nation. 
There  are three  bodies  of  secular  law  to  which  the  ruler 
of  the Teutonic  States was related : first, the traditional trlbal 
law, which varied considerably within such extended dominions 
as  those  of  the Frankish Empire ; secondly, the legislation of 
the  ancient  Roman  Empire, which  obtained  in many districts, 
mainly in the form of different editions of  the Theodosian code, 
a system of  laws over which the Frankish king or emperor  had 
little control, which are usually referred to by the wrlters of this 
time as the "leges sacrs  " ; and, thirdly, the actual new laws, or 
additions to old laws, which the king or emperor might issue, but 
Only with the consent and counsel of some or all oi his subjects. 
r , 
lhe relation  of  the king or emperor of  the ninth century to 
the  secular law is thus very different from that of  the Roman 
emperors  of  antiquity.  We are only repeating the judqment 
Of  the great III~JOT~~~  of  historical  scllolars, and would  refer to 23  6  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  NINTH  CENTURY.  [PART  1~. 
the work  of  Stubbs  ancl Waitz  among  the older writers, and 
to Richter and Kohl3 and Vlollet  among the more recent  It 
IS true that Pustel de Coulanges has argued with much learning 
and  ingenuity  against  this  view,  or  at least  in  favour  of  a 
considerable modification of  it, but  we  do not  think that he 
has succeeded in establishing his case.  The matter is, however, 
of  such  great importance in the history of  the development of 
political  theory  that  we  think  it well  to  illustrate it  briefly 
from  the legal  documents of  the ninth century. 
We may begin by observing the method of  promulgation of  a 
series of  "  capitula," to be added to the "leges,"  issued by Charles 
the Great in the year 803.  One manuscript contains an account 
of  the method of  promulgating these in Paris.  They were  sent 
to Stephen the Count, who was to cause them to be read  in the 
"  mallus publicus " in the presence of  all the "  scabinei."  When 
this had been done, and they all agreed that they would for the 
future observe  the laws,  the "  scabinei,"  bishops,  abbots,  and 
counts,  affixed  their   signature^.^  This  statement,  it  is  true, 
only refers to one  place, but a comparison with sect. 19 of  the 
"  Capitulare Missorom " of  the same year makes it fairly plain 
that something like this was the normal mode of  promulgating 
these new laws.  We learn that the "  missi" were to inquire of 
the "  populus " about the " capitula " which were to be  added to 
the laws, and to see that, when all had consented, their signature 
or other authentication was appended to the "  capitula." 
We can  now  compare  with  this  the  formula  with  which 
Stubbs,  Const  Hlst  of  Eiig  (ed. 
1891),  vol.  1.  p  141, &c 
Waitz,  Deutsche  Verfassung's 
Geschchte  (ed.  1883),  vol.  m.  p 
601, &c. 
3  Richter  and  Kohl,  "  Annalen  des 
Franklschen Reiches,"  I1  Abtheilung, 
p.  586, &c. 
4  P  Violleb, "  Hlstoire  des  Instltu 
tions Folitiques et Adm~nistratives  de 
la France,"  v01  i  p.  197, &c 
% G.  H. Leg ,  sect  11.  vol.  i.  No 
39 : "  Sub ipso anno hsc  capltula facta 
sunt  et consignata  Stephano Comiti, 
ut hrec  manifests  fecisset  m  civltate 
Parisns  mallo  pubplico  et ipsa  legere 
fecisset coram  1111s  scabineis ,  quod ~ta 
et fecit  Et omnes  in  uno  consen- 
serunt,  quod  ipsi  voluissent  omnl 
tempore  observare  usque  in  pos- 
terum ;  etiam omnes scabinel, eplscopl, 
abbatis,  cornitis  manu  propna subter 
firmaverunt " 
M  a. H  Leg ,  sect. ii  v01  I  Ne 
40,  c.  19 : "  Ut populus  interrogetur 
de  capitulis  qua  m  lege  noviter 
addita sunt ;  et postquam  omnes con- 
senserint,  aubscrlptiones  et  manu- 
firmationes  suas  in  ipsia  capltulla 
faciant." 
CHAP.  XIX.]  THE KING  AND  THE  LAW. 
Charles  the  Great  issues  the  "  Capitulare  Aquisgranense." 
Charles  does  this with  the  consent  of  his  bishops,  abbots, 
and  all his  faithful sub~ects.~  We find  yet  another 
very noteworthy illustration of  this conception  of  the mode of 
public administration and legislation in the '  Ordinatio Imperil ' 
of  Lewis  the Pious in 817, the document which  provides  for 
the  partition  of  111s  doininions between his sons.  These regu- 
lations are made in a sacred assembly and "generahtas" of the 
whole people,  held after the wonted  manner.  After a  fast of 
three  days  his  eldest  son  (Lothair) was  elected by Lewis  and 
the whole people to be his colleaque  in the empire.  Then with 
the  comnlon  counsel 1t was  decided  to give  the younger sons, 
Pippin and Lewis, the title of  kings, and to allot to them cer- 
tain  lands by definite "  capitula."  These were  considered  and 
then  confirmed  by Lewis  and all his  faithful subjects, so that 
what was done by all mlght  by  all be held in~iolable.~  (This 
M  G  H.  Leg., sect. 11  vol.  i  No. 
77. " Karolus  serenlsslmus impelator 
Augustus,  a  Deo  coronatus,  magnus 
et pacificus, cum  episcopis,  abbatibus, 
comitibus, ducibus,  omnibusque  fidell 
bus Christlanac ecclesia  cum consensu 
cons~lioque  constitult  ex  lege  Sallca, 
Romana  atque  Gombata capitula  ista 
m  palatio  Aquis,  uc  unusquisque 
fidelis justitias  its faceret  qui et ipse 
manu  propria  firniavlt  capltula  ista, 
ut  omnes  fideles  manu  roborare 
studuissent." 
M.  G.  H  Leg,  sect.  11.  vol  i. 
No  136  "  Cum  nos  in  Del  norr>lile 
anno  incarnatioui~  Domini  octmgen  - 
ksimo  septimo  decimo,  indlctione 
decima annoque imperil nostri quarto, 
mense Juho, Aquisgrani palatio nostro 
more  sohto  sacrum  conventum  et 
Generalitatem  popul~ nostri  propter 
ecclemlasticas  vel  totlus  imperil nostrl 
utllltates pertractandas  congegassemus 
et In  his studeremus, sublto divina In 
BPlrat~one  actum  est,  ut  nos  fideles 
nostrl ammonerent, quatenus manente 
incolurnitate  et pace  undique 
a  Deo  conceasa de statu totius regni 
et de  fillorurn  nostrorum  causa  more 
parentumnostrorum tractaremus.  . . 
Qu~bus  (jejuniis  orationlbus  elemosi 
narum largitionibus) rite per  trlduum 
celebratis,  nutu  omnipotenbm  Del,  ut 
credimus,  actum  esb  ut et noetra  et 
totius  populi  nostri in  dllecti  primo 
genltl  nostn Hluthar~i  elechone  vota 
concurrerent  Itaque  taliter  dlvlna 
dispelisatlone manifestatum  placuit et 
nobls  et omni  populo  nostro,  mole 
solemni  imperial1  diademate  coruna- 
tum nobis et consortem et successorem 
imperii,  si Dominus  ita voluerit, com- 
munl  voto  constitui.  Ceteros  vero 
fraties  ejus,  Pippinum  videhcet  et 
Hludowicum squivocum nostrum, com- 
muni  consillo  placult  regns  inslgn~ri 
nominibus, et loca lnferius denominata 
constltuere,  in  qu~bus  post  decessum 
nostium  sub  seniore  fratre  regal1 
potestate  potiantur  juxta  inferius 
adnotata capitula,  quibus,  quam Inter 
eos  const~tuimus,  conditio  contmetur 
&us  capitula  propter  utilitatem im- 
peril  et perpetuam  intel  eos  pacem 
conservandam  et totius ecclesia  tuta- 
men  cum  omnibus  fidellbus  nostris 
considerare  placuit  et  considerata 
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last phrase  is  perhaps  specially  worthy  of  notice.)  We may 
conipare  with  these  the  terins  of  the  "  Yroemium"  to  the 
'' Capitularia tam Ecclesiastica  quam Mundana " of  818, 819 ; 
sect.  29  of  the "  Capitulare  Ecclesiasticum" ; the  phrases  of 
the "  Cap.  Legi  Salicze  Addita"  of  819 ; and  the  " Cap.  de 
Functionibus  Publicis " of  820.l 
But it is  hardly necessary  to  multiply citations to establish 
a judqment which is almost universally  accepted as to the con- 
stitutional theory of the Teutonic States,-namely,  that the king 
does  not  make  laws  by  his  own  authority,  but  requires the 
consent and advice of  his wise  men, and, in some more  or  less 
vague  sense, of  the whole nati~n.~  It  is this tradition or theory 
which at last finds son~etliing  like a formal  and explicit defini- 
tion in the failious phrase  of  the "Edictnm  Pistense"  of  564, 
"  Quoniam  lex  consensu  popnli  et constitutione regis  fit," 3- 
a phrase which, no doubt, like so many of  the obite~  dicta of  the 
Middle Aces, must not be interpreted under the terms  of  what 
we  consider  our  clear-cut  modern  conceptions,  but  which  is 
full of  significance  for the developnient  of  the theory of  law, 
when  it  is  taken  in  its  proper  connection  with  the  general 
tendencies of  the ninth century and of  the Teutonic traditions. 
manibus firnlaic, ut, 1)eo opem ferente,  gratia  Dei  rex.  Notum esse volumus 
sicut ab omnibus co~~mnni  voto actum  omnibus Dei et nostris fidelibus, quon- 
est, ita communi  devotione  s cuilctii  lam hzc, quae sequuntur, capitnla nunc 
inviolabii~ter  conserventur ad  illorum  in  isto placito  nostro,  anno ab incar- 
et totius populi  Christiani perpetuam  ilatione  domini  nostri  Jesu  Christi 
pacem ; salva  in  omnibus  nostra  im-  DCCCLXIV.,  anno videlicet  regni  x~ostri 
periall  potestate  super  filios  et popu-  il~so  propitio  xxv.,  indictione  xii.  vii. 
lu~n  nostrum,  cum  omni  subjectione  Kalend. Julias  in hoc  loco, qui dicitur 
qua patri a  filiis  et imperatori ac regi  Pistis,  una  cum  fidelium  nostrozum 
a suis populis exhibetur."  consensu atque consllio constituimus et 
l  M.  G. H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  137 ;  138,  cunctissineullarefragationeperregn~~ 
c. 29 ; 142, C.  2,3, 6, 8 ; 143, c.  5.  Cf.  nostrum observanda mandamus. . . . 
also Nos.  215 and 221.  "  6.  Et quoniam lex consensu ~opuli 
We  do not mean by this that the  ct constitutione regis fit, Franci jurare 
emperor  or  king  did  not  exerclse  a  debent,  quia  sesnnclum  regium  man- 
great and perhaps almost independent  tlatum  nostrum  ad  justitiam  redden- 
authority  in  issuing  administrative  dam  vel  taciendam  legibus  bannitlls 
ordinances, and many  of  these belong  vel  mannitus  fuit ;  et  sic  ipsa:  re5 
to the category of  what would  in later  illi  judicio  scabiniorum  in  bannuru 
times have been regarded as laws.  mittantur,  et,  si  necesse  fuerit,  ipSe 
17. G. H.  Leg., sect. ii. vol. ii. 273 ;  in forbannum mittatur, qui ad justitiam 
Ecli~L.  Pirit.,  864 ; Jun. 25.  "  Kalolub  reddendam venire noluerit." 
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phrase  represents the colnlnon  tradition  of  the Teutonic 
States, and we  can  see no reason to think tliat the traasforina- 
tion of  the Frankish kiilgdom  into the empire made any change 
in these constitutional conceptions.  We  see no reason 
to think  that even  Charles the Great dreamed of  claiming the 
position  of  the ancient Roman  emperors as the sole  legislator. 
~t is true, indeed, that Charles the Great and Pippin issue laws 
in  Italy  under  another  form  than  that  which  is  customary 
elsewhere, and that in these there is usually no mention of  the 
council and consent of  the great  men,l but we think that this 
be understood as arising out of  their position in Lombardy 
as conquerors. 
We think, then, that the political theory of  the ninth century 
regarded  the ruler  as being  bound  by the laws of  the nation, 
not as superior to them.  The king had his part in making and 
law, but others had a part also, and in some vague 
sense even the whole nation.  We think that this is clear, but 
it is no doubt also true to say tliat the historical circumstances of 
the  Frankish  States in the ninth  century probably  tended  to 
give this tradition rather more reality than it may have had be- 
fore, or in other Teutonic States.  The history of  the century is 
the history of  a  perpetual series  of  revolts and civil wars, and 
as a result of  these the royal authority was certainly dwindling, 
so  that  as the century advances we  perhaps find  a  more  arid 
inore frank assertion of  the limited and even conditional nature 
of the royal a~~thority. 
U.  H.  Q.  Leg., sect. U. vol. i. Nos.  85, 92, 93,  94, 95, 97,  98. C~AP,  XX.]  SOURCE AND CONDITIONS  OF AUTHORITY.  241 
CHAPTER  XX. 
THE  THEORY  OF  THE  SOURCE  AND  CONDITIONS  OF  AUTHORITY 
IN THE  STATE. 
WE have so far considered  the source  of  the authority of  law, 
and  its  relation  to  the  king  or  other  ruler.  We must  now 
examine the immediate source of  the authority of  the ruler. 
It would  be  a  grave  mistake, we  think, to  conceive  of  the 
ninth-century writers  as having  any such  definite  theory  of 
the  delegation  of  the  popular  authority  to  one  man  as that 
which  obtained  among  the Roman Jurists.  The theory of  the 
ninth century is much vaguer  than  this: the  divine  appoint- 
ment, the custom  of  hereditary succession, the election  by the 
great men  and the people,-all  these  elements go to constitute 
the  conception  of  a  legitimate  claim  to  the throne.  In a 
doclunent  concerning  the electiou of  Charles  the Bald  to the 
kingdom of  the Eastern Franks in 869 we have a good statement 
of  all the grounds of  succession-the  right of  the legitimate heir, 
the appointment of  God, and the election of  the nati0n.l 
The  custom  of  hereditary succession-that  is, of  succession 
within one family-was  among the Franks, as generally among 
the  Teutonic  tribes,  accepted  as  normal;  but  it is also  true 
that among the Franks as elsewhere, in order that a  succession 
1 M.  (3.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
276,  Electionis  Karoli  Capitula  in 
Regno  Hlotharii  Factq 869,  Sept.  9. 
2. "  Quia  denique  vo1unt;~tem  Dei, 
qui voluntatem  timentium  se facit et 
deprecationes eorumexaudit, inconcordi 
unanimitate nost~a  videmue hunc regni 
liujus heredem esse legitimum, cui nos 
spontc commisimu3, domnum videlicet 
przsentem regem ac principern nostrum 
Karolum,  ut nobis  prrosit  et prosit, 
videtur nobis, si vobis  placet, ut, sicut 
post illius verba vobis manifestabimus, 
signo  certissimo  demonstremus,  Pia 
illum  a  Deo  electum  et nobis  datum 
principern  credimus et eidem !argitori 
Deo  ex  suis  beneficiis  non  sl"Us 
ingrati." 
s~lould  be valid, it should be confirmed by some national election 
or  We are not  here  concerned with  the consti- 
tutional question of the organisation  of  the council of  the great 
men or wise  men  of  the kingdom,--that  their election was in 
some sense considered as the election of  the nation will hardly 
be  doubted, we  think,  by any one.  The question in which we 
are now interested  is the fact of  the  elective  character of  the 
monarchy of  the ninth century rather than its method. 
In order  to  make  the matter clear we think  it is desirable 
to  consider  certain  elections  as  illustrating  this  principle. 
There is, indeed, one instance of  the appointment  of  rulers in 
the Frankish  Empire of  the ninth century which  might  seem 
at  first  sight  to  furnish  an  example  of  a  strictly  personal 
appointment without the sanction  of  the nation.  This is to be 
found  in  the statement  of  the division  of  his  dominions  by 
Charles the Great in 806.  In this he makes no mention of  the 
counsel or  consent of  any one, but seems to determine all the 
questions concerning the appointment of  his sons as colleagues to 
himself  during  his  lifetime, and the division of  his dominions 
among  them  after his  death, by his  own  will  and authority.= 
It should, however, be  observed  that Einhard  in his  Annuals 
for  the  year  806  relates  how  this  settlement  was  made  by 
Charles  at  a  meeting  of  the primores  and  optirnates  of  the 
Franks, and that it was confirmed  by the oath of  the Frankish 
optimates and sent to  Pope Leo to be  subscribed by his hand.2 
It is  perhaps  also  worth  noting  that  even  if  Charles  might 
be thought to claim  the right  of  nominating his  successor, he 
clearly  enough  conceives  of  a  return,  after his  death,  to the 
custom  of  election.  In the fifth  clause of  the "Divisio  Reg- 
norum" he provides that if  one of  his  sons should die leaving 
M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  45,  Divisio  Regnorum. 
Einhardi Annales, a. 806, M. G. H. 
Script.,  vol.  i. : "  Illiique  absolutis, 
conventurn  habuiC  imperator  cum 
~rimoribus  et optimatibus  Francorum 
de  Pace  constituenda  et conservanda 
inter  filios  sues,  et  diviaione  regni 
facienda  in  tres  partes,  ut  sciret 
Unuhcluisque  illorurn,  quarn  partem 
VOL. I. 
tueri et regere debuisset,  si superstes 
illi  deveniret.  De  hac  parthione  et 
testamentum  factum,  et jurejurando 
ab  optimatibus  Francorurn  confirm- 
atum,  et  constitutiones  pacis  con- 
aervandze  causa  factae,  atque  hzec 
omnia  litteris mandata  sunt, et Leoni 
pap, ut his  sua manu  eubscriberet, 
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a son, he should, if  the people  elect him, reign in his father's 
~1ace.l If, however, it should be  contended  that the relation 
of  the action of  Charles  the Great to the principle of  election 
is a little ambiguous, there can  be  no doubt about the matter 
when we turn to the successors of  Charles the Great. 
We have already considered the settlement of  the empire in 
817 by Lewis the Pious:  and we need only here draw atientiod 
to the very explicit terms in which is expressed the consent of 
the whole people  to the election  of Lothair, the eldest son, as 
colleague  to  his  father in  the  empire,  and  to  the  elevation 
of  the younger  sons  to the dignity and title of  kings and to 
authority in  the several portions of  the  empire,3 and to the 
provision  for the election  by  the people  of  their  successors.4 
We pass on  to the later part of  the century, and we  find 
not only that the principle of  election is very clearly retained, 
but that we can trace the gradual development of  the custom 
of  stating  the  conditions  on  which  the  elections  are made. 
In the documents  concerning  the  succession  of  Charles  the 
Bald  to the kingdom of  Italy in  8'76  we  have  a  very  clear 
statement of  the election  by  the bishops,  abbots,  counts, and 
others, and we  have  also  the record  of  the  mutual  pronlises 
made by  subjects  and king to  each other.  The  bishops  and 
counts swear obedience, counsel, help, and fidelity, while Charles 
swears to give law, justice, honour, and mercy to alL5 
l N.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  45, 5 : "  Quod si talis filius cuilibet 
istorum  trium  fratrum  natus  fuerit, 
quem  populus  eligere  velit  ut patri 
suo in regni hereditate succedat, vol- 
umus ut hoc consentiant patrui ipsius 
pueri,  et regnare  permittant  filium 
fratris  sui  in  portione  regni  quam 
pater ejus,  frater eorum habuit." 
a  See p.  237. 
M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  136,  Ordinatio Imperii:  "Actum 
est, uC  et  nostra et totius populi nostri 
in  dilecti  primogeniti  nostri electione 
vota concurrerent,"  and "Ceteros vero 
fratres  ejus,  Pippinum  videlicet  et 
Hlodowicum squivocum nostrum, com- 
muni  consilio  placuit  regiis  insigniri 
nominibus, et loca inferius denominata 
constituere,  in  quibus  post  decessum 
nostrum  sub  seniore  fratre  regali 
potestate  potiantur." 
M.  G. H.  Leg., sect. ii. vol.  i. KO. 
136, c.  14. 
M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  220,  Kar.  11.  Imp.  Electio., 
876  Febr. : "  Gloriosissimo  et a  Deo 
coronato,  magno  et pacific0  impera- 
tori,  domino  nostro  Karolo  perpetuo 
august0 nos quidem Ansbertus cum em- 
n~bus  episcopis,  abbatibus,  comitibus 
ac  reliquis  . . . perpetuam  optamus 
prosperitatem  et pacem. 
"Jam  quia  divina  pietas  VOR  beat- 
orum  pri~lcipum  apostolorum  Pet~i  et 
Pauli  interventione  per  vica~lum  i~' 
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Jvheu  Charles the Bald  died  Lewis  the  Stammerer  finally 
came to the throne, with the consent of  the bishops, the abbots, 
the primores  of  the kingdom, and others, and was  consecrated 
and crowned  by Hincmar, Archbishop of  Rheims?  We have 
domnum  videlicet  Johannem  trum  secundum  suum  ordinem  et 
summum  pontificem  et  unive~s,llem  personam  honorabo,  et  sahabo,  et 
~~iritalemque  patrem vestrum,  honoratum  et salvatum  absque  ullo 
ad  profectum  sancta:  Dei  ecclesiae  do10  ac  damnatione  vel  deceptione 
nostrorumque  omnium  incitavit  et  conservabo, et unicuique competentenl 
ad  imperiale  culmen  sancti  Spiritus  legem  ac justitiam  conserrabo, et qui 
judicio  provexit,  nos  unanimiter  vos  illam necesse habuerint et  rationabiliter 
protectorem,  dominum  ac defensorem  petierit,  rationabilem  mibericordiam 
omnium  nostrum  et  Italici  regni  exhibebo, sicut fidelis  rex  suos fideles 
regem eligimus, cui et gaudenter toto  per  rectum  honorare  et  salvare  et 
cordis  affectu  subdi  gaudemus,  et  unicuiyue  competentem  legem  et 
omnia,  qua:  nob~scum  ad  profectum  justitlam  in  unoquoque  ordine  con- 
totius  sanctae  Dei  ecclesis  nostro-  servere et  indigentibus et rationabiliter 
rumque omnium salutem decernitis et  petentibus ratlonabilem  misericordiam 
sancitis, totis viribus annuente Christo  debet  impendere.  Et  pro  nu110 
concordi  mente et prompta voluntate  homine  ab  hoe,  quantum  dimittit 
oiuae~  vare promittimus.  humana  fragiiitas,  per  studium  aut 
"  Any~ertus,  sancts Mediolnnensis  malevolentiam  vel  alicujus iudebitum 
a~cl:i?piscopus  subscripsi," &c.  hortamentum  deviabo,  quantum  mihi 
--  Deus  intellectum  et  possibilitatem 
'l~i~  promitto  ego,  quia  de isto  die  (donaverit) ; et  si  per  fragilitatem 
in  antea  isti  seniori  meo,  quamdiu  contra  hoc  mihi  surreptum  fuerit, 
vixero,  fidelis et obediens  et adjutor,  CUm  recogllo~ero,  voluntarie  illud 
quantumcumque plus et  melius sciero et  emendale studeb",  sic,"  &C. 
potuero, et  consilio et auxilio secundum  M.  Cf.  H.  Script.,  vol.  i.  Hincm. 
meum  ministerium  in  omnibus  ero  Re".  Annales,  ad  arm.  877.  The 
absque  fraude  et;  ingenio  et  p~imres  were indignant because Lewis 
absque  ulla  dolositate  vel  seductiolle  had granted honores to certain persons 
seu  deceptioue  dbsclue  respectu "  sine illorum consensu."  The primores 
alicuju8  et  neque  per  me  then, with Richildis, "conventurn suum 
neque  per  neque  per  literas  ad Montem-W~tmari  condixerunt," and 
. . . Goutra  suum  honorem  et suam  from  there  negotiated  with  Lewis. 
ac  ecclesis  atque  regni  sibi  commissi  Finally Richilclis and  the primores  go 
quietem  et  tranqulllitatem  atque  to  him  at Compiegne,  and  Richildis 
Soliditatem  machinnbo,  . . . neque  "attulit ei prsceptum per quod  pater 
alicluod  umquam  scandalum  movebo,  suus  illi  regnum  ante mortem  suam 
quad  iIlius prssenti  vel futurs  saluti  tradiderat,  et  spatam  qus vocatur 
contraria  vel  nociva  esse  possit,  sic  Sancti Petri, per quam eum de regno 
me  Deus  adjuvet  et ista  sanctorum revestiret, sed et regium vestimentum 
Patrocinia."  et  coronam  ac  fustem  ex  auro  et  --  gemmis.  El,  discurrentibus  legatis 
"Et ego, quantum  sciero  et ration-  inter  Ludovicum  eC  regni  primores, 
ak'ik!r  potuero,  Domino  adjuvante  et  pactis  honoribus  singulis  quos 
tej  banctissime  ac  reverentissime  petierunt,  6  Idus  Decembris  con- 
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the promises which  he  made  at the time, and in these we find 
both a very frank recognition  of  the fact that he is appointed 
king by the mercy of  God  and the election of  the people, and 
very emphatic assurances that he will observe the ecclesiastical 
rules and the national laws? 
We may  compare  the tone  in  which  Hincmar  addresses 
Lewis 111.  While protesting his  humility, Hincmar says that 
he may very well say to him (the king) that it was not he who 
elected Hincmar to his office in the Church, but Hincmar and 
his colleagues, with  the other faithful subjects  of  God and his 
forefathers, who elected him to be ruler in the kingdom, on the 
condition of  his keeping the laws.2 
If we find such strong pledges  of  good  government given by 
the kings and emperors  of  the regular  line, we need hardly be 
surprised to find that these  become  almost stronger in the case 
of  the  election  of  those  who  were  not  so  near  the direct 
succession.  In  the doc~unents  concerning  the election of  Boso 
to the kingdom  of  Arles  in  879, we  find  something very like 
a  formal  statement of  conditions  of  election.  The  synod  or 
assembly sends to  Boso  inquiring whether  he  will  grant  law 
and justice  to all his subjects, great  and small, and will listen 
to  all  intercession,  and  freely  hearken  to  all  good  counsel, 
seeking rather to make  himself  useful than merely to be chief. 
Boso  replies  that he is  but  little equal  to such  a  charge as 
abbatum, quam regni primorum ceter- 
orumque qui adfuerunt, consecratua et 
coronatus est in  regem  Ludovicus  ab 
Hincmaro Remorum episcopo. " 
'  M.  G.  H.  Leg., sect. ii. vol. ii. No. 
283  (A.) : Professio  istius  Hlodowici 
filii Karoli : "  Ego Hlodowicus,  miseri- 
cordia  domini Dei  noatri  et electione 
populi rex constitutus,  promitto teste 
ecclesia  Dei  omnibus  ordinibus,  epis- 
coporum  videlicet,  sacerdotum,  mon- 
achorum,  canonicorum  atque  sancti- 
monialium,  regulas  a  patribus  con- 
scriptas  et apostolicis  adtestationibus 
roboratas  ex  hoc  et  in  futurum 
tempua me illis ex integro servaturum. 
Polliceor  etiam  me  servaturum  leges 
tt statuta populo,  qui mihi ad  regen- 
dum  misericordia  Dei  committitur, 
pro  communi  consilio  fidelium  nos- 
trorum,  secundum quod  predecessores 
mei  imperatores  et reges  gestis  in- 
seruerunt  et  omnino  inviolabiliter 
tenenda  et  observanda  decreverunt. 
Ego igitur  Hlodowicus  rectitudinis  et 
justitis amore hanc  spontaneam  pro- 
missionem  meam  relegens  manu  pro- 
pria  firmavi." 
Hincmar of  Rheims, Ep, xs. : . . . 
'L  -  ita  et  ego  juxta  modulum  meum 
humili  corde  ac voce  dicere  possum: 
Kon  vos  me  elegistis  in  pr;elatione 
Ecclesie, sed ego  cum collegis  meis et 
ceteris Dei ac progenitorum veatroruy 
fidelibus, vos  elegi  ad regimen  reg;:, 
aub conditione debitas leges servandl. 
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that  offered,  and  would  have  refused  it had  they  not  been 
l,nanim~~~,  and promises that he will  maintain law and justice, 
and  ill strive to follow the example of  the former good princes, 
and to  maintain  equity  both  to the clergy  and  to his  other 
faithful men?  We feel that this is something like a  compact 
between the ruler about to be elected and his subjects.  - - 
This is almost more clearly still expressed in the capitnlaries 
of  the election of Guido as King of  Italy by the bishops met at 
payia in 889.  The formal document of  the election recalls  the 
disastrous  confusions  that had followed  the death of  the Em- 
peror Charles, and then proceeds to state how they have met at 
pavia to consider the common welfare of  the kingdom, and have 
elected  Guido, inasmuch  as the divine aid has enabled  him  to 
triumph over his  enemies, and inasmuch as he promises to love 
and honour  the holy Roman Church and to obey the ecclesias- 
tical  laws, and to  maintain  their  own  laws to all his  subjects, 
to  put down  rapine and establish and maintain peace through- 
out  his  kingdom.  They  report  that for  all these  and  many 
other indications of  his  goodwill  they have elected him to the 
'  31. GC.  H.  Leg.,  sect. ii. vol. ii. No. 
284,  Convent.  Mantalensis,  879,  Oct. 
15 (A).  Synodi  ad  Bosonem  regem 
designatum  legatio : "Si vultis  omni- 
bus,  aicut  boni  ~rincipes  . . . legem, 
justitiam  et  rectum  concedere  et 
servare, tenentes humilitatem, que est 
fundamenturn  virtutum . . .  qui sitis 
acceasibiles  omnibus recte suggerentibus 
et pro  aliis  intercedentibus, querentes 
magis  prodesse,  quam  prieesse  .  . . 
justus  patricius  vestris  majoribus  eb 
minoribus  apparentes  .  . .  salubre 
consilium  libenter  audientes . . . ut 
neque  eadem  sancta  synodus  et 
Primates vestri cum ea sentientes nunc 
de  vobis  in bonitate  maledicantur vel 
detrahantur  in  futuro  neque  sacro 
Wtro principatui nobis,  ut credimus, 
I~rofuturo  juste  derogetur. . . ." 
(B.) Bosoni regis electi ad synodum 
reaponsio- 
'l  Ego  autem  conscius  mee  con- 
ditionis  et figmenti  fragilis  impayem 
me judicans  tanto negotio  omnimodis 
abnuissem,  nisi  per  Dei nutum  vobia 
cor  nnum datum et animam unam in 
unum  consensum  advertissem.  . . . 
Omnibus  ut monuistis,  legem,  justi- 
tiam,  et rectum  momburgium  aux- 
iliante  Deo  oonservabo  et impendere 
curabo ; quo  sequens  prscedentium 
bonorum principum vestigia  tam sacris 
ordinibus quam vobis  nostris fidelibus 
consulere certem equitatem servando." 
a M.  G.  H. Leg.,  sect. ii. vol. ii. No. 
222,  Widonis  Capitulatio  Electionis. 
Electionis  Decretnrn : "  Post  obitum 
recordande  memorize  domni  Karoli, 
gloriosi  imperatoris  et senioris nostri, 
quo~  quantaque  pericula  huic  Italico 
regno usque  in  przesens tempus super- 
venirent,  nec  lingua  potest  evolvere 
nec  calamus  explicare. . . . Sed quia 
illi  supervenienti  perspicuo  principe 
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It is,  however,  not  only  at  the  time  of  the  election  or 
appointment  of  a  king that we  can  see something very like 
bargain  or  agreement  between  people  and  ruler.  More  than 
once we  find  the emperors or kings trying to bring back con. 
fidence  and order by  solemn assurances that  they  will  main- 
tain  law  and  justice  if  their  subjects  on  their  side  will 
render them true help and obedience.  In 851 Lothair, Lewis, 
and  Charles  met  at Mersen, and issued  a  document in which 
they assure their  faithful subjects  of  all ranks and conditions 
that  they  may  be  fully secure  that for  the future they will 
not  condemn  or  dishonour  or  oppress  any  one  in violation 
of  law  and  justice  or  right  authority  and reason,  and  that 
they will, with  the common  council  of  their  faithful  subjects, 
set  forward  the restoration  of  hol;  Church,  and  the  whole 
state of  the kingdom, in the assurance  that their  subjects on 
their part will  be  faithful and  obedient, and  true helpers  to 
them, with  such counsel  and aid  as is due from every subject 
to his  prince?  This  assurance  or  agreement we  find repeated 
evanuerunt  nosque  in  ambiguo  re- 
liquerunt tamquam oves non habentes 
pastorem,  necessarium  duximus  ad 
mutuum  colloquium  Papie  in  aula 
regia  convenire.  Ibique  de  communi 
salute  et  statu  hujus  regni  solliciti 
pertractantes  decrevimus  uno  animo 
eademque sententia prsfatum magnan- 
imum  principem  Widonem  ad  pro- 
tegendum  et regaliter  gubernandum 
nos in regem  et senlorem nobis  eligere 
et in  regni  fast~gium  Deo  miserante 
prefigere pro eo, quod isclem magnificus 
rex  divino,  ut  credimus,  protectus 
auxilio  de  hostibua  potenter  trium- 
phavit  et hoc  non  sue  virtutis,  sed 
totum divins miserationis providentie 
adtribuit,  in  super  etiam  sanctam 
Romanam  eccleaiam  ex corde  se  dili- 
gere,  et evaltare  et ecclesiastics  jura 
in omnibus observare, et leges proprias 
siugulis  quibusque  sub  sua  ditione 
positis  concedere  et rapinas  de  suo 
regno  penitus  extirpare,  et  pacem 
reformare  et custodire  se  velle  Deo 
teste  professus  est.  Pro his  ergo et 
aliis  multis  ejus  bone  voluntatis 
inditiis  ipsum,  ut  prelibavimus,  ad 
regni  hujus  gubernacula  ascivimus, 
eique  toto  mentis  nisu  adhesimus 
seniorem,  piissimum  et  regem  ex- 
cellentissimum  pari  consensu  ex hinc 
et in posterum  decernentes." 
M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii 
NO. 205, Hloth., Hlud., et Karoli Con- 
ventus apud Marsnam  Secundus, 851 : 
6.  "Ut nostri fideles,  unusquisque in 
suo  ordine et statu,  veraciter sint de 
nobis  securi,  quia  nullum  abhinc 
inante contra  legem  et justitiam  vel 
auctoritatem  ac  justam  rationem aut 
damnabimus  aut dehonorabimus  aut 
opprimemus  vel  indebitis  machins- 
tionibus affligemus, et illorum, scili~et 
veraciter nobis fidelium, communi con- 
silio  secundum  Dei  voluntatem  et 
commune  salvamentum  ad  restitu- 
tionem  sancte  Dei  etclesire  et 
statum regni et ad honorem  regiullb 
atque  pacem  populi  commissi  nobis 
pertinenti  adsensum  prebebimus  in 
hoc, ut illi  non  solum  non  aint nobis 
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,t  Coblentz  in 860 in almost  identical  terms,l  and  again  by 
clIarIes the Bald  in  the "  Capitula  Pistensia " of  869.2  We 
have  also  the form in which  these  promises were issued after 
the  meeting  at Coblentz  by  Lewis,  and it  is  perhaps  worth 
while looking at this,  as it  exhibits  almost more  clearly  the 
cllnracter of  an agreement  or mutual  promise.$ 
In the ''Capit~la  Pistensia" of  862 we  have another state- 
ment of  the same principle  of  mutual obligation.  These  begin 
a  very  solemn  acknowledgment  of  the  faults  which 
have  brought  the  present  distress  upon  the  country:  the 
king  laments that by his  own  evil deeds he has driven  away 
contradicentes  et resistentes  ad  ista 
exsequenda, verum etiam sic sint nobis 
fideles et obcedientes ac veri adjutores 
atque  co-operatores  vero  consilio  eh 
aincero ausilio ad ista peragenda quse 
premisimus,  sicut  per  rectum  un- 
usquisque  in  suo  ordine  et statu suo 
principi  et suo seniori  esse debet." 
M.  G.  H. Leg., sect. ii. vol.  ii. NO. 
242, Hlud., Kar.,  and  Hloth. II., Con- 
ventus  apud  Confluentes, clause  10. 
M.  C.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  275 : "  3.  Ut omnes nostri fideles, 
veraciter  sint  de  nobis  securi,  quia, 
quantum  sciero  et juste  ac  rationa- 
biliter  potuero,  Domino  adjuvante 
unumquemque  secundum  sui  ordinis 
dignitatem  et personam  honorare,  et 
aalvare et honoratum ac salvatum con- 
servare volo, et unicuique eorum in suo 
ordine secundum sibi conlpetentes leges 
tarn nlundanas quam ecclesiasticas rec- 
tarn rat~onem  et justitiam conservabo, 
et nullum  fidelium  nobtrorum  contra 
legem  et jastitiam  vel  auctoritatem 
ac  justam  rationem  aut  damnabo 
aut dehonorabo auk opprimam aut in- 
debitis  mach~nationibus  affligam ; et 
legem  ut przdiximus,  unicuique  com- 
Petentem,  sicut antecessores  sui tem- 
Pore antecessorum meorum habuerunt, 
in omni d~gnitate  et ordine adjuvante 
Deo  conservaturum  perdono,  cuillhet 
duntaxat  ex eis,  qui mihi  Bdeles  et 
~bedientes  ac  veri  acl~utores  atque 
co-operatores  juxta  suum  ministeri- 
um  et  personam  cons~lio  et  auxilio 
secundum  suum  scire  et  posse  et 
aecundum  Deum  ac  secundum 
seculum  fuerint,  sicut  per  rectum 
unusquisque  in  suo  ordine  eb  statu 
regi suo et suo seniori esse  debet." 
M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  242, Hlud., Kar.,  Hloth. II., Con- 
ventus  apud  Confluentes,  860,  Jun. 
Adnuntiatio  domini  Hludowici  regis 
apud Confluentes lingua Theodisca, 5 : 
"Et volumus, ut  vos et ceteri homines 
fideles nostri talem legem et rectitudi- 
nem  et tale  ~alvamentum  in  regnis 
nostris  habeatis,  sicut  antecessores 
vestri tempore antecessorum nostrorum 
habuerunt,  et nos  talem honorem  et 
rectam  potestatem  in  nostro  regio 
nomine  apud  vos  habeamus,  sicut 
nostri  antecessores  apud  vestros  an- 
tecessores  habuerunt ;  et justitia  et 
lex omnibus conservetur ;  et pauperes 
homines  talem  defensionem  habeant, 
sicut tempore antecessorum nostrorum 
lex  et  consuetudo  fuit, et sicut  hic 
fideles nostri communiter consenserunt 
et scripto  nobis  demonstraverunt  et 
nos cum illorum  consilio  consentimus 
et  observari communiter volumus.  Et 
si aliquis  hoc  perturbare  voluerit,  a 
null0  nostrum  recipiatur, nisi  ut aut 
ad  rectam  rationem  aut  ad  ration- 
abilem  indulgentia,  concessionem  de. 
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not  only  the conception  of  a  mutual  agreement made,  at his 
election  or  otherwise,  between  the  king  and  the  people,  but 
also  the conception  that the subjects have  the same right  to 
compel  the king to observe  his agreement as he has to compel 
them to observe theirs. 
The circumstances of  the ninth century tended thus to favour 
the development of  the conception that the ruler holds his place 
in virtue  of  the election of  the nation, and of his fulfilment of 
the promises on which that election was based ; and there were 
not wanting in the century circumstances which tended towards 
the further  conclusion, that if the king  failed to discharge the 
obligations which he had undertaken, he might  not improperly 
be  deposed.  The deposition  of  the unhappy Lewis  the Pious 
serves  to illustrate  this  tendency,  and  probably  also  helped 
materially to develop  it.  We cannot here discuss  either  the 
general  circumstances  or  the constitutional  conditions  of  the 
deposition  or  abdication  of  Lewis  the  Pious.  But it  is  for 
our  purpose  extremely  important  to  observe  the  terms  in 
which  the  deposition  of  Lewis  is  alluded  to.  It was  at 
CompiAgne  in  the  year  833  that  Lewis  was  compelled  to 
abdicate, and the bishops,  there assembled,  published  a  state- 
ment in which  they set forth the great faults that Lewis  had 
committed,-how  he had  neglected  his charge, and done many 
things displeasing to God  and men; and they relate  how they 
had  exhorted  him  to  repentance,  inasmuch  as he  had  been 
deprived  of  his earthly power  in accordance with  the counsel 
of  God  and  the ecclesiastical  auth0rity.l  In the next chapter 
we  must  consider  the  significance  of  this  reference  to  the 
'  M.  G. H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii.  tamen  memores  praceptorum  Dei, 
No.  197,  Episc.  de Pen. quam Hlud.  ministeriique  nostri  atque  beneficl- 
Imp.  professus  eat,  Relatio  Compend-  orum  ejus  dignum  dusimus, ut per 
iensis, 833 : "  Sed quia idem  princeps  licentiam men~orati  principis  ~otharii 
ministerium  sibi  commissum  negli-  legationem  ad  illum  ex  auctoritate 
genter tractaverit et multa,  qua Deo  sacri  conventus m~tteremus,  quze  eum 
et hominibus  displicebant,  et fecerib  de suis  reatibus  admoneat,  quatenus 
et  facere  compulerit  vel  fieri  per-  certum consilium  sue saluti~  caperet, 
miserit  et  in  multis  nefandis  con-  ut,  quia  potestate  privatus  erat 
siliis  Deum  irritaverit  et  sanctam  terrena  juxta  divinum  consilium  et 
ecclesiam  scandalizaverit  . . . et ab  ecclesiasticam  auctoritatem,  ne  suarf 
eo divino justoque  judicio  subito im-  animam perderet, elaborare in exbrew 
perialis  sit  subtracta  potestas,  nos  positus totis viribus studeret." 
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of the ecclesiastical authority in the deposition  of  Lenis. 
1,  the meanwhile  we  are only concerned  to observe  that the 
bishops look upon the deposition as lawful. 
is in this same sense  that Hincmar of  Rheims appears to 
refer to the subject in his treatise on the divorce of  Lothair and 
Tetburga, in a passage to which we  have  already referred.  He 
is arguillg  against those who maintained that the king was sub- 
ject to no laws or judgments, and pointing out that lrings like 
were  rebuked  by  the prophets,  Tlleodosius  by  St Am- 
brose, goes  on  to say that in his  own time the pious  Emperor 
Lewis had been cast down  from  his  kingship, and was restored 
to it  post  satisfactionem"  by the  bishops with the consent  of 
the people.l  Hincmar seems to nlean  that the deposition had 
been  unwise, but he  does  not  suggest that in itself  there was 
anything improper  in the action;  indeed  the general  context 
would  suggest  that he regarded  such  action  as  being  under 
certain  circumstances  proper  and right. 
It is true that in that letter or treatise of  Hrabanus Maurus 
which we have already cited, Hrabanus, referring to the depos- 
ition of  Lewis, speaks very emphatically about the honour due 
from  sons  to  their  parents,  and  the  honour  and  obedience 
which all men are to give to the royal authority, and illustrates 
the  right  attitude  of  the subject  by  the classical  example of 
David  and  Saul,  and  from  more  recent  historical  examples 
shows  the judgment  which  overtakes  those  who  rise  against 
their  legitimate  princes.  We have  already  cited  the  letter 
as  illustrating  the  persistence  of  the  characteristic  mode  of 
thought  of  Gregory  the  Great  in  the  ninth  century,  and 
there  is  nothing  to  surprise  us  in  the  fact  that  those  who 
disapproved  of  the  revolt  against  Lewis  the  Pious  should 
have  appealed to these   principle^.^ 
Perhaps the stronqest illustration of  the tendency to conceive 
of the deposition  of  the king  as  being  under  certain  circum- 
stances justifiable  is to be found in a document or procla~nation 
l  Hincmar of  Rheims, De Div. Loth.  cum  populi  consensu,  eb  Ecclesie  et 
et  Tet.,  Quest.  vi.  Resp. : "  Nostra  regno restituit." 
pium  Augustum  Ludovicum  a  Hrabanus  Maurus,  EpinC.  15, in 
regno  dejectum,  post  satisfactionem  &I.  G. H.  Ep., v.  See p.  216. 
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issued in 859 by Charles the Bald against those who wished to 
depose him.  In  this document, after appealing to his  claim of 
hereditary succession  from the Emperor Lewis, he argues that 
he was  elected with  the will, consent, and  acclamation  of  the 
bishops and other faithful  men of the kingdom, and was  conse- 
crated, anointed, and crowned  by  Wenilo,  Bishop  of  Orleans, 
and that from the office in which he was then  placed he cannot 
be  cast out, at least without  the judgment  of  the  bishops  by 
whom  he was  then  consecrated.  "They  are,"  he  says,  "the 
thrones  of  God,"  among  whom  God  sits,  and  by  whom  he 
decrees judgments, and to their paternal  correction  and chas- 
tisement  he is willing  to  submit, and does  submit? 
We  shall  have  to  consider  this passage  again in discussing 
the  relation  of  the  ecclesiastical  and secular  powers,  but  in 
the meanwhile it  is worthy  of  note,  as indicating  in a  very 
forcible  way  that  the  deposition  of  a  king,  who  was  held 
to have failed  to  discharge  his  obligations,  was  a  thing  not 
wholly improper in the minds of  the men of  the ninth century. 
We may very well recall those phrases concerning the distinc- 
tion  between  the king and the tyrant which we considered in 
a  previous  chapter,  and we  shall feel  that the conception  of 
the character of  the king, as depending upon his respecting and 
maintaining justice,  was not a mere piece of  abstract sentiment, 
but was tending  to have  a  more  or less practical and effective 
influence on public life. 
M.  G. H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  300,  Libellus  proclamationi  ad- 
versus Weniloaem, c.  3 : "Sed  et post 
hoc  electione  sua  aliorumque  episco- 
porum  ac  ceterorum  fidelium  regni 
nostri voluntate,  consensu  et acclama- 
tione  cum aliis archiepiscopis  et epis- 
copis Wenilo in diocesi sua apud Aurel- 
ianis civitatem in basilica sancte crucis 
me  secundum  traditionem  ecclesias- 
ticam  regem  consecravit  et in  regni 
regimine  chrismate sacro  perunxit  et 
diademate atque regni sceptro in regni 
solio sublimavit.  A qua consecratione 
vel  regni  sublimitate  subplanteri  vel 
proici  a  nullo debueram,  saltem  sine 
audientia  eb  judicio  episcoporum, 
quorum  ministerio  in  regem  sum 
consecratus  et  qui  throni  Dei  sunt 
dicti,  in  quibus  Deus  sedet,  et per 
quos  sua  decernit  judicia;  quorum 
paternis correptionibus et castigatorii6 
judiciis  me  subdere fui paratus et in 
praesenti  sum subditua." 
CHAPTER XXI. 
THE  RELATION  OF  THE  AUTHORITIES  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE. 
WE must  now resume  the consideration  of  the theory of  the 
of  the  secular  and  ecclesiastical  authorities.  NO 
student of  the history of  the Middle Ages will  doubt that the 
theoretical  and  actual  relations  of  the  two  great  powers  in 
society continually exercised  a  very strong influence upon  the 
theory of  the State and the theory of  the origin and nature of 
political authority. 
To the political theorists of the ninth  century, however great 
their reverence for the king and the secular authority, there is 
obviously  always  present  the  consideration  that alongside  of 
the law of  the State there  stands a  law which  the nation has 
not made, a law which  is more majestic and authoritative than 
that of  any secular society-the  law of  the Christian Church; 
and that alongside  of  the secular organisation  and institutions 
there  stand  the organisation  and institutions  of  the Church. 
If the ruler  is bound  to respect  the law of  the nation, mnch 
more is he bound  to respect  and obey the law of  the Church; 
and while  the great  organisation  of  the Catholic Church may 
admit  him to some  share  in its councils, niay look to him for 
assistance in enforcing its decrees, yet the Church is not  only 
independent  of  him  in  religion  but  looks  upon  him  as its 
subject  in spiritual matters. 
We have seen that the patristic theory of  the relation  of  the 
two  powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, finds its completest 
Statement and definition in the letters and tractates of  Gelasius 
I.  These may also be said to furnish us with the best starting- 
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bishops  of  the empire, in a  long  and important  statement on 
the condition  of  Church and State and the nature of  ecclesias- 
tical  and  civil  authority,  addressed  in the  year  829  to  the 
Emperor Lewis the Pious, quote  and comment  on  the words of 
Gelasius'  twelfth  letter,  m  which  he  had  said  that there  are 
two authorities by which alone all the world  is governed-the 
sacred authority of  the bishop and the power  of  the sovereign 1 
The  same passage  is  quoted  by Jonas of  Orleans  m  the first 
chapter  of  his  work  'De  Institutione  Regia,'2 while Hincmar 
of  Rheims  cites  the woids  of  this  letter  and  also  those  of 
Gelasius'  fourth  tra~tate.~ 
%I  G  H  Leg, sect  11  v01  11 
No  196, Episcopo~nm  ad  Hlud  Imp 
Relatio,  3  "  Quod  ejusdem  sc 
cles~z  corpus  In  duabus  principalitei 
div~datur eximus  personis  Princ~ 
pal~ter itaque  totius  sancts  Del 
ecclesis corpus  in duas  eximias  per 
sonas,  m  sacerdotalem  videlicet  et 
regalem,  aicut  a  san~tis  patribus tra 
ditum  accepimus,  div~sum  esse  novi 
mus ,  de qua re Gelas~us  Romans sedis 
venerabilis  episcopus  ad  Anastasium 
~mperatorem  ~ta  scr~bit '  Dus sunt 
quippe,'  inqu~t, '  ~mperatoi auguste 
quibus pr~n~~pal~ter  mundus 111c regl 
tur,  auctoritas  sacrata  pontificum  et 
regalis potestas ,  in quibus tanto grav 
ms  pondus  est  sacerdotum,  quanto 
etiam  pro  ipsia  regibus  hominum  in 
divino  redd~turi sunt  enamme  ra 
tionem '  Fulgentius  quoque in libro 
de Ventate Prsdestiuat~onis  et Grat~a 
ita scribit  '  Quantum pertiuet,  inquit, 
'ad  hujus temporis vitam, in sccles~a 
nemo  poilt~fice pot~oi, et  in  ssclo 
christ ano  nemo  imperatore  celsior 
~nvenitur  ' " 
a  Jonds of  Orleans,  De  Instit  Rep, 
cap  i  "  Sciendum  onlilibus  fideli 
bus  eat  quia  uu~versalis  Ec~lesia  cor 
pus est Christ1 et ejus caput idem  est 
Chr~stus, et in  ea  dus principaliter 
exstant  eximis  person-,  sacerdotalis 
videl~cet  et regalis, tantoque est prs- 
stantior sacerdotalis,  quanto pro  ipsib 
regibus  Deo  est rationem  redd~turus 
Uncle Gelasius Romans Ecclesls vener 
abilis  pontifex  ad  Anastasium  lm 
peratorem  scribens,  '  Duo  quippe 
examine  rat~onem reddituri ' 
Fulgent~us  quoque  in  libro  de  Veri 
tate  Prsdestmationis  et  Gratlae  ~ta 
scrib~t  '  Quantum  attinet  ad  hujus 
temporis vitam, in Ecclesia nemo pon 
t~fice  potior  et in  ssculo  Christiano 
imperatore  nemo  celsior  invenitur ' 
Ergo quia tants  auctor~tat~s,  imo tant~ 
discrimmis est miuisterium sacerdotum, 
ut  de  ipsis  etiam  regibus  Deo  sin6 
rationem  redd~turi,  oportet  et valde 
necesse est, ut de vestra salute semper 
slmus  soll~citi,  vosque  ne  a voluutate 
Del, quod absit, aut a  ministerio quod 
vob~s  comm~sit,  erretis,  v~g~lanter  ad 
moneamus,  et si,  quod  abs~t,  ab  eo 
aliquo  mod0  exorbital er~tis,  pontifical~ 
stud10  humillter  admonendo,  et sal 
ubr~ter  procurando,  opportunum con 
sultum  saluti  vestrs conferamus,  ut 
non  de  silent10  taciturnitatis  nostrs 
damnemur  sed  magis  de solertissima 
cura et admon~tione  salut~fera  remun 
erarl a Chr~sto  mereamur " 
Hincmar  of  Rheims,  Ad  Ep~sc 
De  Inst  Carol  cap  1  "  Hinc 
marus  eplscopus  ac  plebis  Del  farn 
ulus  Doctr~na  est Cbristiana,  secuu 
dum sanctarurn scripturarum  tramitem, 
prsdicationemque majorum  aua Deo 
ac  Domino  nostro  Jesu  Christu  cona 
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~t IS important to observe  not  only the fact that these pass- 
.,, are quoted, but  the character  of  the comments which  are 
aa 
lnade on them  The bishops in 829 preface their quotat~on  by 
the statement  that the body of  the Church  of  God is divided 
chiefly between two exalted persons, the priestly and the roj  al. 
Jonas  of  Orleans  puts  the  same  view  more  clearly  when  he 
tells  us  that all  faithful men  should know that the universal 
Church  is the body of  Christ, and that Christ is the  head  of 
the  body,  and in  this  body  there  are  two  persons  of  chief 
authority, the priest and the kmg.  While Gelasius thinks of 
these two authorities as existink in the world, the bishops and 
Jonas  conceive of  them as being both within the Church. 
It is also worth noting that while the bishops  slmply quote 
the words  of  Gelasius, "In quibus  tanto gravlus pondus  est 
&tore et redemptore nostro, qul slmul 
solus  rex  et sacerdos  fieri  potult 
cu~~s  nomine  omne  genuflectltur, 
ccelestium, terrestrium et infernorum, 
disponente, s~cut  beatus Gelasius  papa 
ad  Anastasium  imperatorem  dicit,  et 
in gestis qus nuper  apud martyrlum 
sancts  Macrs  in  synodo  gesta  sunt 
partlm  cont~netur,  duo  sunt,  qulbus 
principaliter,  una  cum  speciallter 
cujuscumque  curs subjectis, mundus 
hic regitur, auctoritas sacra pontificum, 
et regalis potestas ,  in qu~bus  personis, 
smut  ordine  sunt divisa vocabula, ita 
sunt  et  divisa  in unoquoque  ordine 
ac  professlone  ordmationum  offi~ia 
Quamvis emm membra veri regls atque 
pont~ficls secundum  part~c~pationem 
uaturz, maguifice  utrumque m  sacra 
generosltate  sumpsisse  dicantur,  ut 
smul regale genus et sacerdotale  sub 
slstant, memor tamen Christus frag~li 
tatis  humane,  quod  suorum  salute 
congrueret,  dispensatione  magnifica 
temperans,  Sic  actionibus  propriis, 
dlgnltatibusque  distmctis offic~a  potes 
tatis  utriusque  discrevit,  suos  volens 
medlcinali  humilitate  aalvari,  non 
humans  superbia  rursus  (ut  ante 
&dventum ejus in  carnem pdbani  lm 
peratores,  qu~  iidern et maxime ponti- 
fices d~cehantur),  interclpi, ut  et  Clirist- 
ianl rege~  pro sterna vita pontific~bus 
ind~gerent,  et pontifices  pro  tempor 
al~um  cursu rerum imperialibus  dispo- 
sition~bus  uterentur ,  quatenus spirit 
alis actio a carnalibus d~staret  incursi- 
bus,  et ideo  m~litans  Deo  minime  se 
negotiis  sscularibus  impllcaret,  ac 
vicisslm  non  llle  rebub  divinis  prs 
sidere videretur qu~  esset  negotns s;e- 
cular~bus  ~mplicatus,  ut  et  modest~a 
utriusque  ord~nis  curaretur, ne extol 
leretur utroque suffultus, et competens 
qual~tatibui  actionum  specialiter  pro 
febsio aptaretur 
"Cap  11  Sed tanto gravius  pondus 
est sacerdotum, quanto etiam pro ipsis 
regibus  horninurn  In  divlno  reddituri 
sunt examui~e  rationem,  et tanto eat 
d~gn~tas  pontificum major quam regum, 
quia reges in culmeu regium sacrantur 
a pontificibus, pont~fices  autem a regl 
bus consecrari  non  possunt ,  et tanto 
in human~s  rebus regum  cura eat pro 
peusior  quam  sacerdotum, quanto pro 
honore et  defensione et quiete  sanctz 
Fccleq-e, ac rectorum  et mlnistrorum 
lps~us,  et leges promulgando  ac  mill- 
tanclo  a Rege regum est els curs  onus 
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sacerdotum,"  Jonas,  in  his  introduction,  calls  the  priestly 
person  p~cestantior, arid  in  applying  this  conception  he 
urges  that  the  priest  must  always  anxiously  care  for  the 
salvation  of  the  king  and  carefully  admonish  him  lest  he 
should  turn aside  from the will  of  God  or neglect  the charge 
which  God  has  committed  to him.  While  Gelasius,  that is, 
insists only upon  the obedience which  the king should render 
to the priests  in religious  matters, and the priest  to  the king 
in  secular  matters,  Jonas  also  thinks  that  the  priest  is  in 
some  measure responsible  to  see  that the king does  his  duty 
even  in  secular  affairs. 
Hincmar  embodies  large  parts  of  the  tenth  letter  and of 
the  fourth  tractate  of  Gelasius.  Christ  is  the  only  person 
who was  both  kiug and  priest, and although  there is a  sense 
in which  Christians may  be  called  a  royal and priestly  race, 
yet  Christ,  mindful  of  the  infirmity of  human  nature,  has 
allotted  to  each  authority  its  own  duties,  so  that  Christian 
kings  require  the  bishops  for  eternal  life,  and  the  bishops 
require  the king for  temporal things, and therefore  the clergy 
should  keep  themselves  clear  of  secular  business,  and  the 
secular  person  should  not  interfere  in  spiritual  matters.  So 
far  Hincmar  does  little  more  than  follow  Gelasius,  but  his 
development  of  the  principle  "  Tanto  gravius  est  pondus 
sacerdotum,"  &C., is  different  and  noteworthy.  The  burden 
of  the priest  is greater, because  he will  have  to give account, 
in  the  judgment,  even  for  kings,  and  the  dignity  of  the 
bishop  is  greater  than  that  of  the  king,  because  kings  are 
consecrated  to  their  office  by  the  bishop,  while  the  bishop 
cannot  be  consecrated  by  kings. 
In three  important  points,  then,  we  see  that  some  ninth- 
century writers  have  developed  the position  of  Gelasius,--the 
first, that both the secular and the spiritual powers  are within 
the Church;  the second,  that in  some  measure  the  priest  is 
responsible  to see  that the secular  ruler  does  his  duty;  and 
the  third,  that  the  dignity  of  the  ecclesiastical  person  is 
greater,  for it is  by  him  that the  king  is consecrated:  and 
each  of  these  principles  has  importance in the ninth-century 
conception  of  the  relation  between  the  spiritual  and  the 
temporal  powers.  In  the  main  it  is  clear  that  the  ninth 
century  simply  carries  on  from  the  sixth  the  principle  of 
the  two  authorities  in  society-two  authorities  which  are 
independent  of  each other in their own  spheres ; 
but  the  experience  of  the  ninth  century  tended  to  bring 
the  difficulties  of  this  position,  and  to  develop  the 
tendency towards  the assertion of  the priority of  one or other 
of  the  two.  The  conditions of  the time  are indeed  so  com- 
that we  could  easily quote phrases from the legal  docu- 
ments and the general authors of  the period to support almost 
any theory of  the relations  of  the two  powers.  It would  be 
easy to produce  evidence to show that the temporal  power was 
really superior even in ecclesiastical  matters ; to show that the 
consent of  the king or emperor was necessary for ecclesiastical 
action, and that it was the secular power which  controlled all 
ecclesiastical  appointments.  On the  other hand, it would  be 
quite  as  easy  to  produce  evidence  to show that the  Church 
was actually superior to the State ;  that the king was absolutely 
under  the canonical  law, liable to excommunication  like  any 
private  person ;  that it was the Church which really conferred 
the  royal  authority, and that the Church could  take it away 
again. 
A century or two later we  shall find  views  of  this kind  set 
out in open  contradiction to each other; we shall find Europe 
filled  with  the  clamour  of  the great  struggle for  supremacy 
between  the Church  and the Empire.  But it  is  the charac- 
teristic  of  the ninth century  that these apparently divergent 
tendencies  of  thought  can often be traced in the same person ; 
that we  find  the  same  person  using  language which  in later 
times  would  mark  him  clearly as  a  papalist, and  the  next 
moment  using  phrases  which  became  the  catchwords  of  the 
imperialist. 
It  is possible, no doubt, to maintain that in the early years of 
the  ninth  century the authority of  the State relatively to the 
Church was  at its highest point, and that the opposed  concep- 
tion  develops  throughout the century till it culminates in the 
pseudo-Isidorian  literature.  But we think that the safest judg- 
ment which  we  can  form  on  thc whole character of  the ninth 
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sentury is this, that men were  convinced that each power had 
its own appropriate sphere, but that they were also keenly alive 
to the fact that in practical  life  the two spheres  intersected, 
and that no general principle could enable  them to determine, 
with  regard  to many questions,  what exactly  was  the sphere 
of  the State and what  the sphere of  the Church. 
We may find a very good illustration of  the complexity of  the 
situation  and the ambiguities of  theory in the position  of  that 
writer  to  whom  we  have  already  so  often referred,  Sedulius 
Scotus,  whose  work  seems  to  belong  to  the  middle  of  the 
century.  He does  not  seem to have  had  the  same practical 
experience  of  affairs  as  Hincmar  of  Rheims,  and  there  are 
therefore  some  points on  which  Hincmar is his  superior; but 
he shows a  considerable power  of  putting together  his views, 
so  that, in spite of  a  certain incoherence  of  detail, they really 
form  an  organic  whole.  At any  rate,  it may  be  useful  to 
consider  for a  moment  what  are his views  as to the position 
of  the emperor  or  king relatively to the Church. 
He  begins his treatise by urging the prince to remember that 
he should give thanks to God and honour to His Church.  The 
whole commonwealth flourishes when the king fears and honours 
God  and provides  carefully for  the wellbeing  of  the Church? 
The charge of  the king, then, is not to be thought  of  as merely 
secular.  The work of  the king is to set forward such conditions 
as will further the cause of  religion as well as the temporal well- 
being  of  the State.  If  his heart is not set upon God's  service, 
God may take the kingdom from him.2  He has therefore great 
responsibilities  in  Church  matters as well  as in secular.  He 
must prefer  the wellbeing  of  the Church to his  own  personal 
advantage, and must  help  and protect  all those who work  in 
God's   erv vice.^  We have  here  simply the  comrnon  medisval 
conception  of  the duty of  the ruler of  the State to do what  he 
can to further the work of  the Church.  Sedulius evidently did 
not imagine that the State could  stand aside and refuse to take 
a part in the service of religion.  But this is not all.  The good 
ruler, he says, will  set forwarcl the wellbeing of  the Church  in 
1 Sedulius  Scotus,  De  Rectoribus  a  Id. 3. 
Christianis  1.  Td. 31. 
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ways, and he must remember  that God  has set him as His 
vicar  in  the  g~~~ernment  of  the  Church,  and  has given  him 
power over both orders of  rulers and subjects,'  and therefore he 
is especially admonished  to  see to the holding  of  synods every 
year.2  We have  in an earlier chapter referred to this title  of 
the Vicar  of  God as applied to the secular  ruler.  Certainly as 
used  by Sedulius it  seems clearly to imply a large measure  of 
authority even over the Church. 
So far we have one aspect of  the theory of  Sedulius.  But if 
we  now  turn back  to the eleventh  chapter  of  his treatise we 
sllall  see  the other  side of  the matter.  Here also the king is 
admonished  to  provide  diligently for the  meeting  of  synods, 
inasmuch as these are of great benefit to the Church.  But then, 
abruptly and somewhat sharply, he is warned  that he must  not 
interfere recklessly in ecclesiastical affairs;  he must show him- 
self  humble  and very cautious, and  beware lest he should  take 
upon himself  to judge of  any ecclesiastical affair before  he has 
learnt the decrees of the synods.  The pious ruler will carefully 
hear what is just and lawful according to the canonical decision 
of the holy bishops, and will then give his consent and authority 
to what is just and true.  He will  in no way form  any prlaju- 
dicizcnz  on such matters, lest haply, falling into error, he should 
find himself  guilty of  some fault hateful in the sight of  God. 
Sedulius enforces this with a story of  how Valentinian, when he 
was invited by the bishops to take part in some doctrinal dis- 
cussion, said that he was in no way worthy to take part in such 
matters, but that this belonged to the priests.*  Sedulius follows 
'  Sedulius  Scotus,  De  Rectoribus 
Christianis,  19 : "  Oportet  enim  Deo 
amabilem  regnatorem,  quem  divina 
Ordinatio  tanquam  vicarium  suum  in 
regimine  Ecclesis sus esse  voluit,  et 
Potestatem ei super utrumque ordinem 
Pralatorunl et ~uhditorum  tribuit, ut 
aingulis  personis  et qus justa  sunt 
decernat,  et  sub  sua  dispensatione 
Prior  ordo  devote  obediendo  fideliter 
Wbditus fiat," 
Id. id. 
'' Id. 11  : "Unde cautum et  humilem 
et valde  circumepectum  oportet  esse 
regem:  nec  quidquam  de  negotiia 
ecclesiasticis  judicare  prwsumat,  ante- 
yuam synodalia statuta  cognoscat.  . . . 
Pius itaque rector tanquam luminosa 
pupilla  prirno  quod  justum  et legiti- 
mum  est  secundum  canonicas  sanc- 
toruru  episcoporum  sanctiones  penpi- 
caciter  attendat ; dehinc  consensum 
atque  auctoritatis  adminiculum  his 
quse  sunt vera et justa  adhibeat.  Per 
se  vero  nullatenus  de talibus  prsju- 
dicium  faciat,  ne  forte  errando  ante 
conspectum  domini  culpam  aliquam 
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this up in the next chapter by urging the ruler to make himself 
an example of  humility and obedience.  If he is reproved  by 
wise men he should repent ; and Sedulius cites the exalnples of 
David and Nathan, of  Theodosius and Arnbr0se.l 
If, then, in the title of  Vicar  of  God  in the governn~ent  of 
His Church  Sedulius expresses  something of  the authority of 
the king even  over churchmen, in his treatment of  his relation 
to the synods and  their decisions  he  gives us the other side  of 
the  matter.  It must be  noticed, however, that even here the 
king has his own place, at least in the execution of  Church law. 
After he has heard the judgment of the bishops, it still remains 
for  hirn  to give  his  consent  and  authority to what has  been 
decreed. 
We have before cited the letter of  Cathulfus on the nature of 
the  royal  authority.  He  states, even  more  empllatically than 
Sedulius, that the  king  is  the representative  of  God, and  he 
certainly  seems  to imply  that the  position  of  the  bishop  is 
secondary.  He bids  the king remember God  always with  fear 
and love, for he is in God's place, to watch over  and  golTern  all 
God's  members, and will  have to give account for  these  in the 
day of  judgment.  The  bishop is, in the second place, "in vice 
Christi tantum."  The king must therefore carefully see that he 
establishes the law of  God over the people of  God, whose place 
he  holds, "cujus  vicem  tenes."  He must,  with  his  bishope, 
superintend  the life  of  the monks  and nuns, but he  must  do 
this  through  spiritual  pastors,  not  through  laymen,  for  that 
would  be wickedness.=  We should judge  that the position of 
bilis memoriz Valentinianus Imperator 
cum a sanctis episcopis rogaretur qua- 
tenus  dignaretur  ad  emendationem 
sacri dogmatis interease, 'Mlhi,'  inquit, 
'cum minimus de populo  sim, fas non 
est talia perscrutari, verum sacerdotes 
quibus hsec  cura  est, apud semetipsos 
congregentur ubi voluerint."' 
l  Sedulius  Scotus,  De  Rectoribua 
Chiistianis,  12. 
2  M.  G. H.  Ep.,  iv.  "  Epiatols 
Variorum  Carolo  Magno  Regnante 
Scriptz,"  7 : "  Cathuulfus  Carolo  I. 
Francorum  Regi prosperitatem  gratu- 
latur eumque ad virtutem ~equendam 
admonet."  "  Memor esto ergo semper, 
rex  mi,  Dei  regis  tui cum  timore  et 
amore, quod tu es in vice  illius  super 
omnia membra ejus custodire et  regere, 
et  rationem  reddcre  in  die  judicii, 
etiam  per  te.  Et episcopus  est  in 
secundo  loco,  in  vice  Christi  tantum 
est.  Ergo  considerate  inter  vos  dili- 
genter  legem  Dei  couytituere  super 
populum  Dei,  quod  Deus  tuus  dixit 
tibi,  cujus  vicem  tenes,  in  psalmo : 
'  Et nunc reges  intelligite,' et reliqua ; 
item : '  Servite  Domino  in  timore.'  et 
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Catllulfl1s was  practically the same as that of  Sedulius, though 
he is more  emphatic in his assertion of  a certair~ 
priority of  the royal  power.  The  letter is, however, too brief, 
and the discussion  too incomplete, to enable us  to form a very 
definite decision upon the subject? 
The conception  of  the separate provinces of  the secular  and 
the spiritual powers  is  so well defined in the fifth century, and 
so carefully restated in the ninth, that we cannot doubt that all 
parties,  lay  or  clerical,  would  have,  in theory,  held  that the 
powers were co-ordinate, and, in their own spheres, independent 
of each other.  But, as a matter of  fact, circumstances were too 
strong for theory, and  not  only did the definition and delimita- 
tion  of  the boundaries  of  the province  of  each power prove a 
task  of  insuperable  difficulty,  but  each  power  in turn found 
itself  compelled  to trench in some measure upon the province 
of  the  other.  We begin  by  considering  some  of  the  many 
points in which, in spite of  the theory of  the independence and 
authority  of  the Church, the State did  actually  trench  upon 
its  prerogatives. 
We have seen how Sedulius and Cathulfus speak of  the king 
or  emperor  as  the  vicar  of  God  in  the  government  of  His 
Church ; that is, they conceive that it is part of  the duty of  the 
civil ruler  to  maintain  good  order  and piety  in the Church. 
We find  the same principle very strongly declared by Smarag- 
dus.  He urges  upon the king that if  he sees anything wrong 
in the Church of  Christ it is his duty to reprove and correct  it. 
If he sees any person in the Church of God running into luxury 
or  drunkenness, he is to forbid, to terrify him.  He is to put 
reliqua ; item  '  Adprehendite  discip- 
linam  ne quando  irascatur  Dominus,' 
et  reliqua.  . . . 'Sponsam  Christi 
vestire  cum ornamentis  super  omnia, 
id est ecclesiarum privilegia constituere 
maxima.  Monachorum vitam  et can- 
onicorum  cum  episcopis  tuis  simul 
virginurn monasteriorum regere.  Non 
per  laicos,  quod  scelus . . .  sed  per 
apiritales  pastores  omendare,  super 
Omnia Deum timentes,  sicut scripturn 
(eat) ~n  lege.' " 
1  The  letter  of  Cathulfus  belong6 
probably  to  the  last  years  of  the 
eighth  century,-that  is,  to  a  time 
when  the papacy  was  under  a  cloud 
and  the  authority  of  Charles  the 
Great  in relation  to the Church was 
at its highest  point;  and  the letter 
cannot therefore be taken as properly 
representative  of  the  general  stand- 
point  of  the  ninth  century,  except 
so far as its statements  are found to 
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down all pride and anger with threats and sharp reproofs.  Be 
is to do what he can as a king, as a Christian, and as the repre- 
sentative of Christ (" pro vice Christi qua fungeris ")?  We can 
find  illustrations  of  this  conception  of  the duty  of  the civil 
ruler  to maintain good  order  and  discipline in  the Church  in 
the proceedings of  Charles the Great, of Lewis the Pious, and of 
Charles the Bald.  In the "  Capitula de  Cansis  cum  Episcopis 
et Abbatibus  Tractandis"  of  811 we  have a  list of  topics  on 
which  the  bishops  and  abbots  are  to  be  interrogated,  and 
certainly  the tone  of  the  questions  indicates  clearly  enough 
that Charles the Great thought it his duty to look very sharply 
into the conduct of  the clergy even in purely religious rnatters.2 
In the "Admonitio  ad  omnes regni  ordines,"  issued  by  Lewis 
the Pious  in 823-5, Lewis lays down very explicitly the prin- 
ciple  that it is his  duty to  admonish  men  of  all orders as to 
the  discharge  of  their  duties,  and  frames  regulations  for  a 
very  comprehensive  inquiry  which  is  to  be  made  by  taking 
the evidence of  the  bishops  about  the conduct  of  the counts 
in  administering  justice,  and  that  of  the  co~rnts  as  to  the 
conduct  of  the  bishops  in  their  life  and  teaching?  In the 
1 Smaragdus Abhas,  Via  Regia,  8 : 
"Si quid forte perversum  in Ecclesia 
videris  Christi,  satage  corripere,  et 
emendare  non  cesses.  Si videris  ali- 
quem iu domo Dei,  quae  est  Ecclesia, 
currere  at1  luxuriam  ad  ebrietatem, 
prohibe,  veta,  terre,  si  zelus  domus 
Dei  comedit  te.  Si  videris  superbia 
inflatum,  aut  iracundia  savum, . . . 
reprime  omnes,  minare  omnlbus,  et 
refrena  severiiisime omnea.  Fac quic- 
quid  potes  pro  persona  quam gestas, 
pro miniaterio  regali  quod  portas, pro 
nornine  Christiani  quod  habes,  pro 
vice  Christi qua fuugeris." 
W.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  72,  Capitula  de  Causis  cum 
Episcopis et Abbatibus  Tractandis. 
M.  a. H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  150: "3. Sed quamquam  sumrna 
hujua  ministerii  in  nostra  persona 
consistere  videatur,  tamen  et divina 
auctoritate et humana ordinationo ita 
per  partes  divisum  ease  cognoscitur, 
ut  unusquisque  vestrum  in  suo  loco 
et  ordine  partem  nostri  ministerii 
habere  cognoscatur ; unde  apparet, 
quod ego omnium vestrum admonitor 
esse  debeo,  eC  omnes  vos  nostri 
adjutores esse  debetis.  . . . 
"14.  Volunlus  studere . . .  et per 
commune  testimonium,  id  est  epis- 
coporum  de  comitibus,  cornitum  de 
episcopis,  comperire,  qualiter  scilicet 
comites  justitiarn  diligant  et faciant. 
et  quam  religiose  episcopi  conver- 
aentur  et  prsdiceut,  et  amborum 
relatu  de  aliorum  fidelium  in  suls 
miuisteriis  consistentium  squitate 
et  pace  atque  concord~a  cognoscere. 
Simillter  etiam  voluinus,  ut omue5 
illis  et  illi  omnibus  de  communi 
societate e6 statu a  nobis  interrogxfi9 
verum  testimonium  sibi  mutuo  per 
hibere posaint." 
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ti  Capitulare  Septimanicum apud  Tolosam  clittulll" of  844  we 
find  C1.1arles the  Bald  strictly  forbidding the bishops  to take 
against those priests who  had appealed  to hinl for pro- 
tection against the oppression of the bishops, and warning them 
that they  must  obey  his  injunctions,  and see  that every  one 
obeys the Canons.'  In 853 we  find the same Charles  sending 
round  his "missi"  to hold  inquiries and correct  abuses in all 
cities and monasteries  along  with the bishop  of  each diocese.2 
There are even indications in the literature and history of tile 
times  that  the responsibility of  the emperor for the conduct of 
the Church extended to the condition of  the papacy itself.  We 
do not wish  to enter into any discussion of  the exact character 
of  the  purgation  of  Pope  Leo  111.  in  the  year  800,  but  at 
least  it  is  clear  that  Charles  the  Great  had  been  gravely 
concerned  with  regard  to  the  charges  brought  against  the 
Pope.  Leo 111.  was very  careful, in purging himself  by  oath 
of  the crimes  laid  to his  charge, to  make  it quite  clear  that 
he  did  this  of  his  own free will, and not as one  amenable to 
the judgment  of  any  man,  and  to  guard  against  his  action 
being  taken  as  a  precedent  for  his  successors;  but  his  own 
statement  makes it clear that Charles  had come  to Rome, in 
part  at least,  to  inquire into  the  matter.3  And  in spite  of 
l  X. G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  255 : "  1.  Ut  episcopi  nullum 
inquietudinern  sive  exprobationern 
presbyteris  aut apelte ingerendo  aut 
alia  qualibet  occasione  machinando 
pro  eo,  quod  se  ad  nos  hac  vice 
reclamare  venerunt,  inferant;  quia 
longs oppressio  hujusmodi  itineris eos 
fecit subire laborem.  . . . 
"8.  Ut episcopi sub occasione, quasi 
auctoritatem  habeanb  canonum,  his 
constitutis  excellentis  nostrze  nequa- 
quam  resultent  aut  neglegant,  sed 
potius  canones,  uh  intelligendi  sunt, 
intelligere  et  in  cunctis  observare 
Procurenh ;  quia  si  aliter  fecerint, 
OQnimodis et qualiter canones fidelium 
$mis  agendum statuanb et qualiter 
'ntnll~gi  ac  observari  cum  mansuetu- 
nil  trae  decreto deheant, synodali 
dijudicatione  eO  nostra  regia  auctor- 
itate docebuntur." 
WM.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  259, Cap.  Missorum  Suessionense: 
"1. Ub  missi  nostri  per  civitates  et 
singula  monasteria,  tam canonicorum 
quam  monachorum sive  sanctimonial- 
ium,  una  cum  episcopo  parochie 
uniuscujusque, in  qua consistunt, cum 
consilio  eh  consensu  ipsius,  qui  mon- 
asterium retinet  vitarn  ibi degentium 
et  conversationem  inquirant,  et ubi 
neLesse  est corrigant,"  &c. 
M.  G.  H.  Ep.,  v.  Ep.  Select. 
Pont.  Rorn.,  6.  800  A.D.  Dec.  23. 
"  Sacramentum  quod  Leo  Papa  jur- 
avit.  '  Auditum, fratres karissimi,  et 
divulgatum est per multa loca, qualiter 
homines  mali  adversus me insurrexer- 
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the  care  Leo  111.  had  taken  to  guard  against  his  action 
becoming  a  precedent,  we  cannot  help  feeling  that  Pope 
Leo  IV.  was  following  in  Leo  111.'~  steps,  and  was  even 
going  somewhat  further, when,  in  his  letter to the Emperor 
Lewis 11.  of  about 853, he expressed  his willingness that the 
emperor  and  his  "missi"  should  inquire  into  the  charges 
which  had  been  made  against  him,  and  his  readiness  to 
amend  everything  according to  their judgment.' 
We think that all this will  serve  to show sufficiently  clearly 
that the civil  ruler in the ninth  century was thought of, and 
was  recognised  in fact, as having  some real  responsibility for 
the good  order and conduct of  the Church.  He  was not  only 
the protector  of  the Church  against external enemies, but was, 
at least in some measure, responsible to guard it against corrup- 
tion  and  decay.  How  exactly  this  responsibility  was  to  be 
carried  out into practice was a very uncertain  matter, and one 
upon which, when put to the test of  practical action, men in the 
ninth century would  probably have  differed  greatly ;  but there 
unt super me graria crimina.  Propter 
quam causam  aud~endam  iste clemen- 
tissimus ac sereniss~mus  dominus  rex 
Carolus  una  cum  sacerdotibus  et 
optimatibus  suis  istam  pervenit  ad 
urbem.  Quam  ob  rem  ego  Leo 
pontifex  sancts  Romans  ecclesis,  a 
nemine  judlcatus  neque  coactus,  sed 
spontanea  mea  voluntate  purifico  et 
purgo  me  in  conspectu  vestro coram 
Deo  et angelis  suis,  qui conscientiam 
meam  novit,  et beato  Petro  principe 
apostolorum  in  cujus  basilica  con- 
sistimus :  quia  istas  criminosas  et 
sceleratas  res,  quas illi  mihi obiciunt, 
nec  perpetravi  nec  perpetrare  jussi ; 
testis mihi est Deus, in cujuw jud~cium 
venturi sumus et in cujus conspectu 
consistimus.  Et hoc  propter  suspi- 
tiones tollendas mea  spontanea volun- 
tate  facio ; non  quasi  in  canonibus 
inventurn  sit,  aut  quasi  ego  hanc 
aonsuetudinem aut decretum in sancta 
ecclesia  successoribus  meis  necnon 
et  fratribus  et  coepiscopis  nostris 
imponsm.' " 
M.  G. H.  Ep.,  v.  Ep.  Select. 
Leonis  IV.,  40,  c.  853 :  "Kos  si 
aliquid  incompetenter  egimus,  et in 
subditis  justs  legis  tramitem  non 
conservavimus,  vestro  ac  vestrorum 
missorum  cuncta  volumus  emendare 
judicio  quoniam  si  nos  qui  aliena 
debemus  corrigere,  pejora  commit- 
timus,  certe  non  veritatis  discipuli, 
sed  quod  dolentes  dicimus,  erimus 
pre csteris erroris magistri.  Inde milg- 
nitudinis vestrs  magnopere clemenciam 
imploramus, uC  tales ad haec  qus  dixi- 
mus perquirenda missos in his partibus 
dirigatis, qui Deum per omnia timeant, 
et cuncta  quemadmodum  si  vestra 
prssens imperialis  gloria  fuisset,  ex- 
amussim diligenter exquirant, et non 
tantum  hsc  qus superius  diximus 
exagitent,  sed sive minora sive etiam 
majora  illis  sint  de  nobis  indicata 
negotia,  ita  eorum  cuncta  legitimo 
terminentur  examine,  quatenus  in 
posterum  nichil  sit,  quod  ex  eis  in- 
discussum vel  indiffinitum  remaneet." 
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seems no doubt that this conception of  the responsibility of  the 
king was held very comnlonly, if not universally. 
It is partly at least from this standpoint that we may most 
llsefully consider the relation of  the civil ruler of the time to the 
synodical and legislative organisation of  the Church.  We do not 
think that any one doubted the independent legislative and ad- 
nlinistrati~e  authority of  the synods of  the Church, but yet we 
find that ihe synods  are constantly spoken of  as being  called 
together by the emperor or king as well as by the ecclesiastical 
and that the decrees, administrative or legislative, of the 
synods, are issued with the co-operation of  the royal power. 
We  niay  take  as  our  first  example  of  this  condition  of 
things  the  Capitulare  of  Karlmann  of  742.  Here  we  find 
Xarlmann,  with  the counsel  of  the bishops,  presbyters,  and 
chief  nien  of  the kingdom, decreeing that a council and synod 
should  be  held  to  advise  him  how  religion  and the  law  of 
God  might  be restored, and  then, with the bishops and great 
men, ordering  that synods should be held  every year, at which 
the king should  be  present, and by which  the canons and laws 
of the Church should be restored.1  We  find parallels in Charles 
the  Great's  Capitulary  of  769;  in the "Capitulare  Haristal- 
lense"  of  779:  and  in  the "  Admonitio  Generalis"  of  789." 
We are specially  told  that Charles  the Great was  present  at 
the  Synod of  Frankfort in 794,  and he  is said  to have pre- 
M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  secb. ii. vol. i.  No. 
10: "In  nomine  Domini  nostri  Jesu 
Christi.  Ego Karlmannus, dux et prin- 
ceps Francorum, anno ab incarnatione 
Christi  septingentesimo quadragesimo 
secundo, xi Kalendas  Maias, cum con- 
cilio  servoxum  Dei  et  optimatum 
meorum  episcopos  qui in regno  me0 
aunt  cum  ~resbyteris  et  concilium 
et synodum  pro  timore  Christi con- 
gregavi,  id  est  Bonifatium  archi- 
episcopum  et Burghardum . . . cum 
I'resbiteris  eorum,  ut mihi  consilium 
dedissent,  quamodo  lex  Dei  et 
@cciesiastica rellgio  recuperetur,  qus 
in  diebus  prreteritorum  principum 
disaipata  corruit,  et qualiter  populus 
Cllristianus  ad  salutem  animm  per- 
venire passiti et per  falsos  sacerdoter 
deceptus non  pereat. 
"  1.  Et  per consilium sacerdotum eb 
optimatum  meorum  ordinavimus  per 
civitates  episcopos,  et  constituimus 
super eos  arch~episcopum  Bonifatium 
qui est missus sancti Petri.  Statuimus 
per  aunos  singulos  synodum  congre- 
gare,  ut nobis  prssentibus canonum 
decreta  et aecclesis  jura  restaurentur 
et relegio Christiana emendetur." 
2  M.  G. H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  19. 
3  M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  20. 
4  M.  a. H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i 
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sided.1  The  synod,  we  are  told,  was  called  together  by  the 
apostolic  authority and  by  that of  Charles  the Great.2  Per- 
haps  the  most  marked  recognition  of  the  imperial  share  in 
such ecclesiastical  business  is to be  found in the Epilogue  to 
the decrees  of  the Council  of  Arles  of  813.  In this we  find 
the decrees  presented to the emperor, and he  is  asked  to  add 
anything which  may  have  been  omitted, to  correct  anything 
that  may be  wrong,  and  to aid  in  carrying  into  effect what- 
ever  may  have been  rightly  de~reed.~ 
It may perhaps be  urged  that these  examples  are  all taken 
from the time of Charles the Great himself, and  that his  rela- 
tion to the Church was wholly exceptional ; but we can find some 
parallels  at least  later in the century.  In 818-19 Lewis the 
Pious issued a number  of  capitula on ecclesiastical and  secular 
matters, and it is worthy of  note  that the form  in  which  this 
is done  is  very  much  the  same  as  that in  the  earlier  cases. 
Lewis  calls  together  his  bishops,  abbots,  and  great  men, and 
with their advice issues the Capitula which are to be  observed 
by  ecclesiastics  and  layinen  alike.4  The  proceedings  of  the 
1 Synodica  concilii  Frauconofurt. 
Xansi Councils, vol. xiii. p. 884 : "  Pre- 
cipiente et prsesidente piisimo et glori- 
osissimo domno nostro Carolo rege." 
a  M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  28,  Synodus  Franconofurtensis : 
"  Conjungentibus,  Deo  favente,  apos- 
tolica auctoritate atque piissimi domini 
nostri Karoli regni anno xxvi. princi- 
patus sui, cunclis regni Francorum seu 
Italiae, Aqnitanie, Provintie, episcopis 
ac sacerdotibus synodali  concilio, inter 
quos ipse  mitissimus  sancto  interfuit 
conventui." 
Mansi,  Councils,  vol.  xiv.  p.  62 : 
"Hsec  igitur . . . quam  brevissime 
annotavimus,  et  domino  imperatori 
prsesentanda decrevimus, poscentes ejus 
clementiam,  ut si quid hic minus est, 
ejusprudentia  suppleatur :  si quid secus 
quam ee ratio habet, ejus judicio emen- 
detur, si  quid  rationabillter  taxatum 
eat,  ejus  adjutorio  divina  opitulante 
dementia perficiatur." 
'  M.  G. H. I.P;.,  wt. ii.  vol.  i.  NO. 
137,  "Prcemium  Generale  ad  Cap. 
Tam.  Eccl.  quam  Mundana " : . . . 
Quinto anno imperii nostri, accersitis 
nonnullis episcopis, abbatibus, canonicis 
et monachis  et fidelibus  optimatibus 
nostris,  studuimus  eorum  consultu 
sagacissima  investigare  inquisitionc, 
qualiter unicuique ordini, canonicorum 
videlicet,  monachorum  et  laicorum 
juxta  quod  ratio dictabat eC  facultas 
suppetebat, Deo opem ferente consul- 
eremus. . . .  Sed qualiter de his divina 
co-operante  gratia  consultu  fidelium 
pro viribus et temporis brevitate, liceb 
non  quantum  debuimus  et voluimus 
sed  quantum  r  Deo  posse accepimus, 
egerimus  et  quid  unicuique  ordilli 
communi  voto  communique  consensu 
consulere studuerimus, ita nt  quid can- 
onicis  proprie  de his, quidve monachis 
observandis, quid etiam in legibus mun. 
danis  addenda, quid quoque  in  capit. 
ulis  inserenda  forent,  adnotsveri~nu" 
et singulia  3inqula  observanda  contra 
deremufi,"  &c. 
Synod  of  Ponthion  in  876  seem  to  show  that the  principle 
that  synods  should  be  summoned  by  the  king  or  emperor, 
that he might preside  at them,  was  still accepted.  The 
Emperor  Charles  the  Bald  is  said  to  have  presided  at this 
synod, and it  is  spoken  of  as  having been  called  together  by 
the Pope  and the Emper0r.l 
The history  of  the century seems  to illustrate very  exactly 
the theory as we  have seen it in  Sedulius  and  Srnaragdus  or 
Cathulfus.  The  king  is  responsible  for  the  good  order  of 
the Church, and at least  has his share in the calhng  together 
of  the synods  of  the Church  and the promulgation  of  their 
decrees. 
There is yet one further  point  of  Church  order in which the 
influence  of  the secular  power  is  very  great-that  is, in the 
appointment  of  ecclesiastics.  We do  not  wish  to enter upon 
a  discussion  of  the  many  and  intricate  questions  connected 
with  this  subject,  but  we  must  deal  with  it  so  far  as  is 
necessary to bring  out the fact that here  again  the  theory of 
a separation  of  the two  powers was  found  impossible of  literal 
application  to  the  actual  circumstances  of  the  time.  The 
emperor or king did as a matter  of  fact exercise a most power- 
ful influence over  all  appointments of  the greater ecclesiastics, 
and  the propriety of  this is not  denied  by  any  writer  of  the 
ninth  century. 
The  bishops,  in  their  address  to Lewis  the  Pious  of  829, 
quite  frankly recognise  this,  and  exhort  him  to see that the 
greatest  care  is exercised  in appointing pastors and  rulers in 
the Church of  God.2  Hincmar of  Rheims  is  quite as frank in 
recognising  the  authority of  the secular  ruler in the appoint- 
ment  of  bishops.  In his  treatise,  "De  Institutioile  Carolo- 
M. G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  v01  ii. 
No.  279,  Synodus  Pontigonensls : 
"  E.  Ideoque,  quia  imperialem  excel- 
lentlam  .,,tram  synodo  prreesse,  et 
vicarios  sedis apostolicse  praesto  nobis 
"de5se  gaudernus, &c.  G. Sancta syn- 
od~%  que in  nomine  Domini  voca- 
dornini  Johannis  ter beatissimi, 
universalis papw  et jussione domini 
Raroli  perpeml  augusti  conglegan 
est  in  loco  qui vocatur  Pontignnis," 
&c. 
M.  a. H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  v01  ii. 
No.  196, Episcoporum  ad  Hlud.  Imp. 
Relatio : "  57.  Iterum monendo  mag- 
nitudini vestrs suppliciter suggerimus, 
uC  deinceps  in  bonis  pastor~bus,  rec- 
toribusque in ecclesiis Del constituendis 
magnum studium atque sollertissimam 
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manni,"  he very  clearly  reckons  the  consent  of  the  prince, 
the election  of  the clergy and people,  as the proper  ele- 
ments  in  an  appointment to  ecclesiastical  ru1e;l  and  in 
letter  to  Lewis  III., occasioned  by  some  dispute  about  the 
appointment  of  a  Bishop  of  Eeauvais, he again  admits very 
frankly that the consent  of  the prince is a  necessary part of 
the appointment to such an office.  This is the more noticeable, 
as the general purpose  of  the letter is to  condemn and correct 
what  Hincmar clearly thought was  an exaggerated  conception 
of  the royal  authority  with  regard  to  ecclesiastical  appoint- 
ments.  we  must  indeed  notice  how  emphatically  Nlncmar  - 
condemns the notion  that the appointment of  a  bishop was a 
matter in the arbitrary power  of  the prince, attributing this to 
the suggestion  of  the devil himself, and that he wholly denies 
that  the  prince  can  order  the  election  of  whomsoever  he 
pleases.  A bishop, Hincmar seems to  mean, should  be  elected 
by the other  bishops  of  the province, with  the consent of  the 
people and clergy of  the diocese, and when the prince has given 
his consent he is to be  taken to the metropolitan for consecra- 
ti~n.~  We do  not  enter  into  any  discussion  of  Hincmar's 
1 Hincmar of Rheims, De Institutione 
Carolomanni, 5 : "  Qualiter autem con- 
sensu  principis  terre, qui res  ecclesi- 
asticas  divino  juclicio  ad  tuendas  et 
defensandas suscepit, electione cleri  ac. 
plebia  quisque ad  ecclesiasticum  regi- 
men  absque  ulla  venalitate  provehi 
debeat,  et Dominus  in Evangelio,  et 
sacri  canones  aperte  demonstrant 
dicente Domino : '  Qui non  intrat per 
ostium  in  ovile  ovium,  sed  ascendit 
aliunde,  ille fur est et wtro."' 
a  Hincmar  of  Rheims,  Ep.  xix. : 
c.  i.  "  '  Ut sicut sacrre leges et  regulae 
precipiunt, archiepiscopis  et episcopis 
collimitanearum  clioeceseon  electionern 
concedere  dignen~ini,  ut undecunque, 
secundum formam regularem electionis, 
episcopi  talem  eligant,  qui et sancta 
Ecclesia  utilis,  et regno proficuus,  et 
vobis fidelia ac devotus co-operator ex- 
istat :  et consentientibus clero et plebe 
eum  vobis  adducant,  ub  secundum 
ministerium  vestrum  res  et  fscul- 
tates  Ecclesiae,  quas  ad defenrlendum 
et tuendum  vobis  Dominus  commen. 
davit, sus disposition1  committatls, et 
cum  consensu  ac letteris vestris eum 
ad  metropolitanum  episcopum  ac  CO- 
episcopos  ipsius  dioceseos  qui  eum 
ordinare  debent,  transmittatis,  et sic 
sine scandali macula ad sanctum sacer- 
dotium provehatur.'  . . . 
"c.  iii.  Nam  si quod  a  q~ibusdam 
dicitur,  ut audivi,  quando  petitam 
apud vos  electionem  conceditis,  illum 
debent  episcopi,  et  clerus,  ac  plebs 
eligere,  quem  vos  vultis,  et  quem 
jubetis  (qure  non  est  divinze  legis 
electio, sed humane  potestatis extorsl0)r 
si ita est, ut  dici a quibusdam audivi, 
ille  malignus  spiritus, qui per serpen- 
tem plimos  parentes  nostros  in para- 
diso  decepit  et inde  illos  ejecit,  Per 
tales  adulatores  in  aures vestras  hsC 
nbilat ; quid,  hoc  in  Scriptura  tarn 
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nosition with  regard  to the part of  the metropolitan  and  the 
ither bishops of  the province  in the election of  a  bishop: it is 
enough for us to observe that Hincmar clearly admits the place 
of  the  secular  ruler,  but  as clearly  also is anxious thab  this  -- 
should be  defined  and limited. 
A  position  very  similar to that of  Hinc~nar  is represented 
by the little treatise "  De Electionibus Episcoporum,"  written 
bv Florus Diaconus, a writer of  the ninth  century.  Here also 
it is candidly  admitted  that  in certain  kingdoms  the custoln 
pevailed  that a  bishop should be  consecrated  after the prince 
had  been  consulted, and Florus admits that this custom  tends 
to  peace  and tranquillity,  but he emphatically  denies  that it 
is necessary to a  proper  con~ecration.~  Florus maintains that 
veteris  quam  Novi  Testamenti  non 
continetur,  neque  in  catholicoium 
dictis, vel  sacris canonibus,  nec  etiam 
in legibus  a Christianis imperatoribus 
et regibus  promulgatis  hoc  scriptum 
vel decretum inveuitur,  sed talia dicta 
infernus evomuit.  Christus enim per 
apostolum loquens, talem jubet eligere : 
'qui  potens  sit exhortari  in  doctrina 
sacra et iis qui contradlcunt revincere.' 
Et si quis coutra hoc loquitur, iniquita- 
tem contra Dominum loquitur et inter 
blasphemes  a  Sancto  Spiritu  com- 
putatur.  Sic  enim  atavus  vester 
Carulus  et abavus  Ludovicus  impera- 
lores intellexerunt,  et ideo  in  primo 
libro  capitulorum  suorum promulgav- 
erunt scribentes.  '  Sacrorum,'  inqui- 
unt,  'cauonum  non  ignari,  ut in  Dei 
nomine  sancta  Ecclesia  suo  liberius 
potiatur honore, assensurn ordini eccles- 
iastic~  praebemus,  ut sc~licet  epi-cupi 
per electlonem cleri et  pupuli secundum 
etatuba  canonum,  de propria  dicecesi, 
remota  personarum  et munerum  ac- 
ceptione ob vitre meritum et sapientice 
donum  eligantur,  ut  exemplo  et 
verb0  aibi  subjectis  usquequaque 
Prodcsse  valeant.'  .  .  .  Et  sacri 
canones  dicunt,  'Primum  enim  illi 
(win  clerici  uniuscujusque  Ecclesie) 
'eprobandi  sunt,  ut  aliqui  de alienis 
Ecclesiii  merito  prreferantur.'  Eh 
item, 'Ut episcopi, judicio  metropolit- 
anorum  et  eorum  episcoporum  qui 
circumcirca  sunt,  provehantur  ad 
ecclesiasticam potestatem ; hi, videlicet 
qui plurimo  tempore  probantur  tam 
verbo fidei quam rects conversationia 
exemplo.'  Attendendum  est  igitur 
qualiter hoc imperiale capitulum sacris 
regulis  et  antiquorum  imperatorum 
legibus  congruat,  ostendens  quoniam, 
sicut  et  leges  et reguls  dicunt,  in 
electione episcopi assensio regis sit, non 
electio,  in  episcoporum  vero  exsecu- 
tione sit electio,  sicut et ordinatio." 
l Florus Diaconus,  De Electionibus 
Episcoporum  ir. : "  Quod vero  in qui- 
busdam  reguis  postea  consuetudo ob- 
tinuit, ut consultu principis  ordinatio 
fieret episcopalis, valet utique ad cum- 
ulum  fraternitatis, proptcr  pacem  et 
concordiam  mundane potestatis ; non 
tamen  ad  complendam  veritatem vel 
auctoritatem  sacrre  ordinationis,  clus 
nequaquam  regio  potentatu,  sed  solo 
Dei  nutu, et Ecclesis  fidelium  con- 
sensu,  cuique  conferri  potest.  . . . 
Unde graviter quilibet princepi delin- 
quit, si hoc  suo beneficio larglri posse 
existimat, quod sola divina gratia dis- 
pensat ; cum  ministerium  sus potes- 
tatis in hujusmodi negotium peragendo 
adjungere debeat, non prsferre.  . . . 
'L vn.  ..  &us omnia non ideo  dicimus, 270  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF NINTH  CENTURY.  [PART  m. 
the true requirements for a proper appointment are the election 
of  the clergy  and  the whole  people  of  the  diocese,  and con- 
secration by the lawful number of bishops ;  l  and he urges that 
for  nearly  four hundred  years from the Lime  of  the apostles 
no  consent  was  asked  from  the secular  power, and that even 
after the emperor was  Christian this liberty for the most part 
contin~~ed.~ 
The position  of  Hincmar and Florus is not  quite  identical. 
Hincrnar  looks  upon  the  consent  of  the  prince  as normally 
necessaxy  for  the  appointment  of  a  bishop ; Florus  considers 
this as a legitimate custom  of  some  kingdoms, but not as being 
a  universal custom,  and  still  less does  he  admit it to  be  of 
universal  obligation.  But they agree  in  admitting  that, as a 
matter of  fact, the secular  ruler  has a  considerable power with 
regard  to ecclesiastical  appointments, while  they are both con- 
cerned  to correct any exaggerated  conception  of  this. 
quasi potestatem  principum in  aliquo 
minuendam putemus, vel contra religi- 
osum morem regni aliquid  seutiendum 
persuadeamus ; sed  ut clarissime  de- 
moustretur,  in  re hujusmodi  divinam 
gratiam sufficere. humanam vero poten- 
tiam  nisi  illi  consonet,  nihil  valere. 
Quapropter in sacris canonibus Patrum, 
ubi  plurimre  cause  conlmemorantur 
sine quibus episcopalis ordinatio irrita 
habenda est, de hac re nihil invenitur 
insertum." 
l  Id.,  i. : "  Manifestum  est  om- 
nibus qui in Ecclesia  Dei  sacerdotale 
officium  administrant,  qus sunt  illa 
qus  in  ordinatione  episcopali,  et 
sacrorum  canonorum  auctoritas,  et 
consuetudo  ecclesiastics,  juxta  dis- 
positionem divinre legis et traditionem 
apostolicam jubeat  obxervari.  Videli- 
cet  ut  pastore  defuncto,  et  sede 
vacante,  unus de clero Ecclesis, querr; 
communis et concors  ejusdem cleri  et 
totius  plebis  consenrus  elegerit,  et 
public0  decreto  celebriter  ac  solem- 
niter  designaverit,  legitimo  episco- 
porum  numero  consecratus,  locum 
decedentis  antistitis  rite  valeat  ob- 
tinere ; nec  dubitetur  divino  judicio 
eb  dispositione  firmatum,  quod  ab 
Ecclesia  Dei  tam  sancto  ordiue 
et legitima  observatione  fuerit  cele- 
braturn." 
Id., iii. : "  Juxta  hrec  verba  beati 
Cypriani,  ordinatos  fuisse  constat, 
et legitime prrefuisse  universo  populo 
deinceps omnes  Ecclesiarum  Dei anti- 
stites,  absque  ullo consultu  mundens 
potestatis,  a  temporibus  apostolol.~~, 
et  postea  per  annos  fere  quadrin- 
gentos.  Ex  quo  autem  Christiani 
principes  esse  coeperunt,  eamdem 
episcoporum  ordinationibus  ecclesi- 
asticam  libertatem  ex  parte  maxima 
permansisse, manifesta  ratio  declarat. 
Neque  enim  fieri  potuit,  cum  unus 
Imperator  orbis  terr~  monarchism 
obtineret,  ut  ex  omnibus  latissimia 
mundi partibus, Asire videlicet, Europs 
ec  Africre, ornnes  qui ordinaudi erant 
Episcopi  ad  ejus  cognitionem  de- 
ducerentur.  Sed fuit  semper integra 
et  rata  ordinatio,  quam  sancta 
Ecclesia  juxts,  traditionem  apostol- 
icam et  religiosze observationis formam 
celebravit." 
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It  is  perhaps  necessary  to say  a  word  about  the theory 
of the relation of  the emperor to the papal elections.  We may 
begin  by  observing  that  Florus  Diaconus  assumes  that  the 
consent of  the  civil  power  is  never  asked  for  in  this ca8e.l 
lvhether  such  a  statement  can  be  taken  as  accurately  rep- 
resenting  the relations  of  the emperor to  the papal  elections 
in the  ninth  century  is  doubtful.  The "  Pactum  Hludowici 
pii  cum  Paschali  Pontifice"  of  S17 does,  indeed, agree  with 
this  in its careful provision  that no  one  is to  interfere  with 
the election  of  a  Pope, but that it is to  be  left in the hands 
of  the Romans, and  that they are freely to elect him  whom 
the divine inspiration  and the intercession of  St Peter suggest. 
Only  after  the consecration  is  an  ambassador  to  be  sent to 
1,ewis  or  his  successor  to  arrange  for  the  continuance  of 
friendship  and  peace  between  the  Emperor  and  the  Pope.2 
The  terms  of  Lothair's  "  Constitntio Romana"  of  824  are so 
far in agreement with  this.  It  reiterates the provision  of  the 
Pactum,  that  no  one  is  to  take  part  in  the  election  of  a 
Pope  except  the Romans  them~elves.~  There  is in existence, 
Id. vi. :  'l Sed et  in Romana Ecclesia 
usque in prasentem diem cernimus abs- 
que  interrogntione  Principis  solo  dis- 
positionis judicio et fidelium suffragio, 
legitime pontifices consecrari ;  qui  etiam 
omnium regionum et  civitatum que  illi 
subject= sunt, juxta antiqiium morem, 
eadem  libertate  ordinant  atque  con- 
stituunt  sacerdotes ; nec  adeo  quis- 
quam  absurdus  est,  ut  putet  min- 
orem illic sanctificationis divinam esse 
gratiam,  eo  quod  nulla  muudanre 
potestatis  comitetur auctoritas." 
M. G. H. Leg., sect. ii. vo1.i. NO.  172: 
"Et  quando  divina  vocationc  hujub 
sacratissinla  sedis  pontifex  de  hoc 
mundo  migraverit,  nullus  ex  reguo 
nostro,  aut Francus aut Longobardus 
aut de qualibet gente homo sub nostra 
Potestate constitutus, licentiam habeat 
cOntraRomauos, aut  publice aut  private 
veniendi vel  electionem  faciendi ;  nul- 
lusque in civitatibus vel  territoriia ad 
ecclesiz beati Petri npostoli potestatem 
l'ertinentibus  aliquod  malum  propter 
hoc  facere  presumat.  Sed  liceat 
ltomanis  cum  omni  veneratione  et 
sine  qualibet  perturbatione  honorifi- 
cam  suo pontifici  exibere  sepulturam, 
et eum  quem  divina  iiispiratione  eb 
beati Petri intercessione omnes Romani 
uno consilio atque concordia sine aliqua 
promissione ad pontificatus ordinem ele- 
gerint  sine  qualibet  ambiguitate  vel 
contradictione  more  canonic0  con- 
secrari.  Et dum  consecratus  fuerit, 
legati ad nos vel ad successores nostros 
reges  Francorum dirigantur, qui inter 
nos et illos  amicitiam et caritatem ac 
pacem  socient,  sicut  temporibus  pie 
recordationis  domni  Karoli  attavi 
nostri,  seu  domni  Pipini  avi  nostri 
vel  etiam  domni  Karoli  imperatoris 
genitoris  nostri  consuetudo  erab 
faciendi." 
%.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
So. 161 : "  3.  Volumus  ut in electione 
I~ontificis nullus  przsumat  venire, 
ueque liber neque servus, qui aliquod 
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however, a form  of  oath, supposed  to be  of  this time, required 
of all those who were  to take part in the papal  election: this 
not only makes  the  electors  swear  allegiance  and  fidelity to 
the  emperor,  but  also  includes  a  provision  that  he who  is 
elected  is  not  to  be  consecrated  until he has taken  such an 
oath in the presence  of  the "missus"  of  the  emperor  as that, 
taken by Pope Engenius.  From a passage in Einhard's Annals 
for 827,  it would  appear that on the death of Valentinus, his 
successor,  Gregory IV., was  elected,  but not  consecrated until 
the  ambassador  of  the emperor  had come  and examined  into 
the character  of  the election?  It must, however,  be  noticed 
that these documents, and especially the "  Pactum," while they 
are  probably  genuine  in  substance,  are  probably  not  all 
authentic in detail. 
Our  examination  of  these  matters  will,  we  think,  have 
served  to bring  out sufficiently clearly the fact that, whatever 
might  be  the theory of  the division  of  functions between  the 
secular  and  the  spiritual  powers,  the  secular  power  did  in 
practice certainly tend to exercise a very considerable authority 
even  in the strictly spiritual  sphere.  We  may  say  that the 
foundation of  the whole situation, as far as theory is concerned, 
lies in this, that it is the duty of  the civil ruler to care for the 
Romanis,  quibus  antiquitus fuit con- 
suetudo  concessa  per  constitutionem 
sanctorum patrum eligendi pontificem. 
&nod  si  quis  contra  hanc  jussionem 
nostram  facere  praesumpserit,  exilio 
tradatur. " 
l M.  G.  H.  Leg., sect. ii. vol. i. No. 
161.  Forrn  of  oath  to the emperor 
to be taken by electors  to the Papacy, 
which  seems to belong to the time of 
Pope Eugenius : "  Promitto ego ille per 
Deum omnipotentem et per ista sacra 
quattuor evangelia  et per hanc crucem 
domini nostri Jesu Christi et  per corpus 
beatissimi Petri principis apostolorum, 
quod ab hac die in futurum fidelis  ero 
dominia  nostris  ~mperatoribus  Hludo- 
wico  et  Hlothario  diebus vitz me=, 
juxta vires  et intellectum  meum, sine 
fraude atque malo  ingenio, salva fide 
quam repromisi domino apostolico ;  et 
quod  non  consentiam  ut ahter in hac 
sede Romana  fiat electio pontificls nisi 
canonice  et juste,  secundum  vires  et 
intellectum meum ;  eb  ille  qui electus 
fuerit  me  consentiente  consecratus 
pontifex  non  fiat,  priusquam  tale 
sacramentum faciat in przsentia 
domini  imperatorls  et  populi,  cum 
juramento,  quale  dominus  Eugelllus 
papa, sponte pro conservatione omnium 
factum habet per scripturn." 
The editor  cites,  to illustrate this, 
from Einhard's  Annals  for  827 : "2. 
. . . quo  defunct0  (i.e.,  Pope Valen- 
tinus) Gregorius  (IV.) electus, sed non 
prius  ordinatus est quam legatus im- 
peratoris  Romam  venit  et electlonem 
populi  qualis esset  examinavit." 
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wellbeing  of  the  Church, and  to interfere when  he  sees  that 
the  Church  is,  for any  reason,  being  badly  administered  or 
falling  into  corruption.  We  can  see  how  this  conception 
gives rise  to the theory that it is the king's  duty to 
see  to  the  regular  meeting  of  synods,  and  thus gives  him 
necessarily a  share in  the legislative, as well  as the adminis- 
trative, control of the Church.  It is easy also to see how this 
conception  of  the  responsibility  lying  upon  the  king  to  see 
that justice  and righteousness  prevailed  in the Church as well 
as  elsewhere,  might  lead  to  a  considerable  ambiguity  in  his 
relation  to the discipline of  the Church.  The relations of  the 
empire  to the Papacy  in the  cases  of  Leo  111. and  Leo  IV. 
are but the final  examples  of  a  tendency to look  to the civil 
power  to set things  right  in the Church, when  there was no 
one  else who  could  act.  And, finally, the tendency to subject 
ecclesiastical appointments  to some control on  the part of  the 
civil  ruler,  while it has many  other  political  and social  rela- 
tions, may also  be regarded in part at least as illustrating the 
same conception, that the secular power  has its own responsi- 
bility  for  the  good  order  of  the  Church,  and  has  therefore 
necessarily  something  to  say with  regard  to  the  persons  to 
whoin  the government  of  the Church is to be  intrusted. 
We have  said  enough, we  think,  to make it  clear  that in 
the  ninth  century the theory of  a  strict duality of  authority 
in society does  not  prevent  the civil power  from  acting very 
frequently  in the sphere  of  the ecclesiastical,  and  that this 
intervention  is  not  only  tolerated  in  practice,  but  is  to  a 
considerable  extent justified  in theory. 
We must  now  consider  the other  side  of  the subject,  the 
extent to which the ecclesiastical authority intervened in civil 
affairs, and  the character and conditions of  this interference. 
We may  begin  by  observing  that if  the  king  or emperor  is 
by  some  writers  styled  the  Vicar  of  God,  the same  title  is 
also  claimed  for  the  bishops.'  Hrabanus  Maurus  calls  the 
priests  or  bishops  the  vicars  of  the  prince  of  shepherds  in 
51.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii.  83 :  'L  Nos autem L)ei judicio aui ab  illo 
No. 293, Concilium Meldense Pal isieuse,  vicarii constituti,"  &C. 
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the Church of  God, and wa1.w  them to be determined against 
the proud  and  contumacious,  to  be  careful  that  no  earthly 
power  terrifies  them  in  their  rnle  of  souls,  and  no  worldly 
blandishments soften their rig0ur.l 
What is more important than this title of  Vicar of  God, it is 
certain  that the people  of  the ninth century  were  perfectly 
clear  that the  ecclesiastic  is  bound  to  correct  and  reprove 
persons  of  every  rank and degree,-to  use  against  them, if 
necessary, the severest penalties of  the Church.  A very strong 
phrase is used  by  a  synod held  in 859, which  expresses this 
very  directly  and  forcibly:  the  bishops  are  exhorted  to  be 
united  in their ministry and holy  authority, and with mutual 
counsel and help to rule over and correct  klngs and the great 
ones of  the earth, and the whole  people committed  to them in 
the Lord.2  The same view is very strongly expressed by many 
writers.  Alcuin exhorts the priest to declare the Word of  God, 
and the prince to obey.3  Jonas of  Orleans quotes that passage 
from  the history of  Rufinus,  discussed  in an earlier  chapter, 
in  which Constantine  is represented as sajing to the bishops 
bhat  God  has  made  them  the judges  of  all,  and  that  they 
cannot be  judged by any.&  The same passage  is quoted by tile 
bishops  in that address to Lewis  the Pions  which  we  have 
already  frequently  cited.5  There  is,  therefore,  nothing  that 
we should  regard as new,  when  we find  tile  pseudo-Isidorian 
Decretals  using  very strong  language about the subjection of 
l  M.  G.  H.  Ep.,  v.,  Epistolarum 
Fuldensium  Fragments,  20,  C.  iv. : 
"  Rabanus inquit :  Quomodo in Chrlsti 
sacerdotibus discreta debet ease pietas 
erga condigne pcenitentes, ita debet et 
foi tis  ease  constantia contra  superbos 
atque  contumaces.  Nec  debet  ulla 
terrena  potestas  terrere  rectorem 
animarum  nec  mollire  secularibus 
blandimentis  rigorem  Christi pontifi- 
cum, qui vicarii  principis pastorum in 
ecclesia  Dei  esse  videntur.  . . .  In 
Epistola  ad  Humbertum episcopum." 
2  M.  G. H.  Leg.,  secb.  li.  vol.  ii. 
No.  299,  Synodus  apud  Saponarias 
habita, 2 :  "Eplecopi namque secundum 
lllolum niinisterium ac sacram auctori 
tatem uniti sint et mutuo consilio atque 
auxilio  reges  regnorumque  primores, 
atque  populum  sibi  commissum  in 
Domino regant  et corrigant." 
M.  G.  H.  Ep.,  iv.,  Alcuin,  EP. 
18: "Illorum  est, id  est, sacerdotun1, 
verba  Dei  non  tacere.  Vestrum  est, 
o  principes,  humiliter  obcedire,  dili- 
genter implere."  Cf.  Ep.  108 : ''Et 
sis  obediens  servis  Dei,  qui  te  de 
mandatis  ejus ammoneant." 
Jonas  of  Orleans,  "  De  Instit., 
Laic.,"  ii.  20.  See p.  177. 
%.  G. H.  Leg.,  sect  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  196,  Episcop.  ad  Hlud.  Imp. 
Relatio,  22. 
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princes  to  bishops.  In his  39th  Decretal  letter  Clement  is 
represented as saying that all princes  of  the earth are to obey 
the bishops,  to submit to them and help them, and that those 
oppose  them,  unless  they  repent,  are  to be  put ouh  of 
the  Church? 
The  political  theory of  the ninth century, then, very clearly 
that there is an authority in the Church which ex- 
tends over all persons, even the most exalted in society.  It will 
be useful to consider more closely the relation of  the civil order 
and the civil rulers to the law and discipline  of  the Church. 
We  have  already  examined  the  treatment  i11  Hincmar's 
work,  'De Ordine Palatii,'  of  the relation of  the king to the 
law  of  the State; we  have seen  that  Hincmar  expresses the 
general  view  of  the  ninth  century  when  he  maintains  that 
these laws are binding upon  the king.2  Hincmar  goes  on  to 
say  that much  more  must;  the  king  obey  the  divine  laws.$ 
There is a system  of  divine  law in the Church  to  which  all 
men  owe their obedience.  We do  not  wish  to  enter into so 
complicated  a  subject as that of  the gradual formation of  the 
body of  Church  law:  to do  so  would  take  us  very far  away 
from our  proper  topic.  It  will  here  suffice  if  we  point  out 
that  by  the ninth  century there  were  in existence  and  cir- 
culation  in Western Europe  collections of  Church regulations 
on doctrine  and  discipline, and these  regulations  were  looked 
upon as having  in some  sense  a  divine authority.  There are 
some  words  in  Hincmar's  treatise  'Pro Ecclesiz  Libertatum 
Defensione'  which  may  very well  be  taken  as representative 
of the attitude of  the ninth  century towards these  laws.  This 
1s  the treatise  written  by Hincmar in the early stages of  the 
quarrel  between  Charles  the  Bald  and  Hincmar's  nephew, 
Hincmar, Bishop of  Laon.  Hincmar at  first sided  wholly  with 
Pseudo .  Isidore,  Clement,  Dec 
xxxix. :  "  Omnes  principes  terrse  et 
cunctos homines eis obsedire et capita 
submittere  eorumque  adjutores 
existere prscipiebat.  . . .  Omnes ergo 
qui  eis  contrxdicent,  ita  damnatos 
et  infames  usque  ad  satisfactionem 
monstrabat, et nisi  converterentur  a 
liminibus  ecclesire  alienos  esse  prse- 
cipiebat." 
See p.  233. 
M.  G. H.  Leg , sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
Hincmar  of  Rheims,  De  Ordine  Pal- 
atii, 9 : "  Multo minus  autem  regi, vel 
cuilibet inquocunqueordine ccntra leges 
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his nephew, and wrote this treatise to protest against the royal 
action, which  at first he looked  upon  as an outrageous  inter- 
ference with ecclesiastical prerogative.  A vassal of  the Bishop 
of  Laon  had  complained  to  Charles  of  his  treatment  by  the 
bishop, and Charles  had  summoned  the bishop  to  appear and 
to answer before his  courts.  When he did not appear, Charles 
put his property under the ban.  Hincmar of  Rheims  protests 
against such action as being wholly improper and even scandal- 
ous, and quite contrary to the canons and the laws.  He quotes 
St Leo  as saying that the canons  were  enacted  by the Spirit 
of  God,  and confirmed  by  the  reverence  of  the whole  world, 
and  were  established  by  men  who  now  reign  with  God  in 
heaven  and still work  miracles  on  the earth.l 
We think  that these words  are highly characteristic  of  the 
general attitude of  men  in the ninth century towards Church 
law.  No  one, we think, doubted  that in some sense all men of 
all ranks were bound to obey it.  Earlier in the century  Ago- 
bard  of  Lyons had used  phrases  similar to those  of  Hincmar. 
Agobard is writing of  the proceedings of the bishops at Attigny 
and CompiBgne, and represents himself  as making  a  speech in 
which  he discussed  the nature and authority of  the canons of 
the  Church.  In former  times, he said, the holy  bishops  had 
come  together  and decreed that the canons must be  preserved 
inviolate, inasmuch as they had been confirmed by the Spirit of 
God, the consent  of  the whole  world, the obedience of  princes, 
the  agreement  of  Scripture, and that  from  that time  it had 
been an accepted  doctrine that any action  against the canons 
was an action against  God  Himself, and against His universal 
Church,  and that they  could  not  be  violated  without  danger 
to  religi~n.~  A  little  earlier  in date  still  we  find  a  letter 
Hincmar of  Rheims, Pro Eccl. Lib. 
Defen., i. :  "Et quis oculum simplicem, 
id  est,  rectam  intentionem,  quam  in 
vobis  nescit,  putalit :  ubi  factum 
Domino contrarium, et inimicum sacris 
aanonibus,  sicut  beatus  Leo  scribit, 
'Spiritu  Dei conditis et totius mundi 
reverentia  consecratis,  quorum  con- 
ditores  in  cm10  cum  Deo  regnantes, 
et  in  terris  miraculis  coruacantes, 
adhuc  nobiacum  in  constitutionibus 
vivant' : sed  et legilus,  quibus  una 
cum  eisdem  sacris  canonibus  moder- 
atur Eccleaia,  constat adversum ? " 
M. G. H. Ep.,  v. ;  Agobard, EP., V. 
C.  4 :  "  Convenerunt episcopi, viri sancti, 
quibus tunc habundabat ecclesia, statu- 
erunt inlibatos conservari debere sacros 
canones,  qui firmati sunt spiritu Dei, 
consensu  totius  mundi,  obcedientie 
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by  Siegwald,  Bishop of  Aquileia, mutilated  unfortunately  and 
ol~ly  partly comprehensible, in which  we  have a  very emphatic 
exhortation  to  Charles  the Great on the duty of  obeying the 
canons.  In spite  of  the  fragmentary  state in  which  it has 
come  to  us,  we  can  make  out  fairly  clearly  the  emphatic 
terms in which  Charles  is admonished  to observe and enforce 
obedience to the canons? 
There  is, then, a  body of  law in the Church which  all men 
must  obey and to which  all  other  laws  must conform  them- 
selves.  Hincmar considers the question  of  a  possible  collision 
between the national  system of  law and the divine law, and is 
perfectly  clear  that in such a  case  the human  laws must  be 
altered and made conformable to the divine ;2 and in another 
treatise  written  by  Hincmar  we  have  an exposition  of  the 
superiority of  the divine law, and men  are reminded that they 
may  now  justify  themselves  in their  actions by  appealing  to 
human  laws and customs, but in the day of  judgment they will 
have  to answer,  not to the Roman,  or  Salic, or  Gundobadian 
laws,  but  to  the divine  and apostolic  laws.  Hincnlar  urges 
that  in a  Christian  kingdom  even  the public laws should  be  - 
in accordance  with the principles  of  Chri~tianity.~ 
principum,  consonantia  scripturarum. 
Ex quo tempore acceptum et receptum 
est non  aliud  esse  agere  cuiquam  ad- 
versus  canones  quam adversus Deum, 
et adversus ejus universalem ecclesiam, 
neque  sensum  est umquam  a  quibus- 
que  fidelibus,  ut talia  statuta absque 
periculo religionis violarentur." 
M.  G. H.  Ep.,  iv.;  Ep. var.  Carolo 
Magno Regnante, 8 : "  Vestra est . . . 
[8~]rorum  canonum  inviolabiles sanc- 
tiones salubriter promulgatas nullo quo- 
libet usurpationis ti[tulo] . . .  mutilare, 
dicente  scriptura : Terminos  patrum 
tuorum  ne  transgredieris  presertim 
Gum  sere  . . . vestre  mansuetudo 
decrevit  omnium ecclesiarum prasules 
diviuis  legibus  subjacere  et pri  . . . 
Secum  . . . [irreplrehensihilia  docu- 
menta sancto dilucidante Spiritu prs- 
libata modis omnibus custodire." 
M. a.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
De Ordine Palatii, 21 : "Si  quid vero 
tale  esset,  quod  leges  mundsn~  hoc 
in  suis  diffinitionibua  statutum  non 
haberent aut secundum gentilium con- 
suetudinem  crudelius  sancitum  esset, 
quam  Christianitatis  rectitudo  vel 
sancta  auctoritas  merito  non  con- 
sentiret,  hoc  ad  regis  moderationem 
perduceretur,  ut ipse  cum  his,  qui 
utramque legem nossent et Dei magis 
quam humanarum legum statuta  metu- 
erent, ita decerneret, ita statueret, ut, 
ubi utrumque servari posset, utrumque 
servaretur, sin autem, lex ssculi merito 
comprimeretur, justitia Dei conservar- 
etur." 
Hiucmar  of  Rheims,  De  Raptu 
Viduarum, etc., c. xii.:  "Defendant  se 
quantum  volunt  qui hujusmodi  sunt, 
sive  per leges, si ulle sunt, mundanay, 
sive per consuetudines humanas, tamen 
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There  is again, therefore, nothing new in  the strong phrases 
in  which  the  Pseudo - Isidorian  Decretals  express  the  pin. 
ciple  that  no  emperor  or  other  potentate  may  do  anything 
contrary to the divine commands:  if  the judges,  at the kingJs 
desire,  should  command  anything  unjust  or  contrary  to  the 
evangelical, or prophetic, or apostolic doctrines, such commands 
have no auth0rity.l 
The  secular ruler,  then,  must,  like  other  persons, obey the 
divine law, and  if  he refuses  to  do  this he  is  subject to the 
discipline of  the  Church.  It is indeed  clear  that there were 
some  in  the  ninth  century who  doubted  or  denied  that the 
authority of  the  Church  extended  so  far as  to  the  excom- 
munication  of  the  king  or  emperor.  From  that  section  of 
Rincmar's  treatise  on  the  divorce  of  Lothair  and  Tetburga, 
to which we have  so often  referred, it is  clear that there were 
some who  denied  that  the  king  was  liable  to  the judgment 
of  the bishops  of  his own  dominions, or  to that of  any other 
bishops.  Some wise  men,  says  Hincmar, maintained  that the 
king  is  subject  to  no  laws  or  judgments  but  those  of  God 
alone,  who  made  him  king ; and  that, as he  should  not  be 
excommunicated  by  his  own  bishops,  whatever  he  may  do, 
so  he cannot  be  judged  by  other  bishops.  Hincmar,  indeed, 
makes  short work  of  this  contention,  describing  it concisely 
as blasphemous  and  full  of  the  spirit  of  the  devil, and  then 
shows by a series of  examples, drawn  from the Old Testament 
and Church history, that kings were  reproved  by the prophets 
and separated  from  the Church  by bishops ;  2  and  at the  end 
judicii  nec  Romanis,  nec  Salicis,  nec 
Gundobadis,  sed divinis et zpostolicis 
legibus  judicandos.  Quanquam  in 
regno  Christian0  etiam  ipsas  leges 
publicas  oporteat  esse  Christianas, 
convenientes  videlicet  et  consonantes 
Christianitati." 
l  Pseudo-Isidore,  Marcellinus,  Dec. 
iv. : "Non  licet  ergo  imperatori  vel 
cuiquam  pietatem  custodlenti  aliquid 
contra mandata  divina prssumere nec 
quicquam  quod  evangelicis  propheti- 
cisque  et apostolicis  regulis  obviatur 
agere.  Injusturn  enim  juditium  et 
definitio  injusta regis metu vel  jussu 
a  judicibus  ordinata  non  vaieat,  nec 
quicquam  quod contra  evangelice  vel 
prophetics  aub  apostolics  doctrins 
constitutionem  successorurn  patrum 
actum fuerit, stabit.  E6 quod ab in- 
fidelibus  aub  hereticis  factum  fuerit 
omnino cassabitur." 
Eilncmar of  Rheims, De Div. Loth. 
et Tetb.  Qucestio 6.  "Dicunt quoque 
etiam aliqui sapientes, quia  iste prin- 
ceps  rex est, et nullorum  legibus  ve! 
judiciis  subjacet  nisi  solius  Dei,  ?U! 
eum  in  regno,  quod  suus  pater  111' 
dimisit,  regem constituib, et si voluerib 
pro hac vel alia causa ibit ad placiturn, 
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of this section  of  the treatise  he  lays it  down that the synods 
the Church know no respect of  persons.1 
Hincmar's  judgment  is  clear,  and  we do  not  doubt  that  .  - 
all ecclesiastics in the ninth century would  have 
with him.  That  the Popes  may  have  been  unwilling  to  go 
the  length  of  directly  and  explictly  excommunicating  the 
emperors  of  the  fifth and  sixth  centuries,  we  have  seen  in 
former chapters.  But in their relations  to the Frankish rulers 
the  Popes  were  not  so restrained.  As  early as  770  we  find 
Stephen 111. threatening to excommunicate Charles and Carlo- 
man if  they neglected his  injunctions against a  marriage  with 
the daughter of  the Lombard king Desiderius ;  and in regard 
to  this  very  question  on  which  Hincmar  writes  we  find  that 
Pope  Nicholas  threatened  at last  to  excommunicate  Lothair 
unless  he  would  take back  Tetburga." 
vel  ad  synodum, et si noluerit, libere 
et licenter  dimittet :  et sicut  a  suis 
episcopis,  quidquid  egerit,  non  debet 
ercommunicari,  ita  ab  aliis  episcopis 
uon  potest  judicari,  quoniam  solius 
Dei principatui  debet  subjici,  a  quo 
solo  potuit  in  principatu  constitui ; 
et quod facit, et qualis est in regimine, 
divino  sit  nutu,  sicut  scriptum  est : 
'Cor  regis  in  manu  Dei,  quocunque 
voluerit  vertet illud."' 
Responsio.  "  Hzc  vox  non  est 
catholici  Christiani, sed nimium  blas- 
phemi,  et  spiritu  diabolic0  pleni." 
He  cites David's  reproof  by  Nathan, 
Saul's  by Samuel,  Rehoboam's  by the 
prophet, and proceeds :  'l Quando pec- 
mverunh reges, et filii Israel, et traditi 
sunt in manus gentium, sicut Manasses 
et  Sedcchias,  vel  timuerunt  a  facie 
Domini  sicut Ezechias,  per  prophetas 
vel  iram  a  Domino  susceperunt,  vel 
misericordiam  meruerunt.  Et  in 
Deuteronomio  scripturn  est  (Deut. 
Xvii.  8 - 13).  Per  sacerdotes  enirn 
dicit  Dominus  (PS.  ii.  10-12).  Et 
aPostolica auctoritas commonet,  ut et 
reges  etiam  obediant  prepositis  suis 
in  Domino,  qui pro  animabus eorum 
invigilan&  ut non  cum  tristitia  hoc 
faciant.  Eb  beatus  Gelasius  papa  ad 
Anastasium imperatorem scribit :  '  Quia 
due  sunb persons?, quibus prlnc~paliter 
hic regitur mundus, scilicet pontificalis 
auctoritas,  et regia dignitas,  et tanto 
majus  est  pondus  pontificum  quanto 
de ipsis etiam regibus  reddituri  sunt 
Domino  rationem.'  Ambrosius  Theo- 
dosium imperatorem  ab ecclesia culpis 
exigentibus  segregavit  et per  poeni- 
tentiam revocavit." 
1 Hincmar of  Rheims, De Div. Loth. 
eb Tetb.  Qumst. 6, Responsio. "  De eo 
quod  dicitur,  Quia  Rex,  si nolueriti 
venire ad synodum, libere etiam com- 
pellatus  dimittet : sancta  Scriptura, 
sacrique canones monstrant,  in judicio 
personam  non  debere  acoipere,  sed 
causae qualitatem discernere." 
2 M.  G.  H. Ep., iii.  Codex Carolinus, 
45 :  "Et si qui, quod  non  optamus, 
contra hujusmodi nostre adjurationis 
atque exhortationis seriem  agere  prac- 
sumserit,  sciat  se  auctoritate domini 
mei, beati Petri apo~tolorum  principis, 
anathematis  vinculo  ease  innodatum 
et s regno  Dei  alienum  ahue cum 
diabolo  et cjus atrocissimis pompis et 
ceteris impiis sternis incendiis  coucre- 
mandum deputatum." 
3 M.  G.  H.  Scriptorum, vol.  i.  Ann. 
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It must at the  same  time  be  noticed  that we  may  find a 
partial  explanation  of  the  existence  of  such  views  as those 
which Hincmar condemns, in the tone of  some  letters of  Pope 
Leo IV. in reference to a threat of  Hincmar  to excommunicate 
the Emperor Lothair.  He complains of  the pride of  Hincn~a~, 
which  had  led  him  to  threaten  with  excom~nunication  the 
emperor  whom  Pope  Paschal  had  consecrated  with  the  oil 
of  benediction,  thus violating  every  divine  and  earthly law.1 
Leo IV.'s  phrases  are no  doubt  related  to such a  question  as 
whether it was competent for any one except  the Pope himself 
to excommunicate  kings and emperors, and must  not  be con- 
strued  as  meaning  that  Leo  would  not  have  claimed  that; 
authority  for  himself:  they  belong  to  the  question  of  the 
reIation of  the authority of  bishops  and metropolitans  to that 
of  the Pope.  But it is easy to see  that such  phrases  might 
tend to encourage the judgment that within his own  dominion 
the  ruler  was  not  amenable  to  the jurisdiction  of  Church 
courts.  There  were  clearly  certain  ambiguities  and  uncer- 
tainties  in  regard  to  the  relation  of  the  discipline  of  the 
Church to the monarch  in  the ninth  century; but no doubt, 
also, the Church was very clear that it had  spiritual  authority 
over even the highest in station. 
No  doubt  these  claims,  that  the  church  should  exercise 
jurisdiction  even  over  the most  exalted  persons  in the State, 
l M. G. H.  Ep., v.  Ep. Select. Pont. 
Rom.  Leo  IV.,  36 :  "Ita  ut,  quem 
imperatorem  princeps  sacerdotum  et 
primus sancte  recordationis predecessor 
noster dominus Pascalis papa oleo bene- 
dictionis  unctum  consecraverat  more 
predecessorum apostolicorum, una cum 
fratre Carolo rege et uxoribus ac filiis, 
anathemate  injurasset,  nostrum  et 
ejusdem  magni  imperatoris  minis- 
terium  parvipendens  et transgressus 
divinas  pariter  et humanas  constitu- 
tiones." 
Leo IV.,  37 : "  Nec illum etiam can- 
onice possumus collaudare, quod super- 
stite przsule sedem  ejus invasit,  qui 
etiam, cum debuerat de jactura honoris 
proprii valde esse perterritus, in unctum 
Domini,  quem  sedis  apostolica  bene- 
dictionis  oleo  publice  consecravit 
sibique  proprium  fecit  heredem, 
anathematis  jaculum  contra  omnem, 
non  solum  dlvlnam, immo mundanam 
institutionem inferre presumpsit. 
"Item.  Unum  pro  culpe  sus 
mzlicia  censura  sedis  apostolics  com- 
muniter  mandamus, ut neque  de  sua 
unquam  prssumptione  valeat gloriari, 
oeque  contra  vos,  quem  Deus  sibi 
principem  et imperatorem  elegit,  et 
per manus summi et apostolici pontif- 
icis  sanctificatum benedictionis  oleum 
super vestrum  caput effidit, clam vel 
publice  audeat  aliquam  quocumq*e 
tempore  anathematis vel  aliam  injune 
inferre jacturam." 
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,re  to be  interpreted  as  referring  to spiritual matters.  But 
it  was  not  easy  to  draw  a  clear  line  between  things  which 
were to be reqarded  as spiritual and  those  which  belonged  to 
the  secular  sphere.  We  have  already  noticed  that  Jonas 
of  Orleans,  in commenting on the twelfth  letter  of  Gelasius, 
urges that as the priests  will  have to render  account to  God 
for  kings  as  well  as  for  private  persons,  it  is  their  duty 
carefully  to  admonish  them  lest  they  depart  from  the will 
of  God, or from  the proper discharge  of  the office  which  was 
committed  to  them.l  The  ecclesiastical  order  was  in 
some  measure  responsible  for  the  just  administration  of 
the State, just as we have  seen that the king was responsible 
for the  good  order  of  the  Church.  It is interesting  to see 
that  this  principle  finds  expression  in  some  of  the  formal 
documents of  these times.  In  the "  Pr~ceptio  " of  Chlothar II., 
of about the end of  the sixth century or the beginning of  the 
seventh, we find it provided, that if  any judge should condemn 
a  man  unjustly in the  absence  of  the king, the bishop  is  to 
reprove him.2  Again, in the documents concerning the election 
of  Guido in 889 we find  a  provision  that  the  common  people 
are  to  have  their  own  laws,  and  are  not  to  be  burdened 
further than the laws allow: the count is to see  to  this, but 
if  he  neglect  his  duty,  or  allow  injustice to be  done,  he is 
to be  excommunicated  by the bishop  of  the place  till he has 
rendered  sati~faction.~  Again,  therefore,  we  find  nothing 
strictly new in the emphatic  assertion  of  the Pseudo-Isidorian 
'  Jonas of  Orleans, De Instit. Reg., 
cap. i. :  'L  Ergo quia tants auctoritatis, 
imo  tanti discriminis  est ministerium 
sacerdotum,  ut de ipsis etiam  regibus 
Deo  aint  rationem  reddituri,  oportet 
et  valde  necesse  est,  ut  de  vestra 
salute  semper  simus  solliciti,  vosque 
ne  a  voluntate  Dei,  quod  absit,  aut 
a  ministerio  quod  vobis  commisit, 
emetis, vigllanter  admoueamus." 
M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  i. 
No.  8,  Chlotarii  11.  Prmceptio,  6 : 
" Si  judex  aliquem  contra  legem  iu- 
juste  damnaverit,  in  nostri  absentia 
ab episcopo castigetur, ut quod perpere 
judicavit  versatim  meliua  discussione 
habeta  emendare procuret." 
M.  G.  H.  Leg, sect.  ii. vol.  ii. 
No.  222,  L' Widonis  Capitulatio  Elec- 
tionis,"  5 : "  Plebei homines et  universi 
ecclesie filii libere suia utantur legibus ; 
ex  parte publica  ultra,  quam  legibua 
sancitum  est, ab eis non  exigatur, nec 
violenter  opprimautur ;  quodbi factum 
fuerit, legaliter per comitem ipsius loci 
emendetur, si suo voluerit deinceps pot- 
iri honore;  si vero ipse neglexerit vel 
fecerit aut facienti assensum prebuerit, 
a loci episcopo usque dignam satisfactio- 
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Decretals,  that  any  one  who  is  oppressed  should  freely  be 
allowed to appeal to the priest? 
The  intervention  of  the bishops  for  the lrrotection  of  the 
oppressed  has,  indeed,  a  long  and  complex  history. 
early as the time of  Justinian  we  find  the Imperial  Govern- 
ment  laying upon  the bishops  a  great  deal  of  responsibility 
for the supervision of  the expenditure of  money left for public 
charities and other public  purposes;  and we  even  find  them 
given  a  considerable  power  of  intervention,  to  protect  the 
citizens  against attempts on  the  part  of  the magistrates  to 
impose improper  exaction^.^  It may be  doubted whether such 
powers  were  originally  given  to  them  on  account  of  their 
spiritual authority, or because  of  the position  occupied  by the 
bishops as prominent  citizens  in their dioceses: the truth pro- 
bably is that both their secular and their  ecclesiastical  position 
contributed to  bring  about such arrangements.  However this 
may  be,  it  is  clear  that  in  the  ninth  century  the Church, 
through  the bishops, exercised  a  very  considerable authority 
in the control of  even the secular affairs  of  society, altogether 
apart  from  that  authority  which  the  bishops  possessed  as 
being  among  the great  men  of  the kingdom  or empire. 
The Pope and  the bishops  of  the church exercised  a  con- 
siderable  authority in the  appointment and in  the deposition 
of kings and emperors.  We do not wish to discuss the qnestion 
which in later times was  often  raised, as to the nature of  the 
authority  by  which  Charles  the  Great  was  elected  to  the 
empire.  In  later times men  on  the one  side  maintained  that 
this was done by the Pope,-that  he in the plenitude  of  his 
power  conferred  the  empire  on  Charles;  while  on  the other 
side it was held  that the action  of  the Pope  was  simply that 
of  one who recognised  his  accession,  and by consecration in- 
voked on it the divine  blessing.  We do  not know that there 
is any reason  to suppose that  at the time  the theory  of  the 
matter  occupied  men's  minds  to  any  serious  extent  at all. 
' Pseud. - Isidore,  Anacletus  Dec.  his fulciatur eO  liberetur." 
xvi. : "  Omnis  enim  oppressus  libere  2  Cf.  esp.  Justinian  Codex, i.  3.  45, 
sacerdotum,  si voluerit, appellet judi-  and i. 4. 26. 
tium et a  nullo  prohibeatur,  sed  ab 
The Franks had  come to Italy on the urgent invitation  of  the 
popes as their protectors against the Lombard power, and later 
on  against  the  Greek  power.  Pope  Stephen  11.  had  recog- 
nised Pippin as king of the Franks, and had afterwards crowned 
him, and finally Pope Leo 111. had  crowned  Charles the Great 
as  emperor.  We  doubt  whether  at the time  it  occurred  to 
any  one  to consider  what precise  authority  lay behind  these 
acts.  There  is  no  doubt, however, that in the ninth  century 
we find clear traces of  the rapid development  of  a  theory that 
the Pope had  some  very  distinct  share in the appointment of 
emperors  or  kings,  and  that  the  consecration  by  him  was 
regarded as something more than the mere  solemn  recognition 
of  a  proper  election  or succession,  and the invocation  of  the 
divine blessing.  And so also with the position  of  the bishops 
in the appointment and consecration  of  kings, there  are very 
clear  traces of  the conception that they  had  a  great  deal  to 
say in elections, and that their  consecration  was  looked  upon 
as a very important matter. 
It  is here  again difficult  to  say how  much  of  the authority 
of  the Pope or  the bishops is to be attributed to the political 
importance of  their position among the most important magnates 
of  the empire, and how much to their religious authority.  We 
must be prepared to recognise that each has its real influence, 
while these two elements of  their authority are often  fused  to 
such  an  extent  that  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  separate 
them.  When,  for  instance,  we  find  that  the  provisions  for 
the partition of  his dominions by Charles the Great, after they 
had  been  considered  and  sworn  to  by  the magnates  of  the 
empire, were sent to Pope Leo  that he might  subscribe  them: 
we  can hardly say whether this is to be taken  as a  recognition 
of  some  right in the head  of  the spiritual power  as such to 
take  1113  part in these arrangements, or  whether  it is to  be 
interpreted as due to the sense of  the great political influence 
l  M.  G.  H  Scriptorum,  vol.  i.,  pacis  conservanda:  causa  factae  atque 
Einhard,  Annals "  for  806 :  De  hec omnia  litteris  mandata  aunt,  et 
hac partitione et testamenturn factum,  Leoni  papre,  ut his  sua  manu  sub- 
et lurejurando  ab o~tirnatibus  Fran-  scriberet,  per  Einhardum misaa." 
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which  the  Pope  had  exercised  and  was  still  exercising  1u 
Western  Europe, and especially in Italy. 
Whatever may be the exact  nleaning which we  are to attach 
to such  a  recognition  of  the  authority  of  the Pope,  there  is 
no doubt of  the importance  of  his position later in the century. 
In the '  Chronicon  Salernitanum ' there is preserved a letter of 
the Emperor  Lewis  11.  written  to  the Enlperor Basil  of  Con- 
stantinople in 867.  It  appears that Basil had expressed his in- 
dignation that Lewis should call himself "  Imperator Augustus." 
Lewis defends his use of  the title on the ground largely that he 
had  been  anointed  and consecrated by the Pope, and says that 
those Frankish princes were called first kings and then emperors 
who were anointed with the holy oil by the P0pe.l  It  has been 
suggested that this letter is spurious-that  it is impossible  to 
think  that any Frankish  emperor would  have  spoken  in such 
terms.  It  seems to us that such a line of  argument is exceed- 
ingly  unsafe, for,  apart from  this letter, there is  considerable 
evidence  that  at least in the latter part of  the eighth century 
it was frequently recognised that the Pope  had  a  very import- 
ant  part  in  the  appointment  and  consecration  of  kings  and 
emperors.  In a former chapter we have referred  to  the terms 
of  the document concerning  the election of  Charles the Bald 
to the kingdom of  Italy at Pavia in 8'76 ; we  must  now notice 
in this document the reference  to the elevation of  Charles, a 
few months earlier,  to the  empire  as being  the work  of  the 
Pope.  The bishops  and other magnates of  Italy elect Charles 
as king in view  of  the fact that God  had  raised  him  to the 
imperial throne by  means  of  the vicar  of  the blessed  prince 
of the apostles Peter and Paul, Pope Johm2  It might, perhaps, 
,  l M.  Cf.  H.  Scriptorum,  vol.  iii., 
'  Chronicon  Salernitanum,'  p.  522 : 
"Invenimus  prresertim,  cum  et ipsi 
patrui nodtri, gloriosi reges, absque in- 
vidia  imperatorem  nos  vocitent  et 
imperatorem  esse  procul  dubio faten- 
tur,  non  profecto  ad  statem,  qua 
nobis majores sunt, attendentes, sed ad 
unctionem  et  sacrationem,  qua  per 
summi pontificis manus, impositione et 
oratione divinitua  ad hoc sumus cul- 
men  provecti,  et  ad  Romani  princi- 
patus  imperium,  quod superno  nutu 
potimur, aspicientes." 
P. 523.  "  Nam  Francorum principes 
primo  Ieges,  deinde  vero imperatores 
dicti sunt, hii dumtaxat, qui a Roman0 
pontifice  ad  hoc  oleo  sancto  perfusi 
sunt." 
M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  220,  Kar.  11.  Imp.  Electio : 
"Jam quia divina pieh  vos beatorurn 
be  suggested  that this is only an Italian view of  the appoint- 
lnent of  Charles the Bald, but the same conception is expressed 
In the proceedings of  the synod of  Ponthion, which was held in 
June  and July 876.  We learn that at this synod the proceed- 
ings of  the Italian magnates at Pavia were read and confirmed : 
the part of  the Pope in the election of  Charles to the empire 
seems as clearly recognised at Porithion as it hacl been at  Pavia.l 
We find similar references to the influence  of  the Pope  in the 
election of  kings in the separate kingdorns which  made  up the 
empire, while here we also find a similar authority attributed to 
the bishops.  In the proceedings of  the synod held  at Quierzy 
in  858  we  find  some very significant  phrases  on  the subject. 
The  synod  sent  a  letter,  which  is  thought  to  have  been 
composed  by  Hincmar  of  Rheims, to Lewis of  Germany, pro- 
testing  against  his  invasion  of  the territories  of  Charles, and 
addressing  a  special  remonstrance  to  those  archbishops  and 
bishops  who  had  themselves,  with  the consent  of  the people, 
anointed Charles to be king, while the Holy See had afterwards 
honoured  and confirmed  him, by letters, as king.  The  synod 
evidently attaches great importance to the unction, and speaks 
of  him  who  faithlessly  and  contuinaciously  lifts  his  hand 
against  the Lord's  anointed,  as  of  one  who  despises  Christ, 
and who will, therefore, perish by the spiritual sword.2  Again, 
principum apostolorum Petri et Pauli 
interventione  per  vicarium  ipsorum, 
domnum  videlicet  Johannem  sum- 
mum pontificem et universalem papam 
spiritalemque patrem vestrum, ad pro- 
fectum  sancts Dei  ecclesis  nostror- 
umque  omnium  incitavit  et  ad 
imperiale  culmen  Sancti  Spiritus 
judicio  provexit,  nos  unanimiter  vos  . . .  Italici regni regem  elegimus." 
M.  Cf.  H.  Leg , sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  279 (B.) :  L'S~cut  domnus Johannes 
apostolicus  et unlxersalis  papa  primo 
Romie elegit atque sacra unctione con- 
stituib omnesque Italici regni episcopi, 
abbates, comites  et reliqu~  omnes,  qui 
curn  illis  convenerunt,  domnum  nos- 
trum gloriosum imperatorem  Karolum 
augustum unanimi devotione elegerunt 
sibi  protectorem  ac  defensorem  esse, 
ita et nos qui de  Francia, Burguudia, 
Aquitania,  Septimania,  Neustria  ac 
Provincia pridie Kalendas Julii in loco, 
qui dicitur Pontigonis,  anno xxxvii. in 
Francia ac imperii primo, jussu ejusdem 
dornni et gloriosi augusti  convenimus, 
pari  consensu  ac  concordi  devotione 
eligimus  et confirmamus." 
M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  297, "Epist. Synodi. Carisiacensis 
ad  Hlud.  Reg.  Germ.  Directa,"  15: 
''  Maxime ,rutem nobis necesse est loqui 
cum  illis  archiepiscopis  et episcopis, 
qui consensu et  voluntate populi regni 
istius  domnum  nostrum  fratrem  ves- 
trum unxerunt  in  regem  sacro chris- 
mate divina traditione quemque sancta 
aedes  apostolica  mater  nostra  litterirr 286  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF NINTH  CENTURY.  [PART  1~. 
we  find  the archbishops and  the bishops  of  the  kingdom  of 
Aries  electing Lewis, the son  of  BOSO,  to  follow his  iather in 
that  kingdom,  and  they  do  this  partly  on  the ground  that 
the ~ol~  See  had  approved  of  such an election? 
We find the strongest and most remarkable assertion  of  the 
importance of  the consecration  and unction  by  the bishops  in 
another document, which refers  to the election  of  Charles  the 
Bald as King of  the Neustrian Franks.  This is a proclamatioll 
issued  in the name  of  Charles  the  Bald  himself  in  859: he 
recounts  how,  after  his  election  by  the  bishops  and  other 
faithful  men  of  the kingdom,  he  had  been  consecrated  and 
anointed with  the  holy  chrism,  and  had  received  the  crown 
and  sceptre,  and  he  urges  that  after  this  consecration  he 
cannob  be  cast  down  from  the  kingdom  by  any,  at least 
without  the judgment  of  the bishops  by  whose  ministry  he 
liad  been  consecrated  king:  they  are,  he  says,  the  thrones 
of  God, among whom  God  is sea~ecl,  and  by whom  he decrees 
his  judgments,  and  to  their  paternal  reproofs  and  chastise- 
ments  he  had  been  and  still was  prepared  to subn~it.~  We 
may perhaps  suitably recall  the phrases  in which  the bishops 
describe  the deposition  of  Lewis the Piou~,~  and the words  of 
apostolicis ut regem  honorare studuit 
et confirmare."  The letter then cites 
examples  of  the reverence  shown  to 
the Lord's  anointed in the Old Testa- 
ment,  and  continues :  "Sic  et  qui 
infideliter et contumaciter  in unctum 
qualemcunque Domini  manum  mittit, 
dominum  christorum  Christum  con- 
temnit,  et  in  anima  procul  dubio 
spiritualis gladii animadversione perit " 
1 M.  Cf.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  289, "  Hludowici Regis Arelatensis 
Electio,"  890 : "  Cum ig~tur  d~ligenter 
conperissemus,  quod  assensus  sancte 
catholicze et apostolicze matris nostra 
huic  favereb electioni,  simul  conveni- 
mus in civitatem Valentiam  (i.e.,  -4rch- 
bir~hop  of  Lyons,  Archbichop of  Arles, 
Archbishop of  Embrun, A~chbishop  of 
Vienne, mith other bishops),  . . .  at- 
que  secuudum  Dei  voluntatem  quz- 
situri exploravimus,  si hunc  digne  et 
rationibiliter secundum monita domixlii 
apostolici,  cujus scripta  prs manibus 
habebantur,  super  nos  regem  con- 
stituere deberemus." 
M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  300,  '<  Libellus Proclamationis ad- 
versus Wen~lonem  " : "  A qua consecra- 
tione vel regni sublimitate subplantari 
vel  proici  a  nullo  debueram  saltem 
sine audientia et juclicio  episcoporum, 
quorum miuisterio  in regem sum con- 
~ecratus,  et qui throni Dei sunt dicti, 
in quibus Deus sedit et per quos sua 
decernit judicia ;  quorum paternis cor- 
reptionibus et  castigatoriis judiciis me 
subdere  fui  paratus  et  in  prosenti 
sum subditus."  See p. 252. 
M.  G.  H.  Leg,  sect.  ii.  vol.  ii. 
No.  197,  'l..  . . quia  potestate  pli- 
vatus  erab  juxta  divinum  consilium 
eb  eccle9lasticam  auctoritatem.'"ee 
p.  260. 
~mp.  SXI.]  AUTHORITIES  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  28'7 
Hincmar  in referring to the same event, and to the restoration 
of Lewis by the bishops with the consent of  the people.1 
The  importance  of  this conception  of  the authority  of  the 
Pope  and  the bishops  in  relation  to  the appointment and the 
deposition of  emperors and  kings is very obvious.  As we have 
said,  it  is  very  difficult, perhaps  impossible,  to  disentangle 
the  relative  importance  of  their  spiritual  and  their  secular 
position  in  the  matter.  The  fact  that  they  are  great 
persons  in Western  Europe, or in  a  particular  kingdom, has 
obviously  much  to  do  with  it,  but  there  are  already  clear 
traces  of  a  theory  that,  as  spiritual  rulers,  they  have  some, 
though  it may be  a  somewhat  indefinable,  authority over  the 
secular power. 
We have endeavoured  to bring out as clearly as possible two 
facts with regard to the theory of  the relation of  the authorities 
of  Church and  State in  the ninth  century.  First, that in the 
ninth, just as in the fifth century, men  believed  firmly that the 
two authorities were separate and independent, each sacred and 
supreme in its own sphere-that  the ecclesiastic owed allegiance 
to the king in secular matters, and that the king owed allegi- 
ance to the Church  in  spiritual matters.  But also, secondly, 
that the practical experience of  the ninth century made it clear 
that it was very difficult  to distinguish the two spheres by any 
hard-and-fast line.  Still, we think that the writers of  the ninth 
century held  to the theory of  a  dual authority in society; we 
think that they would have repudiated any other conception. 
It  is true that there is one work which belongs to this period, 
which in the later middle  ages  was  interpreted  as expressing 
quite another theory-the  theory,  that is, of  the supremacy of 
the spiritual power  over  the temporal.  This document  is the 
famous  cc Donation " of  Constantine.  We  have  hitherto  left 
this  document  out of  account  for  two  reasons-first,  because 
it is almost  certain  that the later  interpretation of  the docu- 
l  Hincmar of Rheims, De Div. Loth.  palia unanimitaa, saniore consilio, cum 
et Tetb , Qu. vi. Resp. :  "  Nostra etate  populi  consensu  et Ecclesiae  et regno 
~ium  Augustum  Ludovicum  a  regno  restituit." 
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ment was incorrect ; and, secondly, because, whatever its mean. 
ing  and  purpose  may  have  been,  it exercised  no appreciable 
influence in the ninth century on the theory of  the relations 
of  Church  and  State. 
From our point of  view the important  phrases of  the "Dona- 
tion" are those which  deal  with  the grant of  authority to the 
Pope,  and  the transference of  the seat  of  imperial  authority 
from Rome to By~antium.~  The exact meaning of  these phrases 
has been discussed  by a number  of  scholars, and it is generally 
agreed that the interpretation given to them in the later middle 
ages  can  hardly be  that which  was  in the mind  of  the com- 
piler.  In later  times  they  were  understood  to  signify that 
Constantine  granted  to  the  Popes  a  complete  temporal  au- 
thority over  the West, and  it is  not  disputed  that the words 
might  have this meaning; but it is now generally agreed  that 
they must  be  interpreted  as referring  to a  grant  of  temporal 
authority  in  Italy.  Most  historical  critics  think  that  the 
purpose of  the document was to assist the Roman See in secur- 
ing  the  reversion  of  the  Byzantine  territories  in  Italy,  and 
especially  of  the  Exarchate.  It seems  possible  that  the 
"Donation"  was  built  up  in  part  on  traditions  which  may 
have  been  long  current  in  Italy, and  that the circumstances 
of  the eighth century, when  the Bishops of  Rome  came  to  be 
the actual representatives of  the Roman  res pzcblica  in Italy, 
and  its  principal  defence  against  the  Lornbards,  may  have 
tended  to give these traditions a  new significance, and to sug- 
l Pseudo-Isidore, '  Exemplar Domini 
Imperatoris  Constantini.'  "Unde  ut 
non  pontificalis  apex  vilescat,  sed 
magis  amplius  quam  terreni  imperii 
dignitas et glorise  potentia  decoretur, 
ecce tam palatium  nostrum, ut pliela- 
tum  est,  quamque  Romane  urbis  et 
omnes  Italis  seu  occidentallum  re- 
gionum  provincias,  loca  et civ~tates 
,  sepe  fato  beatissirno  pont~fici nostro 
Silvestro unirersali  papse contradentes 
atque  rel~nquentes ejus  vel  succes- 
sorum ipsius  pontificum  potestati  et 
dictione  firma  imperiali  censura  per 
hanc  nostram  divalem  sacram  eC 
pragmaticum  constitutum  decernimus 
disponendum,  atque  jurse  sanctz 
Romanse ecclesia  concedimus perman- 
surum.  Unde congruum prospexlmus 
nostrum imperium et regnl potestatem 
orientalibus transfern  ac transmutari 
regionibus  et in Bizantiie provintia in 
obtimo loco  nomini  nostro  civ~tatem 
edificari  et  nostrum  illic  const~tui 
imper~um, quoniam  ubi  p~incipatus 
sacerdotum  et  christiane  reiiglonis 
caput  ab  imperatore  ccelesti  con- 
stitutum est, justum  non  est ut illic 
insperator terrenus habeat potealtem." 
gest  to the author their reduction  to a  definite  and coherent 
form.  We are not  here  concerned  with  the growth  of  the 
temporal states of  the Bishop of  Rome, but it seems to us that 
so far from looking upon  this as the result of  an unreasonable 
greed for  secular power, it  should  be  recognised  that nothing 
was  more  natural than that the Popes, finding themselves  to 
be  the actual chiefs of  what  survived  of  the  ancient Roman 
State in Italy, should have desired to maintain and even extend 
their  authority.  Any one who  studies the papal  correspond- 
ence and the 'Liber  Pontificalis '  in the eighth century will, we 
think, feel that the leadership of  the Roman  res publica  in the 
West was  forced  upon  them  rather than  deliberately  sought. 
It was  only slowly and reluctantly that they drew away from 
the Byzantine  authority, for  after all, as civilised  members  of 
the Roman State,  they preferred  the Byzantine to the barbarian; 
and when circumstances had  practically destroyed  the Byzan- 
tine power  in Italy, it was  natural  that they should  seek  to 
hold  together, or  to recover  from the barbarian, even  though, 
like the Frank, he was a  friendly barbarian, some  fragments of 
the ancient commo~~wealth  of  ci\ilisation.  It is of  course  true 
that once they had hoken with the Byzantine power, they had 
no  inclination  for reunion  with it, but this again, considering 
the history  of  the eighth  century, was  not  unnatural. 
It  is  then  generally  thought  that  the  purpose  of  the 
"Donation" was  to assist the Bishcps of  Ilome in establishing 
a  claim  to the reversion  of  the Byzantine  authority in Italy. 
Other conjectures, such as that of  Grauert? that it was intended 
to  support the  Frankish  empire  against  the  criticism  of  the 
Byzantines, though they have  been  urged with  much learning 
and  ingenuity, seem  too  far-fetched.  It  must  at the same 
time  be  recognised  that the  problem  of  the  date  and  place 
of  origin  of  the  document  is  surrounded  wit11  perplexities. 
The "Donation"  cannot  be  later  than  the ninth  century, as 
it  is contained  in a manuscript of  that time, and is embodied 
in  the  Pseudo-Isidorian  decretals.  How  long  before  that  it 
may  have  existed  is  a  question  of  great  complexity.  In a 
letter  of  Pope  Hadrian  I. of  778  there are phrases  which, ~t 
l  '  Historisches Jahrbuch der Gorresgesellschaft,'  3, 4, 5. 
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1s  urged, imply  a  knowledge of  the "Donation,"  but the text 
cannot  be  said  to  render  this  certain?  Hadrian  evidently 
refers to some  tradition  of  great  grants  of  authority  by  the 
Emperor  Coastantine,  but  whether  he  is  referring  to  this 
document is another question.  In a  letter of  the same Pope 
to  Constantine  and  Irene, of  785,  he  describes  a  vision  of 
Constantine, which  suggests the tradition  which  is embodied 
in  the "Donation,"  but this does  not at all necessarily  prove 
that  he was  acqnainted  with  the  "Donation"  it~elf.~  The 
first  writers  of  whom it can  be  said with any degree  of  con- 
fidence  that  they  are  acquainted  with  this  document  are 
Ado  of  Vienne3 and Hincmar of  Rhein~s,~  in the ninth cen- 
tury.  It  is  certainly  perplexing  that  there  should  be  no 
certain  evidence that the document was known  in Italy until 
the  latter  part  of  the  tenth  cent~ry.~  At the same  time 
the more recent investigations  into its phraseology, and especi- 
ally  those of  Scheffer-Boichorst,G seem  to  make  it fairly  clear 
that the work  was  compiled  in Italy, and in the latter part 
of  the eigtrth  century. 
In  later volumes we  shall have  to consider what importance 
this document may have had in the scholastic period.  For tlie 
present it is enough to say that it produced no appreciable effect 
upon the political  theory of  the ninth century.  The theorists 
of  the following  centuries may have tried to reduce to a com- 
plete  unity  the  elements  of  authority in  society;  the ninth 
celltury  writers knew  nothing  of  this. 
If we  now  look  back  over  the political theory of  the ninth 
century, we can lay down certain general propositions about its 
l  M.  G.  H.,  Epist.  iii.,  Codex  Car- 
olinus,  60 : "  Et  sicut  tempolibus 
beati  Silvestri  Romani  pontificis  a 
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stantino,  magno  imperatore,  per  ejus 
largitatem  sancta  Dei  catholica  et 
apostolica  Romana  ecclesia elevata at- 
que evaltnta est et potestatem in his 
Hesperiae  partibus largiii dignatus." 
Po~e  Hadrian  1.  ; Ep.  lvi.  Migne 
 pat^.  Lat., vol.  96, p.  1220. 
?  Ado  of  Vienne,  Chronicon;  Migne 
Patr. Lat., vol.  12.3, p. 92. 
'  M.  G.  H.  Leg.,  sect.  ii.  vol.  6. 
Hincmar of  Rheims,  'l De Ordine Pal. 
ati~,"  13. 
M. G.  H.,  Diplomatum  ii.  Otto 
III., No.  389. 
"  Mittheilungen des  Iustituts fur 
Oesterreichiache ~eaohichtsforschung," 
10  and 11. 
character.  It  is, we think, in the first place, clear that there did 
not  exist  in this time  and  among  these  writers  any  general 
philosophical  system  of  political  theory.  Certain  great  and 
important conceptions the men of  this period  apprehended and 
developed with force ;  but in the main it is true to say that they 
are concerned much more with the practical circumstances of  the 
life of  their time  than  with  the attempt to construct a system 
of  political  thought,  We have  pointed  out the fact that their 
statements  are often incoherent, sometimes  almost self-contra- 
dictory; this is the direct consequence of  the fact that they are 
not  conscious  of  any systematic theory  as lying behind  their 
practical judgments.  We think that when we  have recognised 
this, and if  we very carefully keep it in mind, we may still with 
justice say that their treatment of  the character and the founda- 
tion  of  the  organised  life  of  society  turns  upon  three great 
conceptions. 
In tlie  first  place,  they  clearly  held,  and  in some  measure 
understood,  that conception  of  the equality  of  human  nature, 
whose history we have studied from the time of  Cicero.  They 
not only reproduced the phrases of  the Fathers, but they clearly 
also  understood  their  point  of  view.  This  implies, indeed, 
something more  than the fact  that they held  to the theory of 
equality ; it also n~eans  that they understood and approved  the 
conception of  the d~fference  between the primitive condition of 
man  and the actual  condition  of  human  society.  They  held 
that it was not nature but man's faults which had brought into 
existence the conventional  institutions of  society.  It is quite 
true that, except  with  regard  to the instilution of  slavery, the 
subject does not greatly occupy their  minds; but  it is import- 
ant, especially with reference  to the developed medizval theory 
of  society, to recognise  that this conception was always alive. 
Secondly,  they  held  very  firmly  to  the conviction  of  the 
sacred  character  of  the  organised  structure  of  society  in 
government.  They follow the New Testament and the Fathers 
in the doctrine that the civil  order of  society is necessary, and 
that it  is sacred.  Indeed  it is the very firmness with which 
they hold this that causes them to adopt the extreme language 
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and sometimes to speak as though anv resistance to the actions 
of  those  who  represented  the sacred authority  were  a  thing 
unlawful  and irreligious.  The disorders  of  the time  were  so 
great,  the  necessity  of  delivering  western  Europe  from  the 
confusions wlilch  followed  the downfall  of  the ancient empire 
in the West was  so obvious, that we cannot wonder if  at times 
they exaggerate the pr~nciple  of  obedience to authority. 
But,  in  the  third  place,  the  tlieory  of  the ninth  centuiy 
recognised  with equal clearness the necessity  of  checking the 
unjust  and  tyrannical  use  of  authority.  If the Fathers like 
St Ambrose  and St Isidore  lay much stress  on the limitation 
of  authority by its end-nameIy,  the estabhshment and main- 
tenance  of  justice-the  ninth-century writers  assert this con- 
ception  with  even  yreater  clearness,  and, under  the influence 
of  the traditions of  the Teutonlc races, find a practical applica- 
tion of  the theory of  justice In the concept~on  of  the supremacy 
of  law,  and of  the l~mited  and conditioned  character  of  the 
autholity of  the ruler.  The emperor or klng is  bound  by the 
national  law,  and derives  his  authority, ultlmat~lp  no  doubt ' 
from  God,  but  immediately  from  the nation,  and  holds  this 
authority on the condition of  his  setting forward righteousness 
and lustice in the Stata 
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State In nlnth century, 253 292. 
Influence of  th~oretical  and  actual 
relat~ons  of  Church  and State on 
poht~cal  theory of  Middle  Ages, 
')52 
~heorv  of  ninth century founded on 
the definit~ous  of  Gel3sius I ,  the 
two  powers  are  dependent  of 
each  other,  253 - 257,  261,  287 
290 
Modifications  of  these defin~tion~  In 
ninth century, 255,  256 
Complexitv  of  actual  relations  m 
n&th century, 257. 
Illustrdtlons  of  this complexity  in 
the  wr~tings  of  Sednlius  Scotus 
and Cathultus,  '58  261 
King  the Vicar ot  God  In  govern 
ment of  the Church,  259 262. 
secnlar laws  must be made to %lee 
with d~vine  laws, 2i7 
Emperor and kings may be excom 
municated, 278 282 
Pope Leo  LV  seems to condemn ex 
commun~cst  on of Emperor by  the 
bishops ot the Empire, 280. 
iuthority of  popes  and  b~shops  in 
appointment  and  deposition  of 
secular rulers,  282 287 
Consecration  of  Charles  the  Great, 
282,  283 
Consecration of  Lewis I1 ,  284 
Cousecrat~on  of  Charles  the  Bald, 
264,  285 
Importance attached by Charles the 
Bald to h~s  consecration  as K~ng 
of  the Western Franks, 286,  L87 
Tlie "  Donation of Constautine," 287 
290. 
cero- 
Cicero, with Seneca,  represents  the 
atmosphere out of  wh~ch  the polit- 
ical  theory  of  the  Fathers  and 
Roman Lawyers grew, 3 
Cicero an eclectic ph~losopher,  3. 
Just~ce  tlie essential  quality of  the 
State, 4. 
Defiu~tion  of the State, 4 
Jnst~ce  dependent of  man's  con- 
sent, 5. 
Cicero  in  opposition  to Carneades 
and Ep~curus,  5 
Nature.  not  utilitv.  the  source  of  ". 
lustlee, 5. 
In  agreement with Sto~cs  on just~ce, 
3. 
Jnstlce lies behmd all law, 5 
Justice. the law of  nature, the same 
as reison, 5,  6 
Law of  nature 1s  from God, 5, 6 
Law of  nature and theorv of  iust~ce  .  " 
in soc~ety,  6. 
All true law is derived from law of 
nzture. 6 
Illustrations  of  respons~b~i~ty  of  Human  'society  an  institution  of 
kinn  for  good  order  of  Church,  I  na+,,~r~.  6 
262y27'. 
This responsibility  extends  even to 
rondit~on  of aauacy, 2b3, 264 
Relat~on  of  k;ng  sydods  and 
leg~slation  of  Church  265-267. 
Authontv of  king ~n appointment of 
ecclesl~stics to  spiritual  offices, 
287 270  -.  - 
Relation of  Emperor  to papal  elec 
tions, 271,  272 
Illustl aaons of  eccles~astical  author 
ity in secular matters, 273 287 
The h~shops  the Vicars  of  God, 213,  1 
.. .  .  .  .. .  .  7  - 
Cicero s  concept~on  of  equallty  of 
human nature, 8 
Conception  of  natural love between 
men, 9 
Parallel between his views and those 
of  French Revolution,  9 
Break  in  pol~t~cal  theory  between 
Aristotle and C~~ero,  9 
Relation  of  C~cero  5  conception  of 
equdhty to Christlzll,  9 
Modern character of Cictro's views of 
human nature, l0 
Historic  c~rcnmstances producing 
274  ch~nges,  10 
hc.eslast:cs  have spiritual author~ty  (  Influence  of  theory  of  eqoalitu  on 
over all ranks and classes of  men  Cicero  theory  of  government, 
274,  275  11,  16 
Kings  and  rulers  mubt  obey  the  Relation of h~s  theory of  equalltj to 
canons, 275 278.  /  slavery, 11,~ 298  INDEX.  INDEX. 
Slaves to be treated sa hired labour-  ..- 
ers, 11. 
Some men  may justly  be  alteks: 
?$er0  infii~enced  by Aristotle, 11, 
id. 
Cicero's  theo~y  of  corruption  or 
defect  in hnman nature,  12. 
Relation of  his conception to that of 
Seneca and the Christian Fathers, 
12, 13. 
Theory of  the origin  of  the State, 
l2 
~he'state  grows o11t  of  the family, 
14. 
Conception  of  organic  development 
of  State, 14. 
Anticipates Burke, 14. 
State  founded  on  law  and justice, 
14. 
All  governments,  existing  for  the 
salre of all, legitimate, 14. 
If government be  unjust, then there 
1s no State, 15. 
All just  governments are tolerable, 
not necessarily satisfactory, 15. 
No  liberty under monarchy or aris- 
tocracy, 15. 
Modern  character  of  Cicero's  con- 
ception of  liberty as share  in gov- 
ernment, 15, 16. 
Eelation  of  his  view  of  liberty  to 
theory of equality, 16. 
Preference  for mixed  novernments,  .. 
16. 
Theory of  social contract,  17, 63. 
Agreement with Lawyers on theory 
of  law. 55.  57. 61. 
Agrees  ~iwyers  on  source  of 
authority, 63. 
Agrees wlth St Pan1 on natnral law, 
R'?  In!?  U-., -"-. 
Comparivon of  his view  of  slavery 
with  St Paul's.  88. 
His theory of  natural law and that 
of  Fathers, 102-106. 
Phrase about property, 137. 
St Augustine and Cicero's definition 
of State, 165-170. 
8t Isidore's defimtion of State amees 
Consecration of kings- 
Symbolises  the  divine  source  of 
authority of  king,  214. 
Early history  of  consecration,  214, 
note 4. 
Great importance attributed to this 
by Charles the Bald, 252, 286. 
Importance  of  consecration  and 
unction in ninth century, 28'2-287. 
Emperor  Lewis  IT.  claims  title  of 
Emperor  on  ground  that he had 
been anointed by Pope, 284. 
Fraukibh  prlnces  called  kings  and 
enlperors when anointed  by Pope, 
2Q4.  -- -. 
Constantiue- 
Influence of  his conversion  on rela- 
tions of  Church and State, 176. 
Recognises,  according  to  Rnfinus, 
the  jurisdiction  of  bishop  over 
himself in spiritual matters, 177. 
Constnntiils reproved severely by Lucifer 
of  Cagliari for interference in Church 
matters, 178. 
Conncils- 
Council  of  Ganm  excomnlunicates 
any one who tersuades a slave to 
fly from his master, 121. 
Council  of  Toledo  on ordination  of 
slaves, 122, note 1. 
Cyprian,  Pseudo:  "De  Doodecim Abn- 
sivis Saeculi."  its inflnence in the ninth 
cyprian,-St- 
Comments  on community  of  goods 
as in the Acts : such conduct that 
of the true sons of  God, 133. 
Does not say this is necessary,  but 
the perfect way, 133. 
Cyms, his just monarchy, 15. 
David and Nathan, 188, 260. 
David and Saul, 152, 216, 217. 
Democracy, theory of:  Relation  to this 
of Cicero and Roman Lawyers, 16, 79. 
Demosthenes- 
Definition of  law, 56. 
Law a discovery and gift of God, 56. 
Law  intended  for  correction  of 
with Clcero's,  172.  offences, 56. 
.Claudius,  Emperor,  edict providing that  Civil law set forth by the wise,  56, 
slaves  deserted  bv their  masters  on  1  68. 
New  Testament. 89-98. 
a&&int  of  illness should be free, 49. 
Clement of Alexandria- 
Treats onr Lord's command to  young 
rlch  ruler  as  metaphorical,  133, 
134. 
ttecognises  no advantage in poverty 
in itself  133  134. 
The king 'is  a )ruler who  governs ac- 
cording to laws,  and  reigns  over 
willing subjects, 162. 
Clement  of  Rome:  authority of  rulers 
derived from God, prays that God will 
give them wisdom, 128. 
Cohlentz, Declaratiol~s  of, 230, 247. 
Divine  authority  of  rulers  in  the 
Fathers,  125  - 131,  147 - 160,  177, 
187. 190-192. 
The expression of  an agreement on 
the part  of  the whole  State, 56, 
68. 
Devil, his claim  to the kingdoms of  the 
world false, according to Irenseus, 128, 
129. 
'Didache,  pr  Teaching  of  the  Twelve 
Apostles  :  Christian men should share 
all  things  with  their  brethren,  132, 
134. 
Divine  source  of  authority  of  govern- 
ment 
Seneca and Pliny, 31. 
Jnstinian, 69, 70. 
coercive government a divine remedy 
for sin, 128-131. 
Irensus.  aovernment  from  God,  , - 
129. 
Rnler  the  representative  of  God, 
148-150. 
Ruler,  the Vicar  of  God,  has the 
image  of  God ;  bishop, image of 
Uhr~st,  149, 215,  259, 260. 
Wiclied and good  ruler^ alike repre- 
sent God, 151, 152. 
Roler must be obeyed,  le&  God be 
resisted  (Gregory the Great),  152, 
! .62 
Influence  on  Gregory's  practical 
action  of  theory of  divine author- 
ity of  ruler, 153-157. 
Alltecedents of  this theory,  157-159. 
A~~archical  tendencies  in  early 
Christian societies, 157, 158. 
Christian  emperors  patrons  of 
Church, 158. 
Tradition of  Jewish monarchy in Old 
Testament, 159. 
Theory  of  Gregory  contrasted  with 
Roman Lawyers, 159. 
Relation  of  this theory to theory of 
just~ce,  161-174. 
 elation  of  Augustine's  theory  of 
State and that of  Divine Right, 
169, 170. 
Treatment  of  subiect in ninth cen- 
tury, 210-218. 
Signiticance of such phrases as "king 
by dlvine grace,"  214. 
Significance of  consecration of kings 
and emperors, 214. 
Rebellion  against  king  is  rebellion 
aqainst God, 215, 216. 
"  Donation of  Constantine," 287-290. 
Donatists- 
Contiscation of  their property by the 
Imperial Government,  140. 
Their theory ol property, 140, 141. 
"  Edictum Pistense," 338, 248. 
Emptio, 52. 
Epicureans- 
Their view of  justice,  contrast with 
Stoics, 5. 
View of  origin of  State, 13. 
On relation of wise nlan to the State, 
27  28. 
Relation  of  their theory of  State to 
St Paul's, 98. 
Doubt as torelation of human nature 
to political life, 126. 
Equality of human nature- 
Contrast between views of  Aristotle 
and Cicero, 8, 45. 
Circumstances  of  Aristotle's  view, 
7,  8. 
Equality affirmed by Cicero, Seneca, 
and Lawvers.  9.  48. 
continuityv of' theory  to  time  of 
French Revolution, 9. 
This theorv constitutes the most im- 
portant biffererce between ancient 
and modern political phlloqopby, 9. 
Theory  of  equality arises from  ex- 
perience of Macedonian and Roman 
empires, 10. 
The mind of  everv man is  free (sui 
~uT~s),  21. 
All men  are equal by natural law 
(Ulpian), 40,  47. 
New  phrases  about  human  nature 
in Lawyers, 45, 46. 
Influeuce  of  theory  of  equality on 
theory  and condition  of  slavery,  .  . 
48, 49. 
This theory helps towards disappear- 
ance of slavery, 50. 
Relation  of  theory  of  Lawyers  to 
that of  Christianity, 50. 
This conce~tion  in New Testament, 
83-89. 
Teaching of Jesus Christ on the sub- 
ject,  84. 
Teaching of  St Paul, 84, 85. 
Treatment  in  New  Testament  of 
equality in relation to slavery, 86- 
89. 
Natural equality and slavery in the 
Fathers, 111-124. 
Conception of  Fathers similar to that 
of  later philosophers and lamyers, 
111-114. 
Natural  equality and government in 
the Fathers, 125-131. 
Natural  equality  and  state  before 
the Fall in the Fathers, 144-:46. 
Treatment  of  equality  of  1111mau 
nature in ninth century, 19.5  209. 
Ninth  century  continues  theory  of 
Fathers, 199. 
Eugenius,  ---  Pope,  oath  on  his  election, 
ziz. 
Ensebius  of  Cssarea,  attitude to Em- 
peror, 177. 
Fall,  the,  and the state of  nature,  117, 
144-146. 
Felix 11.- 
Historical  circumstances  of  treat- 
ment  of  relation  of  Chnrch  and 
State by Felix 11. and Gelasius I. 
185, 186. 
Felix anathematises Acacins, 186. 
The king should learn from the priest 
in regard  to the things  of  God, 
rather than prenume to teach, 186, 
187. 
Felix gives Emperor Zeno choice be- 
tween communion with St  P~+er  or 
with Peter of  Alexandria, 188.  1  Action  of  Felix  against  Basilihcua 
1  and Zeno, 189. INDEX.  INDEX. 
Florentinus- 
Dlstingu~shes jus  gentzuqn  from 
mtuta, 39 
Slavery an iustitutlon of 116s gentturn, 
39. 47  76  ,-. .- 
Does not define 771s  naturale, 41 
Dei ivation of  sei z  IS,  47 
Relat~on  of  hls theory of  slavery to 
theory ot  state ot nature,  43,  44, 
54  59, 60 
Some  modes  of  acqulnng  private 
property are prlmitlve,  53 
HIS distmction of  ?us gentzum and 
natura and St  Isidore, 106 
Florus Diaconus- 
Treatlse :,' De  Electlonibus  Episco 
porum,  269, 270 
Denies need of  roy~l  a~seiit  to Epis- 
copal election  -69  270 
Admlts  propriety  of  this  in  klng 
doms where the custom had grown 
up, 269, 270 
Den es that Emperor was  consulted 
with regard to  papal election, 271 
Galus- 
His  theory of  the jz~s  gmhum, 37, 
38 
No  opposlt~on  between  us gent~um 
and jus  naturale  38 
JLS  gentzum  of  Gaius  has  Same 
character as ]us noturale in Clcero, 
38, 70 
Galus  holds  same vlew  of  law and 
justice  as Stoics,  38 
Distlnctlon  between  slave  and  free 
man, 46 
Slsvery  an  liistltution  of  321s  gen 
tzum, 46 
IVIasJer  has power of life and death, 
Galu8'8  definit~on  of  jus  etude  le 
produced by Is~dore,  109 
Limit of rights of property, 142 
Gelavus I .  St- 
slave who  had been  o~dained  to 
ferior  orders to be restored to hlq 
mistress,  122 
lave,  ordilned  pnest,  to be  sent 
back to his micLi ess, but as priest 
on her estates, 122 
Relations of  Church and State, 184 
192 
HI;-de~nltions of  this relat~on  go to 
establish  a  theory  of  dualism  in 
society, 184, 183 
Relation  of  thls to mediteval  new, 
185 
Historical  circnmstances  of  theory 
of  Felix 11.  and Gelasins I ,  185,  I  186 
/  No clear evldence that Gelasius ex 
communicated any emperor, 186 
1  188 
l  Emperor has received hls authority 
trom God, 187 
Clvd  power  has no  jurisdiction  in 
1  spirrtual matters. 187. 189 
Occasions when ecd~esiistlcs  had re 
sisted secular rulers, 188  189 
Dehnitions of  relations  of  the two 
authorities,  190 192 
These  dehnrt~ons  the starting point 
of  theory of ninth century, l92 
Difficulties of dualistlc theory already 
apparent, 192. 
Influence  of  theory of  Church  and 
State  on  theory  of  authorlty  of 
c~vil  rulers, 192, 193  253 
Ninth century theory of  Church  and 
State founded upon Gelasius' def 
46  in~tions,  253 257- 
Slavery anses from capture in war,  Nodifi~ations  ot these m ninth cen 
46  tury, 255, 256 
Gaius  looked  on slavery as natural  Gospels, the  Treatment of  poverty and 
and lust, 46  riches, l00 
Does  not assert  natural  ~nequality,  ,  Government and anthorltv- 
46 
Limitation of  rrghts  of  master over 
slave, 48,  49 
Propeity  arises  from /us gentttm, 
51, 52 
Ongin  of  property,  czptnre,  occu- 
pat 011  tralltioil  a1  52 
Property  primit~ve rational,  and 
lust, 62 54 
Q 11  law  founded on  reason.  not 
l  egisl~tive  authonti d4ived  from 
people, 65, 66 
T eatment  of  Senatus  consulturn, 
66  -- 
D4m1tion of  vts gegztzum  quoted In 
Institutes, 72 
Altered  qnotatlon from Gaius in In 
stitnteo, 72 
Aristotle's  vlew that government is 
founded  on  the  inequality  of 
human nature, 7. 
Government is good lf for the benefit 
of all, 15 
Agreement  of  Clcero  and Aristotle, 
15  -. 
Liberty  a  share  m  government,  ac 
cording to Cicero, 15. 
Cicero s di~satlsfaction  with the three 
forms of ~overnment  16 
Government in Golden Age, 23 
Coerc~ve  government made necessary 
by the corruption of human nature, 
24  2~ 
Seneca and Stoica hold the form of 
government to be indifferent, 30 
Political authorrty derived from thp 
popullrs,  according  to  Roruan 
Lawyers, 63.70 
Theory of government m New Testa 
meut  All  ohtlcal  anthonty 1s 
trom God, 8f  98 
Political authority is from  God be 
cause its end is  justice, 90  91 
The Christ~an  Church  and Judalsm 
in relation to Roman Government 
91 93 
Tendency of  Christian  societies  to 
anarchism, 93 97 
Wycllffe  s  theory  of  civll  lordship, 
OR 
0" 
Relation  of  New  Testament  theory 
of  government  to  that  of  the 
ph~losophers,  97, 98 
Coercive  government not natural or 
priwltlve, according to  the Fathers, 
126, 127, 144 
St Gregory  maintains  the existence 
of  order and authority in state of 
Innocence (cp Seneca and Postdon 
ins)  127, 128 
Coercive government a divine remedy 
tor  sin in the Fathers,  128,  131, 
141 
There is no one above the Emperor 
save Go l,  who made him Emperor 
(Optatus), 148, 179 
8t Gregor) s  theory  of  source  of 
government  contrasted wrth  that 
ot  Roman  Lawyers, 159 
History of  mediteval  polit~cal  theory 
largely  that  of  struggle  between 
these two views, 159 
Authority of government, and justlce 
in Fathers  161 174 
The State the Instrument of justice, 
thls  the  normal  Tlew  of  the 
Fathers, 161 
Just1 e a1 d  beneficel~ce  the ratio of 
the State (Ambrose), 16 
In~portance  of  liberty  in  State (St 
Anselm, Cassiodorus, and Giegory 
the Great), 163 
Divine source  of  authority in nlnth 
century, 210 218 
Justlce as the proper  end ot govern- 
ment in n~nth  century, 219 228 
Theory of source and conditlo~~s  of 
aurhority in ninth  century,  24U- 
252 
Gratiau- 
St  Isldore's  definit~on  of  natural law 
embodied in the Decretum,  106 
Interpretation of  St Isidore s phrasr, 
"  Communls  omnlum  possessio,' 
Men  are equal  no coerclve  eo~elll 
ment in the beginning, 127,a128 
Order  and authoiity m state of m 
nocence  and  among  angels,  12i, 
128 
Compare mth  Seneca and Posidon~u~ 
128 
Coerclve gove~nmei~t  a divine institu 
tion, 1)x 
Dlvink  character  and  authorlty  of 
government, 130, 131 
Almsgiving an act of justl~e,  138 
Unjust to use propertj for pelsonal 
benefit beyond what  is necessary, 
138 
Compare  theory  of  property of  St 
Thomas Aquinas, 139 
First writer  to st  ~te  fully t2 eory of 
Divine R~ght  of  ruler, 147 
l  he U  icked and the good ruler allke 
represent God, 152 
Conduct  of  David  and  Saul  proves 
that  subjects  mast  not  ~iltlcis~ 
then rulers, 153 
To reslst the ruler 1s to resist  God 
l52 
St Gregory's  attitude to Emperors, 
153 157 
Canonical law and the Enipeior, 154 
156 
React~on of  ecclesiastical  theor7 
against  St Glegory, 159 
Influence  on  theory  ot  equality  in 
ninth century, 199,  200 
lnfluence on theory of dlvme author 
itv of rulers 111  the ninth centur) , 
213, 218, 219, 220 
Nature of  the trne king, 226, 227 
Glegory  IV  (Pope)  elected  but  not 
consecrated  till  Emperors  ambassa 
dor  had  enqulred  ~nto  his  election 
272 
Guido, King of  Italj - 
In  doeoments concernlug his election 
~t  1s  provlded  that  peopl~  are to 
have thelr own  laws, 240 
lbe bishop  1s  to  protect  people 
against the count, 281 
Hadrian,  Emperor  Severe pun~shment 
ot lady who had ill treated her slave 
women, 49 
Hellenism, its Influence  on Juda~sm,  82 
85,103 
Hermogenianus- 
HIS relation  to d~stinctron  between 
AI< men  by nature equal,  masters 
to remember this, 114 
Masters  must  give  account  to God 
tor slave#, 123 
143, note 1. 
Green, T  H ,  on <'General  Will," 62 
Hllary  St, of  Polctler5- 
bt Paul and natural law, 83,105,106 
On the scope of natural law, 105,106. 
3us naturale  and /us grntlum, 42, 
53  72 
Gregory the Great, St- 
The Roman E~nperors  rule over  free 
men  the barbarians  over  slaves, 
8. 163 
Domznza  dzstzncta  belongs  to  ?us 
$14  ?it%um,  53 
His posltion  in regard to prim~tive 
character  -.  of  property  uncertalu, INDEX.  INDEX. 
justkce, 6, 61  VL, IJ 
By  An  it slaves  are held  <'pro null~a,  '  Justice belongs to the future, 62  1  Jus natuuiair  the erpresslon  of  the 
Jutla~sm- 
~ontzct  hetween Juitni~  and Hellen~c 
~deas,  mfl leli~e  of latter, 82, 85 
Relztion  to nnrversalism and human 
eqnahty, 84, 85 
Relation  of  Jews to  Roman Govern- 
ment, 91 93 
Jew~sh  slavery limiteil  131 
Posslble  theo~les  of  coll~rnunisn~  in 
later Jndalsm,  134  135 
Influence  on the Fathers of  Jew~sh 
~oncept~on  of  the d~vine  autho~~ty 
of  bmgs,  150 153, 157 159. 
Juhanus - 
Cu,tom  makes and unmakes law, 64, 
65 
Autliollty of law der~ved  fro111 people, 
b4,  65 
Relat~on  of hrs view to that of  Ga~uq, 
65 
Jus czvrle- 
Clcero and Roman Lawyelslrold that 
clvil  law  rmbod~es  prlnc~ple  of 
4u 
rill  mv11  law  d~rected  by  natural  ( 
Jus naturale  See Nature. 
Justice- 
C~cero  s theory of ~ust~ce  4 6 
Just~ce  essential to the Idea  of  the 
State, 4, 5 
Relatlon to natural la~,  5 
Contrast  between  theoly  of  C~cero 
and  the  Stolcs  and  that  of  the 
Ep~cureans,  5 
Just~ce  a proper qual~ty  of  relations 
between master and slave, 11 
Just~ce  the test of  legit~mate  govern 
meut, 15, 16 
Study of just~ce  the duty of Lawyers, 
accord~ng  to Ulpian, 34 
A quahty of the  jus  gentzum, accord 
ing to  Galas, 37 
Relation of  clvd  law to justice,  55 
62 
Tjlp~an  defines ~ostice,  58 
Jus natwale represellts what 1s just, 
60 
Lawyers and Cicero agree on jnst~ce, 
01  ?n 
----  . 
reason (Galus)  -5 
Warclanus  quotes  Detnosthenes  and 
Chrys~ppns  on civil law, 56 
Ulp~an  S the0 y of clvil law, 57 59 
Anlbigu~ty  of  Ulp~an  s  statement 
-0 
d" 
Disct~ssion  of Ulpian's theory, 59,  GO 
Aml-r~guous  phrase of  Paulus, 60 
Laws  ought to be ~ust,  yet must l - 
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